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Especially after the recent privacy scandals in social networks, privacy is getting
more and more important to users. Although most users claim to value privacy,
their online behavior speaks differently: Most of the privacy settings in their online
environment, like social networks, or location sharing services, remain untouched
and are not adapted to their privacy needs. In this thesis, I will present an approach
to tackle this problem, based on two different pillars. The first part focuses on as-
sisting users in choosing their privacy settings, by using machine learning to derive
the optimal set of privacy settings for the user. In contrast to other work, our ap-
proach uses context factors as well as individual factors to provide a personalized set
of privacy settings. The second part consists of a set of intelligent user interfaces
to assist the users throughout the complete privacy journey, from defining friend
groups allow targeted information sharing; through user interfaces for selecting in-
formation recipients, to find possible errors or unusual settings, and to refine them;
up to mechanisms to gather in-situ feedback on privacy incidents, and investigating
how to use these to improve a user’s privacy in the future. Our studies have shown
that including tailoring the privacy settings significantly increases the correctness of
the predicted privacy settings; whereas the user interfaces have been shown to sig-
nificantly decrease the amount of errors, especially unwanted disclosures, that are
made when sharing information.

Zusammenfassung
Insbesondere nach den jüngsten Datenschutzskandalen in sozialen Netzwerken wird
der Datenschutz für Benutzer immer wichtiger. Obwohl die meisten Benutzer be-
haupten Wert auf Datenschutz zu legen, verhalten sie sich online allerdings völlig
anders: Sie lassen die meisten Datenschutzeinstellungen der online genutzten Di-
enste, wie z. B. von sozialen Netzwerken oder Diensten zur Standortfreigabe, un-
berührt und passen sie nicht an ihre Datenschutzanforderungen an. In dieser Ar-
beit werde ich einen Ansatz zur Lösung dieses Problems vorstellen, der auf zwei
verschiedenen Säulen basiert. Der erste Teil konzentriert sich darauf, Benutzer bei
der Auswahl ihrer Datenschutzeinstellungen zu unterstützen, indem maschinelles
Lernen verwendet wird, um die optimalen Datenschutzeinstellungen für den Be-
nutzer abzuleiten. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Arbeiten verwendet unser Ansatz Kon-
textfaktoren sowie individuelle Faktoren, um personalisierte Datenschutzeinstellungen
zu generieren. Der zweite Teil besteht aus einer Reihe intelligenter Benutzerober-
flächen, die die Benutzer in verschiedene Datenschutzszenarien unterstützen. Dies
beginnt bei einer Oberfläche zur Definition von Freundesgruppen, die im Anschluss
genutzt werden können um einen gezielten Informationsaustausch zu ermöglichen,
bspw. in sozialen Netzwerken; über Benutzeroberflächen um die Empfänger von
privaten Daten auszuwählen oder mögliche Fehler oder ungewöhnliche Datenschutze-
instellungen zu finden und zu verfeinern; bis hin zu Mechanismen, um In-Situ-
Feedback zu Datenschutzverletzungen zum Zeitpunkt ihrer Entstehung zu sam-
meln und zu untersuchen, wie diese verwendet werden können, um die Privat-
sphäreeinstellungen eines Benutzers anzupassen. Unsere Studien haben gezeigt,
dass die Verwendung von individuellen Faktoren die Korrektheit der vorhergesagten
Datenschutzeinstellungen erheblich erhöht. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass die Benutzer-
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In this chapter, we will give an introduction on the history of privacy, how privacy
affects the digital world and the term “data privacy”, and which problems and chal-
lenges occur within this context. Especially the development of privacy laws in
the United States will be discussed in more detail, as most of the social network
providers and internet companies like Google operate in this country. We will put
a special emphasis on the topic of privacy in social media, where related work has
shown the difference between perceived privacy and actual privacy, e.g. the per-
ceived recipients of a data item (like a post or a photo) and the actual recipients
differ significantly [34]. Based on the identified problems, we will discuss current
approaches, as well as the problems that are still present. Research questions will
be derived based on the identified problems that will be solved throughout the re-
mainder of the thesis. As we will discuss later throughout this chapter, there are
multiple touchpoints, e.g. multiple situations in the privacy journey of a user, where
the approaches discussed in this thesis can assist the user in making her privacy
decisions. At the end of this chapter, we will discuss these touchpoints and how
our approaches can contribute to addressing the current problems that arise in those
situations.
1.1 The history of privacy
The contents of this section are based on the book “The Death of Privacy: The Battle
for Personal Privacy in the Courts, the Media, and Society” by Gini Graham Scott
[289]. The notion of privacy has always been changing over time [289, pp. 3]. The
term “privacy” was first mentioned in ancient times by Greek and Roman philoso-
phers. At that time, people lived in close quarters in small dwellings consisting of
only one room, or they lived together in a larger family compound, therefore peo-
ple’s lives usually were not very private. The term privacy had a negative connota-
tion, persons demanding privacy were seen as deprived of something [289, p. 16].
Aristotle even claimed that “an individual who lived only a private life could not
be fully human” [217]. The right to personal privacy requires the right to individu-
alism, e.g. being able to choose whether to share aspects of one’s personal life with
the community and authorities or not. However, early cultures showed little or no
concern for personal privacy or rights to individualism [35]. Slavery was a com-
mon practice in ancient Rome, and slaves were kept in barnlike accomodations like
animals without any rights. Also for normal citizens, an unusual behavior was con-
sidered subject to the law and open to state scrutiny [35]. In contrast to that, the right
to individualism and privacy against authority was an integral part of the Hebrew
society. However, the right to privacy was still bound by numerous laws that told
them what they could do or could not in their private life, such as what they were
allowed to eat and whom they could marry [223]. This radically changed with the
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introduction of the first democracy in Athens later, where people had the power to
take part in the legislative process for the first time, allowing them to include their
individual needs in the lawmaking process [232]. After the Roman Empire until the
Middle Ages, the Christian church gained more and more power and thereby took
over control over people’s lives. Their religion required them to share their most
private experiences, as they had to reveal any thoughts and actions that did not
conform to the church’s ideals during confession [156, p. 4]. However, the commu-
nity evolved and later in the fifteenth century, a society of the privileged emerged
in the West, where privacy was seen as a privilege rather than unsocial behavior.
Only privileged people had the possibility to live in their own private house, pay
for a better private education for their children, and be allowed to join private clubs,
whereas common people were still living crowded together as in ancient times [342].
This notion of privacy as a kind of privilege was even reinforced in the sixteenth to
the eighteenth century, where privacy in terms of a “private life” was seen as a key
aspect for modern individuality and self-interest [223].
In the United States, early privacy laws were based on the English common law
which denotes privacy as the right to be protected from “physical interference of life
and property” [306, pp. 9-11]. People’s home was seen as their private castle which
should not be accessed without permission of the owner. The rights were later ex-
tended to cover the “spirital nature, feelings and intellect” of a person, eventually
covering a “right to be let alone”, including not only property but all kinds of posses-
sion, “intangible as well as tangible” [306, pp. 9-11]. After the Civil War, the urban-
ization of America and improvements in printing technology led to the rise of the
media, which became affordable and popular among common people at that time,
creating new privacy threats [289, p. 39]. Information could spread faster through
media, and by the end of the nineteenth century, almost everyone who could read
had access to a daily newspaper [289, p. 39]. At that time, popular journalism, pre-
senting news in a sensational and colorful way, spreading gossip about well-known
persons, was very popular. As a result, there was a growing concern about privacy
threats [289, p. 40]. Oral gossip was limited to a few people and therefore not a
big threat, but the new mass media were able to create an information circulation
that had not existed before, especially for sensational and curious information [289,
p. 40]. Whereas cameras were still too big and expensive at the beginning of the cen-
tury, the privacy situation became worse as they became smaller and affordable at
the end of the century, allowing photographs to be published in media as well. Also,
advertisers used photographs of people, sometimes without their consent, and, even
worse, sometimes suggested they would endorse their products [289, p. 40]. The re-
sult was a significant rise in the number of court cases against privacy violations,
for example where a photo studio was using a picture of a person to sell Christmas
cards without even notifying the person [289, p. 41]. The increasing number of pri-
vacy court cases led two lawyers named Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis to work
on an article about privacy for the Harvard Law Review in 1890. They pointed out
that informational privacy was not part of the United States law at that time, and
proposed that such laws should established in the future as a countermeasure to the
privacy threats introduced by the media, based on the “right to be let alone” [335].
Brandeis, who became a judge in the powerful Supreme Court later, strengthened
the privacy law in the United States based on this article [289, pp. 42]. At the same
time, privacy against the government also became an important discussion point
with an increasing number of court cases, as the state used to search people’s homes
and used wiretapping and eavesdropping techniques on telephone devices that be-
came popular in the 1920s [289, pp. 44].
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As we can see, the way in which privacy is protected or violated changes when
new technology is introduced. Every technology that allows the spread or to gath-
ering of information in a new way offers new ways of breaching privacy which are
not yet covered by law, leading to an increased privacy threat and thus an increased
number of court cases [289, pp. 56]. In the nineteenth century, the evolution of mass
media posed the biggest threat to privacy, followed by an increasing use of surveil-
lance techniques by the state in the twentieth century [289, pp. 44]. At the end of the
twentieth century, a new information technology called the internet arose, making it
again easier to spread, store and access information on demand, posing completely
new privacy threats1, which will be discussed in the next section.
1.2 Privacy and the internet
Privacy concerns regarding online data sharing have been articulated since the be-
ginning of the internet, when computers were connected and shared around the
world [84]. The term “internet privacy” thereby involves the storing, repurposing,
sharing with third parties, and displaying of information about a person’s private
life, meaning all information relating to an identified or identifiable individual [190].
That means that information privacy entails either personally identifying informa-
tion (PII), e.g. information which allows identifying a person with a high probability
without mentioning the name, for example through the age and the physicial ad-
dress of a person, or GPS tracking data [193], as well as non-PII information such
as the visitor’s behavior on a website. The internet allows information to be spread
even faster than in the age of growing media, especially because social network sites
also allow users to create and publish their own content [330]. Although lawmakers
have tried to limit the unauthorized sharing of sensitive data, there are many threats
to privacy, leading to a general opinion that “privacy is dead” [255]. Throughout
this section, we will describe the privacy threats on the internet and especially in
social media.
One of the oldest and most often discussed privacy threats in the internet is
HTTP cookies [250]. Cookies are typically used to store state information required
on complex websites, for example for storing the contents of the shopping cart on
an online shopping website. However, cookies can also be used for tracking a user’s
behavior throughout the internet, for example which websites he has visited, and,
based on that, which topics and products he is interested in. These tracking cookies
make it possible to build a profile of a user’s behavior and interests and can also be
used in computer forensics, and therefore pose a privacy concern that has prompted
lawmakers in Europe and the US to take action in 2011, resulting in laws that forbid
tracking users throughout the internet without their knowledge and require compli-
ance with users decisions not to be tracked2. Whereas most users were not aware
of tracking cookies at the rise of the internet in the 90’s, later studies in 2009 have
shown that at that time, about 58% have deleted a cookie at least once, and 39% did
it every month3. Therefore, developers were searching for ways to circumvent this
problem, so they would still be able to track the user even if she completely disabled




duckduckgo (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
3https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press-Releases/2007/04/comScore-Cookie-
Deletion-Report?cs_edgescape_cc=DE (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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affected by the aforementioned countermeasures against HTTP cookies that users
began to carry out. In 2009, Flash cookies, a.k.a. local shared objects, were shown
to be the most popular technique for storing data on the 100 most visited web sites
[307]. Two years later, a study on social media discovered that of the top 100 web-
sites, 31 were using both HTTP and Flash cookies [252]. As browsers became able
to automatically detect and remove Flash cookies as well, website programmers be-
gan to develop a mechanism known as zombie cookies, which store the tracking data
at multiple destinations, with the ability to recover missing copies if deleted by the
user [2]. Its most famous implementation, called Evercookie, by Samy Kamkar4 is able
to store the information in more than ten types of storage mechanisms, for example
Flash cookies, various HTML5 storage mechanisms, using caching mechanisms, etc.
If only one of the copies is deleted, Evercookie uses one of the still existing storage
mechanisms to recover the deleted cookie. Evercookies are still used as one of the
major techniques for behavior-based targeted advertising [43]. Another technique
that makes it possible to reidentify and track a user is device fingerprinting [161].
Instead of storing the information on the device, device fingerprinting uses the prop-
erties of the device, like hardware IDs, the MAC address, the TCP/IP configuration
or the OS fingerprint. By that means, it is possible to discriminate between devices,
although it is often, especially on mobile devices, not always possible to uniquely
identify a device using fingerprinting [161]. But in contrast to cookies, it is hard for
a user to prevent fingerprinting, as sending wrong hardware information can affect
the layout of the website in a negative way and also slow down the speed of the web
browser. Similar to cookies, device fingerprinting is mostly used by advertisers5.
Another topic regarding privacy in the internet is the sharing of photos, and es-
pecially tagging of persons appearing on a photo. Whereas the audience of a shared
image has typically been limited to friends and relatives before the rise of the in-
ternet [60], the audience for snapshots is nowadays significantly larger. Photos are
not taken solely for home usage anymore; rather, they are created for public appeal,
and are often posted on social media websites accessible to the public [203]. How-
ever, users often underestimate the audience of photos when posted online, leading
to a privacy risk [34]. Especially problematic in social networks is the procedure of
tagging, which allows the original poster of the photo to name and link the persons
visible on the photo, even if they never agreed to being tagged. By that means, a
user can upload photos including a person and even displaying the person’s iden-
tity without any consent of the tagged person. As a Harvard law review article has
shown, there is not much a person can do against being unwillingly tagged [164].
It takes some time for the person to find out about being visible and tagged in a
published photo, and further time for the social network provider to take the photo
down after a complaint from the user. During this timespan, the photo displaying
the person in a way that could violate them personally can be seen, shared and dis-
tributed, without the possibility of ever deleting all of its copies [164]. Using the
published pictures, it is even possible to re-identify a person online and also offline,
allowing the creation of augmented reality apps that recognize persons in real life
and display their publicly available information to a user [4]. Also, Google Street
View has been seen critically in terms of privacy, as the pictures may show an indi-
vidual’s involvement in particular activities [99].
Early web search engines in the 2000s like Yahoo and AOL Search already had
the ability to track a user’s searches, for example through the IP address or other
4https://samy.pl/evercookie/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
5https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/11/30/how-to-prevent-device-fingerprinting/
(last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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identification meachanisms discussed above. Although the user’s identity was not
known, those search engines could already find out a lot about the individual’s in-
terests and current needs 6. A grocery chain named Target was even able to deter-
mine a young woman’s pregnacy before her own father, sending out coupons for
baby supplies to their common home address 7. After 2009, Google launched their
personalized search engine, which uses the user profiles created by search requests
and visited websites to offer the user individualized search results that should bet-
ter match her needs [17]. Besides individualized search results, Google also uses the
profiles for personalized advertisements [356]. Studies have shown that personal-
ization of pre-purchase advertisements, i.e. advertisements that are shown to the
user when he is about to look for a product, as well as post-purchase advertisements
(i.e. ads that are shown after the user bought a product) for alternative products
significantly increases the click rate on the displayed ads [356]. Since 2012, Google is
using its account system to track users and their interests over multiple of the user’s
devices, like different computers, laptops and also smartphones [81]. Unfortunately,
users are not given any chance to opt out from the data collection or targeted adver-
tising; the only way to opt out is to delete all Google accounts, also losing access to
its social network Google+ and the Play Store, which is the central way of installing
and maintaining apps on an Android smartphone 8. Other large internet companies
like Amazon, Apple, Facebook or Spotify are also storing usage profiles of their vis-
itors. Analyzing these massive data sets, also known by the term Big Data Analysis,
allows the companies to infer detailed psycho-demographic profiles of their visitor
without their notice [192].
Finally, internet service providers (ISPs) also have the ability to track the user’s
visited websites and, if the connection is not encrypted, also the actual content of
the communication [138]. The privacy policies usualy state that such data is not ana-
lyzed; however, federal organisations can usually require an ISP to give them access
to this information, in some countries like the United states even without a warrant.
Mobile phone providers have even introduced additional header information into
the HTTP header (a.k.a. header enrichment), which allows them to identify and track
their users, which is also broadly used for the purpose of targeted advertising [329].
In the next section, we will first define the terms privacy and lay users as they are
used nowadays, and then discuss existing privacy concerns of lay users in social
media websites and location sharing, which is the major domain that we want to
address within this thesis.
1.3 The latest notion of “privacy” and “lay users”
1.3.1 Privacy and sensitive data
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the term “privacy” has been described
formally first by Warren and Brandeis as “the right to be left alone” [130, pp. 15-17].
However, there has been a lot of discussion over the actual meaning of being “left
alone”. One of the most recognized publications about this term by Daniel Solove
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and to be immune to their scrutiny in the person’s private space, for example in his
home environment [305, pp. 15-17]. Besides this right to be left alone, the term of
privacy is defined by several other so-called aspects of privacy in literature, which we
will explain in the remainder of this subsection.
One of them is the limitation of access to private data, meaning that a person
should be able to be part of a society without other individual organizations or per-
sons collecting private data about them [305, p. 19], meaning that privacy is the
ability of a person to limit access to her own personal information or “the condition
of being protected from unwanted access by others—either physical access, personal
information, or attention” [44, p. 10-11]. Similarly, another privacy aspect is a per-
son’s control over information, which is defined by Alan Westin as follows: “privacy is
the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” [119].
Alan Westin has also defined four states of privacy [119] namely solitude, meaning
a “physical separation from others”; intimacy as a “close, relaxed, and frank rela-
tionship between two or more individuals” [119], anonymity; meaning the “desire
of individuals for times of ’public privacy.” [119] and lastly reserve denoting the
“creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion” [119] of a person,
which have to be respected by others by restricting communication of information
concerning the person. Another definition of privacy and another privacy aspect is
secrecy, which has been defined by Richard Posner as the right to hide personal in-
formation from others that could be used to their disadvantage [191, p. 271], also
taking into account that the unwanted disclosure of information can also lead to
negative consequences for a person, and that the right to privacy should protect a
person from those negative consequences.
Privacy can also be seen as a necessary precondition for a person to build her
own personality and identity, whereas the lack of privacy can hinder this develop-
ment [275]. Through privacy seen as a “social ritual”, children are thought that they
have moral ownership over their body, which also entails the control over who is al-
lowed to meet them and when [275]. Others defined privacy as a recognition of peo-
ple as individuals that can make choices autonomously about themselves; therefore,
privacy means the ability to choose (regarding which private information is shared)
[32]. By that means, privacy can also be understood as a requirement for person to
build a self-identity. Privacy barriers are elemental in this process, as they allow to
characterize the boundaries and limits of the character and thereby help to shape the
character of a person [10]. This also includes the ability to decide when to have con-
tact with other persons and their perceived image of a person’s self, which enables
a person to control which external factors establish the self and thereby shape the
character and the self-image [10].
Similarly, privacy is also described as an essential requirement for persons to
strengthen or intimate relationships with other humans [305, p. 35]. As a part of
relationship with another, it is necessary to share personal information with a friend
and also to receive personal information from that person, while some information
is not shared. On the other hand, social norms also require withholding some of the
private information that a person received within his relationship, whereas other
information might be shared [305, p. 35].
1.3. The latest notion of “privacy” and “lay users” 7
In this thesis, privacy and sensitive data are meant as the possibility of the user
to have an overview of the data that is collected, as well as the control over which
data is collected, and with whom it is shared. With the term of privacy, we therefore
mean data privacy, e.g. control and autonomous decision on the collection, process-
ing and sharing of personal digital data in general, shown as an example for data
that is shared in a social media context, as well as data acquired and processed by
mobile phone apps and intelligent retail stores.
1.3.2 Lay user
Although the term of a lay person is commonly used, not many attempts have been
made to define the term of a “lay user” or “novice user” [62]. Checkoway defined lay
persons as persons without some kind of financial vested interest in decision-making
outcomes of a domain [63]. Lundval et al. discriminated lay and professional users
by the definition of their goals in the domain: A professional user is a user who
has a well-identified goal for his/her activities, acting within the formal part of the
economy [216]. Alternatively, lay persons can also be defined as persons without an
abstract body of knowledge that can be applied in the domain in question [14]. Al-
though lay users have little or no domain experience at the beginning, they acquire
specialized domain knowledge when involved in a domain-specific task, and can
furthermore bring different types of knowledge from other areas that can be useful
[30]. Lay users are mostly defined by other terms like “non-professionals”, “non-
experts” or “amateurs”, which means they are defined more by abilities they do not
have, rather than the abilities they do have [157]. Lay persons are those “who have
not gone through the training or socialization into the particular profession under
discussion” [157]. Lay persons are therefore persons that have the “ordinary” so-
cial norms, knowledge, and skills of the society. In contrast to that, professionals
acquire new social norms and skills during their training and professional practice
[343]. The skills and social norms acquired throughout this process can be traced
through reading professional publications and talks that are typically published in
the domain. However, the skills and social norms cannot be defined so easily.
This definition of a lay person has several negative aspects: First, this defini-
tion distinguishes only lay users and professional users regarding a specific domain
called the index domain. However, a part of the population that is called a “lay
user” by this definition could also have some prior experience in a similar field. A
Java programmer would be called a lay user in Python programming according to
the definition. However, her experiences in the Java programming domain will also
be of use in the Python programming domain; she therefore cannot be compared to
another lay user without any coding experience. Also, users that are not proficient in
a similar domain may bring other experiences with them that are more or less help-
ful; for example, if they are using a computer on a daily basis in their life. Lastly,
some studies and decisions are made with expert members only, which eases the
decision process [287]. Still, studies have shown that lay people can also contribute
with their knowledge in such scenarios, and should therefore not be excluded a pri-
ori [157].
Lay and expert users both have their own characteristics which a developer has
to account for during the software development process. Especially expert users
have their expectation for how a product or user interface will work, based on the
experiences they have had with similar products in the past [176]. Furthermore,
efficiency and effectiveness plays only a minor role for lay users, but pleasure and
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early success are particularly important for them, as they motivate users toward
further exploration of functionality and interaction [54]. Professional users usually
understand a product because of their prior knowledge and similar products they
have used before. However, this is not possible for lay and novice users; therefore,
guess-ability is an important aspect, so they can explore the software on their own
without prior technical knowledge [142].
Professional users typically have good ideas for overcoming limitations of the
software [340] and respond to unexpected behavior of the software better than lay
users 9. Lay users, on the other hand, need support to overcome such problems
and need to be pointed to workarounds for the software limitations [142]. Lay users
also typically do not understand the specific terminology of the domain. Studies
have found that there is a mismatch in information representation used by lay users
compared to professional users [304].
Professional users also usually use the products in their work environment, and
therefore often also have concerns about the legal consequences of their actions.
Therefore, professional users tend to follow more closely the rules and instructions
given by software developers. Lay users, in contrast, do not have to fear legal con-
sequences, or consequences for their job position. Furthermore, lay users use the
software typically at home or in an uncontrolled environment, whereas professional
users are usually using the software in a public controlled environment [97].
Lastly, when a professional user wants to switch the software she uses, she usu-
ally wants to take advantage of her prior knowledge with the software and therefore
will most likely choose a (software) product that has changed only a little compared
to the product that she used before. Radically changing to a completely new prod-
uct with a completely different design and functionalities would need a professional
user to start again from scratch and get used to the new software, wasting accumu-
lated experience [340]. Hence, lay users that have no prior knowledge about any
product in the domain can be motivated more easily to choose new designs that are
different from the current standard, and can profit from new design concepts that
have not been tested before [80].
Based on the findings of related work, we designed our user interfaces using in-
terface metaphors like the radar metaphor, which are currently not used in commercial
applications like social media websites or smartphone operating systems, but which have
been shown to perform better compared to those traditional interfaces according to
user studies. Furthermore, the focus in our UI development lies on the side of en-
joyment and motivation of the user, whereas pragmatic capabilities play only a minor
role. According to the literature discussed above, these two decisions should make
our user interfaces attractive especially for the target group of this thesis, namely the
lay users.
1.4 Key problems in social media privacy
According to a study from 2016, about 73% of all adults in the U.S. are using social
network sites today [259]. Privacy concerns are inherent to social media platforms,
as “by design, social media technologies contain mechanisms for control and access
to personal information, as the sharing of user-generated content is central to their
function.”, meaning social network companies need private data to be made pub-
licly available in order to operate [259]. Once shared with the public, it is hard to
9https://www.fda.gov/media/838888/download (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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unshare social media content, as other users can forward the information to an au-
dience different from what the original poster expected, or download the photos or
create screenshots to store the content permanently, without the ability of the orig-
inal poster to delete it. On the one hand, sharing information online can therefore
create privacy concerns; on the other hand, it allows users to connect to people all
around the world, stay in touch with friends gone abroad, or discuss special inter-
ests in groups independent of their location, religion, and race [337]. Therefore just
staying away from social networks, or not actively engaging in social media, is also
not a solution, as it leads to a reduced amount of social ties and a decreased social
capital [98]. Whereas users had few privacy concerns in the beginning of social me-
dia [355], things have changed over the last years: In 2013, 60% of teenage Facebook
profiles were already private [228].
Although social network platforms offer privacy settings which allow users to
narrow down the audience of a post to single individuals, the privacy settings that
users apply often differ from their desired privacy settings [27]. This effect called
the privacy paradox can be found often in the domain of social networks, and might
be caused by the third person bias, meaning that the people are aware of the privacy
risks, but think that the risks do not apply to themselves as individuals [175]. Others
speculate that users lack the technical knowledge needed to transfer their privacy
desires into actual privacy settings, leading to the fact that users barely touch the
privacy settings and thereby run into the privacy paradox [218]. Often, the risk of
unintentionally spreading information is perceived as small compared to the appeal
that a user can achieve when sharing private information on the social web exclu-
sively for friends or followers [87].
As studies in the past have shown, users generally trust social network providers,
although it is known that they use the data for advertisements [95]. Nevertheless,
there are many other ways the data in a social network can be retrieved and misused
by third parties without the support of the social network provider: Social network
apps often request access to a user’s personal profile to offer a personalized experi-
ence. Most of the popular apps on Facebook, for example Farmville and Quiz Planet,
do so - not only for a personalized experience, but mainly as a part of their business
model, which includes selling private data to advertisers and tracking companies 10.
It has been shown that the learning app Take With Me Learning is recording students’
personal information like name, school, email and age and selling it to advertising
companies without the consent of their users [248], thereby violating the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). Only the most recent Cambridge Analytica
privacy scandal, where the data of participants of a personality test app as well as
the data of the participant’s friends was used to sway people’s votes for the presi-
dential election, came to the public and decreased the users’ trust in the Facebook
social network [135]. Social network sites usually offer an API for their applications
to comfortably retrieve personal data from the app users, and are therefore also of-
ten used by researchers, in order to collect anonymous data samples [211]. It is also
possible for hackers to gather access to private profiles by sending out friendship re-
quests from a fake user. A study has shown that of 250,000 friendship requests from
an unknown user, 75,000 were accepted, thus giving access to the private profile of
the user which is visible for friends only per default [139].
Based on the gathered data, either illegal or legal, it is possible to perform several
attacks: The hacker can use the gathered information to create a fake profile, which
10https://gawker.com/5666325/how-to-stop-facebook-from-sharing-your-information-
with-third-parties (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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can be used for cyberbullying and stalking. It has also been shown to be possible
to derive social security numbers out of the private data inside a social network [6],
which is used as an authorization for several legal acts. One out of five employers
search the social networks before hiring a canidate, in order to acquire negative in-
formation about the candidate 11. Employers are especially concerned about alcohol
and drug abuse, and pictures of excessive party situations in social media can be
read as a tendency towards such problems 11. Also, law enforcement and secret ser-
vices have successfully been using the social networks to prevent criminal acts and
to track down suspects 12. Since 2017, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) has been screening the social network profiles of immigrants arriving in the
U.S. 13. Having controversial content or contacts in one’s social media profile can
therefore also lead to the rejection of a visa for the United States.
Having these possible consequences in mind, it is clear that it is important for a
social network user to narrow down their audience to the smallest possible subset,
while still keeping in touch with friends, keeping the social ties stable. Unfortu-
nately, this task is very hard for a user, as the next section will show.
1.5 Current approaches
Social network providers have already tried to make it easier for their users to per-
form narrowcasting, e.g. to narrow down the audience as much as possible to pre-
vent unwanted data disclosure: On Facebook and Google+, friend lists and circles
were introduced, which allow users to assign their friends to different groups, cor-
responding to the social circle they belong to (for example workmates, family, or
friends from a football club). However, assigning all friends to the correct friend
lists is a very time-consuming task [247], as a social network user on Facebook, for
example, has on average 388 friends 14 up to 5000, the highest number of friends
possible. Therefore, social network providers came up with the idea of automated
friend lists, which are inferred automatically, for example using profile information
like the home address, school attended, or the employer. However, those friend lists
rarely reflect the actual social groups and thereby the friend lists a user would have
created manually [230]. Therefore, friend lists are created very rarely [167], and only
about 17% of all posts are shared using custom privacy settings, involving friend
lists or excluding/including single persons [230]. Research has tried many differ-
ent approaches using community detection [40] or machine learning based on the
friends’ profile data, activity logs or the friendship graph [230]; however no solution
that is accepted by users has been found so far [230].
Although friend lists already make it easier to define the correct audience for a
data item, the user still has to manually select the right groups and possibly include
or exclude single persons. Research has therefore worked on recommender systems
that propose privacy settings to the user. These recommender systems are either
based on simple rule-based approaches [58] or on machine learning algorithms. Rule-
based recommenders decide on the disclosure of a data item based on a hand-written
rule set that was created by the developer, the user, or both. As an input for the deci-
sion, rule-based systems use context factors, like the topic of a post, the distance in
11https://www.computerworld.com/article/2532900/one-in-five-employers-uses-social-
networks-in-hiring-process.html (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
12http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35890739 (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
13https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/politics/immigrants-social-media-trump.html
(last accessed: 2020-03-09)
14https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/facebook-statistics/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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the friend graph between original poster and recipient, or the occasion when a loca-
tion is shared [58]. Rule-based systems have the advantage that it is easy to find out
why the system recommended a given privacy setting by reading the rules. Some
rule-based recommenders even allow one to specify the privacy rules in natural lan-
guage [49], allowing lay users to refine and adapt the privacy settings. Machine
learning-based systems, on the other hand, do not rely on a set of rules. Instead,
machine learning systems are trained with a set of training data, which includes the
input variables (for example context factors) together with the corresponding correct
privacy settings the machine learning system has to predict later. After processing
the training data set, the machine learning system is able to predict the privacy set-
tings for given input variables. Also, some machine learning based recommenders
use context factors like the topic of the post as an input for the prediction [300],
whereas others try to use privacy settings the user already chose in the past [31], or
ask users for explicit feedback on a sample of privacy decisions [296, 295] as an in-
put for the training phase. Another possibility for recommending privacy settings is
clustering the training set based on the personality of the users into a small finite set
of clusters [128]. A new user is then assigned to one of the clusters based on her per-
sonality, and given the average privacy settings of that cluster as a recommendation.
However, assigning a user to a cluster based on personality measures usually re-
quires the user to fill out a personality questionnaire, introducing an additional user
burden. Research has found ways to derive personality measures from the writing
style of user-written text [104], which can be used as a solution for the problem. In-
terestingly, personality measures like the big five personal inventory and especially
privacy measures have not yet been used as an input for a machine learning-based
prediction, although they could be used as additional measures together with con-
text factors to further increase the precision of the recommendation. The derivation
of privacy measures from user-written text has also not been examined so far.
In some cases, neither a user model nor previous privacy decisions are available
as an input for the recommendation, nor does the user have social network posts or
other written text that can be used for deriving the user model. However, research
has already succesfully used cross-domain recommender systems for solving such kinds
of problems. If no data is available for a domain, cross-domain recommenders use
the user model from another domain where more is known about the user, and try
to transfer it to the domain in question. Although the recommendation precision
is significantly lower compared to single-domain recommender systems [282], it is
sometimes the only option to generate personalized recommendations when no or
only a little domain data is available [282]. This technique has already been succes-
fully implementend in research as well as in commercial applications, for example
for recommending books based on movies watched [345], or for recommending mu-
sic that matches the environment at the current location [178]. The usage of cross-
domain recommender systems to recommend privacy settings based on the privacy
settings in other domains has not been part of research so far.
Apart from recommending privacy settings, researchers examined how improv-
ing user interfaces can help users in detecting errors and adapting their privacy set-
tings. One often used approach is to try to reduce the complexity of privacy settings
or privacy notifications to a minimum, so that users can directly recognize what the
problem is, and how they could solve it. An example for this is the privacy bird [79],
which pops up everytime the user visits a website that does not match their privacy
preferences, so they can decide whether to stay or to leave. Based on the color of the
displayed bird icon and the message contained, users can directly see whether the
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problem is that no privacy policy is given by the website, and whether only embed-
ded content or the whole webpage violates the desired privacy settings. Also, the
privacy nutrition label by Kelley et al. allows users to easily compare two websites
regarding their privacy specifications using a label similar to the well-known nu-
trition labels printed on retail products [182]. Although such UIs allow for a quick
overview on the most important facts, they lose a certain degree of detail which
might also contain important information.
A second approach is used by consequence based privacy UIs, which try to en-
gage users in thinking over and adapting their privacy settings by highlighting pos-
sible consequences of their decision. Such a system has been implemented by Wang
et al. for Facebook posts [333], where users are shown the profile pictures of some
of the recipients after the user has pressed the send button, giving them three more
seconds to cancel the final publication of the post. Similarly, other researchers pub-
lished an approach that displays the excessive access rates of smartphone apps to
private information like the current location [9]. Studies in both aforementioned
publications have shown that the UIs significantly engaged the users in thinking
over and also adapting their privacy settings.
Finally, research has also tried to improve the user interfaces for selecting the
audience for a data item, and for adapting the privacy settings manually. Regarding
the former, Kauer et al. proposed a UI for selecting the audience of a social network
post based on interpersonal distance [180], e.g. the tie strength between the original
poster and her friends, to align the recipients in the UI, and to allow the user to select
the recipients up to a given tie strength, so that friends who are not close enough can
be excluded from an intimate post. Their UI aligned the profile pictures from left to
right and offered a slider that could be moved from the left to the right, selecting the
audience for the post up to that point. Unfortunately, the UI was able to display only
a limited number of friends due to the space needed by the profile pictures, making
it hard to use for a real social network profile with hundreds of friends. A similar
approach using a circular design to arrange the friends has also been proposed for
selecting the recipients of an email [105].
Other studies in the past have shown that radar interfaces provide a better overview
and usability in many cases, among others for defining the parameters for a music
recommendation system [227], but also for specifying privacy settings, for example
for participatory sensing applications [69]. According to these studies, the radar in-
terface does not only allow the user to get a better and quicker overview on the UI,
but also actively engages the user in adapting the privacy settings, as he can detect
potentially critical settings better [67] than with a conventional interface containing
only an endless list of on/off options. Unfortuantely, radar interfaces also have a
limited amount of space, making it hard to display a large number of potential re-
cipients inside a social network. Furthermore, there exist multiple parties that are
interested in a specific type of sensitive information. The items a customer bought
during a shopping trip, for example, is of interest for the retailer and for third parties
like marketing agencies, as well as friends and family. Currently, radar interfaces do
not support the display of privacy settings for multiple parties at once.
Lastly, there are several domains where in-situ feedback is used to capture users’
problems and negative experiences when using the software, for example in social
networks or mobile phone apps [114]. In-situ feedback has been proven to be very
effective to bridge the gap between developer and user, and allows them to inter-
act with each other, for example through error reports that can be sent when a user
has experienced an application crash, also known as remote evaluation [313]. Re-
mote evaluation is integrated into several products like Microsoft Windows and the
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Ubuntu operating system. There are also solutions for in-situ feedback for home IT
systems [155], manual assembly workplaces [123], mobile phone applications [290]
and many other domains. However, the capture of privacy violations using in-situ
feedback has not been part of research so far. In the next section, we will summarize
the drawbacks of the aforementioned approaches.
1.6 Problem statement
As stated above, several privacy recommender systems are based on earlier privacy
settings of the user. But often, for example when the user has just created a new
social nertwork account, no information on prvious privacy decisions is available.
This is also known as the cold start problem [222]. Some of the recommender systems
actively ask for privacy decisions. However, answering these requests correctly re-
quires the user to have technical knowledge about the consequences and privacy
threats arising from the decisions, and produces an additional user burden. Further-
more, such systems suffer from the privacy paradox, meaning that users’ privacy
decisions often differ from their actual privacy desires, and thereby so do recom-
mender systems which are based on users’ past privacy decisions. Other privacy
recommenders are based on context factors as an input for the recommendation. A
third and last kind of approach clusters the data according to the user’s personality,
where the number of clusters is typically very low. Each cluster is assigned an av-
eraged privacy policy of its members, so that a new user is first matched to the best
cluster according to her personality, and is then given the cluster’s averaged privacy
policy as a recommendation. A recommender that is prone to the cold-start prob-
lem offering a regression-based recommendation using a combination of personality
measures and privacy measures (later denoted as individual measures), which offers
each user an individualized privacy setting rather than recommending all users in
the same personality cluster the same privacy setting, has not been part of research
so far.
Cross-domain privacy recommenders, e.g. recommender systems that recom-
mend privacy settings for a domain using the privacy settings from other domains,
have not been examined in the past. In particular which domains are suitable inputs
for the prediction of privacy settings of another domain is completely unknown at
the moment. Furthermore, the detail level of the input that produces the best results
is unclear, for example whether a general privacy level of a domain leads to a lower
prediction precision than having detailed privacy levels depending on context fac-
tors like the occasion and groups of recipients. Also, which detailed privacy settings
should be used for the prediction and which prediction precision can be expected is
not clear so far.
Studies have found that the social group of the requestor of an information item
is an important context factor when deciding whether to allow or deny access [246,
321, 74]. Some privacy domains, for example social networks, therefore allow users
to group their friends into groups, so these can be used when defining the privacy
settings for a new post. However, as mentioned above, creating such groups intro-
duces an additional burden, leading to the fact that this option is usually not used.
Automatically deriving friend lists has also not led to satisfying solutions so far. A
gamified approach examining how a grouping task can be designed to be more en-
joyable and thereby motivating for users doing the task has not been part of research
so far.
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Recommender systems based on the user’s personality usually require a user to
fill out a privacy questionnaire, which can take up to 10-25 minutes depending on
the questionnaire, introducing an additional user burden. Research in the past has
shown that personality measures can also be derived from the user’s written text, for
example her email communication, blog entries, social network posts or YouTube
comments [104]. So far, the derivation of privacy measures through written text,
which will most likely also have a large influence on the privacy decision, has not
been examined in research.
Recommender systems are never 100% accurate, but even one incorrectly set pri-
vacy setting can lead to an unwanted data disclosure and thereby to user frustration.
Therefore, in our opinion, privacy recommenders should always be accompanied by
other systems that help users to review and correct the recommendations easily. As
stated before, user interfaces involving a radar design have been shown to make a
big step towards a better overview on the current privacy state, thereby also moti-
vating users in actively engaging in their privacy settings. However, the space inside
a radar interface is very limited, making it hardly usable for scenarios where a larger
amount of data items, for example the friends of a social network user, have to be
displayed. Furthermore, the designs so far only give an overview of the privacy set-
tings for exactly one recipient, for example the app manufacturer. However, in some
cases like a retail scenario, there are multiple stakeholders (retailers, marketing agen-
cies, suplliers, user’s friends, etc.) that might be interested in the data and that each
need their own radar interface, making it hard for the user to get an overview at one
glance.
Finally, in-situ feedback is used in many domains, for example for gathering user
feedback on newly developed or well-established software (like popular operating
systems). So far, it has not been examined whether privacy violations can also be
captured using in-situ feedback applications, for example on mobile devices. In
particular, user’s expectations on the effects on the privacy settings are currently
unclear. In the next section, we will formulate the research questions arising out of
the discussed problems.
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1.7 Research questions
The central research question we try to solve throughout the thesis is:
How can we allow the user to better fit her privacy settings to her individual
needs, without introducing additional user burden?
This research question can be divided into several subquestions:
RQ1 Can personality and privacy measures be automatically derived without addi-
tional user burden?
RQ2 How can we motivate users to carry out their friend grouping tasks?
RQ3 Can personality and privacy measures be used as an input to derive individual-
ized privacy settings, when no other information about the user is available?
RQ4 Can the privacy settings of other domains be used for recommending privacy
settings? Which domains should be used, and what level of detail should the
settings have?
RQ5 Can we enhance radar interfaces to support large amounts of data items and
multiple groups of recipients?
RQ6 Can we use in-situ feedback to capture a user’s privacy violations as they arise,
and what consequences do users expect?
RQ1 will continue existing work on deriving personality measures out of written
text, which has been proven to work for several social networks like Facebook and
Twitter, and also for comments on the video platform YouTube [104]. Nevertheless,
there is no research so far investigating whether it is possible to predict privacy mea-
sures using written text. We will investigate whether there are correlations between
the frequency of words belonging to a certain topic (like words about hobbies, sports
or religious topics), which categories these are, and how well privacy measures in
particular can be predicted with them.
To solve RQ2, we will investigate ways of enhancing the user experience when
grouping data items, for example sorting friends into friend lists. We will espe-
cially focus on how the usage of new interaction systems and the associated new
interaction possibilities can be utilized to increase the pragmatic quality, but most
importantly the hedonic quality of a sorting interface. We will examine how we can
enhance conventional card sorting metaphors with gamification elements in order to
achieve the goal. By solving this research question, we will gather insights on which
UI designs help to engage the user in the sorting task, and especially how the design
affects the error rate as well as the needed interaction time.
With RQ3, we investigate whether, instead of the already discussed clustering
approach, it is also possible to use personality as well as privacy measures (individ-
ual measures) to compute privacy settings which are unique to the user, based exactly
on the given user’s individual measures, instead of using one-size-fits-all privacy
settings. We will investigate especially whether individual measures are factors that
have a significant influence on the privacy settings, and whether those should be
integrated into recommender systems that are so far only based on context factors.
The approach presented should not be limited to one special domain like social net-
works, but should also be tested for use in other domains. We will thereby also
investigate whether the impact and importance of the different individual measures
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is always similar throughout different domains, or whether the most influential in-
dividual measures depend on the domain.
With RQ4, we are the first to study whether there are correlations between the
privacy settings of different domains, and how they can be used for a cross-domain
prediction of privacy settings. We will focus especially on the question of what level
of detail is needed for a meaningful prediction, how precisely the approach can pre-
dict the privacy settings, and how much the precision can be increased when using
more detailed privacy settings (for example using a set of privacy settings based on
context factors like occasion, group of recipients, etc., vs. one general privacy level
for a domain).
RQ5 can again be divided into two subquestions, one seeking improvements
to support large amounts of data items, and one asking how multiple groups of
recipients can be supported. For both questions, we will design user interfaces and
evaluate their effectiveness in a user study. The special focus in the former question
is how we can allow all data items to be displayed, while still allowing the user not
to overlook any data item that is potentially important. That means we will evaluate
whether our advanced design for displaying large amounts of data items allows
a selection of data items with a reduced amount of false positives and negatives
compared to the current traditional list-based solution, meaning it is less likely that a
user will unintentially select a data item that should not be disclosed (false positive)
or fail to select a data item that should be disclosed (false negative). For the latter
question, we have the goal to design a UI that allows a good overview on the privacy
status, and that allows detecting unusual and potentially misconfigured parts of
the privacy settings at one glance. The studies help us to understand how radar
interfaces, and user interfaces with a limited space in general, can be enhanced to
deal with the two aforementioned typical challenges of displaying and adapting
privacy settings, and how effective the proposed techniques are.
Finally, RQ6 will first investigate whether users see potential for in-situ feedback
applications for capturing privacy violations at the moment they occur, regardless
of the user’s current location or occasion. The research conducted for RQ6 will es-
pecially focus on finding out what users expect as a consequence of their feedback,
meaning which changes in the privacy settings they expect based on their feedback.
There are many variables that are unknown at the moment, for example whether the
feedback should only affect the privacy settings regarding the requestor that has re-
ceived negative feedback, e.g. the requestor that should not have received the data,
or whether similar requestors, for example the friends in the same friend group,
should also be affected by the feedback. It is furthermore unknown whether the
first feedback should instantly affect the privacy settings, or whether only the sec-
ond, third or nth feedback within a certain timespan should have some effects. Also
the actual effects on the privacy settings are unknown, for example whether the re-
questors access should be restricted only for the data item with negative feedback,
or whether the requestor should be permanently blocked by the user. By solving
this research question, we expect insights on whether the approach in general is
suitable for capturing privacy violations, as well as guidelines on how privacy set-
tings should be adapted, or in what other way the feedback can be used to assist
the user in enhancing her privacy settings. The next section will outline the envi-
sioned approaches used throughout this thesis to solve the aforementioned research
questions.
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1.8 Approaches and contributions
The proposed privacy framework will support the user in several touchpoints in
what we call the privacy journey: Already today, doing privacy settings requires more
than just defining the recipients when sharing a sensitive data item. A user also has
to create groups of recipients in advance that can be used when sharing a data item
later, or to adapt the privacy settings of a data item at a later point in time, as privacy
desires may change over time. All these actions in connection with choosing privacy
settings, including the adaptation of privacy settings, but also preparatory actions
like the grouping of recipients, are what we call touchpoints, which are summarized
in the privacy journey of a user. Figure 1.1 gives an overview on the touchpoints in
the privacy journey that we want to address.
At the beginning of the journey, we have to create the user model by deriving the
individual measures of the user, e.g. the personality and privacy measures (RQ1).
Based on previous work on deriving personality settings from written text in so-
cial media, we will perform a user study to examine whether there are correlation
between the word categories and the privacy measures, which categories have a sig-
nificant correlation and are thus suitable for a prediction, and how precise a prediction
of the privacy and personality measures can be using this technique. Through this
research, we will get meaningful insights on how a privacy user model can be built
without introducing additional user burden, and what precision can be expected
from such a user model. Furthermore, we will gather information about which word
categories are good predictors for the privacy measures, allowing us to speculate about
correlations between a person’s interests, writing style and privacy desires.
In parallel to creating the user model, the second touchpoint that we are address-
ing within this thesis and that has to be dealt with prior to giving privacy recom-
mendations, is the grouping of recipients (RQ2). So far, research has concentrated
on increasing the pragmatic quality of user interfaces and the automatic derivation
of recipient groups, but has not yet found a solution. Within this thesis, we will ex-
amine how we can make the task of grouping recipients more interesting and thereby
motivating for the users. Through this thesis, we will provide designs and insights
on how new interaction principles like virtual reality and gamification can lead to
an improved user experience within unchallenging tasks that are perceived as a bur-
den by users. We will especially show and discuss how the gamification of this task
influences the error rate and the time needed to do the task.
Having the user model and the recipient groups at hand, we will also support
the user in the actual privacy setting task using recommender systems (RQ3). In
contrast to earlier systems, we will focus on the individual measures as an input for
a regression-based prediction of privacy settings. We will test our concept in four
domains, namely the privacy settings for social network posts, shared locations, the
permission settings for smartphone apps and the privacy settings for data from an
intelligent retail store, like Amazon Go15, that is equipped with sensors to record
customers’ movements and actions within the store. The research will produce new
insights into whether personality, privacy measures, or both have a substantial in-
fluence on the privacy settings in the aforementioned domains, and whether their
influence is similar across domains or dependent on the domain. Furthermore, we
will acquire results about which individual measures have an influence on the pri-
vacy settings, and how precise a recommendation is possible using only individ-
ual measures. The work presented in this thesis can be combined with traditional
15https://www.amazon.com/b?node=16008589011 (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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context-based approaches as an additional domain of input variables to further in-
crease their recommendation precision.
For the cross-domain privacy recommendation approach (RQ4), we will first
conduct an exploratory study that tries to find indications as to which domains
should be used, and which of the privacy settings are good candidates for a predic-
tion. In a subsequent validation study, we will validate our findings by evaluating
the precision of the recommender system based on the input measures determined
in the exploratory study. The research within this approach will give insights on
which domains should be used for the prediction, which level of detail leads to the best
results and how far the precision can be increased using more detailed input (a set of
privacy settings based on context vs. one general privacy level), and what prediction
precision can be expected by the recommender.
Besides the recommender systems, a succesful privacy framework always needs
a UI component in our opinion, allowing the user to manually review and adapt the
recommended settings (RQ5). As stated above, radar interfaces have been proven to
be a beneficial design to give the users an overview on their privacy settings, and fur-
thermore motivate users in actively engaging with their privacy settings. However,
they are unsuitable for scenarios involving a large amount of data items or multiple
layers of privacy settings, for example for multiple groups of recipients. This thesis
will advance radar interfaces in two ways: First, we will contribute techniques that
allow radar interfaces to display a larger amount of data items within their limited
space, making them suitable to display large amounts of data items, like the poten-
tial recipients of a social network post. Second, we will advance the radar design
to support the display of multiple layers (for example for different groups of recip-
ients) of privacy settings at a glance, allowing users to get a better overview and
detect potential misconfigurations in all privacy policies at once.
Finally, we introduce a new touchpoint that has not been examined in research
so far. In-situ feedback has been used for many other domains like software engi-
neering, but the usage of in-situ feedback for capturing privacy violations as they
occur has not been part of research so far (RQ6). Our studies deliver insights on
whether the idea of in-situ feedback is perceived as beneficial by the users, what
consequences users expect from the in-situ feedback, especially regarding their pri-
vacy settings, and how in-situ feedback can be further used for assisting users in
managing their privacy.
Within this thesis, we solely address the threat model of unintenionally sharing
data with a larger audience than intended by the user. We do not address other
privacy threats such as unauthorized usage and propagation of private data by a
platform provider, fraudulent acquisition of private data through hacking attacks,
or other privacy threats existing in the online domain as discussed in Chapter 2. The
influence of context factors has already been examined well in research in the past;
therefore, we concentrate on the additional precision that can be achieved by includ-
ing individual factors in the recommendation. Within the approaches mentioned
above, we concentrate on finding out whether the approach meets the respective
goals in the context of a lab study using real data sets and environments as much as
possible. However, the thesis does not contain in-the-wild studies, where the solution
is integrated into an operating environment like a well-established social network,
and elaborated through the daily usage of a large number of users. Thus the results
regarding the precision of the recommender systems and the user acceptance of the
presented approaches can be seen as an approximation towards what the approach
could achieve within a running environment.
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FIGURE 1.1: Touchpoints in the privacy journey addressed by the
proposed privacy framework.
1.9 Thesis outline
In the next chapter, we will first define several terms important for this thesis, and
give the background knowledge needed for the remainder of this document. We
will especially show problems that users have with the current privacy controls, the
privacy threats that arise out of these problems, and the threat model we are ad-
dressing. We will discuss related work on the context factors and individual factors
that have been discovered by research so far, and existing user interfaces and privacy
management systems and their drawbacks. Finally, we will give a short introduc-
tion into machine learning techniques and cross-domain user modeling approaches,
which constitute the basis for the approaches of the recommender systems presented
in this thesis. Before discussing the recommender systems, we will first show how a
user’s written text can be used for deriving a user’s individual measures (RQ1)based
on text analysis and machine learning in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will then try to solve
RQ3 within the social web: to be more precise, for recommending the audience for a
social network post and the precision of a location to be shared with the friends of the
user. The subsequent chapter then validates that the approach can also be applied
in other domains outside of the social web, using the example of recommending
permission settings for smartphone apps and privacy settings for the private data
captured inside an intelligent retail store. Chapter 7 examines the derivation of pri-
vacy settings using the privacy settings from other domains (RQ4), concluding the
treatment of recommender systems proposed in this thesis. Chapter 8 discusses the
user interfaces that are part of the privacy framework, and thereby addresses several
research questions. The first section addresses how users can be motivated in carry-
ing out the task of recipient grouping through enhancing the user experience of the
task (RQ5). Afterwards, we will introduce OmniWedges and URetail, two advanced
radar interfaces that allow the display of large amounts of data items and multiple
sets of privacy settings for multiple recipients (RQ2). The chapter ends with a study
regarding the usefulness of in-situ feedback on privacy violations as well as possi-
ble applications for the gathered feedback (RQ6). Finally, the thesis closes with an





Background and Related Work
Privacy and privacy settings are not something that can be handled once and then
remain the same for the rest of a person’s life. They are a process which is steadily
changing over time, over the years and the life experience of a person [233]. There-
fore, privacy user interfaces should also be tailored so that the privacy setting pro-
cess is not done only once, using a wizard when the user enters the system. In-
stead, privacy settings have to be checked, reviewed and adapted continuously
[233]. Sometimes, it is also necessary to actively engage the user in reviewing the
privacy settings from time to time to achieve good data privacy [333]. As a logical
consequence, privacy user interfaces should, on one hand, avoid methods requiring
excessive configuration and maintenance, but on the other hand, they should still
give users fine-grained options to control each aspect of their privacy [200], which
makes the task of choosing privacy settings very hard not only for users, but also for
researchers. At the beginning of this chapter, we will discuss current privacy prob-
lems of lay users in different domains, as well as the potential risks associated with
these. We will then review how privacy (settings) management is currently handled
in research, and which input data, e.g. context factors and individual factors, have
been found to have an influence on privacy decisions, and which could thus be use-
ful to perform a personalized prediction of privacy settings. After discussing the
different approaches in privacy user interfaces that support the user in one way or
another in increasing his privacy, we finally review current techniques in machine
learning that will be applied to make privacy setting predictions, as well as related
work in the domain of model transfer, which will be the basis for the development
of privacy setting prediction using privacy settings from another domain (Chapter
7).
2.1 The lay user and her privacy problems in social media
and other domains
Since the world wide web emerged, the transfer and retrieval of information has
become significantly faster and easier [231]. On one hand, this eases the transfer
of data and knowledge; on the other hand, it can also be a threat to people’s pri-
vacy. A special problem in this situation is that it is nearly impossible for the data
provider to foresee for which applications and re-applications his or her data will
be used by others [231]. Therefore concerns about privacy are totally legitimate in a
computerized society, and are a key performance indicator for privacy. A society in
which privacy and therefore security is not present cannot develop and will not be
sustainable [231]. It is therefore important to create zones of privacy for each person,
for example in the home environment, so they can plan their lives without fear. In
those environments, people can restrict their privacy toward different individuals
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according to their needs. This holds for their physical home environment, as well
as their “digital home”, e.g. their social media pages and private data [231]. Most
people share their data with their own perception on how far the information should
spread, which is mostly based on a social norm that they expect of the information
recipients. However, this social norm is often violated by the information recipients,
which results in a privacy breach as perceived by the original poster [237].
2.1.1 Audience misperception and misunderstood privacy regulations
Often, such a privacy breach is caused by a misperception of the actual audience of
some piece of private information, which is often multiple times larger than the per-
ceived audience. On the social network Facebook, for example, studies have shown
that the perceived audience consists of only 27% of the actual audience, which means
the actual audience is four times bigger than users think when publishing their posts
[34]. This is especially problematic as only a small subset of Facebook friends are
real friends; it happens very often that friendship requests are accepted so that the
requesting person will not be upset, although the user does not see him as a real
friend with whom she would like to share her private posts [66]. Users often accept
even friendship requests from users whom they do not know at all: In a study by
Gross and Acquisti [139], 250,000 users were sent a friendship request from a user
made up by the researchers, who was unknown to the participants. Out of those
250,000 users, 75,000 accepted the friendship request. Later studies in 2014 con-
firmed that this still holds, if the friendship requestor has the name or profile picture
of a known friend, lives in the same area, or shares common interests with the user
[271].
There is also a large deficit in understanding of the terms and conditions and pri-
vacy policies of such social network providers: A study involving Facebook users
[327] found that 85% of the participants did not read any part of the terms and condi-
tions of the service provider, and were therefore not aware of what data is collected
by the provider, how it is processed, and for which purposes, including online mar-
keting, it can be used. 79% did not read the privacy policy that gives more detailed
information about those privacy aspects of the terms and conditions. This results in
the fact that 73% of the participants were not aware that Facebook is using their pri-
vate data for marketing purposes. More than half (55%) did not think that Facebook
apps send data to the companies that developed them; they thought the apps were
running isolated on the Facebook page and had no connection to a server belonging
to the developing company. Finally, 63% of the participants thought that the shared
information was only visible for the accepted Facebook friends although this is not
the standard setting; data is shared to friends of friends as well per default.
2.1.2 Narrowcasting – solution or additional challenge?
Often, social network users do not use privacy settings at all and leave them at the
standard settings [355, 174]. Instead, they use a restriction strategy, meaning they only
publish information which they do not see as critical [355], although more sensitive
posts might also be of interest for close friends and can increase social ties to those
friends [98]. Another strategy similar to the restriction strategy is the narrowcasting
strategy. Instead of restricting the content that is published online, the narrowcasting
strategy consists of restricting the recipients of the information [134]. Apart from
increasing a user’s privacy while keeping the utility of the service and the positive
effect on social ties at the same level, narrowcasting also reduces the message load
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for the user’s followers and friends, so that the information they receive in their feed
or on their news wall is reduced to the topics that are of interest for these specific
persons. Currently, Facebook is using a kind of algorithm called algorithmic curation
to automatically organize, select and present the posts of a user’s friends that should
be displayed on the news feed. However, if that is done in the background without
notifying the user (as it is done on Facebook), most of the users (62.5%) are not aware
that such a selection and ranking is taking place. When users find out about this, it
often leads to anger and frustration, as they feel patronized by the social network
providers, or have the feeling of being manipulated by them [270, 100]. In contrast,
if a website includes a user interface where the user can see and adapt the curation
algorithm to his needs, this leads to significantly more active engagement with the
social network privacy settings, and increases the feeling of control and privacy on
the site [100].
Social network providers have tried to increase the privacy control of their users
by introducing friend groups (Facebook) or circles (Google+) that have to be created
by the user, and which can then be used for a narrowcasting strategy, so that only
friends and social circles which are trusted by the user and which are interested in
the information will receive the post. However, creating the friend lists introduces a
major user burden [247] and therefore, users rarely use them [276]. Social networks
also offer automatically generated friend lists; however, these friend lists rarely re-
flect the friend groups that users need and that they would create manually [230].
Study results on the prediction are often biased, as they only ask users whether the
created lists are acceptable, rather than checking whether the created lists reflect the
actual friend groups a user would create from scratch [230]. If compared to user-
created lists, none of the machine learning approaches, based on the friends’ profile
data, friendship graph or activity of the friends, leads to an acceptable solution [230].
That might be the reason why only 67% of all Facebook users use friend lists, and
only 17% of all Facebook posts are shared using friend lists [230]. More than half of
Facebook users have not created any friend list, and about 15% and 10% have created
only one or two friend lists, respectively, which does not allow for a meaningful nar-
rowcasting strategy [167]. Especially pictures, which often contain upsetting details,
are shared without the usage of friend lists in more than 80% of all cases [167].
At the beginning of social networks, those networks were concentrated on small
social circles, like a university community (Facebook); therefore, the privacy threat
was smaller then than now [86]. In a longitudinal study from 2005 to 2011 involv-
ing several thousand Facebook users [316], researchers found that the amount of
publicly shared data was continuously decreasing, while the actual amount of writ-
ten posts was increasing exponentially. Facebook reacted to this by a change to the
UI, where more of the privacy settings were set to public by default. Still, the pri-
vacy settings do not affect the data that is shared with Facebook and its advertising
companies for marketing purposes, which includes all data entered on the social net-
work platform, according to Facebook’s terms and conditions. However, this fact is
known only to a minority of users [316].
2.1.3 Google+ and its advanced privacy UIs
Some years after Facebook became the most popular social network worldwide,
Google started to create a competitive product named Google+. Although the con-
cept is very similar to that of other social networks, users behaved slightly differ-
ently, including with respect to their privacy decisions [219]. Google+ has been
found to be more popular in countries with a lower internet penetration rate, thus
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FIGURE 2.1: Google+ circles used to group social network friends.
Image source: https://www.rivaliq.com/blog/making-google-
marketing-work-for-you/
being used more by people in developing countries that are not as tech-savvy and
privacy-aware as users in industrial countries [219]; therefore they shared more sen-
sitive data. Until the shutdown of Google+ in 2019, the average path length between
users was higher compared to Facebook, which was another possible reason why
Google+ users felt better about sharing sensitive data, as information spreading is
slower in this network [219]. Apart from the different user base, Google+ was the
first social network that put the creation and management of friend lists, called cir-
cles in Google+, in the center of the user interface (see Figure 2.1). The user’s circles
were shown as a part of her own social network page, including several pre-defined
circles and a UI that was thoroughly optimized towards usability. This design choice
also had an impact on the usage of friend lists, which was more frequent in Google+
compared to its competitor Facebook [177]. In the first days of Google+, about 75%
already used selective sharing at least once a week, whereby 67% of all items were
shared using circles.
2.1.4 Privacy problems in other domains
Smartphone app permissions
Similar problems can be found in other domains as well. Concerning smartphone
app permissions, studies have found that only 17% of all users pay attention to the
list of permissions that are required by an app upon installation; the remaining ma-
jority chooses to install the app immediately without a review [109]. This effect
might also be caused by the technical knowledge that is required in order to under-
stand the permissions that are required, which data they allow an app to generate,
and which consequences might occur for a user if she enables that permission. Only
3% of users claimed to understand the information shown on the permission screen,
indicating the lack of technical knowledge and lack of information on the permis-
sion dialogue as one of the possible causes for the low privacy awareness of users
in this domain [109]. Researchers have proposed several solutions to this threat, like
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distributing the tasks that need access to private data over several decoupled on-
line service providers (anonymous task distribution), privacy-aware data process-
ing, data retention, and the possibility for the user to control and audit the access to
her private smartphone data, among other approaches [68]. However, these coun-
termeasures always need to be implemented by the app manufactures, meaning that
end-users cannot address the problem by themselves.
Location sharing
A similar situation can be found in the location sharing domain. If privacy controls
are present, they often have poor usability that confuses end-users, making it hard
for them to understand their benefits. Users therefore often do not touch the loca-
tion privacy settings at all [325]. However, research has found that users actually
can understand the mechanics and effects of location obfuscation techniques, if they
are explained well [51]. Furthermore, users can also detect if an app requests a per-
mission that is obviously not needed by the app, for example if a flashlight app is
requesting access to the contact list [325]. Interestingly, users are also willing to trade
their privacy for cash. In a representative study involving 32 smartphone users, re-
searchers found that users will trade their location data for one month for as little as
$100 on average [51].
Online shopping
Finally, this privacy problem is also present in an online shopping scenario, espe-
cially when it comes to product recommendations that are initiated by the customer.
A study found that in this case, customers willingly answer almost all questions,
even if there is no direct connection between the desired product type and the ques-
tions asked, making it possible to extract private data from the customer that can
later be used for various attacks like social engineering (see next section for details)
[310]. It has further been shown that the usage of eBay by itselfcan lead to a privacy
breach. Research has shown that the rating portal of eBay offers enough private
data to link an eBay account with a corresponding Facebook profile, so that the cus-
tomer’s personality profile, his private interests, workplaces and his circle of friends
can be connected with his items bought on eBay [229]. The researchers were able to
correctly connect 17% of the eBay profiles of the users taking part in the study.
To conclude, we can say that severe privacy problems exist in several domains,
and that these have to be solved in order to prevent further negative consequences.
In the next section, we will discuss which negative consequences misconfigured or
neglected privacy settings can have in the digital world. As we will see, it is not
only oversharing, i.e. sharing too much information that can be seen as a threat (to
privacy). Undersharing, i.e. sharing less data than possible for maintaining a user’s
privacy, also has negative effects, as it is a threat to the user’s socializing and the
social capital of a society in general.
2.2 Privacy risks and benefits of the social web and threat
model
In the media, the social web, and especially social media websites like Facebook and
Google+, are usually known for bad effects, like unintentionally sharing sensitive
data, hacking attacks, privacy violations and the loss of social contacts in the real
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world. Although studies have shown that those negative aspects do exist, there is
also a high amount of positive effects arising from the usage of the social web, as the
following two subsections will show.
2.2.1 Privacy risks in the social web
Most users do not share their whole social network profile with the public; only a
small amount of the information can be seen by everyone, whereas most informa-
tion, especially sensitive data items, is shared with all friends regardless of whether
it is a close friend or just a friend on the social network that the user has never met
personally. However, even items that do not look critical at a first glance can be used
for various attacks [283]. For example, email addresses are crawled and stored by
attackers, either to sell them for spam campaigns, or to store them in a database, so
the data can be used to attack that specific person later1. Therefore, hiding or remov-
ing sensitive data items afterward is not necessarily a meaningful countermeasure
to future hacking attacks, as hackers store such data on separate servers once it has
been retrieved. Moreover, as the data retrieved from a social network usually con-
tains other private information, like birthdays, places lived, and interests, the data
items are significantly more valuable than usual, and will retrieve a higher price on
the black market compared to a data set containing only email addresses. Also, a
date of birth seems unproblematic at a first glance, but can be used to confirm a per-
son’s identity over the phone, for example to change contract details or to make a
new contract with a third party1.
Hacked accounts, friend attacks and phishing
There have been several security breaches where Facebook accounts have been hacked,
even those of prominent persons like Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg [118].
There exist several tools that make it possible to take control over a social network
account [225], for example by retrieving Facebook URLs of Facebook users that are
logged in on the same unsecured network, using a packet sniffer, also known as ses-
sion hijacking [160]. Once the account is hacked, it can be used for many attacks, es-
pecially on the direct friends of the victim. Social networks and their linkability pro-
vide an optimal breeding ground for spreading malicious links to viruses among the
friends of the victim [225], who then spread the malicious software to their friends,
and so on. Or instead of spreading malicious software, the data retrieved from a
social network account can be used for making phishing attacks more efficient, for
example by sending messages to friends, which include personal information that
should be known only to the victim or her close friends, asking for the friend’s pri-
vate information, redirecting to a cloned site of the friend’s online banking account,
or asking her to install a malicious piece of software or Facebook game app so that
they can “play the game together” [143].
Privacy threats caused by Facebook apps
Facebook apps are especially critical, as they are, contrary to what users think, not a
part of the Facebook website, and neither hosted nor controlled by Facebook. These
apps are websites of third-party developers that are hosted on the developers’ hard-
ware, and use the Facebook API to connect to the user’s account and download the
1https://www.nfpcar.org/FOIA/security_guide_to_social_networks.pdf
(last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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requested information on their own servers. Facebook provides only minimal secu-
rity controls, so that while the app manufacturer should actually use the requested
data only inside the app, technically he can also store and process it without any
limitations [291]. A study has found that more than 90%of Facebook apps actually
do not require access to any private information; however, most of them still request
access to it, in order to process the data and place targeted advertisements inside the
app or elsewhere on the web [110]. Apps often also request permission to publish
posts or write messages on the user’s behalf; officially this is to publish achievements
on the profile page, or to invite friends. Unofficially, this functionality is also used
by malicious apps to write messages to friends that look like they were genuinely
written by the user, but that in fact are generated automatically by the app in order
to convince the user to click on a malicious link or provide sensitive information
[110].
Identity theft and social engineering
Even without hacking a social network account, the privacy threats are numerous.
As stated in the last section, when unknown users are sent friendship requests, about
30% of them accept the request even though they do not know the user [139]. As
more recent research from 2014 has shown, this is still the case if the profile name or
picture matches the name or picture of a real friend, if the requestor lives in a nearby
area or if they share common interests, for example [271]. It is therefore rather easy
to become a friend of the target person, or a friend of a friend (FoF), and to access
the sensitive profile items which are shared to friends and FoFs per default. Using
publicly available information, or also using the private information if the attacker
was successful in becoming a friend or FoF, the attacker can create a fake identity
based on the gathered information, which is also known as identity theft. Using this
fake identity, the attacker can carry out criminal acts in the name of the victim and
make contracts in her name. Often, it is also easy to answer the security questions
of an account with the gathered personal information, and thereby to take over the
victim’s existing accounts. Identity theft can also be used in social networks to attack
the friends of the victim, for example using two different techniques discussed by
Bilge and Strufe [36]. In the first approach, the attacker clones the victim’s profile on
the social network, and sends friend requests to the victim’s friends. If the friends
accept the request, the attacker can again use the account to spread malware and
perform phishing attacks, as described above. In the second approach, the victim is
a member of a social network, but does not have an account on another social net-
work. At the same time, some of the victim’s friends have an account on both social
networks. The attacker then extracts the victim’s information on the first network,
and creates a fake account in the second social network, where the attacker again
tries to befriend the friends that are active in both SNs, and performs the aforemen-
tioned attacks upon success. In a study, 60% of a user’s friends accepted the friend
request of the cloned identity in the same social network, and 50% of the friends
accepted it if the identity was duplicated to another social network.
Inference attacks
Apart from identity theft using the available data, it is also possible to infer some
of the missing information data (“inference attack”). A study comparing different
inference methods has shown that it is possible to reconstruct most of the personally
identifiable information in most cases. The person’s birthday could be inferred from
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the account in 77-93% of all cases (depending on the algorithm), their hometown
in 32-40%, their political views for about 50% of the profiles, and the partner of the
person in 20% of all accounts that took part in the study [6]. Especially the birthday,
hometown and current residence are of high interest for attackers, as they allow
them to guess the social security number, which is used for identification for several
legal acts [6]. It is also possible to reconstruct the friend list of a user, even if she has
restricted access to it, allowing attackers to infer the social circle, social status and
the possible income of a user [171].
Stalking
Stalking is also a typical problem which occurs very frequently on online social net-
works, especially as it is rather easy to become a member of the FoFs and have ac-
cess to the profile of the target user, especially the posts and check-ins, so that the
attacker always knows where the user is spending her free time and what event she
is attending [139]. Also, re-identification of a person is possible, either by comparing
an image of the person with the profile images of a social network, or by comparing
and matching demographic data that is available for most users [139]. Unfortu-
nately, suppressing profile items, even so that only friends, or nobody, can see them,
helps only partially to prevent the aforementioned attacks: An inference algorithm
developed by Altop and Nergiz showed some years ago that even in this case, it is
possible to infer the personal profile items with an astonishingly high precision [11].
Sybil attacks
Similar to identity theft, the sibyl attack is also based on accounts or identities that
have been taken over by the attacker [12]. A sibyl attack requires first gaining con-
trol over a large amount of identities in the network. The attacker can then connect
those identities together, so that the attacker has control over a substantial fraction
of the system, for example for manipulating the outcome of an election in the social
network [12]. There exist countermeasures for a sibyl attack [299]. However, if the
attacker manages to take over or insert fake identities so that at least one third of
the system is controlled by the attacker, even those countermeasures will fail [299].
A sibyl attack can also be used for large-scale spam attacks, where each of the con-
trolled identities is used to send spam to the friends of that node, and eventually
also to other nodes that are not directly connected to the controlled accounts [160].
Furthermore, the controlled accounts can be used for a puppetnet attack, where the
controlled accounts send messages and posts to other users which include links to
images or resources of a specific website, so that displaying and reading those mes-
sages creates a massive workload on the target website servers, which then eventu-
ally crash or become unavailable, similar to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack [118].
User deanonymization and friendship network inference
Apart from the personal data of a user, it is also possible to infer the network struc-
ture of a social network, or to identify anonymous users [29, 186]. Studies have for
example shown that if a user uses his real name and personal information in one
social network and a fake identity in another network, it is possible to match those
accounts through the structure of the social graph in both networks [29]. This is
also possible if only fake or anonymized accounts are present, without information
from another social network with real accounts, by taking the structure of the friend
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network and publicly available background information into account. This is also
known as an attributed couplet attack [186]. Hackers as well as social network sites
also use link mining techniques which analyze the friend graph in order to find miss-
ing links (to propose new friends to the user), clustering users into groups, as well
as collective classification of the clusters found, allowing them to assign the users to
different user types [127].
Location inference
Privacy problems can also be found in other domains like location sharing [193,
354, 279]. Users are often unconcerned when sharing their location, although it has
been shown that always sharing one’s location even without any further information
makes it possible to infer the home address of the user [193]. It is also possible to
infer a user’s residential address simply by analyzing the likes on a social network
page [354]. In the algorithm of Yamaguchi, Amagasa and Kitagawa, the likes are
used to identify landmarks that are shared by users (for example local radio stations)
which can then, based on their location, be used to narrow down the home addresses
of the connected users [354]. Conversely, it is also possible to infer the user based
on the check-ins she typically does on the social network page. In a representative
study, researchers were able to train a machine learning algorithm with a data set
containing both user names and check-ins from the past to correctly identify the
users based on their check-in behavior in the future in about 30 to 50% of all cases
on Foursquare and about 80% on Gowalla [279].
Another vector that can be used for attacks is comments and posts that users
publish on their profile page, or more precisely, the writing style of the user [8].
Using text analysis and machine learning, researchers were able to correctly match
90% of all participating accounts between two social network platforms. However,
there exist very effective countermeasures to this attack, like rewriting the comments
in a crowdsourcing approach, or simply translating them to different languages and
then back to the original language [8].
2.2.2 Benefits of the social web
However, although there exist many risks when taking part in a social network com-
munity, actively using social networks also has several positive effects for the user
and society [98, 146, 337, 26]. Most users use social networks for a specific reason
and not only as a pastime [3]. Users are interested in creating a positive picture of
themselves, and to become more accepted and admired in their social circle [3]. The
general opinion is that spending time online reduces the amount of social interac-
tion, especially face-to-face interaction, and weakens social ties, leading to a dimin-
ished social capital for the individual [236]. However, studies have shown that this
is in general not the case [25], as it depends on the actions done online. The problem
is that early research concentrated on the loss of social capital in offline communi-
ties due to the increased time spent online, but did not take into account the gain in
online social ties that might compensate for this effect [341].
In fact, it can even help to tie new communities together and increase one’s social
capital [25]. Social networks can help retaining social bonds, especially to friends
from the past (like school friends) or friends living abroad, making them the per-
fect tool for maintaining long-distance relationships [98]. Social networks greatly
strengthen such weak ties in particular, as maintaining them over a long distance
30 Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
is cheap and easy compared to face-to-face meetings or telephone calls [92]. There-
fore, researchers claim that they can supplement or replace in-person interactions,
mitigating any loss from time spent online [338]. The internet supports offline net-
works through online communities, where the information technology can enhance
the place-based community, as it is possible to connect and discuss with other indi-
viduals on any day, at any time, leading to an increased social capital [146]. Com-
munities are no longer restricted based on their geography, but can form based on
shared interests, regardless of the hometown or nationality of the person [337]. It
has also been shown that a large amount of online users that met online are meet-
ing their correspondents face-to-face later [244]. Parks and Floyd stated in their work
that “relationships that begin online rarely stay there” [244]. Social media, especially
locality-based social networks, can increase the interaction of the local community
and motivate people in taking part in discussions [146]. Members of online com-
munities are also more likely to receive help from others, and in fact have a larger
network of close ties than non-internet users [41].
Furthermore, studies have shown that especially persons with a low psycholog-
ical well-being can profit from an online community, as it is hard for them to form
offline relationships with friends and neighbors, while it is easier to be part of an on-
line community, for example by starting to play games together and finding friends
within this context [25]. Online communities also have lower communication barri-
ers and ease interaction with others, thus encouraging self-disclosure, and allowing
especially younger individuals to construct up their personality and their self-view
[26].
As we can see, there are many potential risks when using an online social net-
work. Of all the mentioned risks, our work tries to reduce the amount of unwanted
disclosures made by the user and her chosen privacy settings, e.g. the privacy threats
that emerge through oversharing. Oversharing can ease social engineering as well as
inference attacks and stalking. However, reducing the amount of shared amount to
zero, e.g. not taking part in any online community, would lead to the (social) threat
of undersharing, leading to a loss of social ties and social capital for a society. There-
fore, the goal of our work is to reduce oversharing (caused by misconfigured privacy settings)
and the privacy risks connected to it to a minimum, while keeping the positive social effects
of online communities intact.
However, as we have seen reducing the amount of shared data does not lead
to perfect security from all attack models. There are also attack models that allow
inference attacks and social engineering when some data items are restricted by the
user. But to be honest, perfect security does not exist. Even if countermeasures for
those attacks are included and a system is created that includes the state of the art
to avoid all of the privacy and security risks known so far, such a system would
still not be safe. There would be still privacy and security leaks that have not been
discovered so far, or for which effective countermeasures do not yet exist.
2.3 Privacy management systems
Studies have shown that sharing private information with a limited audience not
only increases the privacy, but also makes the content that is shown to social net-
work users more interesting, as the authors manually choose recipients that may be
interested in the written post [134]. Even simple approaches involving age, location
and gender as selection mechanisms lead to an improved privacy and usability of
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a social network [134]. Furthermore, using narrowcasting has been shown to in-
crease privacy awareness, while the same amount of content is shared, but only for
a targeted audience [134].
Typical systems supporting the user in doing narrowcasting, e.g. in automati-
cally setting the privacy settings for the new post correctly, often rely on user settings
chosen in the past [296, 295, 31]. However, it has been shown that users’ privacy de-
sires and privacy attitudes, i.e. the privacy level a user wants to have, often differs
from the privacy settings that he actually chooses; this is also known as the privacy
paradox [27]. This effect has been observed in online communities and online so-
cial networks as well as other domains like e-commerce [310]. Research has tried to
identify the causes for this effect. So far, results indicate that it is hard for users to
translate their privacy desires into actual privacy settings, as they lack the technical
background knowledge to do so [218]. The study also showed that users are usually
not aware of the misconfiguration of their privacy settings [218]. It has also been
shown that in addition to a lack of knowledge, users are not willing to invest the
time to adapt their privacy settings correctly and often do not understand the impli-
cations and consequences of their privacy settings, especially the consequences that
arise if they do not adapt the standard settings offered by the provider [128, 218].
Furthermore, it is hard for users to assign their friends to friend groups, which is
a basic requirement for narrowcasting [336]. Finally, users often also have to deal
with usability problems regarding the general workflow, UI mechanics or simply
user interface-related problems [179, 346, 184]. To conclude, if a user’s previous pri-
vacy settings are used as the only source for proposing new privacy settings, one
always has to keep in mind that the settings from the past can only be seen as a
rough approximation of the actual desired settings, rather than a gold standard.
2.3.1 In the social web
The privacy management systems existing in research for the social media domain
can be divided into different types of systems: rule-based systems, machine learning-
based systems and encryption-based systems.
Rule-based systems
Rule-based systems do not contain any kind of artificial intelligence, but rely on
more or less complex rule sets that are created by the user, either directly using a
rules file or indirectly using a user interface. A simple example of such a rule-based
system is the work by Carminati, Ferrari and Perego [58], where access to a social
network resource is granted based on the path between the original poster and re-
quester in the social path, and the trust levels between the users on the path. The
trust level is given by a user for all of her friends (i.e. all outgoing edges from her
node in the social graph) in the interval [0; 1]. In addition to this, the user can spec-
ify whether he fully trusts the user, or only partially. Based on these factors and
the length of the path from the original poster to the requester, the poster can create
rules for which users can access the post, and which users cannot. A similar but
more complex tool is the mobile access control list (MACL) [215]. In order to use
this system, the user has to first fill out a questionnaire, which is used to generate a
default setting. The user can then tune the settings based on his needs, by applying
custom rules for particular contacts and also contexts (like “at work”, for example).
Based on this rule set, the MACL offers three different functionalities for location
sharing. First is long-standing location sharing, where the location is always shared,
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FIGURE 2.2: Rule-based privacy management system involving con-
text factors [284].
but the precision of the shared location depends on the geographical distance be-
tween poster and requester. If the user is in the same city, the requester is shown the
original location, while she can see only the name of the city if she is outside of the
city, for example. The rendezvous functionality shares the location only with specific
users at a specific time of the day, for example for meeting up to go out. Lastly, the
proximity detection functionality shows up if one of the user’s close friends is nearby,
so they can meet up. From the three proposed functionalities, only the rendezvous
functionality was rated as useful by the majority of the users. Another approach
adapting the idea of context-based privacy settings uses the activity of a user for
defining the privacy settings with the example of a traveling salesman [284] (see Fig-
ure 2.2). If a saleswoman (Alice) is on the way to a client (Charlie), the saleswoman’s
supervisor (Bob) may see her location, and also send her messages or make phone
calls. When she has arrived at the client, all incoming notifications are muted, and
the location may still be shared with the saleswoman’s supervisor. After leaving the
client and driving back home, the saleswoman is in her leisure time; therefore, the
supervisor is neither allowed to write messages nor send phone calls, nor can he
see the saleswoman’s position. The aforementioned systems all let the user directly
create the rules, which requires some technical knowledge. In contrast to that, other
systems allow users to specify the privacy rules in free-text form using their natural
language [49]. Using text analysis tools, these rules can then be transformed into an
xml-based file, which can then serve as a basis for the aforementioned rule-based
tools.
Machine learning-based systems
Whereas rule-based systems can be distinguished especially by the complexity of
their rules, machine learning-based systems differ significantly in the algorithm on
which the system is based, and therefore also the input that is used for the predic-
tion of the privacy rules. One approach of machine learning-based systems is to use
a subset of friends labeled by the user regarding their trustworthiness, which are
then used to derive labels and the corresponding privacy settings for the remaining
users [296, 295]. The same can also be done interactively by observing the “allow”
and “deny” decisions of a user as he publishes new posts, to iteratively train the ma-
chine learning system and to give recommendations when the algorithm has reached
a certain level of certainty within the predictions [31]. Whereas the aforementioned
papers did not distinguish between the post content for predicting a privacy pol-
icy, Sinha, Li and Bauer [300] used NLP techniques like Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) and Maximum Entropy to predict the privacy setting of the post for the dif-
ferent friend groups. The system is based on a supervised approach, which uses
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the sharing settings of former user posts in order to train the predictor. Although
this method spares the user from giving explicit feedback to train the system, incor-
rect privacy decisions made in the past will be used to train the system, resulting
in prediction errors. Furthermore, we believe that in the mental model of a user, it
is not the post content that correlates to a privacy setting, but the topic of the post.
While the aforementioned approaches suffer from the privacy paradox as they rely
on privacy decisions made in the past, other systems train their machine learning
model using explicit user feedback, for example by displaying access requests to
the user and using the feedback to train the algorithm, which can then, when the
certainty of the algorithm is good enough, be used to reduce the amount of access
requests that are displayed to the user [350]. Another possible input that has been
used in research is the actual post content for which the privacy setting has to be
generated. Using NLP techniques like Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and Maxi-
mum Entropy, it is also possible to offer privacy settings for the user’s friend groups
[300]. The proposed method is based on a supervised approach, using the sharing
settings of earlier user posts to train the machine learning model. Lastly, some of the
approaches also involve a questionnaire at the beginning, which helps the system to
classify the user and assign her an initial privacy profile, which can then be adapted
by the user [103]. After the system has automatically grouped the user’s friends,
the system uses the group memberships of each user as an input to predict privacy
settings for each of the friends using a machine learning classifier.
Encryption-based systems
Lastly, encryption-based systems concentrate more on data privacy against the so-
cial network provider, rather than data privacy against other social network mem-
bers like the aforementioned approaches. These approaches are mostly based on
encrypted data transfer between end users, so that only the desired recipients of the
information can decrypt the data. “Persona” is a social network that is built around
this idea of encrypted end-to-end communication between users [20]. In this social
network, the user can create custom friend lists by hand, and share the data only
with the selected friends and friend lists using an encryption method which allows
only the selected recipients to decrypt the post. A different and more generic method
is proposed by Beato and Kohlweiss, and is realized as a browser plugin [57]. This
plugin (see Figure 2.3) allows users to publish posts on a social network site, which
is automatically encrypted by the plugin. The recipients of the post can then only
decrypt the message if they have installed the plugin, and if they are chosen as re-
cipients of the message. Using this technique, nearly every social network website,
and also parts of every other online website, can be encrypted independent of the
actual website owner. On the other hand, only users that have the plugin installed
are able to see the post, even if they have been chosen as recipients by the original
poster.
Custom systems for special use-cases
There are also systems that target special privacy scenarios, for example how the
privacy settings can be derived for online content which belongs to multiple owners
(for example a photo with several persons in it) using an auctioning system and
game theory [312]. Other approaches try to solve the privacy problem from the
side of the data collectors, by raising their privacy awareness, so that they do not
collect data accidentally when the data owner did not allow it. The user, on the other
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FIGURE 2.3: Architecture of an encryption browser plugin for secur-
ing sensitive social media data [57].
hand, can see which data was accessed, processed, and deleted, so he can give active
feedback on a privacy violation to the data collectors [197]. However, in the scope
of this thesis, we concentrate on deriving privacy settings using a machine learning
approach, as it allows the highest degree of automation and does not necessarily
need technical knowledge from the users, as they do not have to specify access rules
themselves.
Whereas the approaches presented so far all relied on context factors like time
and date, or activity of the user, there are also some approaches that rely on the
user’s personality in order to provide a more personalized privacy recommendation.
Most of them use a clustering and template approach, where each user is assigned to a
group of users with a similar personality, which are then assigned a privacy profile
that is tailored to that group of users. One approach following this idea has been
proposed by Ghazinour and Matwin [128] and assigns the user to the three person-
ality groups according to Wiley. After the assignment to the group, the algorithm
searches for the three nearest neighbors of the user’s profile, and the user is shown
a summary of current differences and possible misconfigurations compared to the
reference profiles. The approach by Guo and Chen, on the other hand, takes a dif-
ferent view on the user’s personality and privacy desires [141]. In their idea, the
user’s privacy measures are the fraction of profile attributes that are shared and the
profile items that are not shared either with friends or the public. The system has
been trained with a data set containing both privacy measures and privacy settings.
Whenever the privacy settings for a new user have to be predicted, the setting uses
the trained classifier to find similar user profiles, and proposes the privacy settings
of those similar profiles to the user. The user is then shown the predicted results
together with a privacy description for each of the privacy settings, so he can then
review and adapt them.
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2.3.2 In other domains
Mobile app permissions
Proposing privacy settings is also a recent topic in other domains, for example in the
mobile phone domain, where the user has to define and adapt the permission set-
tings for all of the apps installed on her smartphone. Similar to the work presented
above, those systems can also rely either on explicit user feedback, on the privacy
settings chosen in the past, or other techniques like crowdsourcing. A simple ap-
proach by Liu, Lin and Sadeh creates a user profile based on the some example
privacy settings for some permissions of some of the installed apps chosen by the
user. Using a support vector approach, the system then derives the remaining per-
mission settings in an interactive way, allowing the user to adapt settings, and using
the input again for further training and adjusting the prediction algorithm. The pro-
posed approach achieved an accuracy of up to 87% in the evaluation. A system by
Liu et al. uses active user feedback instead of privacy settings by giving the user
an overview on their apps and how often they used the permissions they requested
(Figure 2.4), asking the user whether he feels comfortable with this behavior or not
[209]. Based on this feedback, the approach recommends the privacy settings for
the apps. In a user study, the participants accepted 78% of the recommended set-
tings. Nevertheless, the approach needs information about the usage frequency of
the permissions for each app, which is currently not available on a typical smart-
phone without extended technical knowledge. Other approaches, in contrast, do
not need access to this information, but use static code analysis to derive the pur-
pose of each requested permission [206]. Based on the user’s reported comfort with
the purpose of this permission, the system clusters users into groups with similar
privacy desires, and generates a finite set of privacy settings, one for each of those
clusters. Interestingly, if enough sample data is present, the prediction needs only a
little context information to achieve a good precision. In an approach using a large
online database of the LBE Privacy Guard app, containing permission settings of
more than 4.8 million users, researchers were able to make a prediction with an ac-
curacy of 64% to 87% using only the permission type and the app ID in a simple SVC
algorithm [208]. Lastly, crowdsourcing can also be used to find an optimal tradeoff
between denied permissions and utility of the app [165].
Location sharing
In the location sharing domain, a study by Iachello et al. [163] found that especially
designing privacy management tools for location sharing has its own additional
challenges, which they sum up in a design guideline. Automatic recommendation
without the involvement of the user should not be done; it should be initiated only
if the user actively requests it. Furthermore, such a privacy management system
should support several functionalities particular to the location sharing domain, like
the possibility to completely deny requests, return a wrong location, or a generic re-
ply like “I am busy”. Locations should be shared first only with individuals, before
the location is shared with a group, to prevent sharing the location with a broader
audience than needed. Lastly, the authors encourage use of a decentralized frame-
work, so that the location data can be kept on the users’ devices, and thus the need
for security mechanisms on the provider’s hardware can be limited. As a take-away
message, the authors state that such new privacy systems need a longer training
period than usual user interfaces, and that a steadily changing characterization of
the users is needed to offer them suitable privacy settings, as the factors influencing
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FIGURE 2.4: Modified permission screen (left) and detail screen
(right) to notify the user about the frequency of access to personal
data [209].
the privacy decision, like context factors, also steadily change throughout the users’
lives.
Some of the privacy management systems make an automatic trade-off between
privacy and security in location sharing, based on the possible attack scenarios that
might occur depending on the privacy settings [298], taking the users and the at-
tackers into account. Some of the approaches also take other stakeholders into ac-
count; these can provide security mechanisms but can also be the target of an attack.
These include the social network providers, the infrastructure provider and also the
government, which may record and pass the data to unwanted recipients either by
mistake or as a victim of a hacking attack [288].
Similar to the aforementioned domains, most of the privacy management sys-
tems are rule-based and rely especially on context information when deciding whether
to share a location or not [31, 321, 281]. Benisch and Kelley argue that the greater the
complexity with which the rules can be defined in such a management system, the
more this reduces the problem of undersharing, as users tend to disclose locations
less than they would actually prefer (or not at all) if the privacy management system
does not offer options for fine-grained privacy rules [31]. However, such a system
involving complex rules only works if a sufficiently large number of rules is created,
which is often not done by a typical user. In their management system, they use the
time and place of the location as context factors, as well as the severity of a wrong
disclosure, to adjust the privacy settings. Another system called “Super-Ego” takes
another approach, and uses the privacy decisions of other users as a point of ref-
erence for the decision [321]. If the majority of other users share their location in
the same context, the system decides to do so as well, unless the user explicitly de-
cides differently. As context factors, they used the activity of the person, time and
place, and the identity of the other users, as well as properties of the place like di-
versity of the audience, to make the prediction. Research has also discussed a way
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to find persons while still maintaining their privacy, resulting in software called Per-
sonfinder [281]. Personfinder uses the time of day, day of the week as well as the
location requester to decide on the disclosement of the location. In a study, the cor-
rectness of their disclosement was at 65% at the beginning, but could be improved
using machine learning and a condition-based reasoner to about 79% in a follow-up
study in the wild. Finally, if the location is shared on a mobile phone, the type of
app can also be a context factor that is important for the sharing decision. Whereas
marketing apps should typically not receive the location at all, some apps like a
weather app still have the same utility if the are only given the current city rather
than the exact GPS position. Other apps like sport tracking apps need the exact GPS
position only to derive the pace of the runner, and can therefore also be given a syn-
thetic route with the same speed profile [106]. Consideration has also been given
to the interaction to share a location, especially as changes in the location privacy
settings typically occur when the user is on the go, meeting up with other people,
and does not have much time to open a complex privacy interface and change the
settings [169]. One solution for this problem was proposed by Jedrzejczyk et al. in
their “Privacy-Shake” approach, where the user can control the privacy setting us-
ing shake gestures with her smartphone [169]. However, although the approach was
found to be promising, users struggled to do the gestures correctly, leading to a low
success rate of only 40% and massive user frustration connected to this.
Privacy management from a social-driven perspective and in-situ feedback
Instead of thinking about location sharing privacy in terms of controlling data dis-
closement as a trade-off between privacy and utility, the problem can also be seen
from a social-driven perspective [318]. Usually, people have a certain goal when
sharing their location, which is more than just showing others where they should
meet up. Often, sharing location is a type of impression-management, to shape the
image of a person within their social circle. Therefore, the authors state that, accord-
ing to their study results, users should share the activity they are currently doing
more than the actual place, which is unimportant for impressing others. Instead of
location obfuscation, ambiguous names should be used, as the user’s actual friends
will know which location is meant. Using these rules, it was significantly harder
for a stranger to determine the actual location, even if she had access to background
information like a map or typical routes of the user. In a study, the rate of correctly
identified locations could be reduced to 50% compared to 91% for participants who
were not instructed.
Also, in-situ feedback from users can be used to refine privacy settings, for ex-
ample based on how many other users allowed the access in the past [131], or by
actively asking the user whether to block a location requester once an anomaly is
detected, for example if the requester sent a high amount of location requests in a
short period of time [168].
The necessary preparatory work: grouping recipients
As we have seen in the aforementioned approaches, a lot of them define privacy
settings based on the group of recipients or the requester’s membership in such a
group. However, we also discussed that users typically do not create such groups or
“friend lists” due to the effort required. Research has tried to address this problem
using different approaches, e.g. by using machine learning techniques and also in-
volving the user in the grouping task. In the simplest form, friend grouping, a.k.a.
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community detection, works on the social graph of a user [235]. The algorithm con-
secutively removes edges where the edge density is lower compared to the rest of
the graph. By that means, the algorithm iteratively creates clusters which are uncon-
nected to each other, forming the communities that are returned by the algorithm
[235]. This approach, or manual friend grouping, works well for smaller groups
which are highly connected or where the user remembers the names of their friends;
however, this simple approach fails especially in detecting large groups [13]. Newer
approaches take the user into account, and work especially well for large groups.
Regroup [13] for example, and a similar work by Fang and LeFevre [103], use ma-
chine learning to actively support the user while he is doing the friend grouping:
based on the friends that have been selected as group members so far, the algorithm
derives similar users that might belong to the same social circle, and proposes to add
them as well. Another research idea is to support the user in choosing the audience
when a new post is to be published, rather than doing the friend grouping without a
specific reason, helping the user to find out what meaningful groups could be given
the example of the current post. Similar to the aforementioned approach, the system
observes the recipients added so far, and proposes further friends or friend groups
to be added to the groups of recipients, recalibrating and improving the system after
every new post.
Studies have found that the usability of the friend grouping user interfaces of
social network sites is not the actual problem [177, 336]. It is, rather, the required
mental effort that scares people away from doing the grouping task and leads them
to censor their posts rather than doing narrowcasting with friend groups [177, 336].
Unfortunately, as stated in Section 2.1.2, automatically created friend groups rarely
reflect the desired friend groups and are thus unsuitable for narrowcasting as well.
As we have seen, early privacy management systems were based on rule sys-
tems. However, research has shown that involving machine learning and context
factors can significantly improve the system. Our approach also uses machine learn-
ing for prediction, but uses also individual factors to enhance the prediction precision
as well. In the next section, we will take a closer look at which context factors are
typically used in the different domains.
2.4 Context factors, individual factors, and how to capture
them
As we have seen in the last section, context factors are an important source for pre-
dicting privacy settings, especially in the location sharing domain. Interestingly, it is
very easy to change the user’s mind using money [162]. Even privacy fundamental-
ists who claimed not to share any data at all will share their data if they are paid for
it. Even more interestingly, they still share their data if they are notified about the
negative consequences that can, and also negative consequences that definitely will,
arise [162]. However, it is not the goal of this thesis to push users toward sharing
their data; we therefore do not further observe this method of influencing sharing
decisions. Apart from financial matters, the sharing decisions of other users also in-
fluence a person’s privacy decision [245]. A study has shown that there is an effect
on the privacy choice towards conformity with the choices of other users, meaning if
a user is told that other users reveal more of their data, the user will share more data
as well, and vice versa. However, although the study was able to show that this ef-
fect exists, the effect was only a small one. The actual type of information that has to
be shared has a significantly larger effect on the decision [245]. Another important
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context factor in general is the age of the post or the data that has been published
[16]. The older the post, the less people want to share it, typically because their life
and personality has changed and they cannot identify with the post as much as they
did at the time of writing. Especially if people begin a new chapter in their life, e.g.
graduating from school or university, getting a new partner or moving to a new lo-
cation, they tend to hide or delete old posts that do not fit their new life [16]. Other
studies have found that, in general, the activity the user is currently doing, as well as
the professional context, play an important role, e.g. whether the user is in leisure or
working time, or is visiting an after-work event hosted by her company, which can
be seen as half leisure, half working time [284]. Typically, the requester, the purpose
for the request and the requester’s friend group memberships also have an influence
on the decision [153]. However, it is controversial whether the situation the user is
currently in, e.g. whether she is currently at work, attending a concert, or playing
a sport, has a large influence [199]. Some studies state that the situation and its at-
tributes, e.g. whether it is a family party or a party with university friends, whether
it is a birthday or farewell party, has a strong influence on the decision [153], whereas
others came to the conclusion that the situation in general plays a role, but only a
small one compared to the requester of the information [199].
2.4.1 Location sharing
Apart from the general context factors described below that apply to an online con-
text like ubiquitous environments and social media, location sharing has been a spe-
cial focus of research, as it has been shown that sharing a location significantly de-
pends on the context [246]. Above all, the requester has been shown as the major
factor of influence when sharing a location in several publications [246, 321, 74].
Apart from this, the location itself also plays a role, whereas researchers have a dif-
ferent notion of what is important within the location. Some state that the actual
position is important [246, 31] whereas others say it is more the activity that is per-
formed at the location [73, 321] or the type of people that typically visit such a place
[321]. A third notion is that the professional context is the important factor regard-
ing the location, e.g. whether it is a work environment, or a public or private space
[74]. Finally, some even say that the location, activity or the situation plays only a
minor role compared to the requester of the location [115]. Another factor that is
also sometimes mentioned is the purpose of the location request, e.g. whether it is for
meeting up with a friend, a family member wanting to feel safe about loved ones, or
only an acquaintance who does not play an important role in the location sharer’s
life [246, 325, 74]. The fourth factor that was sometimes mentioned is the time and
day of the week when the location was requested [321, 31], whereas newer publica-
tions came to the conclusion that it is more the activity and not the time and day that
is important [246]. Lastly, there were also context factors that have been found to
be important by one publication, but which have neither been substantiated nor dis-
proved by others, like the frequency and granularity of the request [246], the benefit
of the location sharing and the likelihood that the benefit is actually achieved [325],
and even the mood of the location sharer [74]. Finally, if the requester is a company
rather than a person, it can also depend on the type of company, whether the lo-
cation request is accepted or rejected: Most people are fine sharing their location in
public if the data is anonymized, an equal number of users allow sharing the data for
research purposes only, others allow it for both research and commercial purposes,
and others will share it with nobody. Finally, sharing the location with everybody
without anonymization or only with commercial companies, is very rare [51].
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2.4.2 Individual factors
Apart from those context factors which are independent from the actual user, there
are several factors that depend on the user, like demographic factors, personality
and also privacy desire [185, 359], which we combine under the term individual fac-
tors. Several publications have shown that demographic factors have an influence
on the privacy concern of a user and thereby also on the privacy settings [185, 202,
212]. The demographic factor that was mentioned most frequently is the age of the
user [277, 185, 212, 149, 82, 202, 238]. Interestingly, earlier studies denoting age as
one of the influential factors found that privacy concern increases with an increasing
age, meaning the youngest users have the lowest level of privacy concern [185, 82,
202]. However, newer studies show that this trend did not continue for the next gen-
eration: Most recent studies show the privacy concern decreasing up to the group
of participants aged between 25 and 35 years; but younger participants (between
16 and 25 years) again have a higher privacy concern, indicating that privacy will
again gain importance in younger generations [212, 149]. Another factor that has
been found to be important in several studies is the gender of the user [277, 212, 292,
144]. In all studies that found a gender effect on privacy concerns, females had a
significantly higher level of privacy concern [277, 212, 292, 144]. Interestingly, other
studies claim that demographic properties like age, gender, nationality, marital sta-
tus, employment status and income have no effect on privacy concerns [349, 251]; it
is rather the risk that is perceived that a privacy violation will occur, as well as the
potential damage associated with it [349]. The results for the influence of a user’s
education level are also mixed: Where some claim that people with a low level of
privacy concern are usually poor and less educated [82, 359], others say that espe-
cially highly educated people have lower privacy concerns [251]. Similarly, people
with a higher income seem to have lower privacy concerns [238]; persons with a
higher position at their workplace tend to put more emphasis on security, rather
than privacy of their employees [140]. Also, the nationality and the culture of the
users seems to have an impact: In a study comparing the privacy concerns between
US and Italian citizens, researchers found that Italian citizens are in general less con-
cerned about privacy, demand less control from their government and also dislike
privacy intrusion by the government more than US citizens [90, 91].
Apart from the demographic factors, the personality of a user, especially as rep-
resented by the personality measures of the big five personal inventory [78], has
a significant effect on the privacy settings [24, 144], how they can be motivated in
sharing data [213], and also how privacy user interfaces should be designed [145].
Persons with a high conscientiousness or emotional stability are likely to be signif-
icantly more concerned about privacy [24]. Also whether the user is female, and
whether she has been target of a privacy invasion before, positively correlates with
privacy concerns [24]. Depending on the personality, users are more or less suscepti-
ble to certain social engineering attacks. Users with a low neuroticism, for example,
have been found to be more susceptible to phishing emails, where the recipient ap-
pears to have won a prize [144]. Openness and extraversion correlate positively
with the amount of information shared on social networks [144]. Both introverted
and extraverted persons can be motivated in sharing personal data by offering so-
cial benefit adjustments in return, which can be, for example, the ability to join a
special club, or to be part of a community with special interests that fit the user’s
interests. Extraverted persons are motivated by both online and offline adjustments,
whereas introverted people can be motivated only with offline adjustments [213].
Also, the user’s self-concept makes a difference in privacy concerns. People with
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an interdependent self, e.g. people that define their self through their relations with
others, prefer proxy privacy control by industrial companies, whereas those with an
independent self, who see themselves as unique individuals with their own char-
acteristics, prefer technology-based privacy controls [352]. Even the day of birth
and the corresponding zodiac sign significantly influences personality, according to
a study [324]. Lastly, studies have shown that if the privacy UI is tailored towards
the user’s personality, this increases the privacy and security of the user’s personal
data [145].
In addition to the demographic factors mentioned, expertise in the field of pri-
vacy typically leads to an increased level of privacy concern [185]. People who fol-
low privacy issue developments are often individuals with a high social awareness
[88]. However, in contrast to expertise in the area of privacy, general internet usage
experience does not influence privacy concerns [359]. The technology that is used to
record the data can also play a role. A study has shown that users have a higher level
of privacy concern when sensitive data is recorded using a Google Glass compared
to a smart home system [212].
As we can see, there is mixed evidence on demographic factors and their corre-
lation to privacy concerns; some say that they have an effect in one direction, other
studies claim the complete opposite, whereas again other researchers come to the
conclusion that demographic factors do not have any effect on privacy concerns at
all. However, the negative correlation of some of the personality traits (like aware-
ness and extraversion) with privacy concerns, user behavior and vulnerability to
certain attacks seems to be uncontroversial in research [144]. We therefore decided
to include the privacy concerns as well as the personality traits in our set of individ-
ual features, which are then used for predicting privacy settings. In the next section
we will discuss in more detail how these individual measures are collected.
2.4.3 Personality and privacy questionnaires
Privacy questionnaires
Privacy questionnaires that have been constructed in research over the years have
rarely built upon existing previous work. Therefore, we will discuss the developed
questionnaires one after another in order of publication date.
Alan Westin’s work
The first attempts to capture privacy concerns were made by Alan Westin in the sec-
ond half of the last century, resulting in a categorization of users into three privacy
categories [195]: privacy fundamentalists who do not want to share any data at all,
or as little as possible; on the opposite the unconcerned, who are eager to give away
all their personal data without any privacy concerns; and the privacy pragmatists
between those two categories, who always make a trade-off between privacy and
utility when it comes to sharing sensitive data. Alan Westin proposed a three-item
questionnaire that allows participants to be assigned to one of the three categories
[195]. However, it has been shown that these three categories and the overly short
questionnaire are too coarse-grained in order to do a meaningful prediction of the
user’s behavior in privacy scenarios [349]. Users from the three categories do not
behave significantly differently [349].
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Westin’s categories were later extended into four categories by Sheehan et al., in-
clucding again the unconcerned user, the circumspect user who has some privacy con-
cerns, the wary user with a higher level of privacy concern, and finally the alarmed
user who is similar to Westin’s privacy fundamentalist [293].
Concern for information privacy (CFIP)
After Westin’s first approach, several privacy questionnaires emerged, which mostly
have not been thoroughly tested and validated. In the ongoing section, we will there-
fore describe the most influential questionnaires that have been scientifically validated.
For whatever reason, most of the questionnaires were constructed independent from
prior work. One of the exceptions is the CFIP2 questionnaire by Smith et al., which
is the first approach after Westin’s privacy questionnaire to capture privacy con-
cerns in a detailed manner, offering several continuous privacy measures [303]. The
CFIP consists of fifteen statements, which have to be evaluated by the user on a
seven-point Likert scale. The statements contain abstract privacy scenarios, which
do not involve a specific privacy domain (like online privacy) or specific compa-
nies. The authors provide a detailed guide on how to evaluate the questionnaire
using a weighted average calculation, resulting in four different privacy measures:
collection, denoting how important it is for the user to know which data is collected;
errors, meaning the concern that protections against errors in personal data are in-
adequate; (unauthorized) secondary use, describing the concern that data is used for
another purpose than officially communicated; and improper access, measuring the
user’s concern that personal data can be accessed by unauthorized entities [303].
The CFIP has been proven to be distinct and reliable by later studies [314].
Sheehan’s work
A later approach by Sheehan et al. is based on the fair information principles previ-
ously published by the US Federal Trade Commission 3. In contrast to the CFIP, this
questionnaire used realistic scenarios instead of abstract questions in order to re-
ceive feedback from the user [294]. More specifically, the questionnaire consisted of
14 scenarios in which a privacy violation took place, mostly scenarios around emails
and websites. The authors pointed out three major privacy factors which are impor-
tant: the control over collection and usage of information (similar to the collection
measure of the CFIP), and whether it is a short-term, transactional relationship, that
is established only once for a specific transaction like an online purchase or data ac-
quisition in a questionnaire in return for a refund, or a long-term relationship with
a company that has been established for some time and that is part of an ongoing
relationship with the company [294].
2concern for information privacy
3http://www.lawpublish.com/ftc-fair-information-practice-principles.html
(last accessed: 2020-03-09)
2.4. Context factors, individual factors, and how to capture them 43
Internet User’s Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC)
Based on the CFIP, researchers later developed the Internet User’s Information Pri-
vacy Concerns (IUIPC) scale [221]. Being the first to take advantage of earlier find-
ings and questionnaires, they reused some parts of the CFIP while making the ab-
stract questions more concrete, by rephrasing them to fit the internet context (for ex-
ample by using “online companies” instead of “companies”), especially the context
of online shopping. Furthermore, they added new questions, for example regarding
the user’s privacy practices. The questionnaire allows one to compute three distinct
privacy measures, namely collection similar to the CFIP, the awareness of what hap-
pens with the private data, and control, denoting how important it is for the user to
have control over the flow of her private data, by whom it can be accessed, how it is
stored, and for what purpose it is analyzed [221].
Privacy Concern Scale (PCS)
Another questionnaire that is focused on online privacy is the Privacy Concern Scale
(PCS) [52]. In contrast to the IUIPC, the PCS has a broader notion of privacy which
is not limited to data privacy. More specifically, it allows one to describe the user’s
privacy concerns in three dimensions: first, the general caution with sensitive data
in an online context, similar to the IUIPC; second, the usage of technical protection
mechanisms for data privacy like pop-up blockers, private browsing and deleting
the browser cache; and lastly, the privacy concerns against other entities, like persons
or companies not being who they claim they are, or forwarding an email inappro-
priately. Instead of letting the user rate privacy scenarios, the questions directly
ask about the user’s behavior and concerns. The measure general caution has been
shown to correlate positively with the IUIPC measures [52]. Also, the Need for Pri-
vacy Questionnaire (NFP-Q) uses such a broad notion of privacy, by also capturing
the user’s need for physical privacy and interactional privacy, denoting the user’s
desires to have a safe haven and to be left alone [323].
Privacy questionnaire by Earp et al.
A longer privacy questionnaire has been published by Earp et al. [96], and uses
36 items to capture the privacy concerns and practices of a user regarding six dif-
ferent factors outlined by the authors, using scenario-based questions similar to the
IUIPC. Those factors describe the user’s desire for personalization, for example for
targeted advertisements; the awareness of data sharing and processing similar to the
IUIPC measures awareness; concern about unauthorized transfer of the data; knowl-
edge about which data is collected and where it is stored; and control over the access
regulations on the private data. Unfortunately, although the authors received good
statistical results for their scale, they based their results only on a single sample of
respondents; therefore the scale is not seen as reliable in research and thus is not
used often [256]. Another attempt to capture privacy concerns in the context of web
actions has been made by Dinev and Hart, and offers two measures to categorize a
user, denoting how seriously data misuse is perceived by the user, and how grievous
it is when a third party can find out information about the user in question [89].
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Indirectly capturing privacy concerns
The aforementioned privacy questionnaires all directly asked the user to rate ei-
ther a scenario, or how great the user’s privacy concern is in different subject areas.
Unfortunately, capturing privacy concerns this way itself influences the user’s pri-
vacy concerns, depending on the framing of the privacy questions. When privacy
is made salient, this increases the user’s level of privacy concern in the responses
[48]. Braunstein and Granka therefore propose to derive privacy concerns indirectly,
and offer a data-centric questionnaire which asks about the user’s concern toward
losing data. Although the approach looks promising, they did not conduct a profes-
sional statistical analysis and did not perform a factor analysis; therefore the method
cannot be seen as reliable [48]. Finally, there also exists a privacy scale which is tai-
lored especially towards privacy in the context of social media, observing how the
social interconnectedness corresponds to the user’s privacy desires in a social net-
work [347]. This questionnaire consisted of four different blocks of questions, asking
about Facebook usage intensity and social connectedness on Facebook, which they
tried to match with bridging social capital, denoting how much Facebook is used
to get in touch with people and get to know about new things, as well as bonding
social capital, asking whether Facebook is used as a platform to talk about sensitive
topics like personal problems with other users.
To conclude, there exist many privacy questionnaires which have mostly been
generated without using insights from prior work. The CFIP can be seen as the
most influential questionnaire, as it has been adopted for other questionnaires and
is also used in research very frequently [256]. The IUIPC questionnaire is the second
most used questionnaire [256] and is tailored towards online privacy, making it a
good candidate for our research. Throughout this thesis, we will therefore use the
IUIPC questionnaire for all domains, as it offers a generic view on the online privacy
concerns of a user independent from the actual domain. In the social media domain,
we will also include parts of the more specific social network privacy questionnaire
by Wisniewski et al. [347] to show an example of how introducing a specialized
privacy questionnaire can improve the user model and allow a higher prediction
precision.
Personality questionnaires
Whereas the work in the field of privacy settings has mostly ignored prior contri-
butions, it is just the opposite for the personality questionnaires. Throughout his-
tory, one can find three major development tracks for personality questionnaires,
namely the works by Robert Cloninger resulting in the Temperament and Character
Inventory (TCI) and its successors [72], the questionnaires by Hans J. Eysenck called
Eysenck’s Personality Inventory (EPI) [42] and later the Eysenck Personality Ques-
tionnaire (EPQ) [101], and finally the (most popular) big five personality traits [78].
Big five personality traits
The roots of capturing personality can be found at the beginning of the 20th century,
where researchers started in 1936 to capture personality traits by sampling language,
e.g. by analyzing and clustering adjectives that describe facets of a human’s person-
ality [7]. As a result, researchers came up with a list of 4504 personality adjectives
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[7], later reduced to 171 items by eliminating duplicates, resulting in the sixteen fac-
tor personality model [21]. Research on capturing personality stalled in the middle
of the 20th century, but came back into focus in the 1980s by the work of several
researchers, resulting in the aforementioned personality questionnaires. The NEO-I
questionnaire from 1976 is said to be the first predecessor of the big five personality
traits [76]. Its authors Costa and McCrae again went for a cluster analysis, which led
them to a questionnaire containing three personality traits, namely extraversion, neu-
roticism, and openness to experience [76]. The NEO-I was later refined and extended
with the two personality traits agreeableness and conscientiousness using the study
data from the Augmented Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging [297]. The new
questionnaire included six facets for the three personality traits of the original NEO-
I and was named NEO-PI by the authors [77]. Also, the NEO-PI was revised by
the authors to have six facets for each of the five personality traits, resulting in the
NEO-PI-R [78], which is still used as the current standard for capturing the big five
personality traits. The five-factor model was later supported by an approach based
on lexical analysis, which also emphasized the five mentioned personality traits, de-
noting them as the “big five personality traits” [133]. The NEO-PI-R takes about
45 to 60 minutes to complete; therefore, research created an alternative shorter ver-
sion called the NEO five-factor inventory (NEO-FFI), which takes only ten to fifteen
minutes to complete [45]. There also exists a version called “Ten Items Personal In-
ventory” (TIPI) which is meant for a “quick and dirty” evaluation of the big five
personality traits, requiring only ten items and less than one minute to complete
[137]. The NEO-PI-R is currently established as the standard for capturing personal-
ity and has also received good critiques from other researchers [172], although there
also exist some negative aspects that are not solved by the questionnaire, like the
social desirability bias which leads users to be dishonest about their personality and
therefore the answers to the questionnaire [39]. It has also been shown that the big
five personality traits can be predicted using a person’s writing style, for example
on social media websites or in online blogs [104].
Eysenck’s personality questionnaires
Eysenck’s personality questionnaires were also developed throughout the 1980s,
starting with the Eysenck’s Personality Inventory (EPI) [42] containing 57 questions
to be answered “yes” or “no”, and resulting in two personality dimensions, called
extraversion/introversion and neuroticism/stability, similar to the corresponding
big five personality traits. Based on this work, the authors established the Eysenck
Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) [101], having a total of 57 questions with the same
binary scale, to offer two additional personality dimensions, namely psychotisism/-
socialisation meaning how aggressive, egocentric or manipulative the person is, and
lie/social desirability stating whether a person is willing to lie to be accepted by other
or to conform to social norms. This questionnaire was later extended to the EPQ-R
using either 100 questions for the same personality dimensions, or 48 in the short
version [102], and was finally transformed into the Eysenck personality profiler,
which also offers facets of the mentioned personality dimensions [344].
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Robert Cloninger’s work
Parallel to that, Cloninger started his research in the early 1980s, resulting in his
first attempt toward a personality questionnaire called the “tridimensional question-
naire” [71]. As the name suggests, the questionnaire captures personality in three di-
mensions, denoting how novelty-seeking the person is, how important it is for them
to avoid personal harm (expressed by shyness and anticipatory worry, for example),
and the reward dependence of the person. Based on this 100-item questionnaire
which consisted of “yes”-or-“no” questions, the authors developed the Tempera-
ment and Character Inventory (TCI) [72], which used 240 items on the same scale
to calculate the three aforementioned personality measures which are now called
the “temperaments”, and added a new temperament as well as three “characters” to
their list of output variables. The fourth temperament is called persistence, meaning
how perfectionist and hard-working the person is. The three characters denoted the
cooperativeness of the user; the self-directedness, meaning how responsible and pur-
poseful the person is; and finally the self-transcendence, denoting the spirituality of
the person [72]. The scale was finally revised to the TCI-R scale, using the same
questions but with a five-point rating instead of a simple yes/no choice. Later stud-
ies have shown that the TCI-R has a close relation to the personality questonnaires
by Eysenck [358] as well as the big five personality traits [122]: Harm avoidance is
positively correlated to neuroticism and negatively to extraversion, novelty seeking
is correlated with extraversion, persistence with conscientiousness, and cooperative-
ness with agreeableness, to mention only some of the correlations.
To conclude, there were several lines of development of personality question-
naires. However, research has shown that the questionnaires correlate to each other;
it is therefore likely that all of them are capturing the same results, only in a different
form or with a different labeling of the personality traits [358, 122]. For our research,
we therefore concentrate on the current scientific standard for characterizing per-
sonality, namely the big five personality traits.
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2.5 Privacy User Interfaces
One of the biggest problems regarding privacy is that users are typically not aware of
either the negative consequences that can occur when over- or undersharing data, or
the mistakes in their own privacy settings that can lead to these consequences [214].
Also, pop-up warning messages are often not seen, or ignored [214]. Privacy aware-
ness and transparency of the privacy settings has been shown to increase the notion
of privacy risks, and is therefore essential and has been a central part of privacy user
interface research in the past [214]. It has been shown that a lack of transparency is
an important aspect also in privacy recommender systems [301]. Typically, a “black
box” recommender system that does not allow the user to understand why they are
receiving certain recommendations often leads to a reduced trust towards the sys-
tem [154]. Previous work on privacy user interfaces can be divided into five different
kinds of approaches, which will be discussed in the remainder of this section:
1. audience selection user interfaces that are either based on interpersonal dis-
tance or a radar metaphor to let the user select the right audience while having
an overview over all possible recipients;
2. reducing the complexity of the privacy settings by using abstractions or hier-
archical visualizations;
3. visualizing information flow of the user’s private data to other users and
thereby increasing privacy awareness;
4. grouping user interfaces which are needed to create friend groups used for
narrowcasting; and
5. consequence-based privacy user interfaces that increase the user’s privacy
awareness by emphasizing the possible consequences arising from their pri-
vacy behavior.
2.5.1 Privacy setting and audience selection tools
Instead of visualizing already existing data flows and letting users correct existing
privacy settings, another approach is to limit the data flow when the data is dis-
closed, for example by limiting the audience of a newly created social network post.
Social networks typically offer list-based UIs for that purpose. Figure 2.5 shows
the custom privacy setting dialogue of Facebook, where the user can type in names
of friends or friend groups that should be able to see the post (upper text field) or
that should be excluded from the audience (lower text field). When the user starts
typing, the website provides an auto-complete functionality and displays friends or
friend groups matching the entered text. However, the user still has to remember
the names of the friends to include or exclude, and cannot see the complete current
audience of the post. Research has begun to enhance such privacy setting dialogues
using two different kinds of approaches. One uses the interpersonal distance between
the user and her friends to align the audience in the UI; others use a radar metaphor
to arrange privacy choices in a clustered way.
Studies from the first day of Google+ have found that users select the recipients
of their posts according to the tie strength between the user and the friend as well
as the aspects of their life they belong to [177]. Although the result is not perfect
and will not completely reflect the tie strength of a user and his friends in real life,
the tie strength can be approximated using data available on a social network, like
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FIGURE 2.5: Custom privacy settings dialogue of Facebook.
FIGURE 2.6: Selecting the post audience in a UI based on interper-
sonal distance as a criterion.
amount of likes, chat messages, comments, profile views and time since the friend
was added [351]. Based on this tie strength calculation, Kauer et al. designed a tool
for selecting the Facebook audience based on the interpersonal distance [180]. Their
interface concept (Figure 2.6) was called a slider and aligns the friends from left to
right with descending tie strength and decreasing size of the displayed profile pic-
ture and name, so that the friends with the highest tie strength are given the most
space in the UI. Using the blue slider, the user can select the audience, including all
friends with a tie strength up to this point (area highlighted in blue). Although the
initial concept treated all friends the same way and aligned them all in one slider,
the idea can also be expanded to support selection according to the tie strength in
the different friend groups the user has created, by displaying one slider for each
friend group on top of each other [180]. In an evaluation with a paper prototype, the
authors were able to show that the amount of unwanted disclosures can be signif-
icantly reduced with the new UI (239 errors with a standard interface compared to
92 errors with the new concept).
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FIGURE 2.7: PersonalMap user interface for selecting email recipi-
ents.
PersonalMap is a similar approach, which allows the user to get a better overview
of her most important e-mail recipients, as well as clusters inside the recipients, e.g.
recipients which are often emailed together (like workcolleagues or friends from a
sports club) [105]. In their UI (Figure 2.7), the user is placed in the center, and the
friends around her. The more important a friend is, the closer she is placed to the
center, near the user. In addition to this, the friends are also clustered according to
their tendency to be emailed together, forming the groups denoted by the colored
areas in the UI. PersonalMap received good usability scores and was rated to be
highly accurate by the users; however, the participants in the user study stated they
would most likely not use the tool in their daily life, possibly because the tool lacks
integration into an email client.
The second type of interfaces for defining privacy settings that can also be used
for other privacy tasks than selecting the post audience is based on a radar metaphor.
Typical user interfaces for privacy settings (see Figure 2.8 for the Facebook general
privacy settings page as an example) stack the privacy settings on top of each other,
offering a slider or a link to change the setting for each of the entries, resulting in
endless lists of privacy options, which are divided into several sections, and often
scattered all around the website. Instead of this list-based metaphor, research suc-
cessfully tested the radar metaphor to enhance the privacy overview and thereby
also users’ motivation to check and adapt privacy settings [67].
The most prominent example of such a privacy radar might be the privacy radar
by Reinhardt et al. [69]. Their UI (see Figure 2.9) allows the user to define the privacy
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FIGURE 2.8: General privacy settings page of Facebook.
settings for data generated by the user’s smartphone, using a radar metaphor: Each
corner of the UI is dedicated to one type of sensitive data recorded by the smart-
phone, namely images, location data, audio, and accelerometer data. Each data type
has several abstraction methods, allowing the user to share e.g. only the images
without faces, or only the street level of the current location, denoted by the dots
that are aligned from the respective corner to the center of the UI. The closer to the
center, the more critical and the more sensitive is the data that is shared, also de-
noted by the colors of the dots from red (highly sensitive, unmodified data) to green
(highly abstracted, less critical data). The user can select the corresponding privacy
level by clicking on the corresponding dot. The UI also records which apps have had
access to the mentioned data items, and offers the user an overview on this access
history. If an unsafe setting is detected (like the unmodified audio in Figure 2.9), the
UI warns the user about possible consequences using case examples. Later studies
have shown that besides having a significantly better usability and providing a bet-
ter overview than a list-based UI, it is also easier for a user to spot critical settings,
which motivates the user to review and adapt the privacy settings [67].
A similar design was implemented by the Privacy Badge, which had the goal to
increase the privacy awareness especially on small devices [129]. The user is placed
in the middle of the radar screen, which consists of several layers. If a data item
is shared, a symbol appears on the radar denoting the shared data type (for exam-
ple a “$” sign for payment information, or a “+” denoting location information),
together with information about the time and date of the data request, as well as the
service provider requesting the data (for example “amazon.com” or “map24.de”).
The closer the data point is to the center (the user), the more sensitive is the shared
data type. The authors evaluated the design concept and the functionalities of the
PrivacyBadge, which were rated positively overall. However, a study comparing
PrivacyBadge to the current standard or an in-the-wild study remained for future
work [129].
Apart from privacy settings, the radar metaphor has also been used for other
purposes, for example for expressing the desired music style for music recommen-
dations [227], as shown in Figure 2.11. The interface supports five different acoustic
properties whose importance for the recommendation can be specified by the user,
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FIGURE 2.9: Privacy radar for selecting the privacy settings for pri-
vate data on mobile phones.
FIGURE 2.10: Privacy Badge showing which sensitive data has been
shared and with which service provider.
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FIGURE 2.11: Radar interface for controlling several musical aspects
for music recommendations on spotify.
using either the shown radar interface or a conventional slider interface. By grab-
bing the dots at each edge of the web diagram, the user can change the importance of
the corresponding acoustic property to be weighted as more (drag towards the outer
rim of the web) or less (drag towards the inner rim of the web) important. Also here,
the authors were able to show the interface based on the radar metaphor was supe-
rior in terms of usability. Apart from these traditional two-dimensional interfaces,
the usage of new visualization concepts like virtual reality (VR) can also increase the
usability of an interface [170, 302]. Virtual reality gives users the feeling of really
being in the virtual world, leading to a more natural and efficient interaction that
would not be possible within traditional 2D or 3D applications [170, 302]. Research
has shown that using VR in the e-commerce domain, for example for online shop-
ping, is perceived as more useful, immersive and interesting compared to current
two-dimensional user interfaces [201, 309].
2.5.2 Reducing the complexity of privacy visualizations
For reducing the complexity of user interfaces and reducing the space needed to vi-
sualize large data structures (such as privacy settings), the visualization community
has focused on mapping-based or clustering-based approaches in the past: Mapping
algorithms, for example principal component analysis (PCA), apply dimensionality
reduction techniques to map the high-dimensional data space into a low dimen-
sional space suitable for a visualization [254], e.g. by projecting thumbnail images
to coordinates in the user interface according to their feature vector. On the other
hand, clustering-based approaches, for example multi-dimensional scaling (MDS),
try to group together similar items, like similar thumbnail images, so that the UI
can choose and display only one representative of the cluster instead of all of them
together [254]. The user can then browse through the data set by first selecting the
representative, and then browsing through the contents of the selected cluster [253].
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A clustering approach that is specialized towards clustering and sorting images is
content-based image retrieval (CBIR), using features like color, shape or texture of
the image for clustering [83]. A third approach for visualizing larger hierarchies is
to use a so-called fisheye technique, which can magnify the area the user is currently
interested in, allowing more space to be dedicated to the area of interest while com-
pressing uninteresting parts of the hierarchy, allowing the user to keep a view of
the whole hierarchy while still being able to see the details needed at the moment
[196]. Another possibility for increasing the visibility of complex data structures is
to transform the two-dimensional visualization into a three-dimensional space [257],
for example by using the FADE algorithm [258] or recursive hierarchical space de-
composition of the graph nodes [257].
In privacy user interfaces, researchers further reduced the complexity of the user
interfaces, so that the current privacy status can be seen at a glance [182]. Kelley et al.
for example used the metaphor of a nutrition label to allow users to review and es-
pecially to compare the privacy standards of different websites at a glance [182]. The
work is based on the data provided by the platform for privacy preferences project
(P3P) [120], which was started by the world wide web consortium (W3C) with the
goal to standardize website privacy policies into a machine-readable form, rather
than informal text-based privacy policies. Based on this data set, earlier researchers
implemented the extendable grid user interface for displaying the aforementioned
data [273]. However, user studies have shown that the visualization is not compre-
hensible to users, as some of the labels are not clear to users, and there is redundant
information, as well as some further problems regarding the general usability of the
UI [273]. Kelley et al. therefore used general principles from the nutrition labeling
literature to reduce the amount of information shown to the user, resulting in a nu-
trition label for privacy policies, as shown in Figure 2.12. The design has the layout
of a table, where the types of information are shown in rows, and the way the infor-
mation is used in columns. Light symbols indicate that data is not collected or that
it is only collected when opting in, whereas critical items in the table, where data is
definitely collected that way or unless the user opts out, are marked with a saturated
label in shades of red. The labels of the rows and columns contain short descriptions;
more detailed descriptions can be found on a linked Useful Terms page. In an eval-
uation study, the authors were able to show that their nutrition label allows users
to better understand and compare the privacy policies of two websites compared
to a privacy policy written in natural language. Furthermore, users were wuicker
to understand the policy, and stated the information was easier to find within the
nutrition label [182].
An even simpler privacy UI for P3P website privacy policies was published
by Cranor et al. earlier [79]. Their privacy bird allowed users to specify their pri-
vacy preferences in a privacy dialog, and then notified the users whether a website
matches their privacy preferences using a trayicon, as shown in Figure 2.13. A green,
happy, singing bird (upper left) shows that the website’s privacy policy matches the
user’s preferences, so no further action is required. If a red exclamation mark is
shown, then the privacy bird did not find any item on the website that mismatched
the user’s preferences, but there is embedded content that doe not match the pref-
erences or that do not have a P3P policy. The yellow bird means that the website
does not have a P3P policy, whereas the angry shouting bird informs the user that
one of the privacy preferences does not match. If privacy bird is turned off, a gray
bird is shown. To reinforce the notifications, a sound is played corresponding to the
new state whenever the state of the privacy bird changes. According to their study,
the privacy bird made it easier and faster for the users to spot whether their privacy
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FIGURE 2.12: Privacy nutrition label by Kelley et al., allowing usersto
see a website’s privacy policy at one glance
FIGURE 2.13: Tray icons of the privacy bird, denoting whether the
current website matches the user’s privacy preferences
preferences are met, compared to reading the textual privacy policy or using the
P3P visualization of Internet Explorer. Furthermore, the privacy bird was rated to
be more useful, more helpful in understanding the privacy policy, and more likely
to be used in the future than the privacy visualization of Internet Explorer [79].
Whereas the two aforementioned systems simplified the visualization and un-
derstanding of a privacy policy, others sought UIs that could display a privacy pol-
icy in an understandable way, and also allow the user to select appropriate privacy
settings, while reducing the complexity of the display of information as well as the
burden of choosing correct settings to a minimum [331, 22]. One such system is
PRICON, which was created for a smart automotive environment, where the user
has to choose which of the in-car data can be shared, and in what way [331]. Pri-
con reduces the complexity of privacy to four categories, Anonymity, Data Sharing,
Storage Time and Profiling, allowing the users to easily compare the different privacy
templates that are offered as choices (see Figure 2.14). The four categories were de-
rived in a small-scale pre-study involving judicial privacy experts, IT experts and
experts in human factors. Apart from the overview page to select the privacy tem-
plate, the tool also offers more detailed information for each privacy template on a
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FIGURE 2.14: UI for selecting the privacy template in PRICON.
FIGURE 2.15: Detailed view for weighing up risks and benefits of
each smart car service.
details page, and a services page weighing benefits and costs for each of the smart
car services (Figure 2.15). The authors performed a user study to assess the usability
of the UI, receiving an above-average SUS score of 75, and also an attrakdiff score
that was slightly above average [331]. However, a comparison with traditional in-car
user interfaces was not performed.
A third way of designing a privacy UI is through a data-driven approach, as has
been done by Bahirat et al. when designing their privacy UI for choosing appropriate
privacy settings in the IoT domain [22]. In a study, they first observed users’ behav-
iors in privacy decisions, and which factors influence them. Their results showed
that who is requesting the data has the highest effect, followed by what data is re-
quested. The reason why it is collected (for health and safety, for example) had the
third most importance for the decision, whereas the persistence, e.g. whether the
data is only collected once or continuously, had the lowest level of influence. Where
the data is collected did not have a significant effect on the privacy decision. Based
on this hierarchy, the authors designed a hierarchical user interface that allows the
users to tune their privacy settings, as shown in Figure 2.16.
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FIGURE 2.16: Layered privacy UI for IoT devices.
FIGURE 2.17: “Audience view”, allowing a user to see which infor-
mation other users can see when searching for his profile on Face-
book.
The screen on the left-hand side is the initial screen, showing the available pri-
vacy profiles and allowing the user to select the desired one. When the user clicks
the “learn more” link, the first layer of the privacy setting visualization is shown,
listing the recipients (“who”) that can receive the data. When “more” is clicked, the
second layer is shown, letting the user decide what data should be accessible. Finally,
clicking again on “more” opens the third hierarchy, where the user can choose the
reason and persistence level of the data disclosement.
2.5.3 Visualizing information flow to increase privacy awareness
Users often underestimate the number of recipients for their disclosed information,
as well as the amount of information spreading associated with this [34]. Research
has therefore tried to improve privacy awareness by offering users a graphical user
interface that displays the spread of information in an easily understandable way.
A very simple way of doing so is the audience view, which was also included on
the Facebook website some years after it was discussed in research [207]. In such
an audience view, the user can see how her profile looks when other users such as
friends, other social network members or a public user visits the profile, i.e. which
information the respective group of users can see from their own profile (Figure
2.17). A study has shown that using an audience view makes it significantly easier
to find out whether another user can see personal information like one’s name, email
address, or birth date [207].
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FIGURE 2.18: Friendship circles in PViz, allowing to hierarchically
browse the friend lists.
Other works concentrated more on the display of a user’s direct friends and also
the friend graph connected to them. Early works used simple list-based interfaces
enhanced by community detection algorithms [40], so that the friends can be sorted
and displayed in multiple lists according to the detected communities [210]. PViz
[224] and one of its successors called FreeBu [124] thereby concentrated on visualiz-
ing the user’s friends and friend lists and their connections in an overseeable way.
Initially, the tool partitions the user’s friends into friend groups, as well as individ-
uals who do not belong to any friend group, and visualizes them by circles (Figure
2.18). The privacy settings for the individuals in a group are denoted by the aver-
age percentage of visible profile items, ranging from 0% (no visibility) to 100% (all
profile items visible). If an outlier is detected inside a group (e.g. a user who has
privacy settings significantly different from those of the other group members), the
circle is colored in red to highlight that a review of the privacy settings might be
suitable for this friend list. When clicking on a circle, the tool opens the friend list
and displays each contained friend as a circle in the visualization, again showing
percentage values denoting the respective disclosement settings. Compared to the
Facebook defaults, PViz has been shown to be as effective to detect the privacy set-
tings for single users, but is significantly better for determining the privacy settings
of a group of users.
Based on the work of FreeBu, researchers implemented other possible designs
and evaluated them against the circle-based design used by FreeBu #1 and PViz
[85]. Those encompass (from left to right in Figure 2.19) a map-based visualization,
that displays the friends in a graph-based manner, where friends are nodes and ver-
tices are the friendship connections between them; a column visualization, listing the
friends in different columns according to the detected friend groups; and a mecha-
nism to create friend groups based on the interpersonal distance, similar to the work
by Kauer et al. described in the next subsection [180]. Each of the interfaces had its
own advantages and drawbacks; only the column-based interface received lower us-
ability scores. The study discovered that users typically only interact with their top
20 friends, thus making the rank-based interface most suitable of all those proposed.
Some of the friendship visualizations go even one step further, visualizing not
only the flow to the direct friends, but also to the friends of the friends and the
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FIGURE 2.19: Alternative friendship visualization techniques as im-
plemented by FreeBu 2.
FIGURE 2.20: Information spreading in a social network visualized
by Google+ Ripples..
remaining social graph of the social network. Google+ Ripples (Figure 2.20) thereby
allows users to follow the spread of information for a post, from the original poster
to the rest of the network. Whereas Google+ Ripples was published by the owner of
the social network, which has access to the whole social graph, this is not the case
for third-party app developers or for researchers, which typically only have access
to the user’s direct friends, and which cannot track the information flow thereafter.
Nevertheless, it is possible to approximate the neighborhood of the direct friends
using a graph generation algorithm [15].
The idea of raising privacy awareness by visualizing data flow has also been
tested and evaluated in other domains like mobile smartphone apps [23]. Since the
publishing of the most recent versions of the Android operating systems, apps do
not require a special permission to access the internet, and can therefore send and
receive data online as they want. It is therefore also hard for a user to see if and when
the app is sending personal data like the location or phone ID to an advertiser. The
app “Privacy Leaks” uses TaintDroid to detect whether this happens, and offers the
user an overview screen for each app, denoting how often the app leaked personal
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FIGURE 2.21: Screen of the PrivacyLeaks app, showing the amount
of location requests for different apps.
information, and which information it leaked (Figure 2.21). On a similar screen,
the user can also see to which advertising company the data was leaked and the
number of times this happened. Although the researchers hypothesized that Privacy
Leaks will lead the users to choose apps that leak less private information, the study
did not show any significant effect of the software, although the usability and user
acceptance was very high [23]. The main factor of influence is still the rating of the
app, as well as recommendations of friends [23].
2.5.4 Grouping user interfaces
As stated in Section 2.3.2, grouping social network friends is a needed preparatory
action in order to do narrowcasting, e.g. to disclose new data items like a social net-
work post only to the desired audience. Grouping tasks (also called categorization
tasks) in general have already been broadly investigated in research. There are sev-
eral abstraction levels that can be used to implement a sorting task, each with its
own advantages and drawbacks [280]. The most concrete and least abstract form
of sorting is using the actual objects to be sorted for the task, called object sorting.
Object sorting provides the highest level of detail of information about the object;
on the other hand, it may also include details which are irrelevant for the sorting
task and can thereby hinder or confuse the user. An approach that is a bit more
abstract is picture sorting, where the objects are represented by corresponding pic-
tures. Although this reduces the sensory input on one hand, it is possible to crop out
unimportant details by this technique. Lastly, the most abstract form is card sorting,
where the objects are represented by their name. Card sorting allows a precise limit
on the information given to the user and thereby eliminates unneccessary details,
but requires the user to recognize the object and being able to imagine it.
Apart from the abstraction level, the metaphor and degrees of freedom used in
the UI also make it possible to differentiate among grouping user interfaces. Some
UIs offer a predefined set of groups to be used (closed sorting), whereas others allow
users to create new groups (open sorting). Whereas the former allows more compara-
ble results, the latter is required if the data is highly individual and not comparable
between subjects, and thus needs a higher degree of freedom for the user. Typical
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FIGURE 2.22: Different card sorting metaphors [61]: Stacked card
sorting (left) and explorer-based sorting (right).
metaphors used are the stacked card sorting metaphor, where the cards of the same
group are stacked on top of each other (Figure 2.22 left), or explorer-like approaches
(Figure 2.22 right). Which metaphor works best depends on the user group [61]:
Whereas researchers like the explorer-based sorting best, end-users instead prefer
the stacked card metaphor. Sorting has also been proven to work efficiently in VR
environments [159]: In a study where users were given products to be sorted arriv-
ing on a conveyor belt (see Figure 2.23), they were generally able to discriminate
and sort the products correctly if the visual difference between the products was
large enough.
Kelley et al. found that users follow one of two strategies to group their friends
[184]. Their study included three new user interface prototypes to perform the sort-
ing task (Figure 2.24): an image sorting approach, where the users were given pic-
tures of their friends to sort; a grid-based approach where the users were aligned on
a grid with the possibility to mark them according to the desired friend group asso-
ciation with pens of different colors; and a folder-based approach where the users
had to sort the images into folders using a UI similar to the Windows Explorer. As a
fourth interface, the Facebook friend grouping interface was used as a reference.
The first of the two strategies Kelley et al. discovered in their study was the “by
friend” strategy, where the friends are traversed one by one and each time a friend
has to be assigned to a friend group which has not yet been created, the group is cre-
ated on the fly. In contrast, in the “by group” strategy, the friend groups are created
first and then populated by their members one by one. Furthermore, they stated
that friend grouping should always be seen as a secondary task; UIs should there-
fore give users small friend grouping tasks from time to time rather than prompting
the user to sort all friends at once. Friend groupings change over time; therefore, the
friend grouping UIs should also try to get feedback on the correctness of the friend
grouping from time to time. However, research on how the friend grouping task in
social networks can be designed to be more enjoyable, apart from trying to increase
its usability, has not been conducted so far.
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FIGURE 2.23: Sorting of products arriving on a conveyor belt using
VR [159].
FIGURE 2.24: UI prototypes used by Kelley et al. [184] (from upper
left to lower right): image sorting UI, grid-based UI, explorer-based
approach, Facebook reference interface.
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FIGURE 2.25: Audience + timer nudge, showing the user possible
recipients of the post and the possibility to edit or withdraw the sub-
mission.
2.5.5 Consequence-based privacy user interfaces
Finally, a last form of graphical user interfaces helping users to improve their pri-
vacy is based on displaying the consequences of their privacy choice, enabling them
to reflect on and possibly to change their privacy decision, also known as privacy
nudges. Such a system has been proposed for Facebook posts by Wang et al., and is
shown in Figure 2.25 [333]. The topmost text field is the current standard on Face-
book, where the user can type in a new status message and define the friends which
should be able to see the status update (in this case all friends). When the user clicks
on “post”, the status update is usually directly published. In the approach by Wang
et al., this is not immediately the case: The UI first displays a portion of the recipients
of the post using their profile pictures, and offers the user a three-second countdown
to decide whether they still want to publish the post that way, or whether they want
to change either the content or the audience that is able to see the post. An evalua-
tion has shown that this change in the user interface indeed influences the privacy
decision: A significant amount of users chose not to publish the post, or made some
modifications to either the post content or disclosement settings, after a part of the
audience, i.e. the possible consequence of their disclosement choice, was shown to
the user [333, 334].
Privacy consequences can also be visualized using the user’s smartphone home
screen [286], as shown in Figure 2.26. Whenever somebody accesses the private data
of the user, a new pair of eyes is drawn on the home screen, using the size of the
pair of eyes to denote the frequency of the data request normalized by the closeness
of the person, so that if a close friend makes data requests, the pair of eyes is grows
more slowly than when a stranger requests the data, for example. The authors com-
pared their ambient view with a detailed privacy page that showed the requesting
persons and the number of requests, together with the possibility to restrict access
for those persons. The results showed that using a detailed page requires more of the
user’s time, thus making it less suitable for checking one’s privacy status on the go
with the smartphone. The privacy settings created by the users of the detailed page
were on average better than those of the users of the ambient notification, although
the difference was not significant. However, comparing the privacy settings before
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FIGURE 2.26: Visualization of the frequency of data requests on the
user’s home screen, either allowed or blocked
and after the use of the ambient notifications reveals that the disclosure policy was
significantly improved through the usage of the notification application.
The same approach can also improve privacy for smartphone apps according to
research [9]. Simply displaying excessive access requests to certain sensitive data
items as shown in Figure 2.27, like location requests, combined with a permission
manager that allows the user to adapt the permission settings for the apps men-
tioned in the UI, led 95% of the participants of the study to review their privacy
settings, and 58% of them to further restrict the chosen privacy settings after receiv-
ing the feedback [9].
Also when sharing a location, using privacy nudges and thereby motivating
users to adapt their privacy settings can help, according to Tsai et al. [326]. Their
software “Locyoution” was able to display the user’s own location as well as the
locations of the user’s friends, and included a history page, displaying recent loca-
tion requests together with the possibility to restrict access accordingly. In a study
comparing the amount of granted location requests and levels of comfort with be-
ing located, the researchers found that the amount of allowed requests was reduced
from 44.9% before to 40.3% after the usage of the tool, although the difference was
not statistically significant. However, the self-reported level of privacy concern of
the user, as well as the comfort level of being located by friends and strangers could
be significantly reduced by Locyoution [326].
As we have seen, there are several approaches for helping users improve their
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FIGURE 2.27: Privacy nudges for mobile app permissions.
privacy using UIs: Reducing the complexity of the settings and the UI by condens-
ing and displaying the information to highlight the most important aspects; raising
privacy awareness by highlighting the flow of sensitive information; supporting the
decision process beforehand; or using privacy nudges, to nudge the user to validate
and improve the privacy settings. In this thesis we will use ideas from all of these
approaches: although not in a user interface, we will reduce the complexity of the
privacy settings by suggesting personalized privacy settings using machine learn-
ing, that have only to be reviewed by the user. We will provide a user interface that
allows the user to have an overview of their privacy situation at one glance using
a radar metaphor in the example of the intelligent retail domain; and we will show
how radar interfaces can help in selecting the right audience for a large amount of
social network friends.
2.6 Machine learning and deep learning
Machine learning is a combination of statistical methods and algorithms that have
the goal to perform tasks without explicit instructions by a programmer [37], and
was first used by Arthur Samuel in 1959 [189]. It relies on recognizing patterns
in the data or inferring missing data from a given data set. One general idea is
to build mathematical models on labeled sample data (called “training data”), so
they can later be used to deduct labels for unlabeled data. Other machine learning
methods are specialized on working without training data, by using the inherent
clusters inside the training data, for example for grouping data items together or for
reducing the complexity of the data sets by removing duplicate data. Since 1959,
many different machine learning methods have emerged, which can be categorized
either by their learning style, or by their similarity in the way they are trained and
used.
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There exist three different types of learning methods [37]:
• Supervised learning, methods that require the algorithm is first given a train-
ing set including labeled data. The algorithm is then fitted to the given data,
which means it learns from the training data: Whenever a new data item from
the training set is processed by the algorithm, the predicted label and the cor-
rect label are compared. If both labels differ too much, the algorithm adapts
its parameters so that the new data item as well as the already processed data
items can be predicted with the smallest possible error. How this adaption pro-
cess works, which parameters are adapted and how the difference between the
labels is computed, depends on the actual algorithm type and will be discussed
later. After the training phase, the fitted algorithm can be used to predict la-
bels for unlabeled data items. Examples of supervised learning approaches are
regression and classification approaches.
• Unsupervised learning methods, on the other hand, do not need a training set,
and work on data which does not have a known result. They instead use the
structure inherent in the given data set to perform different tasks, for example
to cluster the data set into groups of similar data items (clustering algorithms),
to remove redundant data items (complexity reduction) or to learn general asso-
ciation rules (association rule machine learning).
• Semi-supervised learning approaches are a mixture of both aforementioned
learning styles. There exists a training set of some data items with a known
result, but also some data items for which the result is not known. Similar
to supervised algorithms, semi-supervised algorithms have the goal to make
a prediction on unlabeled data, but in this case, the model has to first learn
the structures present in the data to train the model and do the prediction on
unlabeled data later. Some regression and classifications algorithms fall into
this category.
For the tasks discussed in this thesis, we try to infer privacy settings based on
users’ personality and privacy measures. In all cases, we have a training set that
has been recorded through a user study that can be used for fitting the algorithm;
therefore the domain of supervised learning approaches is of interest in the scope of
this thesis, and will be discussed in this section. In the following, we will describe
some of the machine learning techniques that have been used later in this thesis, and
how the algorithm selection is conducted.
2.6.1 Support vector machines
The original approach for support vector machines was proposed by Vladimir Vap-
nik and Alexey Chervonenkis in 1963 [166] and worked, in its original form, as a
linear classifier. About 30 years later in 1992, a new method called the “kernel trick”
was proposed that also allows support vector machines to be used for classifying
non-linear patterns [46]. The approach of a support vector machine can be described
best in a two-dimensional space, as depicted in Figure 2.28. Informally stated, a clas-
sification algorithm tries to separate the two classes of data items (blue and pink) by
drawing a line between those two clusters. Mathematically, this imaginary sepa-
rating line is a kernel function in support vector machines, the initial description of
support vector machines used such linear kernels for the classification. The SVM al-
gorithm then selects the line which has the largest margin between the closest points
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FIGURE 2.28: Different hyperplanes separating the data items in two-
dimensional space. Image source: An Introduction to Statistical Learning
[166]
of both clusters (see Figure 2.29), maximizing the generalizability of the classifier.
This simple method is called the maximum margin classifier or hard margin classifier.
Similarly, the same can be done using a plane in a three-dimensional space, or a
hyperplane in an n-dimensional space.
However, it is not always possible to separate two clusters using a simple line,
as shown in Figure 2.30. For this purpose, the authors of the original SVM approach
proposed a method that also allows the misclassification of some of the training
items, called a soft margin classifier or support vector classifier [75]. This type of support
vector machine introduces a regularization parameter C that denotes the amount of
allowed misclassifications. However, choosing the correct C is not always trivial,
as a small C (only a few misclassifications allowed) will on one hand reduce the
bias, but on the other hand may introduce a high variance. On the other hand, a
high C leads to a higher generalizability, but also increases the bias. Therefore, the
authors later introduced an approach called the “kernel trick” to solve the problem
of separability in an n-dimensional space, by introducing polynomial kernels (see
Figure 2.31) and by transferring the problem space into a higher dimension, where
the separation is again possible using linear or polynomial kernels (see Figure 2.32).
Support vector machines are especially suitable if the clusters can be separated
well, and can also handle non-linear data using the kernel trick. On the other hand,
it is hard to determine the cause of misclassification problems, as the use of kernels
for separating the data makes it hard to interpret the algorithm parameters that are
estimated during the learning phase.
Apart from classification problems, support vector machines can also be used
for predicting label sets with an unlimited amount of labels, which corresponds to
a regression algorithm called support vector regression (SVR) [93]. Support vector re-
gression uses the same principle as support vector classification, but this time the
distance from the data points to the hyperplane is minimized. Also, SVR algorithms
can use either a linear or a polynomial kernel for the approximation.
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FIGURE 2.29: Margin between separating line and clusters that has
to be maximized by the algorithm. Image source: An Introduction to
Statistical Learning [166]
FIGURE 2.30: Clusters that cannot be separated by a maximum mar-
gin classifier. Image source: An Introduction to Statistical Learning [166]
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FIGURE 2.31: Polynomial kernel separating two clusters. Image
source: An Introduction to Statistical Learning [166]
FIGURE 2.32: Solving a clustering problem by trans-
ferring the data into a higher dimension. Image source:
http://svmcompbio.tuebingen.mpg.de/img/poly.png
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2.6.2 Ridge regression
A problem that is often experienced using simple linear regressors such as the sup-
port vector regressors is the problem of multicollinearity [319]. Multicollinearity ex-
ists when two or more of the input variables in the data set have a strong correlation
with each other. Let’s say X and Y are input variables with a strong correlation. That
means there is no data set in which X changes while Y stays more or less constant; X
and Y are always changing together, making it hard to precisely estimate coefficients
for both variables, as they cannot be observed isolated from each other. Even small
changes in the data set can lead to a large change of the estimated regression coeffi-
cients, making the regression model highly unstable, and leading to a reduced pre-
cision compared to models without any correlation in the input. Overfitting is often
caused by redundant input parameters that are correlated to each other. Further-
more, the calculated significances for the different input variables are not reliable;
the more variables that are correlated with each other, the more the t-values and the
significance of the input variables is reduced. That means the statistical analysis of
the model can only state how good the overall accuracy of the model is, but it cannot
reliably state how well the individual parameters of the prediction perform.
In practice, multicollinearity can be detected, in its simplest form, by observing
the regression coefficients of the other input parameters when a new feature is added
to the model. In the ideal case, the other coefficients should not change; if some of
them change significantly, there might exist a multicollinearity with those param-
eters. In order to be able to also include input variables that are multicorrelated,
an approach has been invented called Tikhonov regularization or ridge regression [320],
named after its inventor Andrey Tikhonov. Broadly speaking, ridge regression al-
lows a better estimation of the coefficients of multicollinear model parameters at the
cost of an increased, but tolerable bias. Let’s say that A is our input matrix, where
each row contains one set of observed values and b is the vector containing in each
row the corresponding value we want to predict. Then a regression has to find an x
so that A ∗ x = b. A simple regression would then try to minimize the distance of
the regression hyperplane towards the data points, e.g. ‖A ∗ x− b‖, where ‖ · ‖ is the
Euclidean distance. The ridge regression instead adds a regularization term to the
equation, so it optimizes ‖A ∗ x− b‖+ ‖Γx‖, where Γ is called the Tikhonov matrix.
Usually, Γ is chosen as a multiple of the identity matrix (Γ = α ∗ I), so that solutions
with smaller norms are preferred, known as L2 regularization. By that means, it is
possible to shrink the size of the coefficients based on the square of their magnitude,
reducing the problem of overfitting. The amount of shrinking of the coefficients is
controlled by a regression parameter λ. If λ = 0, the ridge regression is equal to a
least squares regression, whereas all coefficients are shrunk to zero if λ = ∞. Usually
λ is chosen between 0 and 1, typically starting with 0.01 as a starting value.
Ridge regression is especially suitable for input data where the probability of cor-
relation between the input parameters is high. The predictions that are performed
later all depend on individual measures like personality or privacy desire; some-
times there are multiple, different measures included from the same topic, for ex-
ample multiple privacy measures. Therefore the possibility of experiencing mul-
ticollinearity in the input data is high in the problems discussed throughout this
thesis. However, we apply heuristics to eliminate redundant input data; therefore
we can neither state that our data sets are free from multicollinearity, nor can we say
that multicollinearity is always present. We will therefore check for every single do-
main whether a regularized method like the ridge regression is needed or whether
unregulated methods like support vector machines are sufficient, as we will see later
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in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
2.6.3 Regression with categorical input parameters
The regression algorithms presented up to this point all have one thing in common:
Input parameters always have to be continuous scales or ordinal variables with a
more or less equal distance between their values. However, regression problems of-
ten also depend on ordinal variables where equidistance cannot be guaranteed, or
even on categorical variables, which cannot, without further processing, be used as
a regression input [37]. In this case, if the categorical variables have to be included
in the set of regression parameters, the data scientist has to first recode the vari-
ables, for example into a binary representation. For this purpose, the number n of
categories of the categorical variable V is counted. Then, for each possible category
C1, ..., Cn = C, one binary variable B1, ..., Bn = B with a value of either 0 or 1 is cre-
ated. The value of each binary variable is calculated as follows:
∀bi ∈ B, ci ∈ C : Bi =
{
1, i f V = ci
0, i f V 6= ci
That way, categorical variables can be transformed into a set of binary variables
that can be used as input parameters for the regression. However, recoding vari-
ables using this approach, also known as one-hot encoding [148], leads to the effect
that the different outcomes of the same categorical variable are coded into differ-
ent binary variables for the regression; therefore each outcome is observed as an
individual parameter (or separate case) by the regression algorithm, neglecting the
connection between the binary variables. Therefore a recoding in binary variables
can lead to a reduced expressiveness of the categorical variable. Another possibility
is to recode categorical variables into a single variable, for example by using ordinal
encoding [148]. In this approach, each category is assigned an integer value depend-
ing on the position of occurrence within the data set. The first category is assigned
1, the second 2, and so forth until the nth category is replaced by the integer n. How-
ever, the values assigned to the different categories are arbitrary; nevertheless, the
regression algorithm expects the integer values to be in a logical order, leading to
a misinterpretation by the regression algorithm and a loss of precision connected to
this. Furthermore, as the encoding depends on the order of categories in the data set,
the categories will receive different encodings when the data set is shuffled or when
another data set is used, making it hard to compare the regression results between
data sets.
To avoid this problem and to automate the conversion of categorical and ordinal
variables into scales, a technique called categorical regression (CATREG) has come
into focus lately [226]. CATREG transforms ordinal and categorical variables into
scales by using optimization algorithms to find the optimal order for the categories
and also the best distance between them. Also for ordinal measures, where the dis-
tance is not necessarily equal, CATREG can apply its optimization algorithm to find
the optimal distance between each of the discrete levels, so that the prediction ac-
curacy is maximized. For this purpose, CATREG utilizes nonlinear transformations
of the input variables and different rating functions to determine the quality of the
chosen transformation. Based on the statistical results and the standard error of the
regression model, the algorithm adjusts the order of categories or the distance be-
tween categories, and performs another test run. This procedure is repeated until
either the maximum number of iteration steps is reached, or the result improves by
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FIGURE 2.33: Layers of a deep learning algorithm Image source: com-
mons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MultiLayerNeuralNetwork_english.png
less than a given threshold ε. Similar to a ridge regression, CATREG also offers to
apply regularization methods on the feature coefficients to avoid overfitting caused
by mutlicollinearity. As a standard, Tikhonov regularization is applied, but other
methods like Lasso and elastic net are also available.
Within this thesis, it is often the case that ordinal, and sometimes also categorical,
variables have to be used as input features within a machine learning prediction.
Again, whether encoding methods like one-hot encoding lead to the best results, or
whether specialized regression methods like CATREG should be applied, depends
on the actual data set and will be discussed in the respective sections later.
2.6.4 Deep learning
The contents of this subchapter are based on the book “Deep Learning” by Ian Good-
fellow [136]. The aforementioned algorithms are all very suitable to solve problems
which are intellectually hard for humans to solve (for example because they require
a high amount of complex calculations), but which can be described formally very
well. However, there are other problems like face recognition or text recognition
which can be solved intuitively by humans, but which are hard to describe formally
and therefore hard to solve using conventional machine learning algorithms. For
solving these problems, a different machine learning technique called deep learning
[136] is usually applied. Briefly stated, deep learning divides the problem to be
solved into a large number of small steps, which are realized by layers inside the
deep learning model. As depicted in Figure 2.33, a deep learning algorithm consists
of several types of layers. The input data (for example the pixels of an image) is fed
into the input layer. After the input layer, several hidden layers process the data in a
way that is determined by the deep learning algorithm, before the data reaches the
output layer, which delivers the result of the analysis (for example the name of the
person that was recognized in the input picture).
The tasks that are conducted by each of these layers are realized in units which
are designed by the programmer. Similar to the aforementioned machine learning
algorithms, deep learning approaches are also trained by sample data, for example
photos annotated with the name of the person that is shown in the image. As we
have seen in the previous sections, machine learning algorithms typically rely on
input features. The quality of the input features, especially the presence of random
variables and the variance of the data, significantly influences the precision of the
prediction. Data preparation and isolation of the features that are important for
the prediction (e.g. the independent variables) is therefore often needed prior to the
training of the ML algorithm. For some cases where the independent variables are
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FIGURE 2.34: Example of an MLP for object classification in images.
Image source: [136]
known or where the amount of random variables is low, those approaches work very
well. However, if the variance of the data or random variables is high, the algorithms
deliver a low prediction precision. Let’s say the algorithm has to recognize a person
in a given image. Images contain a lot of random variables, for example the view
angle, distance, lightning conditions, facial expression, and even the hairstyle or
clothing of the person on that day.
Feedforward deep networks
The most essential example of a deep learning model is the feedforward deep net-
work, also called the multilayer perceptron (MLP). An MLP can be seen as a sequence
of mathematical functions (the hidden layers) that are applied subsequently on the
input data. Figure 2.34 shows an example of a multilayer perceptron for object clas-
sification in images. The input layer is fed the pixels of the image. The next, first
hidden layer detects edges in the image. Based on this data, the second hidden
layer detects corners and contours. The third hidden layer uses the corners and con-
tours for identifying object parts, whereas the final output layer delivers the textual
representation of the recognized objects. As the example shows, each of the layers
performs a relatively simple operation on its own. Given the pixels, it is easy to de-
tect edges by comparing the brightness of neighboring pixels. Given the edges, it is
easy to find the contours as a collection of edges. By finding specific combinations
of corners and contours, it is easy to identify object parts. Finally, the combination of
object parts allows it to easily identify objects. To conclude, by dividing the complex
task of object identification into multiple easy parts, the MLP is able to perform the
complex task.
In contrast to conventional machine learning algorithms, the increased complex-
ity of deep learning methods, involving hundreds to thousands of processing lay-
ers, needs a significantly larger amount of training data in order to perform well.
The roots of deep learning algorithms can be found in the 1950s. However, they
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became popular only starting in the 1990s, when the amount of training data avail-
able was sufficient to train the algorithms correctly. In addition to the amount of
data, the computational ressources needed for deep learning are also significantly
higher compared to other ML approaches, which is another reason why they be-
came popular only 40 years after their invention, when the computational hardware
was fast enough to run them. The larger and more complex the deep learning model,
the more precise the predictions can be, but also more computational ressources are
needed.
Similar to the machine learning algorithms discussed earlier, deep learning algo-
rithms also have a problem with generalization, meaning that they work well on the
training data, but not on the test data. Therefore, similar to machine learning, there
also exist regularization methods for deep learning that increase the precision on test
data, possibly at the cost of prediction precision of the training data. Similar to a
ridge regression, L2 parameter regularization can also be applied to the coefficients
of the deep learning functions in each unit of the deep learning model to avoid over-
fitting. Another approach that is used to avoid overfitting is to create fake data that
is added to increase the size of the training data set, also known as dataset augmen-
tation. Input data often has several known variations for which the deep learning
model should be made robust, for example the rotation or lightning conditions of an
image for face recognition. In that case, additional training images can be generated
by rotating the images of the training set, or by changing the illumination. Injecting
image noise is another option for generating additional images. Apart from gen-
erating additional training data, another solution for increasing the robustness to
variance of the deep learning model is to introduce noise to the parameters of the
unit functions. By that means, additional variance that is not present in the training
data can be incorporated into the trained deep learning model. There are many other
regularization methods like parameter tying, early stopping and multitask learning,
and methods that combine a multitude of models together for the regularization (for
example bagging and other ensemble methods), which will not be discussed here for
the sake of brevity.
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
CNNs were first described by LeCun et al. as a method for the recognition of hand-
written ZIP codes [198]. CNNs are a specialized kind of neural network that works
on two- or three-dimensional, grid-like data; they are therefore especially suitable
for applications like time series analyses and image processing. Convolutional net-
works are based on two different operations that are conducted one after another
in layers. Those two types of layers are named convolution and pooling and are de-
scribed within the next paragraph. Especially for classification tasks, the output of a
convolutional network is often fed into a traditional MLP for the actual classification
task on the preprocessed data.
Convolution layers [136, pp. 327] use a convolution function to process a region
of input data using a convolution matrix (also called a kernel). A convolution opera-
tion S for a two-dimensional input I using a two-dimensional convolution kernel K
is defined as follows:
S(i, j) = (I ∗ K)(i, j) = ∑m ∑n(I(m, n))K(i−m, j− n)
That means for computing the output of the component (i,j), not only is the pixel
(i,j) in the input used for the computation, but also its neighbours.
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FIGURE 2.35: Pooling being invariant to small translations: Whereas
the input is shifted one pixel (top image to bottom image) and thus
causes all four items in the input to change, only two are affected in
the output. Image source: [136, p. 337]
The most important difference from an MLP is that conventional neural networks
like an MLP use a matrix for the computation of the output which has the same size
as the input matrix. That means, if an image to be processed has x ∗ y = M pixels,
the processing matrix would also have to have the size N = x ∗ y. The processing
time for computing the matrix product in a MLP would be therefore be inO(M ∗N).
In contrast to that, convolutional networks use sparse matrices, meaning the matrix
that is applied to each each pixel is significantly smaller compared to a conventional
neural network and therefore faster to compute, reducing the computation time to
O(k ∗ M) where k  N. In addition to this, convolution uses parameter sharing,
meaning not every data point is assigned its own separate wheight, but weights
are shared among several data points, thereby further reducing the memory needed
for the computation. The sharing of parameters also causes the convolutions to be
equivariant to translations [136, pp. 330].
Convolutional networks usually execute several convolution steps in parallel at
the beginning and feed them into a non-linear activation function like a rectified
linear activation function (detector stage). After this, pooling is used to further modify
the output [136, pp. 335]. Whereas the output of a convolution has the same size as
the input, a pooling operation combines several nearby inputs into a single output,
thereby reducing its size. Max pooling, for example, selects the largest number of the
input region as the output. Other pooling functions return the (weighted) average
of the rectangular neighborhood or the L2 norm. Using pooling, the representation
is made invariant to small translations, as the output of the pooling function does
not change (see Figure 2.35). Which pooling function should be used depends on
the data and the situation [47].
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2.6.5 Choice of the right algorithm
Unfortunately, there is no single algorithm that works best on all supervised learning
problems (this state of affairs is called the no free lunch theorem) [37]. The choice of
the best algorithm depends on several issues that have to be traded off; in some
cases even a simple trial-and-error procedure is the best way of finding the best
algorithm for the given problem. The four major issues to be considered for selecting
a supervised learning algorithm are the bias-variance trade-off, the function complexity
and amount of training data, dimensionality of the input space, and the noise in the output
values.
The bias error in a supervised algorithm is often caused by biased training data,
e.g. training data that is not representative and that is missing a lot of important in-
formation [126]. If an algorithm has a high bias, it can perform extraordinarily well
on data items that have a similar bias as the training data, but will perform poorly
on data items that are not present in the training set. A high bias or high bias error
is also denoted as underfitting, which means that the algorithm is too specialized on
the given (biased) training data in order to work for a more general, unbiased data
set. On the other hand, the variance error arises from the sensitivity of the algorithm
to small fluctuations in the data. In this case also known as overfitting, the algorithm
is modeling and predicting the random noise inside the training data, reducing the
prediction accuracy of the model. The goal is usually to reduce both bias and vari-
ance error inside the trained model. Unfortunately, bias and variance contradict
each other: A data set with a minimal bias has a higher variance of the algorithm
parameters across different samples, and vice versa. A countermeasure for this so-
called bias-variance dilemma is the usage of a bias-variance decomposition, which tries
to automatically predict both bias and variance. Bias-variance decomposition was
originally implemented for a classification method called least-squares regression,
but regression methods like LASSO and ridge regression also have regularization
methods that use the bias-variance decomposition to reduce the sum of both errors
to a minimum.
The second important thing when choosing the ML algorithm is the choice of the
complexity of the algorithm, which has to fit the complexity of the data [37]. If the
data is not very complex, a simple algorithm, for example using a linear regression,
can also provide good results on a small, biased data set. As an example, let’s say
we want to build a machine learning model that predicts the speed of a falling object
based on the falling time of the object. As we know from our physics education, the
speed can be calculated as v = g ∗ t where g is the constant gravitational acceleration,
forming a simple linear equation. Similarly, if we are using a linear regression to
solve the problem, we need only two rows of training data to get good results, as all
other data points will follow the same linear regression curve. On the other hand, if
we want to predict complex scenarios like life expectancies based on lifestyle habits,
more complex machine learning algorithms should be preferred. Unfortunately, it
is often the case that the complexity or the expected shape of the regression curve is
not known beforehand; therefore, the machine learning algorithm with the optimal
complexity can be found only by trial and error.
The third factor to be considered when approaching a machine learning problem
is the dimensionality of the data [37]. Independent from the actual machine learning
algorithm, a precise prediction gets harder the more input features the algorithm is
given within the training set, even if the outcome depends only on a small number
of the provided input features. The higher the number of features (the dimensionality
of the input space), the more the algorithm can be distracted by unnecessary input
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features that lead to an increased variance in the predicted outcome, e.g. to an over-
fitting of the algorithm. Because of this reason, when the input space is large, one
should try to reduce the number of input features to a minimum, for example by
using dimensionality reduction, or by using heuristics like the wrapper subset selection
(WSS) to iteratively find good input features while discarding irrelevant ones.
As a fourth factor, it is important to keep an eye on the noise of the output values
in the training set. Especially if the output data is human input data, for example
from a user study, the data scientist has to first check the output values for plausibil-
ity and noise, and remove outliers before applying the machine learning algorithm.
If the output data is too noisy and not sanity-checked beforehand, the trained model
is prone to overfitting, as it is trying to also model the noisiness of the data from the
training set.
Lastly, there are also other factors that have a minor, but still significant influence
on the choice of the algorithm and the precision of the prediction. Based on the het-
erogeneity of the data, e.g. whether all input features are scales, or whether ordinal
or even categorical features are also present, the data scientist has to decide whether
she will use simple algorithms like vector machines or linear regression that can use
only scales as an input, or whether more complex approaches like categorical regres-
sion (CATREG) should be employed to cope with ordinal and especially categorical
variables. Some methods like linear regression, logistic regression, or distance-based
methods are prone to redundancy in the data, which should therefore be reduced to
a minimum.
Within our studies, we always manually checked the study data in order to re-
move outliers, and used control questions to automatically remove participants that
did not fill out the questionnaire earnestly before using the study results as training
data. The algorithm we chose depended often on the type of input data that we used;
we therefore applied simple algorithms like support vector machines, as well as al-
gorithms reducing the bias-variance error like ridge regression, up to a categorical
regression that we used for the location sharing domain, where several categorical
and ordinal variables are present. We used wrapper subset selection heuristics to re-
duce the dimensionality of our data to a minimum. Details on the methods that were
applied on the different domains will be given later, in their respective chapters.
Although deep learning models have been shown to be very precise, they require
a high amount of computational power and a large amount of training data. As the
training data used within this thesis had to be collected by user studies, the amount
of data was sufficient only for traditional machine learning algorithms. Therefore
we see the investigation of using deep learning for recommending privacy settings
based on user personality as a task for future research.
2.6.6 Evaluation of a trained model and cross-validation
Often only one data set is available for training and evaluating a machine learning
model. Therefore, to evaluate the precision of the model, the data is separated into
two parts. The first part is called the training set and is used for training the model
and for adjusting the parameters. In supervised learning, the machine learning algo-
rithm is given both input features, as well as the values of the dependent variables
the algorithm has to predict. Typically, 90% of the data are assigned to the train-
ing set [125]. After the model is trained, the remaining 10% of the data, called the
validation set or test set, is used for validating the trained model. For this purpose,
the model is given only the input values of the validation set, and has to predict
the values of the dependent variables. To measure the quality of the algorithm, the
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averaged difference between the predicted and the actual value is computed, called
the standard error.
However, if this procedure is done only once, it is still possible with a small
standard error that the algorithm would perform worse with another data set, i.e.
the generalizability of the trained model cannot be assured with this approach. For
this reason, a technique called cross-validation is typically used when evaluating a
machine learning model. There are two families of cross-validation methods: the
exhaustive cross-validation and the non-exhaustive cross-validation methods [125,
187]. Whereas exhaustive methods try out all possible partitions of the data into
training and test data, non-exhaustive methods do not test all possible combinations
and can instead be seen as a form of sample testing. In most cases, the number
of data items and hence the the number of possible partitions is too large to allow
exhaustive cross-validation within a reasonable computing time [125].
There are two exhaustive cross-validation methods, namely leave-p-out cross-validation,
and a specialized form of leave-p-out cross-validation with p = 1, called leave-one-
out cross-validation [59]. In these methods, p rows of the data set (or data items) are
used for the test set, while the remaining data items remain in the training set. This
is done for all possible combinations of dividing the data set into p items for the
test set, and the remaining items for the training set. Similarly for the leave-one-out
cross-validation, one data item is always kept for the test set, while the others are
used as a training set.
The most frequently used non-exhaustive cross-validation method is the k-fold
cross-validation [50], especially in its specialized form with k = 10, called ten-fold
cross-validation [274]. In this approach, the data is partitioned into k folds of an
approximately equal size. One of the folds is always the test set, while the oth-
ers are used for the training set. The procedure is repeated for each of the k folds,
and the results are averaged. If k = n, i.e. if the amount of folds is equal to the
amount of data entries in the data set, this approach is equal to leave-one-out cross-
validation [151]. In contrast to other methods that use random sampling, k-fold
cross-validation makes sure that each data item is part of the test set exactly once.
Apart from the more controlled k-fold cross-validation approach, another non-
exhaustive cross-validation method that is often used is repeated random sub-sampling
validation, also known as Monte Carlo cross-validation [94]. In this method, all data
items are randomly assigned to the training or the test set [194]. The size of the
training and the test set is defined beforehand. The procedure of dividing the data
set into training and test sets, training and evaluating the machine learning model
is then repeated n times, and the results are averaged over all runs. In practice,
the procedure is repeated until the change of the averaged result is below a certain
threshold. As the number of runs approaches infinity, the results of the repeated
random sub-sampling validation converges to the results of a leave-p-out cross val-
idation [94]. In contrast to k-fold validation, the size of the training and test set and
the number of runs can be freely chosen. On the other hand, it may occur (and will
occur with increased n), that the test sets and training sets of different runs will over-
lap, or that some of the data items will never be assigned the to test set. In this thesis,
both ten-fold cross-validation as Monte-Carlo cross-validation will be used.
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2.7 User modeling and cross-domain user modeling
As mentioned in earlier sections of this chapter, some of the privacy recommender
systems offer privacy settings based on a user stereotype. In order to find the correct
stereotype, these approaches first have to build a user model. In this section, we
will first discuss how user modeling is performed, and how user models can be
transferred to other domains (cross-domain user modeling), which helps us to predict
privacy settings for a domain based on the privacy settings from other domains, as
discussed in chapter 7.
2.7.1 User modeling
The major part of the content of this section is based on the chapter “User modeling”
from the “Handbook of Human Factors in Web Design” [173]. The main goal of user
modeling is to adapt the system to the individual user’s needs, meaning the system
needs to “say the ‘right’ thing at the ‘right’ time in the ‘right’ way” [117]. This means
that the system first has to gather data from the performance or behavior of the in-
dividual user to either predict user behavior in a human-machine system (predictive
models), or to adapt the user interface to the individual user’s needs (personalized
models) [173, pp. 3]. Which data is included in the user model heavily depends on
the domain and the task for which the user model is developed.
Predictive models
The simplest form of predictive models is static user models. These models are typi-
cally gathered by performing a task analysis, for example using the GOMS technique
[56]. For the GOMS technique, goals and subgoals of the task are analyzed, as well
as the methods that are used to achieve these goals, and the operators that are car-
rying out the task. However, those static predictive models involve no simulation
and therefore also cannot predict the time needed for conducting the task. Once
modeled, they cannot adapt to the current situation or changes in general. Dynamic
predictive models, in contrast, also model the cognitive and motor performance of
the user which has been observed in the task analysis, for example, allowing them
to mimic more realistic user behavior by dynamically adapting the user model [173,
pp. 8]. More advanced user model architectures also incorporate learning skills,
and are thus able to automatically learn from user decisions which are not explicitly
modeled by the developer and thereby also able to infer such user decisions in the
future, for example using machine learning techniques [234]. Apart from being static
or dynamic, some of the predictive models use stereotypes of users, where groups of
similar users are clustered together and represented by the same user profile in the
user model, whereas other predictive models are highly adaptive, meaning that every
user is assigned her own user profile in the user model, depending on her individual
performance [158].
Personalized models
Personalized user models are an important part of adaptive user interfaces [173,
pp. 16]. In contrast to adaptable user interfaces, which allow the user to customize
the UI to her needs, for example by changing the keyboard layout or spell checking
language, adaptive UIs try to automatically infer when user preferences change, and
perform the adaptation automatically, based mostly on a personalized user model.
Some of the approaches use direct input from the user for creating user profiles, for
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example using questionnaires [116]. Based on the answers, the user can be matched
to other users in the database, allowing the UI to be adapted according to their pref-
erences. This technique, called collaborative filtering, assumes that users with similar
characteristics will also act similarly and prefer similar UI designs. Apart from col-
laborative filtering, the adaptation can also be performed based on observed usage
characteristics like mouse or eye movements, or keyboard usage, for example, in
order to recognize that the user is experiencing difficulties and needs help, which
can then be incorporated into the UI. Also, how the UI elements are accessed can
be used to infer which task the user is trying to perform. A museum website can,
for example, be used for gathering information about specific exhibitions that are
of general interest for the user, to provide a virutal tour of the museum, or to help
the user find interesting details about exhibits he found interesting during his visit.
Based on the detected purpose of the visit to the website, a different presentation of
the information may be suitable [173, pp. 22]. Another application of personalized
user modeling is to support users in their tasks, for example by ranking search items
higher when they might be of more interest for the user, or to limit the number of
displayed choices in a UI based on the user profile.
User models are used for a wide variety of applications, for example tutoring
systems that adapt to user abilities and learning skills [173, pp. 24], to facilitate in-
teraction amoing users or to adapt the display of electronic books to the user’s needs
[173, pp. 28], or to implement agents that act autonomously on the user’s behalf [173,
pp. 30]. Personality stereotypes have also been used for recommending privacy set-
tings in research [128]. However, using highly adaptive user models to offer each
user their own privacy recommendations, has not been part of research so far. The
privacy recommenders discussed throughout this thesis all rely on highly adaptive
user models for their recommendations.
2.7.2 Cross-domain user modeling
Recommender systems described in earlier sections of this chapter often rely on
input data that they require from the user, for example her personality measures,
privacy measures, or user interaction data like privacy settings chosen in the past.
However, if a new user enters the system for whom no data is available so far, for
example because he has just registered on a social media website, those approaches
fail. Only over time, when the user generates more and more data to be used by the
recommender system, can the recommendations start to become precise. This prob-
lem is denoted as the “cold start problem” in recommender systems [285]. A similar
problem arises when domain data is present for the user, but there is not enough for
a single-domain recommender system to be able to make a good prediction, called
the “sparsity problem” [243, 204].
Both problems are not new and have been considered in research often. Usu-
ally the idea is to use user models from other domains as an input for the predic-
tion, for example by using privacy settings on other similar social media platforms
to do the prediction (for example using privacy settings from Google+ to predict
privacy settings on Facebook), or by using input from other domains, for example
using the choice of app permission settings to derive privacy settings for a social
network platform. This so-called user model transfer has led to mixed results [348].
On one hand, the precision is better using single-domain recommender systems; on
the other hand, cross-domain recommender systems have the ability to predict in
more than one domain, which can lead to an increased engagement and satisfaction
80 Chapter 2. Background and Related Work
of the user [5]. Therefore, user model transfer should be used when a single-domain
recommender system has insufficient data about the target domain [282].
Collaborative filtering
Cross-domain recommender systems can be divided into two groups of recommenders:
those which are based on collaborative filtering, and content-based approaches. Collab-
orative filtering approaches [33, 55] rely on the assumption that if a user A behaves
similarly to another user B in one domain, then she will behave similarly in another
domain as well. The idea of cross-domain user modeling using collaborative filter-
ing is therefore if data for user A is only available only in a domain D1 and a rec-
ommendation has to be done for domain D2, to find a similar user B for whom data
from both D1 and D2 is available, and who behaves similarly to user A in D1. A is
then given recommendations according to B’s behavior in D2. In the case of privacy
settings, this means that the recommender system searches for a user B that matches
A’s privacy settings in D1, let’s say in the social media domain, and uses B’s privacy
settings in D2, let’s say her mobile app permission settings, to recommend similar
permission settings to A. Technically, these approaches are mostly based on machine
learning approaches like nearest-neighbor. Let’s say, for example, that the data items
to be matched are ratings for movies in different domains. Then, the collaborative
filtering algorithm treats the rating for the movies in one domain as one vector, and
uses a nearest-neighbor algorithm to find a user that gave similar ratings to those
movies. Then, the algorithm predicts ratings for movies in other domains (or books
from the same or another genre, to mention another example) by averaging the rat-
ings of other users who are similar according to the nearest-neighbor algorithm. The
user is then given recommendations based on these predicted ratings.
Content-based approaches
In contrast to that, content-based approaches do not rely on numerical data, like rat-
ings for example, but instead use the actual content for matching similar items, for
example keywords, social tags or semantic properties. More specifically, the content
of each item is denoted by a set of features F = F1, ..., Fn. For each of these features,
an item is assigned a vector consisting of real numbers, where the i-th component of
the vector denotes the weight, i.e. the relevance of the corresponding feature Fi for
the item. Similarly, each user is given a vector containing real numbers that describe
how much he likes or dislikes this feature. An overlap between two domains that
can be used for cross-domain prediction exists if some of the features are present in
both domains A and B, i.e. FA ∩ FB 6= ∅. If so, the recommender system uses the
features from FA that are known from the user, and uses the matching features from
FB for the recommendation. Instead of using keywords for the matching, some of
the content-based approaches are based on social tags that are given by the users, so
instead of using a feature vector with a predefined set of features, the set of features
consists of a vocabulary T, which contains the social tags used in the environment
(for example a social media page). In those approaches, the user is characterized
by the tags she gives to the items (e.g. videos, post entries, etc.) she publishes on
the social media page, and data items are characterized by the tags given to them.
Similar to keyword-based approaches, the user is then given recommendations for
data items from other domains that received similar tags as those that the user often
uses when publishing data, e.g. the topics she is interested in. Apart from those
two approaches, other relations, e.g. context factors such as time or the user’s mood,
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can also be used as an input for doing the recommendation task, similar to single-
domain recommender systems as explained in earlier sections.
Collective and adaptive models
Apart from the data type that a recommender system is working on, cross-domain
recommender systems can also be distinguished by the data sources and recommen-
dation techniques used for building the user model [5]. Some of them use the data
of one domain and try to give recommendations in only one other domain (adap-
tive models); others are collective models which use the data of several domains and
can also make joint recommendations for multiple domains. Examples of content-
based adaptive recommender systems are for example Karminskas and Ricci’s work
on location-adapted music recommending using tags [178]. In their work, they
matched social tags for the location where the user is currently located, and matched
them with music tracks with similar tags, which are then recommended to the user.
Similar work has been done by linking semantic-based knowledge of two domains
together in the example of recommending music for places of interest [111]. In con-
trast to the former work, this approach was more generic and could be implemented
for two arbitrary domains. The semantic knowledge was provided in the form of
RDF models offered by the Linked Data4 project, which offers a global data space
connecting data from multiple domains like people, companies, books, films, televi-
sion, music, statistical and scientific data, and reviews [38].
Social tags have also been used for collective content-based recommender systems,
for example for completing form-based data (entered explicitly by the user on forms
on social media websites) or tag-based user profiles, so that even for social media
websites that are not often used and thus have only sparse information about the
users can be given strong recommendations by assembling and transferring user
models from other social web pages the user has used in the past [1]. Other works
focused on social tags in multiple social networks, and used Wikipedia as a multi-
domain model to do the subsequent semantic modeling of the user’s interests [317].
On the side of adaptive collaboration-based recommenders, mostly ratings were
used for matching the user to similar users, for example to recommend books that
are rated as good by users that gave a similar rating to the same movies as the user
in question [345]. This is especially helpful to solve the sparsity problem, e.g. if one
domain exists with a high rating density, to transfer the ratings to another domain
with a low rating density, and (for example) to recommend movies in such a domain
where only sparse data is available, e.g. where no or only a few movie ratings are
available [204]. The same can also be done for heterogeneous data, for example if
both user ratings as well as “clicks”, i.e. the number of views, exist and should both
be used across several domains, by using a principled matrix-based transfer learning
framework [243].
Similar to collective content-based recommender systems, there also exist ap-
proaches for collective collaboration-based recommender systems, which use rating
matrices containing user ratings from multiple movie and book websites, and then
use classification algorithms in order to find similar users with data present in the
domain in question, so that this can be used for a recommendation [205]. Some
approaches are even able to integrate binary ratings (i.e. “like” or “dislike”) into nu-
merical ratings (like a rating from 1 to 5), and to use both for recommending items in
the target domain [243]. Some of the approaches also use a probabilistic-based ap-
proach which allows the knowledge to be adaptively transferred across the domains
4http://linkeddata.org (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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by deriving the correlation between the domains automatically, thus increasing the
prediction precision [357].
Ubiquitous user modeling
Another possibility for performing user modeling across domains is described in
the ubiquitous user modeling approach by Dominikus Heckmann [152] and was
designed especially for ubiquitous systems. More specifically, the ubiquitous user
model does not transfer knowledge about the user from one domain to the other,
but rather keeps the domain information separate in order to create a combined
user model out of the domain knowledge. The approach consists of several parts:
The General User Model (GUMO) contains persistent properties of a user, like her
personality and characteristics, demographic information, emotions and profession.
Additionally, domain-dependent interests (for example in books or movies) can be
added to the general user model. In addition to this model, SituationReports de-
scribe the current situation of the user as captured by a ubiquitous sensor using an
ontology, for example when the user is stressed (captured by a heartbeat sensor) or
when she is about to miss a flight and is under time pressure (captured by the airline
website and location sensors). A SituationReport contains several blocks (“boxes”)
of information: first the MainPart box describing the subject (user) and the situa-
tion (for example “Peter is under time pressure”), the situation box denoting spatio-
temporal information such as start, end, duration and location of the situation, the
explanation box including the source of deduction for the situation, e.g. which sen-
sor collected the information and the evidence for the situation, and a privacy box
containing information about the owner of the data, with whom it might be shared
and for what purpose. Using these two parts, it is possible to describe the user’s
characteristics in general (GUMO) as well as the current situation the user is in ac-
cording to the sensors of the ubiquitous environment. The approach also contains a
reasoner, which allows merging context data (e.g. situations) from different domains
described in the ontology. The reasoner can automatically resolve conflicts, for ex-
ample if different sensors give contradictory information (for example the heart beat
sensor detects an increased heart rate and reports an increased stress level, while a
video camera detects a relaxed walking style, leading to the opposite assumption),
or if they report in a different semantical or syntactical style about the same situa-
tion. Based on the merged contextual information and the general user model, the
reasoner can output a report about the user’s needs in the current situation, allowing
the design of a user interface which fits the user’s individual needs in that situation,
for example by simplyfying the navigation through the airport when the user is in a
hurry.
So far, privacy settings and privacy policies have not been part of the cross-
domain user modeling research. In a later section, we will observe how privacy
settings from other domains can be used to predict privacy settings for the target do-
main. The presented approach is a collective approach, as it uses the privacy settings
from all other domains used in the study that are suitable for a prediction. The ap-
proach is further based on collective filtering, as the regressors used will be trained
by study participants from which we know the privacy settings in all domains used
in the study. The approach will then recommend to a user privacy settings similar
to those of other users who chose similar privacy settings in the other domains.
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2.8 Discussion
After a review of existing approaches in the last sections, we will now discuss their
weaknesses that are of concern for this thesis and that are addressed by the ap-
proaches presented in the remainder of the thesis. For this, we will discuss in par-
ticular the problems that are present currently in privacy management systems and
privacy user interfaces trying to assist the user in reducing the target audience and
thereby reducing unwanted data disclosures (“narrowcasting”).
2.8.1 Privacy management systems
There are two major types of privacy management systems to support the user in
doing narrowcasting. Each has its own strengths and flaws.
Rule-based privacy management systems decide whether or not to disclose data
based on rule sets, which are either written by the developer and adapted by the
user, or written from scratch by the user. Although rule-based systems make it pos-
sible to easily trace back the decisions of the privacy management system by inspect-
ing the rules, creating the rule set implies an additional user burden. Additionally,
creating these rule sets requires the user to have technical knowledge about how
rules have to be specified, and which rules are required and useful in which situa-
tions. If the rules cannot be specified using natural language, the user furthermore
has to get used to the formal language specification of the rules. Systems inferring
the rules from natural language can introduce an additional source of errors when
translating the rules from natural language to formal rules. However, the created
rules consist of explicit user feedback and therefore reflect the actual user intentions.
Machine-learning based systems can be again divided into three different kinds of
ML-based systems: unsupervised systems that recommend privacy settings with-
out additional user interaction, supervised systems that are based completely on
user feedback for the prediction, and semi-supervised that combine user feedback
and unsupervised learning for their operation. Similar to rule-based systems, su-
pervised and semi-supervised systems rely on user feedback and thus create an
additional user burden. Furthermore, they require technical knowledge about the
consequences of a disclosement from the user, as he has to decide whether to allow
or deny access requests in some exemple cases. On the other hand, they receive
only explicit feedback from the user, and can therefore ensure that their learning
input corresponds to the actual privacy desires of the user. In contrast to that, un-
supervised systems have the advantage that they do not imply an additional user
burden. Nevertheless, they need another data source for training their predictors.
Usually, unsupervised systems try to learn from earlier prvacy decisions of the user,
for example the privacy settings chosen for existing social network posts of the user.
However, studies in the past have shown an effect called the privacy paradox, mean-
ing that users’ privacy settings significantly differ from their actual privacy inten-
tions. Therefore, systems learning implicitly from earlier privacy decisions suffer
from the privacy paradox by learning and recommending privacy decisions which
do not fully comply with the privacy settings actually desired by the user. Both
variants mostly use only context factors like the occasion or group of recipients as
an additional input for their prediction. A small number of approaches assign the
user a user stereotype based on her personality as an additional input. However,
using individual measures as an input for deriving highly adaptive privacy recom-
mendations, where each user is given an individual recommendation based on the
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individual measures rather than based on the user stereotype, has not been part of
research so far.
Furthermore, rule-based and ML-based approaches in the literature only allow
the recommendation of a binary disclosement decision for social network posts. e.g.
to show or to hide the entire post. Fine-grained privacy recommendations which
also take into account the option to hide only parts of the post have not been dis-
cussed so far.
Cross-domain recommendation systems have so far been used only outside of
the privacy settings domain, for example for recommending products of one do-
main (for example books) using ratings from another domain (for example movies).
Recommending privacy settings for a domain (for example social network posts) us-
ing privacy settings from other domains (for example smartphone app permission
settings) has not been discussed so far.
A summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the mentioned approaches can
be found in Figure 2.36. The first column denotes the amount of user burden in-
troduced, followed by whether it is prone to the privacy paradox, i.e. whether the
learning input correlates to privacy settings to be recommended, and whether it is
suitable for lay users by regarding the level technical knowledge needed. Finally,
the last three columns denote whether the publications in that field use individual
measures for a personalized recommendation of privacy settings, whether they of-
fer fine-grained privacy recommendations instead of a binary recommendation to
disclose or not, and whether they allow a cross-domain privacy recommendation.
The privacy framework included in this thesis offers a recommendation of pri-
vacy settings based on individual measures (see Chapters 4 - 6) rather than the user’s
privacy decision in the past, and thereby is unaffected by the privacy paradox. The
proposed approach does not require technical knowledge, as the individual mea-
sures can be gathered either using a standardized personality and privacy question-
naire asking for subjective situation ratings, or by automatically deriving the indi-
vidual measures from text written by the user, for example social network content
(see Chapter 3). The approach offers multiple privacy levels instead of a binary pri-
vacy recommendation for social network posts, location sharing privacy settings,
and privacy settings for an intelligent retail store like Amazon Go. The approach
discussed in Chapter 7 allows us to recommend privacy settings without individual
measures, by using privacy settings from other domains as an input.
2.8.2 Privacy user interfaces
The radar metaphor has been shown to allow a better overview on the current
privacy state and possible privacy threats, thereby also actively engaging users in
adapting privacy settings. However, the space inside a radar interface is limited,
thus limiting the possible applications so far. Approaches trying to use radar in-
terfaces for audience selection suffer from the fact that the audience that can be
displayed inside the UI is very limited. Especially in social networks, where the
potential audience consists of hundreds or even thousands of users, this limitation
makes it impossible to use radar interfaces in a realistic scenario or in-the-wild stud-
ies. Another drawback of the radar metaphor so far is the lack of ability to display
more than one privacy policy at once. Especially in more complex environments,
like intelligent retail scenarios, that involve multiple different parties (“stakehold-
ers”) like retailers, family and friends, or marketing agencies that are interested in
the data, it is hard to get an overview on the total privacy state at a glance.
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FIGURE 2.36: Strengths and weaknesses of privacy management sys-
tems in related work.
In Chapter 8, we describe two improvements on the radar metaphor. First we
will describe techniques that allow us to display a large number of items, for ex-
ample potential recipients of a post, inside a radar-based UI. The results show that
despite the large number of displayed items, the error rate is still significantly lower
using our improved radar-based UI compared to a conventional list-based interface,
as is used in social networks nowadays. Second, we will show a way of displaying
multiple privacy policies, for example for multiple stakeholders, at a glance, using
a three-dimensional privacy pyramid. Our study highlights that the privacy pyramid
allows a better overview on the current privacy state and makes it possible to detect
unusual and potentially harmful settings, whereas the actual review and adaptation
task is performed better using a traditional list-based UI.
User interfaces for grouping items have been a topic of research multiple times in
the past. However, all research was focused on increasing the usability of the UI, or
tried to transfer the sorting task to other input devices like virtual reality. In Chapter
8, we will discuss how new interaction technologies like virtual reality can be used
to not only increase usability, but also to make the task of social network friend
grouping more enjoyable by introducing gaming elements. A study will show that
depending on the design, the usability and also the enjoyability can be increased.
However, the degree of gamification also has a negative effect on the error rate, so
that a trade-off between enjoyability and quality of the results has to be made.
In-situ feedback has been used for notifying the user about potential privacy in-
vasions, for example for notifying the user about a possible hacking attack on her
shared locations, by detecting if the location is accessed at an unusually high rate
within a short period of time. The usage of smartwatches and social network no-
tifications to get in-situ feedback on privacy violations by viewing and rating new
comments or likes, as well as its possible applications to adapt privacy settings, have
not been part of research so far.
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The next chapter will show how the individual measures, which are used for the
individualized recommendation, can be derived from the user’s written text. After-
wards we will discuss the proposed privacy management system for social network
posts and location sharing based on individual factors, before generalizing the ap-
proach to other domains in Chapters 5 and 6. The cross-domain recommendation of
privacy settings is presented afterwards in Chapter 7, whereas the aforementioned
user interfaces are discussed in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 3
Prediction of individual measures
using written text
The work presented here is based on already-published research [263]. Apart from
predicting the privacy settings for various domains, another problem is the collec-
tion of the individual measures. Whereas related work used context features as an
input that can be captured using (for example) post meta-information like the topic,
time and location of the post, the retrieval of individual features like the personality
and privacy measures cannot be done without the support of the user. In the afore-
mentioned studies, we always used questionnaires to derive the individual mea-
sures. However, this procedure requires some time from the user, which he might
not want to invest. Related work has already shown that a part of the user indi-
vidual measures, namely the big five personality traits, can also be derived without
the user’s assistance, by analyzing written text of the user, for example blog entries,
social network posts, or emails. In this section, we will examine whether the used
privacy measures can also be derived from written text.
Personality is an important factor in people’s everyday lives, as it influences most
aspects of life such as job success [28] and overall happiness [242]. Even susceptibil-
ity to some diseases somehow correlates with personality [339]. But in the modern
connected world, with an increasing amount of data stored for each person, pri-
vacy is also an aspect that is gaining importance in our life and the life of future
generations. Personality has been used for many different use cases, from targeted
advertisements on social network platforms [64, 70] through optimizing the songs
played in a personalized online music stream [113] to a content filter for hotel ratings
on TripAdvisor[278]. Although the individual measures can be used in many appli-
cations, the additional effort to fill in questionnaires with more than 100 questions
leads users to avoid such recommender systems, even though they could benefit
from their usage. Researchers have therefore searched for different ways to circum-
vent this problem: Most of them use publicly available data like social network en-
tries or language features extracted out of the user’s posts to perform a prediction of
the personality traits.
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However, the use of written text to predict a user’s privacy measures has, to
the best of our knowledge, not been examined so far. Within this section, we will
therefore try to shed light on this topic, to be more precise, we attempt to answer the
following questions:
1. Is there a correlation between profile information/writing style and privacy
measures?
2. How precisely can the privacy measures be predicted, compared to predicting
personality measures?
3. Which data set should be used (Facebook or Twitter posts, or profile informa-
tion)?
4. If the personality traits are available, can they be used to predict the privacy
measures? How good is the prediction compared to using social network con-
tent?
Furthermore, we replicate the results of current literature [104] with a reasonably
large data set for Twitter users. We performed an online study, where we captured
both the privacy and personality measures using traditional questionaires, as well as
data from three different text sources that are potential candidates for input features
for the prediction. Those sources are user posts from the Twitter and Facebook so-
cial networks, as well as the user’s profile information, like workplaces he entered,
number of friends, his hometown or his marital status. In a first step, we compute
a correlation between the three data sets and the privacy/personality measures to
observe whether they associate with each other. Based on the findings, we continue
with a subsequent regression analysis to determine how precise a prediction of the
individual measures can be, without further complex optimizations by a language
processing expert. The paper ends with a discussion including guidelines describing
the adequate source for the prediction of the different individual measures.
The results indicate that the privacy measures can be predicted significantly bet-
ter than random, where the optimal source for the prediction is the user’s posts from
either Facebook or Twitter. The precision is similar to the prediction of personality
traits. Personality traits can also be used as a prediction input, although language
features provide the highest precision.
3.1 User study and correlation analysis
As stated before, the goal of the study was to find out whether individual features,
especially the privacy measures, can be derived from a user’s writing style on social
networks or by inspecting the user’s personal profile (like workplaces, hometown,
number of friends etc.). In addition to the privacy measures, we also recorded the
personality measures using a 44-item version of the big five personal inventory[172].
To be more specific, we captured the privacy measures using the IUIPC1[221] ques-
tionnaire and the Westin Privacy Index [195] (see Chapter 2). The social network
posts have been analyzed using the LIWC2 2015 text analysis software. LIWC is
simple software to count text occurences belonging to certain categories. For this
purpose, the software first performs a so-called stemming procedure, where each
1Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns
2Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
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word is reduced to its word stem, for example by removing the declension (e.g.
“houses” is replaced by “house”). After this, the software uses its built-in dictionary
containing more than 80 categories of words to match each of the words in the given
text. The software then outputs, for each of these categories, a percentage, describing
how often a word of that category appears in the text. By that means, we can deter-
mine how much of the user’s words belong to the category “sports”, how often he
uses neurotic-seeming adjectives, or how many exclamation marks can typically be
found inside the user’s texts, for example. For predicting personality, related work
[132] has shown that it’s actually not the content of the profile information items in
social networks that correlates with a user’s privacy measures, but rather whether the
user decided to fill out and share a profile item. In addition to the language features,
we therefore checked in our study whether the different fields of the “About” page
of a user were filled out (later called profile features) rather than extracting the actual
content. The next section will describe the procedure of extracting information, as
well as the study procedure, in more detail.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Online questionnaire
The study was implemented using LimeSurvey3; participants were recruited using
Prolific Academic,4. We selected only participants that were actively using Face-
book or Twitter. As the number of people using both Facebook and Twitter is only a
small population, we split the study into two different studies to avoid a biasing of
our results. In the first study, we required participants to be active Facebook users
(using Twitter was optional), whereas we required participants to be active Twitter
users for the second study (Facebook usage was optional). Therefore the amount of
participants and data sets for the Facebook and the Twitter data sets slightly differ
(nFacebook = 104, nTwitter = 109). The results were later merged for the analysis.
We paid the participants a compensation of 1£upon successful participation. Sim-
ilar to earlier studies, the compensation was paid only if the survey passed our plau-
sibility check, where we checked the survey for completeness and also wether the
control questions had been answered correctly. We therefore obtained 110 results
for each study. We filtered out six participants in the Facebook group as their pro-
file contained too few posts to do a correct language analysis (the software manual
states that a text should contain at least 300 words). In the Twitter group, we had one
participant that had too few posts; we therefore had 104 participants in the Facebook
and 109 in the Twitter group. The ages of the participants ranged from 18 to 72 years
(average 33.02, SD 10.94). Again, like in earlier studies, we had a diverse audience
consisting of students, self-employed workers, employees, and also homemakers.
The survey contained two parts. In the first part, participants had to answer the
privacy and personality questionnaires. For the second part, users had to add a test
Facebook friend given by us to their friend list and enter their Facebook ID (first
study) and/or Twitter screen name (second study). The participants were given a
description of which data is accessed, and infored that data access and processing
were done anonymously, as described in the next section. We store only the language
features derived from the LIWC tool, instead of the actual social network posts, and
check whether the profile items are filled out, without extracting the actual content.
3https://www.limesurvey.org, last accessed 09-07-2019
4https://www.prolific.ac/, last accessed 09-07-2019
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At the end of the questionnaire, participants were given the opportunity to leave
feedback and comments.
3.2.2 Analysis of the social network profiles
After all participants finished the survey, the answers from the study were stored
in a csv file. We then used an automated python script to extract the user’s posts
and profile items using the Selenium web automation toolkit 5. Selenium is a web
automation tool that was originally made for automated website debugging. It al-
lows one to remotely control a web browser instance, simulate mouse clicks and
keyboard input, and retrieve the content of a webpage even when it is dynamically
generated using JavaScript, as on Facebook. In contrast to the Facebook API which
is used frequently in related work, we can access and extract all data items that are
visible to one of the user’s Facebook friends (just like the test user that the partici-
pant had to add during the study), rather than the small part of profile information
items that is accessible using the API. The script that we wrote first opens the friend
list of our test user that the participants had to befriend during the survey. It then
opens the profile page of each friend (i.e. each of our study participants), traverses
the sections of the “About” page and records the posts the user wrote (excluding
posts that friends wrote on the user’s timeline) for the analysis using LIWC. As de-
scribed earlier, we only recorded whether the entries on the “About” page (for more
details on which entries were recorded, see Table 3.1) were filled out and visible to
friends or not. The data we extracted from the social network sites is directly piped
into the LIWC application; we stored only the output of the LIWC tool, e.g. the per-
centages for the different word categories. After all of the test user’s friends (which,
again, corresponds to all study participants) were analyzed, they were automatically
un-friended.
The procedure described in the last sections was reviewed and approved by the
ethical review board of our institution.
3.3 Results
As described in the last section, we recorded three portions of social network data:
language features from Facebook posts and from Twitter posts, and the amount of
data provided on the personal Facebook profile page (“profile features”). In addi-
tion to this data, we have the answers to the privacy and personality questionnaires
(IUIPC, Westin privacy scale and big five personal inventory). Given the shape
of our data (not all data items are normal-distributed), we decided to use a non-
parametric test for the correlation analysis. For this, we performed a Spearman cor-
relation between each privacy/personality measure and the language/profile fea-
tures. The first three subsections give an overview on the correlation coefficients and
significances for each of the three data sources: Facebook language features, Twitter
language features and profile features. In addition to the correlation between the
three data sources and the personality/privacy measures, we are also interested in
whether it is possible to use the personality measures to predict the privacy measures,
which is discussed in the fourth subsection.
5http://www.seleniumhq.org//, last accessed 09-07-2017
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Section Observed fields
General profile information number of status updates
Friends number of friends
Work and Education
number of work entries,
number of education entries
Places You’ve Lived number of places
Contact and Basic Info
number of contact entries,






Life Events number of life events
Photos
number of photos





total number of likes,




number of events visited
in the past
Reviews total number of reviews
TABLE 3.1: Observed Facebook profile items. As discussed above,
we either counted the number of visible entries, or whether an entry is
visible to friends.
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3.3.1 Profile features
Table 3.2 gives an overview on the significant correlations that we observed using
only the profile features that have been extracted out of the participants’ Facebook
user profiles (e.g. number of friends, shared workplaces etc.). All correlations have
been computed with n=104 data sets. The most interesting findings are discussed
below.
Value pair rho p
control - religion .223 .017
control - gender .230 .019
control - political .230 .019
awareness - photos .262 .007
collection - places lived -.229 .019
collection - lifeevents -.234 .017
collection - number of friends -.233 .018
openness - family members .209 .033
conscientiousness - music likes -.202 .040
conscientiousness - movie likes -.234 .017
conscientiousness - book likes -.245 .012
extraversion - likes .392 <.001
extraversion - sportlikes .276 .005
extraversion - check-ins .355 <.001
extraversion - events .212 .031
extraversion - reviews .338 <.001
extraversion - number of friends .234 .017
TABLE 3.2: Significant correlations using only Profile features.
The correlations state that extraversion is the easiest to predict using profile fea-
tures, supporting the findings of various earlier works [104, 19]. Based on our find-
ings, extraverted people have more friends on Facebook, attend more events and like
to publish their current location using the check-in functionality. Furthermore, they
like to share their views in reviews, and tell people what they like. Conscientiousness
correlates negatively with published likes on books, movies and music titles, mean-
ing that less conscientious users tend to either be more engaged in music, movies
and books, or to be more willing to announce this on Facebook than others. Fi-
nally, the openness to new experience positively correlates with the number of family
members published on Facebook. Besides the personality measures, the three pri-
vacy measures of the IUIPC questionnaire also correlate with some of the profile
features: Collection negatively correlates with the number of friends, life events, and
earlier residences published on Facebook. In other words, users who place value
on knowing which data is collected therefore tend to publish less information about
their past on Facebook. Interestingly, users who emphasize self-control over their
data tend to publish more potentially controversial personal views on Facebook:
The control measure positively correlates with the probability of publishing political
and religious views.
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3.3.2 Facebook language features
Following the Facebook profile features, we started analyzing the language features
extracted out of the status updates on their profile page. Note that we filtered out
status updates that were posted by other social network members (like the friends or
friends of friends) instead of the actual user. For the sake of brevity, only the results
with a strong statistical significance are shown in Table 3.3.
Value pair rho p
extraversion - clout .348 <.001
extraversion - risk -.262 .007
extraversion - drives .320 .001
extraversion - affiliation .391 <.001
extraversion - cogproc -.254 .009
extraversion - filler -.282 .004
extraversion - friend .255 .009
extraversion - social .255 .009
agreeableness - adverb -.265 .007
agreeableness - percept .266 .006
openness - relative -.258 .008
control - health .258 .008
control - body .288 .003
awareness - bio .258 .008
awareness - shehe .293 .003
TABLE 3.3: Significant correlations using only Facebook language fea-
tures.
Again, extraversion has the most correlations throughout the set of features. Ex-
traverted people do not write about their cognitive processes (cogproc), but like to
talk about friends, affiliations and social affairs. They tend to prefer clout speech, using
for example more swear words than usual. People who are open to new experiences
(openness) use a lot of relative pronouns. Interestingly, it seems that users who put
emphasis on control over their own data seem to be very health- and body-oriented,
writing a lot about healthy products, activities, and the state and progress of their
health and body condition. The values further indicate that people wanting to be
aware of their current privacy settings seem to be social and write a lot about third
persons (shehe), like “she is sooo cute”.
3.3.3 Twitter language features
Twitter language features have been analyzed the same way as described above.
Again we concentrated only on highly significant results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Note
that we used the 37 data sets from the first study and the 72 data sets of the second
study to come to a total of n=109 datasets. Again we will discuss the most interesting
findings; a complete list of LIWC language can be found in the LIWC manual[249].
It can clearly be seen that there are notably more correlations for the personality
measures, supporting the findings of earlier research that also received significantly
better predictions using language features from Twitter [104]. Neurotic users in par-
ticular use language that is said to be typical for this kind of personality trait [78]:
Users with a high neuroticism value are often angry and use swear words often. This
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Value pair rho p
extraversion - affiliation .318 .001
agreeableness - tentat -.286 .003
agreeableness - Exclam .315 .001
neuroticism - cogproc .257 .007
neuroticism - swear .322 .001
neuroticism - sixLtr -.256 .007
neuroticism - analytic -.275 .004
neuroticism - anger .366 <.001
neuroticism - conj .276 .004
neuroticism - negemo .365 <.001
neuroticism - differ .256 .007
neuroticism - interrog .309 .001
neuroticism - function .289 .002
neuroticism - verb .264 .005
neuroticism - AllPunc -.341 <.001
neuroticism - ipron .260 .006
neuroticism - affiliation -.274 .004
conscientiousness - anger -.288 .002
conscientiousness - Exclam .266 .005
conscientiousness - interrog -.247 .010
conscientiousness - tentat -.336 <.001
conscientiousness - ipron -.264 .006
conscientiousness - cause -.254 .008
conscientiousness - cogproc -.341 <.001
conscientiousness - swear -.282 .003
TABLE 3.4: Significant correlations for the personality measures using
only Twitter language features.
could be caused by negative feelings (negemo). On the other hand, people with high
conscientiousness rarely use swear words, and do not show angry behavior. They are
rather tentative. Extraverts often discuss their affiliation with others.
Although we have a lot of features for the prediction of personality, it is rather
mixed for the privacy measures. On one hand, we have three highly significant cor-
relations for the Westin privacy scale measure. Based on our records, privacy-aware
persons are social, but also power-driven, competitive and like to take a risk. On the
other hand, there are only four correlations for the three IUIPC privacy measures.
Unlike the Facebook language features, which had more correlations with the con-
trol and awareness measures, we have three highly significant correlations for the
collection measure. According to the results, users that appreciate having knowledge
about which data is collected are mainly power-driven, perceived as less authentic
and often talk about topics concerning their home, like household products, renova-
tions or issues with the landlord. Lastly, privacy awareness is negatively correlated
with the religion feature.
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Value pair rho p
awareness - relig -.257 .007
collection - authentic -.260 .006
collection - home -.256 .007
collection - power .248 .009
privacy index - risk .254 .008
privacy index - power .275 .004
privacy index - social .254 .008
TABLE 3.5: Significant correlations for the privacy measures using
only Twitter language features.
3.3.4 Personality
As stated in the introduction, we are also interested in whether existing personality
measures can be used to predict privacy measures. Remember that we did the study
in two parts; for the first we required only a Facebook profile to participate in the
study, whereas the second study required an active Twitter account. Nevertheless,
both questionnaires started with the personality and privacy questionnaires in both
studies, before we asked for Facebook or Twitter data. Therefore we can use the
answers of all participants of the first and the second study. We had 104 participants
in the Facebook study, of whom 28 also provided a Twitter account. For the second
study, we invited 81 more Twitter users, to come to a similar total of 109 Twitter data
sets. The correlations presented in Table 3.6 are therefore based on the answers of
104 + 81 = 185 participants.
Privacy Index Control Awareness Collection
rho p rho p rho p rho p
Extraversion -.016 .823 -.020 .777 .042 .566 .052 .470
Agreeableness -.155 .031 .201 .005 .242 .001 .093 .198
Conscientiousness -.115 .112 .036 .617 .339 .000 .138 .056
Neuroticism .192 .007 .102 .157 -.039 .592 -.061 .398
Openness .090 .211 .145 .044 .181 .012 .177 .014
TABLE 3.6: Correlations between personality and privacy measures.
Neglecting the collection measure, each of the privacy scales has a highly signif-
icant correlation with one of the personality measures. Agreeableness, as the best
predictor, delivers strong correlations for the control and awareness measure, and a
significant correlation for the Westin privacy index. Extraversion, on the other hand,
does not have any significant correlation with the privacy measures. In total, the
highest correlation coefficients can be found for the awareness measure, with both
agreeableness and conscientiousness.
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3.4 Discussion of the correlation results and hypotheses for
the regression analysis
Our results follow the line of recent related literature [104], where personality could
be predicted best using Twitter language features. The writing style on Facebook posts
also correlates with the personality traits, although there are significantly fewer fea-
tures that correlate compared to the Twitter data set. Lastly the profile features supply
the least number of correlations, indicating that a prediction using regression al-
gorithms will also perform worse compared to the two other data sets. Whereas
Twitter is clearly the best source for personality prediction, we cannot discern a sin-
gle data source that is perfect to predict all privacy measures: Profile features again
show the least correlations, with six significant and only one highly significant cor-
relation (note that for the other two data sets, only highly significant correlations
were mentioned). The Facebook data set, on one hand, seems to be best for predict-
ing the control and awareness measures, whereas the Twitter dataset provides more
highly significant correlations for predicting the Westin privacy index and the col-
lection measure. If the personality traits are available, they could also be a good
source for predicting the privacy measures, as the correlation measures have shown.
Especially the privacy awareness, control and the Westin privacy index values seem
to be well-predictable. Nevertheless, the number of features provided by the per-
sonality traits is small compared to the number of language features provided by
LIWC. We therefore suspect personality traits to perform worse than the language
feature-based prediction, but still around the level of profile data prediction.
The strong correlations indicate that it is possible to predict the personality as
well as the privacy measures of a user with the aforementioned data sets. In the next
step, we want to find out whether it is possible to do so using a linear regression, how
precise the prediction is using the standard deviation, and how good the prediction
is compared to a baseline approach that predicts a constant value without using any
feature input, denoted by the R2 value.
Based on the previous results, we expect the following results for the regression
analysis:
Personality traits:
1. Regression based on the language feature leads to a lower standard error than
with profile features
2. Regression with the Twitter language features delivers a lower standard error
than with Facebook language features
3. The standard error for predicting the personality measures is lower than for
the privacy measures
Privacy measures:
1. Both language feature sets allow a regression with a lower standard error than
profile features
2. The Twitter dataset yields the best results for approximating the Westin privacy
index and the collection measure, whereas the Facebook data set delivers a lower
standard error for the control and awareness measures of the IUIPC privacy scale
3. Using personality traits as regression input to approximate privacy measures
is possible, with a standard error at about the level of profile data
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3.5 Regression analysis
Related literature has shown that there is no significant difference between multi-
variate and univariate regressors when trying to predict personality using language
features [104]. We therefore decided to use a univariate regressor for our predic-
tion. To be more precise, we used two different settings: First we performed a linear
regression with all features as input values. As using all features can lead to an over-
fitted model (expressed by a low coefficent of determination), we also performed
the linear regression with a subset of the features. To be more precise, we used the
backwards elimination method of the SPSS regressor, which starts with all features in-
cluded and iteratively removes them feature-by-feature to find an optimum set of
features that provides a good prediction with the least amount of features. This pro-
cedure can often, but not always, find a better solution than including all features.
Especially if a model is overfitted with all features included, the heuristic can often
optimize the prediction [18]. The results with all features will be labeled all features
in the results tables; the ones with the minimal feature set can be found in the row
selected features.
The values for the prediction of the personality measures are shown in Table 3.7;
the results of the regression with the IUIPC and Westin privacy scales can be found in
Table 3.8. Similar to the studies in the last sections, we computed the standard error
of the prediction against the correct result, as well as the coefficient of determination
(R2).
The standard error using the profile data is highest for both the personality (0.588
for conscientiousness to 0.769 for extraversion) as well as the privacy measures (0.633
for the Westin privacy index to 0.956 for the collection measure). The personality
measures as a data source perform at a similar level but slightly worse in predicting
privacy measures (0.666 for the privacy index to 1.09 for collection). Both Facebook
and Twitter language features lead to a notably better precision for the individual
measures, whereas Facebook language features are slightly better for personality
(0.328 for openness to 0.499 for extraversion) than Twitter (0.381 for openness to
0.619 for neuroticism), except for agreeableness (0.439 on Facebook vs. 0.390 us-
ing Twitter). The IUIPC measures are predicted better using Twitter tweets (0.375
for awareness to 0.643 for collection) compared to Facebook (0.423 for awareness to
0.661 for collection). The conventional Westin privacy index, on the other hand, is
predicted best using Facebook (0.330) instead of Twitter (0.453).
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Precision of the prediction in general
Taking a look at the prediction precision, we can see that personality traits can be
predicted quite well. The best results for the personality measures that range on
a scale from 1 to 5 could be achieved with the language features. Contrary to our
expectations, Facebook language data performs slightly better than Twitter language
features. Taking a closer look at the full correlation tables reveals that although there
are more strong correlations within the Twitter data set, the correlation measures
for the personality traits in general are higher in the Facebook dataset. The lower
number of features as well as the smaller correlation scores lead the profile data
(information extracted from the user’s “about” page) to perform worse, but still with
a standard error between 0.549 (agreeableness) and 0.769 (extraversion).
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Measure Selected features All features
stderr R2 stderr R2
Profile data
- Openness .601 9.3 .649 -5.4
- Conscientiousness .588 20.8 .617 13.0
- Extraversion .769 27.4 .816 18.3
- Agreeableness .549 21.9 .588 10.7
- Neuroticism .714 14.8 .755 4.8
Facebook data
- Openness .328 73.0 .515 33.6
- Conscientiousness .410 61.5 .626 10.5
- Extraversion .499 69.4 .777 25.9
- Agreeableness .439 49.9 .751 -46.0
- Neuroticism .467 63.5 .723 12.8
Twitter data
- Openness .381 61.3 .666 26.0
- Conscientiousness .473 62.6 .647 30.0
- Extraversion .542 61.5 .783 19.8
- Agreeableness .390 62.4 .580 16.9
- Neuroticism .619 53.3 .874 7.1
TABLE 3.7: Regression analysis for the personality traits using either
all features, or only the most significant ones.
The IUIPC privacy scales can also be best predicted using Twitter language fea-
tures. Having in mind that IUIPC measures range from 1 to 7, the standard error is
not notably larger compared to the personality measures. Unlike what we expected
in the discussion of the correlation results, not only the collection, but also the two
other IUIPC measures are better predicted using the Twitter data, whereas the pri-
vacy index is predicted best using Facebook language input. Also here, a closer
look at all the correlation measures led to the assumption that when comparing all
correlation measures, the coherence between Twitter and the privacy measures is in
general higher than with Facebook language features. Lastly, the profile data again
performs worse than the language features, and at about the same level or only
slightly better than the personality traits.
3.6.2 Comparing personality prediction with related literature
There have been several attempts to predict personality using textual input, most
recently by Farnadi et al. in 2017 [104], where the authors compared the predic-
tion precision for the big five personality traits using different textual sources of the
user. They compared the precision using either Facebook posts, Twitter tweets or
Youtube comments using a large database of 3731 Facebook users, 404 YouTubers
and 44 Twitter accounts. In contrast to our study, this related work therefore had a
significantly larger database; furthermore, they reported only the non-adjusted R2
values which are always equal to or larger than the adjusted R2 that we reported in
the results. We were able to outperform the precision of their prediction with our
Facebook and Twitter features, indicating a better goodness of fit of our model. The
R2 of our regression always ranged between 49.9 and 73.0 for the Twitter or Facebook
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Measure Selected features All features
stderr R2 stderr R2
Profile data
- Control .844 15.0 .894 4.7
- Awareness .674 30.7 .718 21.4
- Collection .956 18.2 1.05 0.7
- Privacy index .633 7.1 .683 -8.2
Facebook data
- Control .635 51.9 .940 -5.2
- Awareness .423 71.7 .705 24.2
- Collection .661 60.9 1.08 -5.7
- Privacy index .330 74.8 .507 40.4
Twitter data
- Control .518 61.5 .724 24.6
- Awareness .375 74.4 .532 48.4
- Collection .643 68.3 .897 38.3
- Privacy index .453 55.4 .681 -0.9
Personality traits
- Control .852 6.7 .879 0.8
- Awareness .769 10.9 .777 9.0
- Collection 1.09 3.8 1.10 2.8
- Privacy index .666 4.6 .667 4.0
TABLE 3.8: Regression analysis for the privacy measures using either
all features, or only the most significant ones.
language features, compared to values between 2.56 and 17.78 in the mentioned pub-
lication. Furthermore, we achieved a smaller standard error for the prediction using
Facebook (0.328 to 0.499 in our study compared to 0.649 to 0.776 in their study).
Their results showed a smaller error for the prediction using Twitter tweets, but as
the authors of that publication also stated, this might be an artifact caused by the the
low number of Twitter accounts in their study (n = 44). To give more detail, they
had a standard error from 0.152 to 0.214, compared to 0.381 to 0.619 according to our
results. The prediction of privacy measures has, to the best of our knowledge, not
been a subject of research so far.
3.6.3 Size of the training set
As stated in the introduction, and following the line of the studies described in ear-
lier sections, the goal of the study was to find out whether the mentioned sources
are suitable for predicting personality and especially privacy measures, and to find
a lower bound for the prediction precision without further optimization. The goal
was not to determine how far the precision can be increased, for example by optimiz-
ing the machine learning algorithm for this specific kind of task, or by optimizing
the word categories of LIWC with the help of a language expert. Our study finds
that the mentioned sources do have a significant correlation with the individual mea-
sures, and that they can furthermore also be used to perform a prediction of those
measures that is better than random. Nevertheless, the prediction can be further op-
timized, either by optimizing the prediction algorithm or the text analysis, or even
by just increasing the size of the training set. We are therefore interested in whether
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the prediction precision can be increased when implementing the prediction as a
Facebook plugin for some thousands of users, or even if it was integrated by the
providers in their website.
3.6.4 Guidelines for the design of a privacy prediction algorithm
The results indicate that all data sources examined in the study sets can be used to
predict personality, as well as the privacy measures of a user. The profile items from
the “About” page of a Facebook user allow a privacy prediction with an accept-
able precision better than random and can therefore be used as a first starting point.
However, Facebook or Twitter posts are a notably better source for the prediction
and should therefore be used first, if available. For predicting the IUIPC privacy
measures, Twitter tweets provide the best precision, whereas the older Westin pri-
vacy scale can be slightly better predicted with language features extracted out of
Facebook posts. If reliable personality traits are available, that kind of information
can also be used, allowing a prediction of the privacy traits in a similar precision as
the profile data.
3.7 Conclusion
As we have seen in Chapter 2, personality and privacy measures have a large in-
fluence on users’ life choices and are therefore used as an input for recommender
systems in research. However, although users could profit from these recommender
systems, most of them are not accepted by users, as they are not willing to take on
the user burden that comes with filling out questionnaires that may contain more
than 100 questions each. Research has already found out that personality can be de-
rived by doing text analysis on documents, short posts or blog entries written by the
user. However, the derivation of privacy measures has not been a part of research
so far. We therefore conducted a user study involving more than 100 Facebook and
Twitter users, and examined whether there is a correlation between the words used
in their personal writing and their personality and privacy measures. The results in-
dicate that there is a correlation between those data sets, and it can also be employed
to perform a prediction of the individual measures using simple machine learning
algorithms. We gave guidelines on which data source should be used depending on
the required precision and individual measure to be predicted. Although we were
able to show the suitability of those input features and gave a concrete guideline on
how to select them, we cannot state how good such a prediction can be when it is
further optimized, which we would like to do in future work.
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The work presented in this chapter is based on already published research [269, 260].
The social web, especially social media websites, have plenty of privacy settings that
a user should adapt to her personal needs in the best case. However, as stated in the
introduction, users rarely adapt them. So far, research either concentrated on an-
alyzing the user’s privacy behavior in the past, or, if such data was not available,
used context factors as an indication to predict privacy settings for the user. Fur-
thermore, related literature concentrated on proposing a binary choice to the user,
to either disclose or not disclose the post. As other studies have shown, users need
a more fine-grained approach for privacy settings, that also allows them to publish
only parts of a post or an aggregated location [246]. In this chapter, we will investi-
gate whether individual factors, like personality and privacy attitudes, can be used
to assist the user in chossing her privacy settings, involving multiple fine-grained
privacy levels, using machine learning. When choosing how to record individual
factors or input variables for multiple domains in general, and especially which indi-
vidual factors should be recorded, a researcher can use two different strategies that
are mutually exclusive. The first strategy targets generalizability. In this case, a re-
searcher tries to use a questionnaire that is as generic as possible while still gathering
enough domain-specific data for the targeted domains. There already exist several
commonly accepted questionnaires capturing personality [78] or privacy attitudes
[221] for that purpose. This strategy has the advantage that the answers to the ques-
tionnaire have to be selected only once, and can be reused for privacy prediction in
other domains. On the other hand, the second strategy targets prediction precision.
In this case, a questionnaire is used that is highly specialized towards one targeted
domain, including domain-specific questions that do not apply to other domains.
This approach can lead to an increased prediction precision, although parts of the
questionnaire answers might be useless for a prediction in other domains. In the
ideal case, such a questionnaire uses a generic part that can be re-used for other
domains, extended by some specialized questions for the domain.
In the first study, we performed a detailed user study involving such an extended
specialized privacy questionnaire as well as a validation study in order to check whether
the concept works in general, how good the prediction precision can be with a spe-
cialized questionnaire, and whether it is accepted in a realistic scenario, involving
the user’s real Facebook posts. In the subsequent study, we will check whether the
concept can be transferred to the location sharing domain using only the generic part
of the specialized questionnaire, and how good a prediction precision can be using a
generalized approach. The same will be done for other domains in the next chapter.
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However, the increased prediction accuracy that can be reached using a specialized
questionnaire for the different domains mentioned here, as well as the derivation of
these additional privacy measures without user interaction, remains for future work.
4.1 Social media domain
Creating a system which is able to automatically predict a privacy setting for friend
lists is difficult if a user has just joined a social network. At that moment, little
data is available to the user and also the provider, which makes it difficult to infer
privacy settings automatically. Related research indicates that every social network
post needs its own privacy setting that restricts the audience based on the topic of
the post. Most social networks only allow a binary decision, e.g. either to hide
or to show the complete post. However, for some of the posts, one might accept
sharing only parts of the post by removing pictures or videos included in the post, or
excluding the comments. Therefore we introduce a more fine-grained privacy scale
to express a user’s privacy desire, offering more than two decisions. As a starting
point for our research, we started with a five-point scale similar to a likert scale to let
the user express, for each friend list, to what extent she is willing to disclose the post
(1 = strongly prefer to disclose, 5 = strongly prefer not to disclose). The answers to
these scales are later denoted as the “privacy settings”, and the five items on the scale
as “privacy levels”. In later sections, we will demonstrate a possible implementation
of such a five-level scale, and discuss the advantages of a fine-grained scaling.
This chapter concentrates on the derivation of the privacy settings, and does not
include a UI or front-end for the proposed system, as would be needed for a field
study. For future work, we envision a user interface which could look similar to the
one displayed in Figure 4.1, where the fine-grained privacy settings for the different
friend groups are proposed by software, based on the topic of the post. The post
topic extracted by the software can be seen on the left side in Figure 4.1, the proposed
privacy settings (denoted by pictograms, according to the possible implementation
of privacy levels in Table 4.4) are displayed on the right side. The “more” button
is used to show the remaining friend groups. When the mouse pointer is placed
on a pictogram, an explanation tooltip pops up that shows which content would be
hidden by the setting. By clicking on the edit button on the left side, it is possible
to override the detected post topic by manual input. As stated in the introduction,
such a privacy assistant alone does not completely solve the problem, as the privacy
setting prediction is never 100% correct, and even a small number of wrong privacy
settings lead to mistrust by the user and thus a denial of the approach.
We introduce a questionnaire that determines the privacy attitude of a user in an
online social network with a focus on privacy towards other users in the network.
We suggest a machine learning approach to automatically derive the privacy level
for each group of users for a given post. The machine learning software takes the
answers to this privacy questionnaire as an input to recommend privacy settings for
each post, tailored to the user’s privacy attitudes. We conducted three user studies,
which will be described in the following sections.
First we conducted a pre-study with a small set of participants, in order to dis-
cover which user groups are typically addressed in a private social network, and
which topics are most recently discussed within posts. Second, the main user study
helped us to refine the questionnaire, to reduce the set of required questions for
determining the privacy settings, and to train the machine learning approach. We
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FIGURE 4.1: Envisioned user interface concept of a privacy setting
prediction system.
verified the correctness and accuracy of the privacy setting prediction in a validation
study.
4.1.1 Pre-study
The goal of the pre-study is to identify the most common topics of social network
posts, and which groups of friends are typically addressed in such a network. Kelley
et al. [184] conducted a user study on friend groups on facebook in 2011. As social
networks have evolved in the last five years, we conducted a pre-study in order to
replicate the results of this publication. We surveyed the participants about typical
topics and friend groups that they personally encounter in everyday SN use.
The study was conducted as a qualitative online study using the software LimeSur-
vey1. We recruited the participants on Prolific Academic2, which is an online recruit-
ing platform like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. For the study, we selected only active
SN users. The participants were paid of £2 if their participation was succesful, which
means that their results were succesfully checked for plausibility.
In total, we surveyed 15 participants aged from 19 to 46 years (mean 30, SD
7.71). The audience of the study was very diverse: As participants we had, according
to their own reports, students, self-employed workers, employees, and even a rev-
erend. The questionnaire was divided into three sections, of which the first section
inquired about the most relevant topics of posts, and the second part about friend
lists in the social network they used. We did not ask for details on the members of
the friend lists; we were just interested in labels describing them. The third section
asked for concrete examples, regarding which groups a certain post should be shared
with. The first two parts were structured the same way: First, we asked about high-
level groups or topics that are often used. Such a high-level topic could be “sports”,
for example. Second, we requested more detailed topics or groups, or sub-groups of
the aforementioned items. A sub-group for this example could be “winter sports”.
The subjects had only to imagine the post topics and friend lists they would use; we
1https://www.limesurvey.org (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
2https://www.prolific.ac/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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did not request them to copy actual friend lists or posts out of their social network
into the questionnaire. The answers were given in free-text form. The subjects could
enter as many topics or friend list names as they could think of. In the third part, we
asked the participants to give some imaginary examples of posts and which groups
they should be shared with.
We collected the topics and friend groups mentioned throughout the three ques-
tionnaire sections and clustered the results of the different questions manually us-
ing an axial coding approach [315]. We selected the friend lists that were mentioned
nine or more times and topics mentioned ten or more times for the result set, as
the amount of mentions again significantly dropped below that level. We found
several groups that involved a special interest of the subject, like “Cincinnati Punk
Rock Scene” or “Buy and Sell Groups”. We clustered all these topics into the cluster
special interest group. As this cluster contains a highly divergent group of users, we
excluded it for the prediction in the main study. An overview of all mentioned top-
















14 tech stuff 5
15 health 1
16 religion 1
TABLE 4.1: Amount of mentions for all the mentioned post topics












TABLE 4.2: Amount of mentions for the friend groups.
The results support parts of the results of the former study by Kelley et al.; most
of the clusters observed in their study can be matched to the friend groups of our
study. Table 4.3 displays the matching between the two sets of friend groups from
both papers. All other groups listed in Table 4.2 could not be matched.
Kelley et al. Our grouping
close friends close friends
work work friends
college / other education school / university friends
family immediate / extended family
TABLE 4.3: Matching of friend groups between Kelley et al. and the
pre-study
4.1.2 Main study
The main study had two goals: First we wanted to refine the privacy questionnaire
to reduce the number of necessary questions to a convenient amount. Second, the
results from the study should serve as a training set for the prediction technique,
which predicts a privacy setting for a new post, for each group of users (discovered
in the pre-study), depending on the topic of the post.
For each of the five privacy levels, we gave the participants of our study a de-
scription regarding how the privacy levels are implemented, i.e. which parts of the
post will be shown and which parts will be hidden, depending on the privacy level:
• Strongly like (level 1): The post is fully disclosed, and is actively brought to
the attention of the receiving group (e.g. shown on their wall)
• Like (level 2): The post is fully disclosed, but not actively brought to attention
(e.g. hidden on their wall; users can only see it if they visit your profile)
• Neither (level 3): The post is only partially disclosed (e.g. comments are hid-
den, or only textual information is shown without images or videos)
• Dislike (level 4): The post is not disclosed to the group (e.g. do not let members
of the group see the post), but there are no additional actions to make sure the
group cannot receive the information
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• Strongly dislike (level 5): The post is not disclosed to the group, and there are
additional actions to make sure the group cannot receive the information (e.g.
if a direct friend of the group comments on the post or reshares it, it is hidden
from the group)
What these implementations do in detail is map a privacy level to a set of binary
settings for the different functionalities of Facebook, such as whether the comments
should be hidden, the post should not be displayed on the timeline of a friend, or
the post should be hidden completely. Table 4.4 shows an overview of the mapping
of the privacy scale to social network functionalities regarding this post. I will fur-
ther discuss the opportunities and limitations of the proposed privacy levels in the
discussion section.
Functionality Privacy Level
1 2 3 4 5
Shown on wall X
Comments shown X X
Image content shown X X
Post visible X X X
Visible if reshared X X X X
TABLE 4.4: Overview of mapping from privacy level to SN function-
alities
Like the pre-study, the main study was conducted as an online study, whereby
recruiting was done using Prolific Academic. Notably, we took care that no partic-
ipants from the pre-study were invited to the main study. In total, we surveyed
107 participants, of which 100 produced usable results. We omitted data sets which
were either incomplete, or implausible according to the answers to the control ques-
tions. The participants were paid £2 upon successful participation after a plausibility
check. Taking the survey took on average 18 minutes. The participant age ranged
from 18 to 55 years (mean 29), again close to the age distribution of a social network
site.
The study procedure was divided into two phases: First, we posed the questions
of the privacy questionnaire (see left side of Table 4.6 in the Appendix). The second
family events movies politics food work hobbies travel sports
sports friends 4.91 4.24 4.01 4.39 4.1 4.35 3.82 3.99 3.64
acquaintances 3.99 3.02 2.74 3.61 2.71 3.37 2.7 2.8 3.33
online friends 3.87 3.12 2.66 3.34 2.67 3.41 2.68 2.82 3.29
close friends 2.61 1.8 2.0 2.79 2.04 2.38 1.8 1.73 2.73
work 4.03 3.08 3.0 3.85 2.73 2.67 2.77 2.81 3.48
friends 3.06 2.17 2.32 3.04 2.18 2.66 2.03 2.01 3.0
immediate family 1.84 2.17 2.25 3.05 2.09 2.49 1.92 1.76 3.02
extended family 2.43 2.41 2.37 3.26 2.27 2.91 2.12 2.06 3.18
school/university 3.86 2.92 2.68 3.47 2.81 3.22 2.78 2.66 3.35
mean 3.4 2.77 2.67 3.42 2.62 3.05 2.51 2.52 3.22
TABLE 4.5: Mean privacy levels for each topic/friend list combina-
tion
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family events movies politics food work hobbies travel sports
sports friends 1.28 1.74 1.84 1.61 1.82 1.64 1.93 1.87 2.11
acquaintances 1.11 1.17 1.27 1.26 1.16 1.23 1.21 1.22 1.67
online friends 1.22 1.32 1.27 1.33 1.23 1.24 1.27 1.29 1.69
close friends 1.16 0.88 1.05 1.34 0.96 1.05 0.84 0.82 1.79
work 1.19 1.31 1.33 1.31 1.34 1.56 1.26 1.30 1.66
friends 1.15 0.81 1.07 1.25 0.92 0.98 0.77 0.74 1.68
immediate family 1.11 1.19 1.16 1.46 1.11 1.22 1.01 1.03 1.82
extended family 1.30 1.24 1.24 1.41 1.15 1.25 1.05 1.15 1.82
school/university 1.22 1.34 1.34 1.39 1.36 1.34 1.29 1.31 1.69
TABLE 4.6: Standard deviation for each topic/friend list combination
part asked for specific privacy settings for the post topic and friend lists that we
derived in the pre-study, based on the privacy levels defined above.
The answers to the privacy questionnaire were given on a 5-point scale (1= strongly
dislike, 5=strongly like). The answers to the second part (specification of the privacy
settings for the combinations of friend list and topic) were also given on a five-point-
scale (1 = strongly like the disclosure ( = privacy level 1), 5 = strongly dislike the dis-
closure ( = privacy level 5)) in the form of a table , where columns represent topics,
and rows the friend lists. Below the table, the users were given an explanation on
the meaning of the different privacy levels, as described earlier in this subsection.
Results
Table 4.5 shows the mean privacy levels for each friend list/topic combination, Table
4.6 the standard deviations. The topics form the columns, whereas the friend lists
are represented by the rows in the table. Table 4.5 is colored according to the average
privacy levels. The colors range from dark blue for a high mean privacy level (mean-
ing “the least information is disclosed”) to light blue for a low mean privacy level
(meaning “the most information is disclosed”). A quick histogram analysis of the
values for each combination of topic and friend group showed the data is normally
distributed, which means that most of the users would choose a value near the mean
of the recorded values. Therefore we can use this table to predict a post’s privacy
setting for every friend list in a social network, by using the mean privacy setting
from the table.
Although this approach already offers different privacy levels based on context
factors (here the friend group and the post topic), it does not provide an individ-
ualized privacy setting, that also takes the user’s personality and privacy attitude
into account. In the next subsection, we will propose a naive approach based on
context factors as well as an approach that is using also such individual factors for a
personalized privacy recommendation using machine learning.
Privacy setting prediction algorithms
We introduce two different mechanisms to predict the privacy setting for a given post
and its topic: The naive approach takes the topic as an input and performs a simple ta-
ble lookup on the data in Table 4.5 to predict the setting. When a prediction for a post
about “food” is requested, the algorithm looks up the column “food” in Table 4.5 and
uses the rows for a privacy prediction for each of the friend groups. Sports friends
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are assigned level 4, acquaintances, work, school/unviersity and online friends re-
ceive level 3, and the remaining three friend groups are assigned privacy level 2 in
this example. The second, more sophisticated technique uses machine learning to pre-
dict the privacy settings. The general approach for a Machine Learning prediction
is to select a set of input questions, in this case the questions of the privacy ques-
tionnaire, which should be mapped to the privacy settings. For this kind of task,
machine learning (ML) estimators are used. These estimators are trained with both
the input and output questions and are able, if the right set of input questions are
selected as features, to predict the output of new, unseen input questions.
There are a variety of possible ML estimators which are applicable for this kind of
task, such as Lasso, SGD, and the Elastic Net regressor. We tried several approaches,
and achieved the best results with a ridge regressor. To be precise, we used the ridge
regression classifier of the scikit-learn3 implementation with an alpha value of 2,
which is the standard value and produced best results in our case. Scikit-learn is
an open source implementation of various machine learning algorithms and can be
obtained as a python library4.
To choose the optimal set of input features, a naive brute-force method would
need to examine all possible combinations of the privacy questionnaire questions,
resulting in 242 cycles of training and prediction. Because of the large runtime re-
quired for that computation, we had to apply a selection heuristic, which is a vari-
ation of the wrapper subset selection (WSS) [188] algorithm, which allows to reduce
the amount of combinations to be tested by iteratively adding features and thereby
minimizing the prediction error: This heuristic starts with an empty set of input fea-
tures and adds new features successively. To decide which feature to select next, the
ridge regressor is trained with the currently selected set of input features, including
one of the remaining input features. We measured the performance of the currently
selected feature set by training the ridge regressor with 75% of the initial dataset,
followed by a prediction of privacy settings for the remaining 25% of the data set.
After that we compared the prediction with the actual privacy settings given by the
participants of the first study. The resulting mean squared error (MSE) is used as a
score for the current set of input features.
The pseudocode to the WSS algorithm is nspired by earlier publications [188]
and is shown in Figure 4.3. We start with two sets: the empty set of current input
features and the set of possible input features which include all of the questions from
the privacy questionnaire. In a first step, the algorithm iterates over all possible
input features, selects the question with the lowest score/MSE, and starts over with
the set of current input features which now includes the question with the lowest MSE.
This procedure is continued as long as there are still features left in the set of possible
input features.
The results of this part of the algorithm are subsets of input features with the
specific score. Figure 4.2 shows a plot of such a result for the topic politics. The y-axis
depicts the MSE for a given set of input features, while the x-axis depicts the number
of input features contained in the specific set. As seen in Figure 4.2, the number of
questions is not necessarily proportional to the value of the MSE. After adding the
13th question, the MSE error does not decrease further. In fact, it increases. We
observed a similar pattern for all topics.
In its original version, the WSS algorithm would stop whenever there is no ad-
ditional feature which decreases the MSE. On one hand, we cannot directly stop the
3http://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.linear_model.Ridge.html
(last accessed: 2020-03-09)
4http://scikit-learn.org/stable/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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optimization process whenever the MSE error increases in the next step, since as
can be observed in Figure 4.2, there are multiple local minima of the MSE before the
global minimum is reached. On the other hand, one of our goals is to keep the user
burden at a minimum, which forces us to keep the number of required questions
as small as possible. For all topics, we could observe that if there is a global min-
imum with more than 15 questions, this global minimum is not much better than
the best local minimum with less than 15 questions. Therefore, we stopped the WSS
algorithm whenever the set of questions contained 15 elements, and took the set of
questions that correspond to the lowest minimum up to this point.
In addition to finding the optimal set of questions for predicting the sharing set-
tings of a single, specific topic, we also computed a set of questions to predict an op-
timal setting for all of the possible topics. This set is later denoted as the generic
set.
Apart from the problem of selecting the optimal set of input varibales, the sec-
ond problem is the format of some of the variables. As stated in the background sec-
tion, categorial variables are in general not suitable as an input for machine learning
without further processing. However, both context features are categorial variables,
which do not imply a certain order of the categories, that would allow us to trans-
form the values to a number, similar to an ordinal scale. At a minimum, both context
factors have a limited number of values. A technique that is often used in this case
is the creation of binary dummy variables, one for each possible value of the variable.
In the case of the topic variable, one would create nine dummy variables, one for
each possible value of the variable (topic f amilya f f airs, topicmovies...). To transform the
original variable into the dummy variables, the dummy variable corresponding to
the value of the original variable is set to 1; all other dummy variables are set to zero.
These dummy variables can then be used as an input for a regression. However, this
approach assumes an equal distance between all categories, which leads to a misin-
terpretation and a loss of precision in the regression algorithms. Another solution to
the problem is to use advanced machine learning techniques that can automatically
transform such categorial variables into ordinal variables or scales before usage.
A third new contribution that we want to propose here is an approach that we
call distributional machine learning. In the training phase, this algorithm splits up
the study data into several groups, one group for each possible combination of the
categorial variables. In our experiment, this would lead to 9 (friend groups) * 9
(topics) = 81 different groups. In the next step, 81 regressors are trained using the
81 data sets, whereby the categorial variables are removed from the data set. In the
prediction phase, the algorithm picks the correct regressor according to the given
combination of context factors in the prediction request, and does the prediction
with the given remaining variables.
So to wrap up again, we had three different options for dealing with the vari-
ables:
1. transform to dummy variables
2. use a categorial regression
3. use distributional machine learning
After testing each of the options, we received the best results with the last option,
distributed machine learning. However, the optimal regression algorithm and also
the best option for transforming the input data heavily depends on the domain data,
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FIGURE 4.2: MSE for the topic “Movies/TV-Shows/Entertainment”.
and therefore cannot be generalized across several domains, as will be shown for
example in the location sharing domain later.
To use the estimators in the evaluation study, we trained the ridge regressors
with 75% of the initial dataset, serialized the instances of the classifiers, and stored
them in a Python module. In total, this procedure yielded one classifier for each
topic, to predict the sharing settings for each of the nine friend lists identified in the
main study.
Prediction algorithm results
The questions which were selected for each topic by the selection heuristic can be
found in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix. In total, 36 questions out of the initial
set of 40 questions were used for the prediction. The set of questions selected to
predict the whole set of topics is denoted by the column generic. The optimal predic-
tion accuracy for a specific topic was achieved with six to fifteen questions, eleven
on average. Although some questions were selected more frequently, we could not
find any meaningful pattern. An overview on how often questions were selected is
shown in Table 4.7.
The questions that were used most frequently by the WSS heuristic were: Q2 (“I
feel out of touch when I haven’t logged in to my social network for a while”) with
ten selections, as well as Q24 (“I want to keep my different social circles separate
from each other on my social network”) with nine, and Q7 (“I post very intimate
things about myself on my social network”), which was selected eight times. These
three questions have also been used for predicting the generic set, supporting the
correctness of the selection algorithm.
The mean squared error of the prediction of the privacy levels against the test
set is displayed in Table 4.8. We computed the mean squared error of the prediction
separately for every topic set, as well as for the whole set of posts in the generic
set. The best results were achieved for the topic events (MSE=1.33), whereas the
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input_quest ions = [ . . . ]
current_qs = [ ]
s c o r e s = [ ]
while ( len ( input_quest ions ) > 0 &&
len ( current_qs < 15)
{
b e s t _ s c o r e = INT_MAX
best_ques t ion = None
for q in input_quest ions :
s = score ( current_qs + q )
i f b e s t _ s c o r e > s :
b e s t _ s c o r e = s
bes t_ques t ion = q
s c o r e s . append ( b e s t _ s c o r e )
current_qs += q
input_quest ions . remove ( q )
}
global_minimum=min ( s c o r e s )
return current_qs [ : global_minimum ]
FIGURE 4.3: WSS algorithm used for optimizing the questions.
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TABLE 4.7: Number of selections for the most frequently selected
questions. For the questionnaire-text, see Tables A.1 and A.2











TABLE 4.8: Mean squared error for the prediction of the privacy level
(from 1 to 5) for the selected topics in the main study.
travel and sports topics were hardest to predict, with a mean squared error of 1.61.
Unsurprisingly, the mean squared error was highest with 1.63 for the generic set,
containing all posts independent of topic.
4.1.3 Validation study
The privacy levels that were given by the subjects of the main study were based on
imaginary posts, so our goal in the validation study was to test the prediction with
actual posts out of the users’ social network profile. We compare the users’ privacy
settings with the predictions of the naive and the ML approach. We did no direct
comparison between the Facebook and the predicted settings, as Facebook’s binary
setting cannot be compared to our fine-grained five-point-scale. Therefore we let the
user do a subjective comparison regarding the satisfaction with the predicted settings
compared to their original privacy settings that were used when publishing the post
on their social network profile.
As in the aforementioned studies, the validation was conducted as an online
study, with recruitment by Prolific Academic. Participants of either of the former
studies were excluded from the validation study. The number of participants totals
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31 persons aged from 18 to 60 (mean 28). As in the two former studies, the partici-
pants were paid a compensation of £2 upon successful participation and after check-
ing the submitted data for plausibility. The study started with the privacy attitude
questionnaire, containing the questions derived from the main study. The privacy
questionnaire is answered in the same 5-point scale that we used for the main study.
As we also want to test for the RMSE of the topic-specific prediction, we took all 36
questions that were selected by the machine learning system.
The second part is divided into several phases. Figure 4.4 shows the website of
this second phase of the validation study; the numbers denote the order of steps a
participant had to take. The UI was created only for the purpose of the validation study,
and is different from a possible UI that implements the approach on a social network site.
First, the subject is given a list of pre-defined topics and an interface to copy/paste
one of her posts that she published in a social network in the past (1). The topic
of the post is then selected by the user through a drop-down list (2). As soon as the
topic is selected, the second half of the page is displayed: On the upper part, the par-
ticipant is asked to enter the privacy setting she used on her social network (3) when
publishing the post (e.g. share with friends, friends of friends, or publicly). As soon
as this information was entered, our approach unveils the proposed group-wise pri-
vacy setting (score between 1 - 5) for each friend list (4), along with a description of
the effects of each privacy setting level from level 1 to level 5. The subject is given
the possibility to adapt the setting suggestion to her needs (5). On the bottom of the
screen (6), the subject states whether she prefers the proposed setting (before user
changes) or her own setting (5-point scale, 1=own setting, 5=our predicted setting).
The second part is repeated until at least ten topics have been entered into the
questionnaire. The questionnaire ends with a question asking whether the sub-
ject would use a system like ours if it was integrated into Facebook (1= very un-
likely, 5=very likely). In addition to the answers to the questionnaire questions, we
recorded whether the user changed the proposed privacy settings, in order to com-
pare the changed setting with the prediction.
Results
To ensure quality, we excluded persons who failed to answer the control questions
correctly, as well as posts whose content did not match the topic the subjects entered
into the system, or posts where we could not verify this fact (for example because
the post was written in a language that we could not translate). The final dataset
therefore consists of 230 annotated posts.
To repeat, for each post as displayed in Figure 4.4, we asked, if they had to choose
between their Facebook settings and our predicted settings, which one they would
prefer. For this question, we performed a T-test against a constant value of three. As
displayed in Figure4.5 , participants significantly preferred the predicted setting to
their own privacy setting (M=3.23, t=2.369, p=0.019).
The results of the closing question “If such a system were integrated into Face-
book, would you use it?” are displayed in Figure 4.6. More than 67% of all partici-
pants would likely or very likely use our system.
The users had the possibility to adapt the proposed setting if they were not fully
satisfied with it. The mean squared error of the predicted settings to the adapted
setting is shown in Table 4.9 aligned with the MSE of the naive approach and the
amount of posts for each category. The results of the aforementioned studies will be
discussed at the end of the chapter together with the results of the location sharing
approach.
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topic MSE (naive) MSE (ML) # posts
family 0.90 0.93 38
events 1.16 0.85 24
movies 0.98 0.26 23
politics 1.28 0.91 14
food 0.83 0.46 28
work 1.00 1.17 18
hobbies 0.95 0.86 29
travel 0.76 0.64 17
sports 1.66 0.6 22
generic 1.15 0.78 230
TABLE 4.9: Amount of posts and mean squared error for the selected
topics in the validation study for the naive and the ML approach.
4.2 Location sharing domain
Although a lot of social network sites also enable the user to share the location with
her friends, for example by attaching the current location to a post or by “checking
in” at a location; the decision whether or not to share the location depends on other
context factors, like the occasion or type of the event the user is currently involved
in, or the time of day and day of the week when the location is shared [31]. The
influence of the individual factors like personality and privacy measures can there-
fore be different from the preceding experiment as well. In this study, we therefore
have the goal to find out which individual factors are of importance for this domain,
which machine learning technique can lead to optimal results, and what precision a
user can expect from such an approach in the location sharing domain.
Especially in recent years, since smartphones with integrated GPS tracking be-
came more and more popular, sharing the current location also became more pop-
ular. Whereas only 11% of all users shared their location in 2013, this number in-
creased to 70% just two years later. Similar to social networks, users tend to censor
their posts or in this case, tend not to share their location at all, if the privacy setting
mechanisms of the location sharing provider are too simple and do not allow them
to tune the disclosure settings in a fine-grained way [31]. However, introducing a
more complex privacy setting mechanism alone does not increase user acceptance
or desire to share one’s location, as those systems require a lot of time to be adapted
to the user’s needs and require some technical knowledge about the meaning and
consequences of the different settings [281].
So far, social network and location sharing providers have not implemented
any solution to this problem. However, research has already proposed several ap-
proaches to automatically infer the privacy settings based on either explicit user
feedback or by analyzing sharing decisions made in the past [281]. However, this
approach only works for users who have already used the system before. Other re-
searchers focused on context factors that have an influence on the sharing decision.
Whereas first studies found indications that the time and day of the week also have
an influence on the privacy decision [31], later studies found that it is not exactly the
time and day of the week that is the crucial factor, but rather the type of the event or
occasion also plays an important role [73]. Apart from this factor, the person request-
ing the location has been found to be a significant factor for the sharing decision by
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multiple studies [74, 31]. Although context factors have been part of research mul-
tiple times in the past, the influence of individual factors has not been examined so
far.
Studies have also shown that most users wish to have more privacy options than
just “disclose” or “ not disclose”, including obfuscated or abstracted versions of their
location, for example only the street name or the current city [246]. Using this func-
tionality, it is still possible to tell your friends that you are visiting your new date
in the town nearby, without disclosing the home adress of that person. Some social
network providers took up this feature request and gave the users the possibility
to apply some of these location abstractions. Nevertheless, the choice of the best
abstraction level is quite hard, especially for lay users, as they have to make a trade-
off between privacy (for themselves) and usefulness of the shared location (for their
friends). So far, social web sites as well as approaches from research do not offer any
support for this fine-grained privacy decision.
Similar to the approach presented in the last section, we conducted a user study
including 100 online participants to find whether and which individual factors have
an influence on the privacy decision (e.g., whether there is a correlation between
individual factors and privacy levels) and, in the next step, how much the precision
increases using those factors compared to a random prediction. In our study, includ-
ing seven distinct privacy levels (or “location abstraction levels”), we were able to
improve the prediction precision by up to 20%. At the end of the section, we will
furthermore give some guidelines on which individual factors should be used de-
pending on the available individual factors and the tolerable additional effort for the
user to fill out questionnaires.
4.2.1 User study
We used a three-step approach for the main study, which will be described in the
next three subsections. First, we collected a so called gold set, i.e. a data set that
contains both individual measures as well as location sharing privacy settings for
a larger number of users. We gathered the gold set using an online study, where
participants were asked to fill in several privacy and personality questionnaires, as
well as their location sharing preferences for different combinations of context fac-
tors. Using the gold set, we first analyzed whether there are correlations between
the individual measures, and whether they are suitable for a prediction. Finally, we
performed a regression analysis using a cross-validation approach to find out how
precise a prediction can be using a machine-learning approach. As described in the
introduction, research has identified two main context factors that influence the lo-
cation sharing privacy decision: first the requestor, and second the occasion or event
when the location is shared. Locations are very often shared on social network sites
like Facebook, Google+ or Foursquare, and the groups of recipients are typically
similar to the user’s friends in social media5; we therefore re-used the groups of re-
cipients from the social media study and other related work from this domain [184]
for the location sharing study. Similar to the social media study, we use several fine-
grained disclosure levels, which also allows users to publish an abstracted location
to some of the recipients. To be more precise, we used the seven abstraction levels
offered by the Google Maps API for our study, as described in Table 4.10.
To reduce side effects, we captured the individual factors, such as personality
and privacy attitudes, using a questionnaire. However, as we have seen in chapter
5https://www.thewindowsclub.com/oversharing-on-social-media (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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Privacy level Displayed location
1 - Exact location exact GPS location
2 - Street & city only area of the whole street
3 - City only city area
4 - Province only area of the province
5 - Country only area of the whole country
6 - Continent only area of the continent
7 - No location none
TABLE 4.10: Privacy levels used in the location sharing study.
3, these measures can also be derived from the user’s written text, so this step could
be skipped at the cost of prediction precision.
Like the social network study, this study was also conducted as an online study
using Limesurvey6, whereas recuriting was done with an online recruiting platform
called Prolific Academic7. We allowed only participants into our study if they were
sharing their location online or using their smartphone. Each participant needed
on average 10 minutes to complete the questionnaire, and was paid £1 afterwards.
The questionnaire included three control questions. The participants were only paid
if each of the control questions was answered correctly and if the participant ful-
filled the study requirements mentioned before. If one of the requirements was not
fulfilled, the participant was automatically rejected by the recruiting platform and
replaced by another. We therefore ended up with exactly 100 valid participants. The
participants were aged between 19 and 65 (average 33.08, SD 9.14). The audience
had very different occupations, from employees and self-employed persons, to stu-
dents, to homemakers. 46 of the participants were female, and 54 male.
The survey shown to the participants consists of two parts. In the first part, we
captured the individual measures of the participants. We used the big five personal
inventory to capture the personality, and the IUIPC and the Westin privacy index
questionnaires without any modification for measuring the privacy attitude of the
participants. In the second part, the subjects had to enter their preferred privacy lev-
els (e.g. location abstraction levels) for each context factor combination. In order to
ensure that the results would be comparable between subjects, we did not use their
own locations shared in the past as an example. Instead, we asked them for a privacy
level for a hypothetical post like “Imagine you are at a music event and share your
location with your sports friends. Which privacy level would you choose?”. We pro-
vided an explanation for each privacy level similar to Table 4.10 at the bottom of the
questionnaire page. As a reminder, we identified two most important context factors
that we used for the study: nine different friend groups (“family affairs”, “events”,
“movies”, “politics”, “food”, “work”, “hobbies”, “travel” and “sports”), and eleven
different occasions (see Table 4.10), resulting in 99 individual privacy levels for each
participant. The online survey ended with a text box, in which participants could
enter feedback or proposals for improvement.
6https://www.limesurvey.org (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
7https://www.prolific.ac (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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4.2.2 Correlation analysis
Before starting with the correlation analysis, we first evaluted whether the chosen
abstraction levels were useful for the participants, by analyzing how often each of
the given abstraction levels was used within the study. Each of the abstraction levels
was used by some of the participants. The least frequently used abstraction level
Continent only was used by 18% of the participants, in total for 0.57% of the settings
of all participants. Interestingly, the two binary options Exact location and No lo-
cation, which are the only two options in many location sharing services, were not
chosen most frequently. The most often used abstraction level was City only, which
was used by 93 participants, on average for 32.65% of all settings. No location was
used for 22.53%, Exact location for 17.84%, and Street only for 15.95% of the settings.
Interestingly, there were more participants who used Exact location (75 participants)
or Street only (74 participants), than who used No location at least once, leading to
the assumption that if a user uses No location, she tends to do it for a larger portion
of her privacy settings. Lastly, Province only and Country only were used only for
about 5% of the privacy settings, thereby becoming the second least frequently used
abstraction levels before Continent only.
As stated earlier, we are also interested in whether we can support the findings
of related work regarding the context factors used in our study, e.g., whether the two
mentioned context factors (type of occupation and group of recipients) have an influ-
ence on the privacy setting. For performing the variance analysis, we first computed
the privacy levels averaged over all occasions (avgrec) for each group of recipients
for the analysis of the context factor recipients, and vice versa for the context factor
occasion (avgocc) , as described in Figure 4.7. Afterwards, we performed a variance
analysis comparing the settings for the different context factor instances (for exam-
ple comparing all privacy levels for the different types of occasions). A Mauchly test
on both averaged privacy levels showed that sphericity is not given for any of them
(p<0.001 for recipients, p<0.01 for occasions); we therefore performed a Greenhouse-
Geisser test. The results indicate that both context factors have a strong influence on
the privacy decision, e.g., that the variance between the context factor instances is
highly significant. Whereas the F-value for the group of recipients is already highly
significant (F8,1092 = 3.329, p = 0.001), the F-value for the context factor occasion is
even higher (F10,890 = 66.865, p < 0.001), leading to the assumption that, although
both context factors have a strong influence, the occasion when the location is shared
has the highest influence.
In the next step, we checked whether the individual factors that we recorded
also have an influence on the privacy decision, and whether they should be used
for a privacy-setting prediction using machine learning. Both the answers to the
personality as well as to the privacy questionnaires contain ordinal data, which is
also not normally distributed according to the F-tests that we conducted prior to
the correlation analysis. The results presented in Table 4.11 are therefore computed
using a Spearman correlation, which is the nonparametric equivalent of a Pearson
correlation.
The largest correlation coefficients can be achieved using the IUIPC privacy mea-
sures, especially the collection (ρ = 0.167, p < 0.001) and control (ρ = 0.167, p <
0.001) measures, indicating that these privacy measures have in general a stronger
influence on the privacy decision, compared to the user’s personality. All privacy
measures have a positive correlation, meaning a higher privacy demand according
to the privacy measures also leads to stricter privacy settings. The measures from the
conventional Westin privacy index also correlate significantly (ρ = 0.024, p = 0.018)
118
Chapter 4. Predicting privacy settings using individual factors
in the social web










TABLE 4.11: Correlations between individual features and the aver-
age privacy levels avgall .
with the chosen privacy levels, although the effect is not as strong as with the two
aforementioned privacy measures. The five personality traits all have a significant
correlation with the privacy levels; apart from the agreeableness measure, alls of them
are also highly significant. Openness, extraversion and agreeableness have a nega-
tive correlation with the privacy levels, indicating that open and extraverted people
in general use less strict privacy settings, and have a higher focus on sharing data
with their friends, rather than protecting their privacy. In contrast to this, neuroti-
cism and conscientiousness, which can be found more with intraverted people, leads
to an increased strictness in privacy settings.
4.2.3 Correlation analysis discussion
Each of the abstraction levels that we offered to the participants was actually used in
the study. Participants used the intermediate privacy level City only most of the time
instead of one of the binary options (exact location/no location), highlighting the
need for fine-grained privacy levels in the location sharing domain. Even the least
frequently used abstraction level, Continent only, was still used by 18 participants,
although only for a very small number of settings. Nonetheless, there seems to be a
need for this option, which led us to the decision to include all abstraction levels in
the regression analysis later.
The results from the variance analysis support the findings of related work re-
garding important location sharing context factors [246] and also the selection of
context factors within the user study. Both context factors have been found to have a
strong influence on the privacy levels. Interestingly, due to our analysis, the occasion
seems to have a notably stronger influence on the settings in the location sharing do-
main than the group of recipients, which stands in contrast to findings from social
networks [115]. This leads us to the assumption that, although the context factors
are similar for both domains, things that you do in life, e.g. which events you attend
and which ones you stay away from, are perceived as more private information than
the things you are posting about, which means people feel more embarassed when
others know about them attending events that do not fit the user’s image, than when
they post or talk about topics that do not fit their image.
According to the results, the personality is also a great indicator for predicting
privacy settings. Within these traits, one can discriminate the privacy effects be-
tween people that like to be accompagnied by other people, and those that prefer to
be on their own: People who are extraverted, open and agreeable typically have less
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strict privacy settings than an average person. This group of people has a focus on
being together, connecting with people, interacting with them, sharing their life with
them; maybe they even want to be seen in a better light and want to show what they
have that others do not. Therefore they like to share everything they experience in
life with others. In order to do so, they prefer to share more information, at the cost
of reduced privacy. On the other hand, people who are anxious, have a high neu-
roticism, and are conscientious, usually like to live on their own. They do not draw
any energy from sharing their life with others; rather they perceive it as awkward if
other persons know details about their life. In accordance with that, they also prefer
to have stricter privacy, and share less about their life in the social web, especially
when it comes to location sharing.
Nevertheless, our results indicate that the privacy measures are better than per-
sonality measures for the prediction. The Westin privacy index already has a signifi-
cant correlation with the privacy levels; however, the IUIPC privacy measures aware-
ness, control and collection have an even stronger correlation. This supports findings
of related literature, where the Westin privacy categories have already been found
to be too coarse-grained to allow a meaningful prediction of privacy behavior and
privacy settings using these categories as an input [349]. Especially when users want
to have high control over their data, and who should be able to see it or not according
to the IUIPC questionnaire, users tend to choose stricter privacy settings . The same
holds for the collection measures, which means that users want to have an overview
on which personal data is collected, and by whom it is collected.
Based on the results from the correlation analysis, we pose the following hy-
potheses for the regression analysis:
H 1: Using only context factors, the occasion yields a better prediction precision than
the recipient
H 2: Including the personality measures reduces the prediction error more than the
context factors
H 3: The best prediction precision can be achieved using the IUIPC privacy mea-
sures
4.2.4 Regression analysis
Based on the results from the correlation analysis, we made the following design
choices for the regression study:
• Location abstraction levels: The analysis has shown that all abstraction levels
were used at least by 13 users. We therefore decided not to remove any of the
abstraction levels.
• Context factors: The variance analysis has also shown that both context factors
have a significant influence on the privacy decision; therefore, both context
factors have been used for the regression analysis as well.
• Individual factors: The correlation analysis has shown a significant or highly
significant correlation between all personality or privacy measures and the
privacy settings. We therefore include all individual features in the regression
study.
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Prior to the execution of the regression analysis, the input data had to be pre-
pared in order to be compatible with a regression algorithm. All privacy and per-
sonality measures have their origin in ordinal scales, and can therefore be directly
used in some regression algorithms. However, both context features are again cate-
gorial variables, leading to a similar problem as in the social media experiment. As
stated in the last section, using dummy variables assumes an equal distance between
all categories, which often leads to a misinterpretation and a loss of precision in the
regression algorithms. Unlike the social media domain, we received best results for
the location sharing domain using an approach called categorial regression (CATREG)
[226] based on a multivariate regression, that automatically transforms categorial
variables into scales, and uses an optimization algorithm to find the best order for
the categories, and also the distances between each of them. Typical parameters to
tune the CATREG algorithm are the maximum number of steps to be used for op-
timizing the variable transformation (of categorial into ordinal variables) as well as
the minimum distance ε that tells the optimization algorithm to stop prematurely if
the optimization score increases by less than ε after a step.
For this analysis, we used the CATREG implementation of SPSS with a limit of
100,000 steps and ε = 0.00001. The two context factors occasion and recipient were
entered as nominal variables, the personality and privacy measures as ordinal vari-
ables. For each combination of input variables, we report the adjusted coefficient of
determination (adj.R2) and the apparent prediction error. The coefficient of deter-
mination (R2) denotes how well the regression fits the actual regression curve and
therefore denotes the degree of fitness of the regression. The values for the R2 start
from a value of 0, which means that the curve does not fit at all, up to 1, which
means a perfect fit. However, although the R2 gives a good overview on how well
the regression fits the actual curve, it does not state whether the included coefficients
are good coefficients for the prediction, or whether the selection of coefficients is op-
timal: If a new coefficient is added to the regression, it can only increase the fitness.
In the worst case, if the new coefficient is useless, the R2 just stays the same. In con-
trast to this, the adjusted R2 also takes the number of coefficeints into account, and
can also decrease when a new coefficient is added that does not signiciantly increase
the fitness of the regression curve (“overfitting”). We therefore always report the
adjusted R2 throughout this experiment. The second important measure used in this
study is the apparent prediction error (APE), which compares how good the pre-
diction is compared to a random prediction. The values of the APE range from 0,
meaning there is no prediction error at all, to 1 meaning the prediction is as good or
bad as a random predictor.
The results can be found in Table 4.12. Already using only the most significant
context factor due to the correlation analysis reduces the APE to 0.966, i.e. it makes
the prediction better than random by 3.4%. Including the second context factor can
again reduce the APE to a value of 0.964. Using individual factors, the apparent pre-
diction error can be reduced significantly more. Adding the personality measures
to the context factors reduces the APE to 0.90; using the IUIPC and Westin privacy
measures reduces it to 0.898 and 0.897, respectively. Using the IUIPC privacy ques-
tionnaire, which is also part of the social network questionnaire, together with the
most significant context factor occasion as an input, leads to a similar APE of 0.899.
If all of the aforementioned individual measures and context factors can be used,
the APE can be reduced to 0.808, meaning the prediction is about 20% better than
random.
4.3. Discussion 121
Input features adjusted R2 APE
Occasion 3.3 .966
All context factors 3.5 .964
Context + personality 9.8 .900
Context + IUIPC 10.1 .898
Context + privacy 10.2 .897
Occasion + IUIPC 10.0 .899
All 19.3 .808
TABLE 4.12: Coefficient of determination (R2) and apparent predic-
tion error (APE) for the regression analysis with the different groups
of input variables.
4.3 Discussion
We tested the social network approach under two different conditions: In the main
study, we asked the users for their settings preferences without giving them any sug-
gestions, to check the prediction precision without influencing the result. In contrast
to that, the goal of the validation study was to verify the PAPMAT system in a sce-
nario which is as realistic as possible. We therefore gave the users settings proposed
by the machine learning algorithm and let them adapt inappropriate settings, just as
a typical workflow with PAPMAT would look.
In both scenarios, we were able to predict the privacy settings with a MSE lower
than the naive method, although we did not exhaust all possibilities of the approach:
First, we had only a small amount of training data, gathered from 100 participants.
The machine learning system’s MSE would be reduced if a larger base of training
data were available. Second, we did not take advantage of the users’ feedback on
and changes to the predicted settings in the validation study to refine the prediction
system. The approach is able to dynamically observe user changes to the prediction,
and take this input as additional training data. This allows us to adapt the prediction
mechanism to a specific user, and to increase the prediction accuracy. Despite that,
users significantly preferred our privacy settings to their own settings, and were
satisfied with the prediction. For only 86 out of 230 posts, subjects preferred their
own setting to our version.
The machine learning approach performed better for all topics in the main study,
and for eight of the ten topics in the validation study. Only two topics (“work"
and “family") are predicted better by the naive approach, whereas mean squared
errors for “family" are almost identical. Work posts have a divergent nature; the
content and audience that should be able to see the post differ greatly depending
on the occupation and work field of the user. A researcher would be more likely to
want to share his work experiences with his community than a cleaner would. A
naive approach that is independent of the questionnaire can achieve better results,
although the mean squared error is still high compared to the other topics. In an
advanced version of our concept, we might include the occupation and work field
into the prediction, in order to ensure a lower MSE for this topic. The differences in
mean squared errors for the topics that were better predicted by the ML approach
are notably larger. For the topic “movies", we achieved a MSE of 0.26 for the ML
approach, whereas the naive solution yielded a mean squared error of 0.98. Which
algorithm is most suitable, depends on the effort the user wants to expend: On one
hand, the results underline that the machine learning approach performs better than
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the naive approach for most topics. On the other hand, the ML approach needs the
answers to the privacy questionnaire in order to work, whereas the naive approach
can function without additional data.
The location sharing approach was also evaluated in two steps: In the correla-
tion analysis, we had the goal to find out which context and individual factors are
suitable for a prediction, and how precise a prediction using these factors can be. The
correlation analysis has shown that all of the included context and individual fac-
tors have a significant influence on the privacy settings, and should therefore be
included in the prediction, whereas individual factors seem to be correlated more
strongly than context factors which have been used in research so far. The regres-
sion analysis supports this hypothesis (H 2). Using only context factors, the APE is
reduced more using the context factor occasion than using the recipient, supporting
H 1. Finally, the best privacy questionnaire for the prediction was not the IUIPC but
the Westin privacy index. We therefore have to partially reject H 3, as the IUIPC led
to a smaller APE than the personality measures and since the APE using the Westin
privacy index is 0.001 smaller than using the IUIPC.
Further research on appropriatness of privacy levels
A central aspect of both approaches is the fine-grained, five-point scale that we give
the user to express his privacy preferences. Although it is a very common and
broadly used technique to offer only a binary choice (like allow/deny), a user de-
cision on privacy is in fact more than a binary decision. A SN user does not only
think “I do not at all want my drinking buddies to know that I dance ballet as a
hobby” or “I would really like my co-dancers to see the pictures of that ballet con-
test”. There are also some groups of people, like university friends, where a user
would say “It is OK if they see it. I do not want to completely cut them off from that
information, but I also do not want to draw too much attention to it”. In this case,
the user would take some middle road, for example by sharing the post and the pic-
tures with the university friends, but hiding them from their timelines (or hiding the
image content), so they can only see them if they visit his personal profile, or by dis-
allowing (possibly embarrassing) comments on the pictures. Similarly, according to
our study, users want to share only the city they are currently in, without disclosing
too many details and thereby reducing the risk of being stalked.
In Facebook and most approaches in related work, the user had to set these
“medium” sharing options manually, as there is no such option between disclos-
ing or not. In our case, the user would set an intermediate privacy level, and the
corresponding privacy settings as shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.10 would be applied
automatically. In order to give the participants of the studies an idea of what each of
the five privacy levels on our scale are meant to express, and to form a more realistic
and meaningful application which is understandable for the subjects, we gave ex-
amples of possible implementations as described in the studies. Nevertheless, as we
did not conduct a study to determine which implementation yields optimal results.
We therefore plan to explore the mental model of the users regarding the privacy
levels and which privacy settings they map to in a future user study.
Earlier studies in location sharing have already found indications that users have
a need for a fine-grained location sharing privacy setting, involving more options
than just to share or not to share [246]. Our study supports these findings: All loca-
tion abstraction levels that we offered in the study and that can also be implemented
using the Google Maps API were used throughout the study. Even continent only,
4.3. Discussion 123
used least, was still used by 18 of the 100 participants at least for one privacy set-
ting. Even more interesting, the most frequently used privacy level was one of the
abstraction levels. The binary choices exact location and no location were only used
second and third most often. We therefore suggest that location abstraction levels
should be made available whenever users have to choose their location. Whether
all abstraction levels that we offered in the study are needed, whether the set can be
reduced while still maintaining the same user satisfaction, or whether other abstrac-
tion levels should be included, should be considered in future work.
Context factors or individual factors for location sharing?
The most important finding from the regression analysis of the location sharing pri-
vacy levels is that, in contrast to the approach of using context factors for the privacy
settings prediction, this approach is only the second choice according to the study
results. Whereas using the two most recognized context factors in the literature can
only reduce the APE by 3.6% for the fine-grained privacy settings, adding the indi-
vidual features according to our approach can again decrease the APE by about 16%
down to 0.808. According to the results, the best way is therefore not to use context
factors, but to capture the individual factors by either using questionnaires or by
deriving them automatically. However, if context factors are already available, these
can be included for the prediction as well.
Advantages and disadvantages of the privacy questionnaires
The usage of a privacy questionnaire seems like more of a user burden at a first
glance, compared to related approaches that get along without initial user input.
An important difference from techniques that use available information to provide
a prediction without user feedback is that the answers to our privacy questionnaire
are explicit user feedback. We can be sure that the answers that are later used to offer
a prediction are in fact correct answers that reflect users’ privacy attitudes. In con-
trast, implicit user feedback that is recorded throughout everyday social network
or location sharing usage may contain faulty or misleading information due to the
so-called privacy paradox [27], which can hamper the prediction process. This is
aggravated by the fact that current social media websites support only a binary dis-
closure choice. As discussed above, this type of setting does not neccessarily reflect
a user’s privacy desire. Moreover, we cannot interpolate the missing information
to map a binary scale to our five-point or seven-point privacy scales. A second ad-
vantage of the questionnaire is the higher generalizability of its answers. The ques-
tionnaire determines a general privacy attitude in the context of the social web. Its
answers could further be used to predict privacy settings for other similar areas, like
personal retail data or data sharing with mobile apps. The results of other related
work as presented in former sections are bound to the specific application context,
and cannot be used outside it.
The number of privacy scale questions for social network privacy settings can be
further reduced
For the proposed set of topics, we used 36 questions in the questionnaire. Partic-
ipants of the main study needed only 2–3 minutes for the privacy questionnaire,
whereas they needed 15–20 minutes to set all the privacy settings. Aside from the
fact that the amount of time needed for the settings is therefore significantly reduced,
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participants often gave general study feedback that setting all the privacy settings
was overly cumbersome and boring. Still, we can further decrease the amount of
time needed for the initial questionnaire: If the MSE of the “generic” prediction is
sufficient, only ten questions from the questionnaire have to be answered. Finally,
as we have seen in chapter 3, it is also possible to derive the personality and pri-
vacy measures out of written text, allowing us to further reduce the user burden.
The same technique could also be used to derive the measures of the social network
privacy questionnaire.
4.3.1 Conclusion
Social network sites have expressive ways to adapt the privacy settings of a post in a
granular way, but still lack a suitable user interface for setting them in a convenient
and understandable way. We introduced a questionnaire to determine the privacy
attitudes of a user in a social network context. We outlined two approaches, a naive
approach and a machine learning approach, in order to propose privacy settings to
the user, which are tailored to the user’s personality and privacy desires as captured
by a privacy questionnaire. For each post, the approaches create a distinct privacy
setting for each friend list. Unlike former work, we use the post topic as additional
input to the prediction, rely on explicit user input using a new privacy questionnaire
to train the predictor, and allow more than a binary disclosure decision by offering
five privacy levels to let the user express his sharing desires.
In a small pre-study, we observed which groups of friends usually exist in a so-
cial network, and which topics were most recently posted about. In the succeeding
main user study, we captured how the answers to the privacy questionnaire can be
used to predict the privacy settings of a user. We introduced a naive solution as well
as a machine learning algorithm, and verified the results in a validation study, using
posts from an operating social network site. The results show that users significantly
prefer the derived setting to the setting they chose when publishing the post on the
social network. The average mean squared error of the machine learning prediction
compared to their actual desired setting was low, which led to a high satisfaction
with the predicted settings. The machine learning approach performed notably bet-
ter for most of the topics. More than two out of three participants claimed to be
willing to use such a system, if it was integrated into the social network platform.
We gave some ideas on how the MSE can be further improved, and outlined a design
sketch on what the user interface for such a system could look like.
The two experiments have shown that it is possible to predict privacy settings for
a user by using individual factors as an input for a prediction, rather than context
factors. The validation study has shown that the approach also works in a realis-
tic scenario that involves users’ real social network posts, and that the approach is
accepted and preferred by the majority of users. In the following chapters, we will
take a look at how the prediction needs to be adapted in order to work for other
domains as well. Unlike the approach presented just now, we will concentrate on
determining the important individual factors that must be used for a prediction,
and on calculating a lower bound for the prediction precision for these domains,
using standard personality and privacy measures. Nevertheless, the prediction can
still be optimized by using custom questionnaires tailored for the specific domain, or
by optimizing the machine learning algorithms to the specific needs of the domain
data, which remains for future work.
Similar to the social media domain, privacy in the location sharing domain suf-
fers from poor user interfaces that do not include any assistance to help users choose
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their privacy settings. Moreover, the available binary disclosure choice has been
shown to be insufficient for the majority of users. So far, related work that makes it
possible to assist users with their privacy settings, even if the user has just started to
use the service, has concentrated on the usage of context factors like temporal fac-
tors, the occasion of the location sharing or the recipient of the location. In the study,
we observed whether individual factors, like the personality or the privacy measures
of a user, can also be used to further increase the prediction precision. Instead of a
binary scale that is used by most related work, we allowed seven different location
abstraction levels in our study.
The study results support the findings in related literature that context factors
have a significant influence on the sharing decision. However, the results also show
that the user’s personality, and especially the privacy measures, have an even larger
influence. The results also indicate that location abstraction levels, as we offered
them in our study, are highly appreciated by users. The two binary choices were
used for only 40% of the settings, whereas 60% were set to a location abstraction level
that is often not offered by most research approaches and location sharing websites.
However, there is still some work to do, such as confirmation of the chosen location
abstraction levels, the possibility to assist with posts with multiple or ambiguous
topics, and finally an in-the-wild study, where the approach is implemented for lo-
cation sharing in a social media or location sharing website, so that we can measure
whether such an assistance system is accepted by users, how good the precision is
with a large-scale training set, and how often users use the system in their daily
routine.
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FIGURE 4.4: Screenshot of the webpage used for the second part of
the validation study.
FIGURE 4.5: Settings preference for user’s setting vs. the predicted
setting.
FIGURE 4.6: Use likelihood of the prediction system.
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∀rec ∈ recipients, ∀occ ∈ occasions : avgall =
∑ setting(occ, rec)
|recipients| ∗ |occasions|
∀rec ∈ recipients, occ ∈ occasions : avgocc =
∑ setting(occ, rec)
|recipients|
∀occ ∈ occasions, rec ∈ recipients : avgrec =
∑ setting(occ, rec)
|occasions|
where setting(occ, rec) denotes the privacy level for recipient rec and occasion occ.
FIGURE 4.7: Formulas to compute the overall average privacy level
(avgall) and the average privacy level for the two context factors “re-





Predicting privacy settings using
individual and context factors
– for smartphone app permissions
The work presented here is based on already-published research [264]. In Chapter 4,
we presented our research on assisting users with their privacy settings in the social
web, via the example of location sharing privacy settings and privacy settings for so-
cial network posts. The results show that, aside from the context factors, individual
factors should also be used for predicting the user’s privacy settings. Furthermore,
fine-grained privacy settings that also allow abstraction levels, rather than just the
option to disclose or not disclose the data, are needed. In this and the next chapter,
we will show that a similar approach also works for other domains like mobile app
settings and the data from an intelligent retail store. Although the problems and
the approach are similar, each of those domains has its own challenges that have to
be considered and solved during the implementation of the algorithm and the user
study.
Smartphones, and especially their permission settings, have faced challenges
since smartphone apps emerged more than ten years ago. The large number of apps
and even larger number of permission settings introduces a massive privacy prob-
lem, as not only technical knowledge about app permissions is needed, but also a
lot of time to tune all of the settings to a user’s needs. As we will see throughout
this chapter, our approach can also be adapted to work within this domain, using
a different set of context factors (for example the app category or permission type)
and individual factors for a prediction. However, the smartphone domain differs
significantly from the aforementioned domains, as the number of apps is chang-
ing constantly, through new apps being installed, and old apps being uninstalled,
raising a need for another workflow when using the privacy setting recommender
system. Also unlike the social media domain, a permission can only be granted or
denied, meaning there is a technical limitation to a binary privacy choice in this do-
main. Throughout the setion, I will describe and evaluate two different use-cases
and approaches that are required for this special domain: one that is targeted to-
wards a new user that has just bought and set up his new smartphone and wants to
be guided in setting all of her privacy settings at once, and another approach that ac-
tively supports the user during his privacy setting process for a specific application
that he has just newly installed.
In the early years of smartphones, the users did not have a possibility to change
the permission settings of their installed apps. Each app came with a fixed set of
permissions that the user had to confirm when installing the app. When the user
did not want to grant one of the requested permissions, he had no other choice than
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not installing the app. Even worse, studies found out that a lot of apps required
permissions that they did not need for their intended use; they were often requested
only for generating user profiles and targeted advertising [65]. Luckily, the smart-
phone users started to find a solution for the problem, which was first introduced as
a hidden functionality in Android 3.4, and which became a permanent functionality
available to users starting with Android 6.0. From this point on, users were able to
allow or deny single permissions of an app, even after the app was installed and
already being used.
However, although this functionality can in principle solve this privacy and se-
curity problem, OS manufacturers like Google and Apple did not introduce a pow-
erful user interface that supports the user in finding the privacy settings for the apps
that best fit the user’s needs, and that explains the meaning of the permissions and
possible onsequences when granting them to the app. According to studies, a typ-
ical user has on average 95 apps installed on his smartphone [240], each of them
having five different permissions [239] leading to a vast amount of 475 permission
which the user has first to understand, trade off the opportunities and risks, and
then adapt according to his personality and privacy desire. Even if the user has the
technical knowledge to do so, the large number of permissions is too burdensome,
so that even knowledgeable users tend to adjust only a small portion of the per-
mission settings, if any. Several studies have found out that most users either are
unaware of the permissions they granted to the apps, or feel uncomfortable with
their permission choice [109, 108, 147, 181]. Instead, most users rely on app ratings
in the app store or play store, to decide which apps are “good” or “bad” and which
of them they should install. However, privacy risks and data security are not part
of the app rating in most cases [65]. Furthermore, research has already found out in
several studies that the current way of displaying permissions and offering to grant
or deny some of them, is not clear to users, and does not have the desired effect of
informing them about potential risks and opportunities when granting some of the
permissions [107, 109, 183].
Similar to other domains, research has tried to solve this problem by deriving
privacy settings using large permission settings databases, containing the settings
of millions of users, and using already-modified permission settings to propose per-
mission settings for new apps [208], or by using context factors like the app category,
permission type, or even the purpose of a permission, that has been automatically de-
rived by analyzing libraries used by the app [209].
As we have seen in earlier chapters, individual features like personality and pri-
vacy measures have a significant impact on the desired privacy settings, sometimes
even more than the context factors. Also, user behavior corresponds to personality:
extraverted and open people tend to have more social network friends, publish more
posts, and like other users’ posts more than an average user [19]. People with a high
conscientousness on the other hand, tend to submit less likes, and are rarely part of
social network groups. The personality has also been shown to have an impact on
user behavior in the mobile app domain: the user’s personality has a significant in-
fluence on the apps installed on the smartphone [353]. WhatsApp users are typically
extraverted, but also emotionally unstable [353], maybe because they are looking for
a person to talk to or get some advice through an indirect online conversation rather
than a face to face meeting with a friend. Twitter users are significantly less agreeable
and more egocentric according to the study [353], just to mention two examples.
However, the usage of individual factors for assisting users in the mobile app
domain has not been a subject of research so far. Similar to Chapter 4, therefore we
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investigate in this chapter whether individual factors have a correlation to the per-
mission settings, which of the individual factors have a significant influence, and
which of them can be used for predicting the permission settings in a machine learn-
ing environment. To be more precise, we attempt to answer the following questions:
1. Do individual factors correlate with mobile app permission settings?
2. Which factors should be used as input for machine learning?
3. What prediction precision can be expected?
4. What might an approach, that supports a new user who wants to choose all of
his privacy settings look like, and how can we also support an already existing
user in choosing privacy settings for newly installed apps?
Toward solving these questions, we conducted an online study to capture indi-
vidual factors as well as permission settings from 100 users; these were later used
to analyze correlations and to train and evaluate a machine learning system. We
propose two different approaches: one is an a priori permission prediction that offers
a new user a guided process for adjusting the privacy settings for all of his privacy
settings at once based on his individual factors; the other is the dynamic permission
setting prediction that uses the individual factors to support the user actively while
choosing the privacy settings on a newly installed app. The study results show that
both the a priori permission prediction and the dynamic prediction improve upon
the current standard and reduce the amount of user interaction needed.
5.1 User study
Similarly to the location sharing study, our target was to find out whether individ-
ual factors have a correlation to the permission settings, and which of the factors
should be used for a machine learning prediction. It was not our goal to find out
how precise such a prediction can be, if a very large data set of millions of users is
used; we would like to postpone this question to future work, if our results indicate
that individual factors are a fruitful source for a prediction. Furthermore, we did not
do a separate study on a customized questionnaire for this domain, which could fur-
ther improve the prediction precision. The results regarding the prediction precision
presented here can therefore be seen as a lower bound for a prediction that might be
possible with a customized questionnaire and a large data set. As input measures,
we recorded the same individual factors that were also used in the two studies in
the aforementioned domains, namely the big five personal inventory using the TIPI
questionnaire [137] and the IUIPC privacy questionnaire [221]. Although it is al-
ready possible to derive the personality measures from a written text, which would
also be the approach for an in-the-wild study using our prediction algorithm, we de-
cided to record the personality measures using a questionnaire to reduce side effects
for the study.
In addition to this generic part of the questionnaire, we also tried two domain-
specific questions asking about the user’s truthfulness when asked for sensitive data,
and about experiences with privacy invasions in the past (see Table 5.1). To be more
precise, we asked them how often (as a percentage) they give wrong information
when asked by a website, and whether they have been target of a privacy invasion
in the past, where data was misused or shared without their consent.
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Label Question
Falsify
Some websites ask you for personal information.
When asked for such information, what percent
of the time would you falsify the information?
Invasion
Have you ever been the target of a
privacy invasion (e.g. your data was misused
or shared without your knowledge)?
TABLE 5.1: Question text and label of the additional question set.
As we wanted to get answers that are as realistic as possible, we asked the users
to give us the desired privacy settings for some of their apps, rather than asking
for a hypothetical permission choice for several app categories. However, given the
limited number of participants and study time, and to ensure comparability, we had
to limit the number of apps covered by the questionnaire, as we will describe in the
next section.
5.2 Methodology
The recruiting method of the study was similar to the studies described earlier: we
had 100 participants that had been recruited using an online platform called Prolific
Academic1. This time, we required that users owned and used an Android smart-
phone on a daily basis. The user had to have at least three new apps installed and
used on a daily basis since the smartphone was bought. The privacy questionnaire
included control questions, which allowed the recruiting platform to automatically
discard answers that did not fulfill the quality standards or that did not fulfill one
of the mentioned requirements. In that case, the study was ended prematurely for
that participant, and the participant was not paid. If the study was completed suc-
cesfully, participants were granted 2£ for their participation.
The participants were aged between 18 and 61 years (M = 30.13, SD = 8.53). The
occupations included students, employees, self-employed persons and also home-
makers, just to mention the largest groups.
The survey that we gave to the participants again consisted of two parts, one
asking about individual measures, another one asking about permission settings.
The first part contained the aforementioned privacy and personality questionnaires.
In the second part, we asked about permission settings that people would choose for
a specific app that they were using on their smartphone. In that part, we did not ask
how they chose their current permission settings for those apps, but how they would
choose if they had the time and motivation to do so. The participants had to enter
between three and ten apps in the questionnaire. We asked the participant, for each
of the apps, to look up the individual permissions that were requested, which of
these permissions the user would like to revoke, and the app’s name, category and
version (see Figure 5.1, upper left). It was only possible to mark “I would revoke
the permission” if the permission was marked as used by the app before. As earlier
research has shown, users struggle to find out which permissions are used by an
app [147]. We therefore gave the participants clear step-by-step instructions on how
to find the permissions for an app, as shown in Figure 5.1 (lower right). To make
sure the users understood the instructions, we asked them to find out and enter the
1http://prolific.ac (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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FIGURE 5.1: Instructions on how to see the permissions requested by
an app (lower right) and questionnaire page asking for used permis-
sions of an app and permissions the user would revoke (upper left).
permissions used by a specific app (in our case Google Maps). Only if this task
was done correctly users were allowed to proceed. If an app with the same version
was entered by several participants, we used this opportunity to validate our data
by checking whether they marked the same permissions used by the apps. In our
study, this was always the case. At the end of the survey, users were allowed to enter
comments and feedback in a free-text form.
5.3 Results
Altogether, 100 participants entered 876 apps into the questionnaire. To get an im-
pression of how often a permission is denied to an app, and if so, how many permis-
sions are denied, Figure 5.2 shows the number of apps together with the number of
denied permissions.
As we can see, the majority of apps were granted all permissions that they re-
quested (447 out of 876). For a significantly smaller number (147 apps), only one
of the permissions was denied. Only a third of the apps had two or more denied
permissions. Regarding the first part of the questionnaire, we computed the big
five personality measures and the three IUIPC privacy measures as described in the
literature [221, 137].
To get an impression of how likely it is for a certain user that a permission is
denied, we computed a permission coefficient comb (see below) for each user, rep-
resenting the likelihood that this permission is denied by this specific user. To do
so, we counted how often a user denied access to a specific permission, and divided
this by the number of the user’s apps requesting the permission, e.g.
∀user ∈ participants, permission ∈ permissions :
comb(user, permission) = |denied(user,permission)||requested(user,permission)| , where requested(user, permission)
means how many of the user’s apps requested the permission, and denied(user, permission)
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FIGURE 5.2: Comparison of apps and number of denied permissions.
how often the user denied this permission. By that means, we get a measure de-
scribing how likely a user will deny the permission, independent from the number
of apps that he entered into the questionnaire. The value of these coefficients ranges
from 0 (always granted) to 1 (always denied), and they are independent between
participants. Table 5.2 shows the average permission coefficients for all permissions.
Taking a look at the permission coefficients, they seem to increase with the sen-
sitivity of the permission. Accordingly, access to SMS, contacts and the current lo-
cation is denied in every third case, which may also be because there are not many
apps where a user can see a sufficient reason why the app might need this permis-
sion, apart from generating user profiles and creating spam. These three permissions
are followed by access to stored photos, the camera, and the phone functionality
which are also denied a bit less frequently than every third case. Access to the Blue-
tooth module and cellular information, on the other hand, is granted quite often,
indicating that these permissions are perceived to be less harmful.
After computing the permission coefficients, the next step was to perform a cor-
relation analysis to see whether, and how strongly the individual measures correlate
with the chosen permission settings. As the data did not fulfill the requirement of
sphericity according to a Mauchly test, we performed a Spearman correlation in-
stead of a Pearson correlation. The results of this correlation analysis can be found
in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The individual measures are shown in the rows, whereas
the app permissions are represented by the columns of the table. Highly signifi-
cant correlations are marked in gray, significant correlations with a grayish back-
ground. Note that we let the participants enter apps that they installed and used on
their smartphone regardless of the app category and permissions requested by these
apps. Therefore, the number N of data sets for a specific permission differs greatly
between permissions. Accordingly, the significance can also be higher in general
for permissions having a large N. Therefore, the correlation coefficient is of more
interest for deciding which individual measure should be used for a prediction.
The highest correlation coefficents can be found using the IUIPC privacy mea-
sures. Especially the collection measures have a high positive correlation with the
permissions that are perceived to be sensitive, e.g. which have a high likelihood of
being denied according to Table 5.2. All of the correlations are positive, meaning



















TABLE 5.2: Permission coefficents according to the study results for
all permissions.
likelihood to deny most of the permissions. In total, the collection measure has a
significant correlation with 11 of the 17 permissions; 6 of the correlations are even
highly significant. The control measure has three significant correlations, namely
with the purchase, contacts and location permissions. Also here, all correlations are
positive, meaning that persons who want to have control over how and with whom
their personal data is shared are also very likely to deny those three permissions.
Finally, the awareness privacy measure has two significant correlations, with the
contacts and photos permissions.
Although related work has often found correlations between personality measures
and privacy choices, the effects that we observe in the results are mostly insiginfi-
cant. The openness personality trait leads to two significant correlations (namely for
the location and SMS permissions). Interestingly, this correlation is negative, mean-
ing that people open to new experiences are less likely to allow access to Location
and to read incoming SMS. People with a high emotional stability are more likely to
allow access to the Bluetooth module, and conscientious participants are less likely
to allow access to the permission other according to our analysis. Although we did
not achieve many significant correlations for the personality measures, the correla-
tion coefficients still remain relatively medium-high, making it a potential candidate
for the machine learning prediction. However, the custom questions did not pro-
duce any significant correlations; we therefore dropped those additional questions
for the machine learning study and analysis.
The power of the analysis depends strongly on the permission type. We received
more samples for permissions which are often used by apps (for example “contacts”,
“location”, “photos”, etc.), resulting in a reasonably high statistical power (> 0.8) for
these permissions in most combinations. However, there are also other permissions
which are rarely used by apps and are therefore rarely reported in the study. The
“wearables” permission, for example, was used only by the apps of 17 participants.
Therefore, the power of the correlation analysis goes down to 0.15 for the correlation
between the “wearables” permission and the “collection” privacy measure. In order
to achieve high statistical power (>0.8), approximately 236 samples would be needed
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FIGURE 5.3: Correlations between the privacy/personality questions
and app permission settings.
for that correlation. Assuming that, similar to our study, only 17% of the participants
report an app with this permission, about 1400 participants would be needed to
achieve high statistical power for this analysis.
In addition to the correlations between individual measures and permission set-
tings, we also analyzed the correlations between the permissions, which we will
need later for the second use-case, where we help the user to adapt the permis-
sion settings for a new app by using the user’s changes to the first permission en-
tries to predict the needed changes for the remaining permissions. The results are
shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. The correlations are notably stronger compared to the
first correlation analysis. The correlation score ranges from 0.217 (Phone–Wifi) up
to 0.859 for the combination cellular information – identity. Similar high correla-
tions could be found between cellular information and purchase (r=0.81) as well as
history (r=0.778). Almost all combinations have a significant or highly significant
correlation; in the cases where they do not, it is very likely because the combination
of those permissions is very rare, and therefore N is too low for the correlation to
become significant.
5.4 A priori permission setting prediction
As the correlations analysis has shown, there are several individual measures which
are suitable as an input for machine learning. Currently, the Android OS allows all
permissions as a default, which goes hand in hand with the results in Figure 5.2. In
line with related literature [209, 208], we therefore concentrated on the hard cases for
the machine learning analysis, where at least one permission is denied. As stated in
the background chapter, the choice of the machine learning algorithm first depends
on the kind of data and kind of prediction to be performed. Unlike in the previous
studies, we now have only two distinct choices (allow or deny), which results in
a classification problem in machine learning. Typical algorithms that are used for
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FIGURE 5.4: Correlations between the privacy/personality questions
and app permission settings, continued.
FIGURE 5.5: Correlations between the app permission settings.
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FIGURE 5.6: Correlations between the app permission settings con-
tinued.
this kind of task, which have also been used in related research, include for example
SVM algorithms like support vector classification [208]. We tried out several classifi-
cations, and achieved the best results with a KNeighbors implementation using two
neighbours according to the two states (allow/deny) the permissions can have. For
each permission, we trained a separate classifier, which was compiled into one dis-
tributional machine learning algorithm that always selects the correct classifier based
on the input variables (here based on the permission to be predicted), as described
in the last chapter.
As we have seen in the last chapter, both the personality measures as well as the
IUIPC privacy measures are potential candidates as an input for machine learning.
Having five personality measures and three privacy measures, this leads to a total of
28 = 256 possible combinations of input features. Unlike the social network study,
where we had a notably larger number of combinations, we are not dependent on a
selection heuristic like the WSS algorithm presented in the social media study (see
Chapter 4). We therefore tried out all possible combinations of input factors using a
brute force method.
5.4.1 Comparative evaluation of the a priori permission prediction
We used a ten-fold cross-validation to train and validate the machine learning algo-
rithm. In this method, the data set is first divided into ten parts of a similar size,
called the folds. The training and evaluation phase is then performed ten times. In
each run, one of the folds (later called the validation fold) is taken out for the val-
idation at the end of the run. The other nine folds (later called training folds) are
used for training and tuning the algorithm and selecting the optimal input features.
To be more precise, we used 80% of the training folds for the training of the algo-
rithm, and 20% for selecting the optimal set of input features. After the training, the
trained algorithm has to predict the permission settings based on the input values of
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Feature set Selected features
IUIPC Collection, Control
Personality Extraversion, OpenExperiences
TABLE 5.3: Features selected by the machine learning algorithm.
the validation fold (in our case the individual features). The computed settings and
the actual settings from the validation fold are then compared to compute the preci-
sion of that fold. At the end, the precision of the ten folds is again averaged to gather
the final precision of the prediction. The input variables selected by the algorithm
(see Table 5.3) correspond to the individual measures with the highest correlation,
which supports the correctness of the input selection method and the results of the
correlation analysis.
To get an impression of the quality of the prediction, we conducted a comparative
evaluation, where we compared the precision of the a priori permission prediction,
using either the personality or the IUIPC privacy measures, with a naive approach
suitable for this scenario that we call the random probabilistic method. In a simple ran-
dom approach, 50% of the settings would be set to “allow”, and the other 50% to
“deny” on average. However, according to the results in Table 5.2 the percentage
of denied and allowed permissions is not about 50% on average, so a naive random
approach would lead to an unfair comparison. For the probabilistic random approach,
we perform the same steps as for the machine learning approach, including a train-
ing phase and a ten-fold cross-validation. In each run of the cross-validation, we use
the nine training folds to compute the average percentage of denied permissions for
each permission type. In the validation phase, the random probabilistic approach then
decides to allow or deny the permission based on the percentage calculated in the
training phase, i.e. when the permission is denied in 80% of the cases in the training
set, the approach will decide to deny the permission with 80% probability, and allow
with a probability of 20%.
5.4.2 Results
The results of the comparative evulation are shown in Table 5.4. The columns denote
the different approaches, namely the random probabilistic approach and the personal-
ized machine-learning-based prediction using the IUIPC privacy measures or the big
five personality measures. The rows denote the different permission types that were
predicted, in addition to an all row denoting the average precision for all permis-
sions. The values shown are the percentages of correct predictions.
Although the probabilistic random approach performs notably better (M = 59, 64)
than a naive random approach (whose accuracy would be about 50%), this approach
is outperformed by the personalized machine-learning approach by more than 10%,
using either the personality or privacy measures (MIUIPC = 70.92, MPersonality =
69.37). The permissions that could be predicted with highest accuracy are the Blue-
tooth (MIUIPC = 96.66, MPersonality = 93.33) and Cellular Information permissions
(MIUIPC = 92.5, MPersonality = 91.25). The most errors were made predicting the
location permission (MIUIPC = 53.33, MPersonality = 58.48), as well as access to SMS
(MIUIPC = 50, MPersonality = 57.5) and the phone functionality (MIUIPC = 67.33,
MPersonality = 58.66) of the smartphone. Interestingly, some of the permissions,
mostly the ones that are perceived as sensitive (i.e. that have a high denial rate
according to Table 5.2), can be predicted better using the personality measures, for
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Permission Random IUIPC Personality
All 59.64 70.92 69.37
Purchase 59.37 78.13 67.50
History 65.88 72.94 78.82
Cellular 78.75 92.50 91.25
Identity 51.87 68.44 60.62
Contacts 48.88 55.18 64.44
Calendar 70.00 80.00 81.11
Location 45.15 53.33 58.48
SMS 54.37 50.00 57.50
Phone 53.33 67.33 58.66
Photos 47.31 63.65 62.44
Camera 53.92 60.00 61.07
Microphone 52.50 74.00 69.00
Wifi 68.82 86.47 78.82
Bluetooth 84.44 96.66 93.33
ID 56.08 64.78 58.70
Other 63.55 71.33 68.22
TABLE 5.4: Prediction accuracy (percentage of predictions that are
correct) for prediction with the Random Probabilistic Model (Ran-
dom), and prediction using the IUIPC questionnaire or the big five
personality test.
example the SMS and Contact (MIUIPC = 55.18, MPersonality = 64.44) permissions,
whereas other permissions like Phone (MIUIPC = 67.33, MPersonality = 58.66) and
Wifi (MIUIPC = 86.47, MPersonality = 78.82) can be predicted better using the IUIPC
privacy measures.
5.5 Dynamic setting prediction
Whereas the a priori permission prediction discussed in the last section targets the
first use-case, where a new user wants to set up all permissions for a newly bought
smartphone, dynamic setting prediction targets the second use-case, where a user has
already set up most of his privacy settings, and wants to adapt the privacy settings
of just one newly installed app. For this purpose, we are facilitating pairwise cor-
relations of privacy choices between each combination of two permissions, so that
the choice of one or more permission can be used to predict the choice of the other.
In Android OS or iOS, the permissions of an app are typically displayed as a scrol-
lable list, where all permissions are enabled by default and listed one after another.
The user then traverses the list and clicks on a permission he wants to deny. In this
case, our approach takes all permission choices up to this point, and uses them as
an input to predict the choices for the remaining permissions. Figure 5.7 illustrates
the functionality of this approach with an example using the Evernote app. The
user decides to deny the Contacts permission. Based on this input, the dynamic set-
ting prediction assumes that the user intentionally left all other permissions above
“Contacts” enabled, so it takes the calendar, camera, and contacts permissions as an
input to predict the choice of the remaining permissions below the “Contacts” per-
mission. This approach will later be called dynamic setting prediction. Technically, we
implemented the approach similarly to the distributional machine learning technique
5.5. Dynamic setting prediction 141
FIGURE 5.7: Functionality of the dynamic settings prediction for the
example of the Evernote app. The user traverses the list of permis-
sions starting from the top and adapts the “Contacts” permission
setting. The dynamic settings prediction uses the permissions al-
ready checked by the user (red) as an input to predict the remaining
unchecked settings (blue).
described in Chapter 4: For each combination of input permissions, we trained a
separate predictor using the training data. Whenever the user changes a permission
and a prediction is requested, the algorithm loads the machine learning estimator
according to the given input permissions, and returns the prediction result of this
estimator.
5.5.1 Evaluation of the dynamic setting prediction
We validated the approach using our study data by simulating a user’s behavior
when choosing the permission settings, and comparing the number of clicks needed
either with the dynamic setting prediction, or without additional support. As a click,
we count every user interaction, e.g. every permission setting that he had to change
manually. For the unsupported version, the number of clicks therefore corresponds
to the number of denied permissions (i.e. the ones which the user had to change
from allow to deny). A simplified version of the program used for evaluating the
dynamic setting prediction is described below.
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# t r a v e r s e a l l t h e u s e r s e t t i n g s
for each u s e r _ s e t t g in t e s t s e t :
# i n i t i a l l y , a l l s e t t i n g s a r e
# s e t t o " a l l o w "
pred= a l l o w _ a l l
for each perm in u s e r _ s e t t g :
i f u s e r _ s e t t g [ perm ] ! = pred [ perm ] :
# p r e d i c t i o n was wrong ,
# u s e r had t o change t h e s e t t i n g
# −> p r e d i c t r ema in ing s e t t i n g s
pred [ perm]= u s e r _ s e t t g [ perm ]
p r e d i c t _ s e t t i n g s _ b e l o w ( )
The test set contains all correct app settings from the user study, and is loaded
by the evaluation program on startup. The program then traverses each of those
user settings (user_settg). Initally, all permissions are set to allow. Then, all permis-
sions for the app are traversed. As soon as one of the permissions is denied, a click
is recorded and the distributional machine learning algorithm is fed with the permis-
sions up to this point as an input, and has to predict the remaining permissions.
The validation program then continues traversing the permissions. If one of the
remaining (predicted) permission settings differs from correct user_settg, a click is
recorded (as the user would have to adapt the incorrectly predicted setting), and the
remaining permissions are again predicted using the already traversed and checked
permissions. The algorithm stops if the last permission from the last app (i.e. the
last user_settg) is traversed.
In the study, we compared the average number of clicks needed without support
and with the dynamic setting prediction using either only the permissions, the IUIPC
privacy measures, the personality measures, or all of them together as an input for
the prediction. For each comparison, we report the average number of clicks needed
either with or without support, and in how many cases the dynamic setting predic-
tion needed fewer clicks (Won %), the same amount (Draw %) or more clicks (Lost
%) than the unsupported counterpart. As the dynamic setting prediction acts only if at
least one of the permissions is changed, we used only app settings for the evaluation
where at least one permission is changed. For the remaining cases, the number of
clicks would be the same either with or without support.
5.5.2 Results
Table 5.5 shows the results of the comparison. Regardless of the input variables
used, the dynamic setting prediction always performed better than the unsupported
method, both regarding the percentage of comparisons won against comparisons
lost, as well as the average number of clicks. However, the precision differs between
the input methods, especially the percentage of lost comparisons. Using only the
permissions for the prediction, the dynamic setting prediction lost in 17 % of the cases.
Using either the personality or privacy measures leads to a loss rate of about 14 %.
If all features are used together, the dynamic setting prediction loses in only 8 %
of all cases. However, in about 60 % of all cases, the number of clicks is similar to
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Input Won % Draw % Lost % Clicks (supp.) Clicks (unsupp.)
Only Permissions 23.49 59.40 17.15 1.91 2.22
IUIPC 25.76 60.60 13.63 1.83 2.21
Personality 26.58 59.30 14.12 1.70 2.10
All 24.66 67.23 8.11 1.58 2.00
TABLE 5.5: Results of the dynamic settings prediction with the differ-
ent sets of input features.
that using the unsupported method. Similar to the loss rate, the number of clicks
also drops from 1.91 using only the permissions to 1.83 and 1.70 using the privacy
and personality measures, respectively, and can be reduced to 1.58 clicks on average
using the dynamic setting prediction compared to 2 clicks without any support.
5.6 Discussion and limitations
The study results show that there are significant correlations between the chosen
permission settings and the personality measures as well as the privacy measures.
According to the machine learning analysis, those correlations are strong enough
to perform a prediction of the privacy settings that is notably more precise than a
random prediction, and also better than the random probabilistic approach, taking the
permission type and its typical denial rate into account. To be more precise, we were
able to achieve an accuracy of up to 71% correct predictions using only the three
privacy measures. However, there are still limitations to the approach and the user
study, which we will discuss in this section.
5.6.1 Implementation of the proposed approaches
We presented and evaluated two approaches to support the user in doing his mo-
bile phone permissions settings: The first is an a priori permission prediction that
helps the user in choosing all privacy settings at once, and the second assists the
user while actively adapting the privacy settings for a specific app. In a final imple-
mentation of the a priori permission prediction, the user could start by filling out
the twelve questions of the IUIPC privacy questionnaire, which could then be used
for calculating the three IUIPC privacy measures, that will be used by the prediction
algorithm later. Alternatively, the user could grant access to his Facebook profile
or a blog website, which could be used for deriving the personality or the privacy
measures (see chapter 3). The prediction algorithm then computes the permissions
in the background, and displays the results in an overview UI, where the user can
review and polish the settings before applying them. Both lay users as well as tech-
nically adept users can benefit from this system. Lay users profit from the fact that
the a priori permission prediction does not pose any technical questions (like “with
which kind of app would you like to share you cellular information?”), so they do
not need the technical knowledge on what the permission means, and which effect
the denial or allowance of the permission might have on the app, their phone secu-
rity and their data privacy. Both lay and expert users profit from the reduced amount
of work that has to be done, as only twelve IUIPC questions have to be answered in-
stead of adapting almost 500 distinct permission settings for every app. The second
approach, called dynamic setting prediction, could be integrated into the permission
dialogue of the Android OS. Whenever a user opens the permission settings page
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of an app, traverses the list and changes a setting, the dynamic setting prediction is
activated, and checks which of the remaining settings should also be denied. The
changed settings are then marked in orange, so that the user can see and review the
settings that have been changed by the algorithm. According to the study results,
this improvement of the permission dialogue should save smartphone users many
clicks, and hence reduce the time needed to adapt the privacy settings of a newly
installed app, and therefore also decrease the experienced frustration and increase
the motivation in adjusting the privacy settings, as it takes less time.
5.6.2 Both questionnaires should be used
The personality as well as the privacy questionnaire both achieve good results when
used as an input for the permission prediction. The privacy measures even per-
form slightly better than the personality measures in our study. Nevertheless, as the
difference between the questionnaires is very small and not significant, we cannot
clearly state that the privacy measures should be used for this kind of prediction.
We would still like to find out whether there is a significant difference in precision
between the questionnaires in future work. Furthermore, taking a closer look at
the prediction accuracy for the different permissions, one can see that some of the
permissions can be predicted better using the IUIPC questionnaire, whereas others
(like Contacts, Locations, SMS) are predicted better using the privacy measures. We
therefore speculate that the “best” questionnaire depends on the permission that has
to be predicted, so that a final solution should always record both the privacy and
personality measures in combination to achieve best results. According to our re-
sults, the prediction precision can be increased to 72.8% if the best questionnaire is
selected for each permission individually. Whether this claim holds has yet to be
proven in future work.
5.6.3 Size of the training set and combination with other approaches
Most of the approaches in related work and also in other domains that are targeting
the cold start problem, e.g. the need to predict privacy settings when no data on past
privacy decisions is available as a source for the prediction, mainly concentrated
on context factors for the prediction, and did not offer a personalized prediction
as in our case. Such context factors are not individual, and can therefore be easily
collected for example by using an app that is allowed to send the chosen permissions
to researchers in an anonymized form. This is not possible for individual measures,
like personality or privacy measures, that have to be captured manually from each
user using questionnaires. Studies of that kind, for example the one conducted by
Bin Liu et al. [208, 206] therefore had access to a large database with millions of app
permissions and the respective context factors (for example the app category or the
purpose of the permission, according to a static code analysis) and were therefore
more precise than the personalized approach presented in this chapter.
The goal of our study was not to test how good an individualized prediction can
be using a large database; the goal was to test whether individual factors are a useful
input feature for such a prediction. As the power analysis of the correlation analy-
sis has shown, about 1400 participants would be needed to achieve high statistical
power for all correlations. Our prediction did not make use of any of the context fac-
tors; still, we were able to increase the prediction by about 20% compared to a purely
random method. We therefore suggest using the approaches from related literature
based on context factors, and improving them by also introducing individual factors
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as a source of prediction, so that on the one hand, the precision can be increased
in general, and it is also tailored to the user’s personality and individual privacy
desires on the other hand. We would like to test how the precision increases with a
large data set, and especially which precision rates can be achieved when combining
both context-based and individualized factors for the prediction, in future work.
5.6.4 Control of random variables
Notably, we took care to reduce the number of random variables to a minimum.
For the online, study, we used prescreening techniques to make sure that the partic-
ipants were using a stationary computer or a laptop and that they were at home
while filling out the questionnaire, so that disturbances from their surroundings
were minimized. Still, there are other random variables that we cannot control, like
a general distrust towards specific app developers or types of apps, that differ be-
tween users. By capturing personality measures within the study, we were also able
to check whether the personalities of the participants were different from a normal
distribution. We compared the recorded personality measures with personality mea-
sures from earlier studies, and found no significant difference; we therefore assume
that we do not have any personality biasing in our test set.
5.6.5 Denied permissions per app and precision of the dynamic setting
prediction
Taking a look at the study results, one can see that the dynamic settings prediction
rarely loses against the unsupported approach, but often has the same number of
clicks. Having a look at the amount of denied permissions per app in Figure 5.2,
one can see that from the cases where at least one permission was denied, only one
permission has been denied in 33% of all cases. The dynamic setting prediction
comes into action only after the first permission is denied; therefore the algorithm
cannot win in this situation: Either the prediction is correct (i.e. it does not propose
to deny any other permission), and then the amount of clicks is the same as for
the unsupported method; or the prediction incorrectly proposes to deny a further
permission, leading to an additional click for the user to change the setting back to
allow. Another 20% of the permissions have only two denied permissions, which
is also difficult for the dynamic setting prediction. Although the conditions were
therefore difficult for our approach, it was still equally good or better in up to 92%
of all cases when using all input features.
5.6.6 Precision of the prediction depends on the permission
The study results in Table 5.4 show that the precision of the prediction differs greatly
between the permissions. That holds for the machinellearning-based prediction, as
well as for the random probabilistic approach. In the cases where the number of
denied permissions is high, for example for the Location, SMS and Contacts permis-
sions, it is very hard for the probabilistic model to achieve good results, whereas it is
easy for permissions which are rarely denied. Particularly hard cases, where many
users struggle with allowing access to their sensitive data, are the cases where the
personalized approach, based on machine learning, can outperform a naive unper-
sonalized solution like the random probabilistic approach most. The results there-
fore indicate that users profit from our approach especially for sensitive permissions,
where incorrect settings can lead to the greatest damage to the user’s privacy.
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5.7 Conclusion
Modern smartphone operating systems allow every single permission to be set for
each app, which on one hand gives a lot of power to the user, but on the other hand
also demands too much from her, especially if she is a lay user that first has to under-
stand the meaning and consequences of the permissions. The case is especially hard
if data about the user’s privacy behavior, like permission settings from other apps
or from online behavior, is not available. Other approaches have so far concentrated
on context factors like the app category and permission type to infer permission set-
tings in that case. However, although those approaches reached a good prediction
precision, the prediction results were generic and not tailored towards the user’s
personality and privacy desires. We examined whether such individual factors, in
our case the big five personality traits and the IUIPC privacy measures, can be used
to derive personalized app permission settings for users. We performed a user study
including 100 participants to gather the desired permission settings as well as indi-
vidual measures, and described and evaluated two approaches to support the user
during her permission setting process. The first is an a priori permission prediction
that uses individual measures to predict all permission settings for all of the user’s
apps at once, which is helpful when she has just bought a new phone and has to
adjust the settings. The second approach is a dynamic setting prediction, that actively
supports the user when she has installed a new app and has to adapt the permission
settings only for this app, by guessing future permission settings based on the ones
chosen so far for the app.
The study results have shown that the a priori permission prediction performs
about 10% better than a random probabilistic method that takes only the permission
type and its typical denial rate into account. Especially for sensitive permissions,
the a priori permission prediction is notably more precise than the unpersonalized
approach. Also, the random probabilistic approach is better or equally good in 92% of
all tested cases, if all individual features are used. Still, there is a lot potential for
future work, from integrating other context factors into the approach, to deploying
and testing the idea in an in-the-wild study, to observing whether spatial or tem-




Predicting privacy settings using
individual and context factors
– in the intelligent retail domain
Since the beginning of retail business, retail data privacy has always been a big is-
sue. Although convential retail stores already collect a lot of information like prod-
ucts purchased, number of customers, sales amounts and much more, the customer
had the possibility to stay anonymous by paying in cash and not using any credit
or loyalty cards. The retail companies rarely had a chance to match the sales data
to the individual customers. Online shopping platforms, on the other hand, have
the ability to match viewed, bought, sold and returned items to individual customer
accounts. The recent launch of Amazon’s first brick-and mortar retail store, called
“Amazon Go”, posed new privacy challenges due to the increased amount of pri-
vate data recorded inside the store. Where the customer was able to stay anonymous
during the shopping process in conventional stores, he is now tracked throughout
the complete shopping journey: Upon entering the shop, the shopper uses the NFC
functionality of his smartphone to identify himself at the entrance gate. He can then
browse the store, grab products, put them back again, and just leave the store with-
out going through a checkout process or scanning the products; he can just leave.
Amazon achieves this using “sensor fusion and deep learning”1 without providing
further details. The technology behind the service is most likely based on camera
systems and other sensors that follow the route of the customer from the entrance,
where she is identified using her smartphone, along the different aisles and shelves
that are visited, and where the system registers grabbed and viewed products, up
to the exit where the system recognizes the contents of the shopping cart and auto-
matically withdraws the price of the shopping cart items from the customer’s credit
card. Although these techniques saves a lot of time for the customers and allows
the system to support them in finding the products they need, not all customers are
happy with this system: In order to make the service work, Amazon has to record
and store a large amount of private data throughout the shopping process, and it is
not even anonymized. Which data exactly is recorded, where the data is stored and
for what purpose Amazon uses it, is as unclear as the technology that is used for
recording the data.
Apart from operating intelligent retail stores like Amazon Go, there exist several
research laboratories, including the Innovative Retail Laboratory (IRL) [308], which
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retail stores. The Innovative Retail Laboratory (IRL) is an application-oriented re-
search laboratory of the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI)
run in collaboration with the German retailer GLOBUS SB-Warenhaus Holding in
St. Wendel. In this living lab, research in a wide range of different domains is con-
ducted, mostly related to intelligent shopping assistance. The demonstrators range
from an instrumented shopping cart employing indoor navigation to several intelli-
gent shopping consultants, ambient information services and an automated check-
out system.
We have already seen, in the last chapters, that the usage of machine learning
approaches can help to predict personalized privacy settings for a user, based on her
personality and privacy measures. In this chapter, we try to tackle the problem of
data privacy in intelligent retail stores by reducing the amount of needed input. In
detail, we try to facilitate correlations between the personality or privacy desires of a
customer and his desired retail privacy settings, in order to form a privacy assistant
that is able to predict the appropriate individual privacy settings for a customer.
Unfortunately, the domain of intelligent retail data has not been a topic of re-
search in the usable privacy domain before. To be able to make a prediction of the
privacy settings, we therefore first had to find out which data is typically recorded
inside an intelligent retail store, and which aspects are perceived as sensitive by the
users.
In detail, we try to solve the following research questions in this section:
1. Which data is collected in current or yet-to-be-built intelligent retail stores?
2. Is there a correlation between personality or privacy attitudes and customers’
data disclosure preferences for an intelligent retail store?
3. Can the correlation be used to predict the data disclosure preferences using a
short personality questionnaire like the IUIPC or TIPI?
4. Are customers interested in having control over their own recorded data in an
intelligent retail store, or do they trust in retail companies?
5. Do customers accept a privacy UI which helps them to monitor and tune their
privacy settings for the disclosure of their private data in intelligent retail
stores?
In the last chapters, we have already seen that in some domains, like social net-
works, location sharing or mobile app permissions, there is a correlation between a
user’s personality and privacy measures and their choice of privacy settings. In this
chapter, we examine whether this concept can also be transferred to the domain of
intelligent retail data.
In a first step, we used expert information from members of the Innovative Retail
Lab to create a list of privacy-sensitive data items that is used inside an intelligent
retail store. We then conducted a larger user study including 100 participants to first
check for correlations, and then to train a machine learning component to make a
prediction of these.
Although the main focus of our work is on the prediction of data disclosement
preferences, we present a user interface which helps the user to set his privacy set-
tings for retail data in a centralized system. Machine learning is utilized to help the
user to find his optimal settings in a privacy assistant, by taking the user’s personal-
ity as a basis for the prediction. The results of the user interface evaluation show that
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the UI including machine learning support is perceived as more comfortable and is
significantly preferred to a standard UI without machine learning.
For this purpose, we conducted a user study consisting of two different stages:
First we had to gather background knowledge about data usage and privacy is-
sues in intelligent retail stores. Afterwards, we conducted an online user study to
find correlations between the personality or privacy attitudes of a user and the pri-
vacy settings for the aforementioned data. Privacy measures were captured using
the IUIPC questionnaire; personality was determined using the big five personality
measure [78] in the form of the Ten Item Personality score (TIPI) [137] questionnaire,
which is a shorter version of the original big five personal inventory questionnaire
(NEO-PI-R). Although the possibility exists to extract the personality measures out
of written text, we decided to capture them using a questionnaire in our study to
reduce side effects. Apart from these questionnaires, we posed two additional ques-
tions about privacy and privacy invasion (see Table 6.3). To be more precise, we
asked the subjects how frequently they had been a target of a privacy invasion (on
a five point ordinal scale from very frequently to never), and how often they enter
wrong information on purpose on websites (percentage as a numeric scale). The two
stages of the study are described in the next two subsections. The work presented
here is based on already-published research [268].
6.1 Background analysis: Data items recorded inside an in-
telligent retail store
Prior to the main user study, we reviewed the exhibitions of the Innovative Retail
Laboratory [308], to find out which data is gathered inside the IRL and could be
recorded in other intelligent retail stores, and created a list of privacy-sensitive data
items, later called permissions or items within the retail privacy settings. The data items
found in the review are shown in Table 6.1 together with a short description, whereas
Table 6.2 shows a list of services that are present in the IRL, as well as the data that
is recorded or required for the service to work.
Most data is recorded for the “invisible checkout”, which allows the customer
to just grab products out of the shelves, and to leave the store without the need to
scan and pay for the products at a checkout. The IRL relies on several methods like
RFID tags inside the products or optical sensors and cameras, for example, to find
out which products have been placed inside the shopping cart. In addition to the
viewed and bought products, the IRL also keeps track of the shoppers’ route inside
the store, including visited areas and stopping points. The IRL uses a Bluetooth loca-
tion system called Quuppa2 for this purpose. The data allows generating heatmaps
for a “management dashboard”, which allows the store manager to optimize the
store layout, for example. The Innovative Retail Lab offers several recommender
systems to the customer, which recommend products that fit with the other prod-
ucts inside the shopping basket, or that match the client’s typical product set. In
addition, it is possible to highlight allergy information on the products inside the
store. For this purpose, nutrition preferences and allergy information about the cus-
tomer are stored.
2http://quuppa.com/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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Variable Description
Address





Nutrition/product preferences like vegan/vegetarian,
likes fish, dislikes meat
Allergies Customer’s allergies
Recent visits Date, time and place of the last shop visits of the customer
Wishlist Bookmarked items/items on the customer’s shopping list
Recently viewed
Items that have been recently viewed by the customer,
e.g. taken from the shelf and put back
Receipt
Detailed shopping receipt, including the products bought
with their exact names and product IDs
Category
The categories of the products bought,
e.g. “vegetables” or “cereals”
Amount The amount of products bought
Price The price of each of the products bought
Loyalty Loyalty points
Location In-store location and movement pattern of the customer























TABLE 6.2: IRL services and private data used.
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Label Question
Falsify
Some websites ask you for personal information.
When asked for such information, what percent
of the time would you falsify the information?
Invasion
Have you ever been the target of a
privacy invasion (e.g. your data was misused
or shared without your knowledge)?
TABLE 6.3: Question text and label of the additional question set.
6.2 Pilot study
The pilot study was conducted with five participants recruited from the university
context. All of them were students aged between 21 and 48 (average 38). Like the
IRL review, the study has an explorative nature, and has to be seen as a qualitative
study to get a first impression on possible data groups and sensitivity orders, without
a claim of absolute correctness. The results will be validated within the interface
evaluation study later. The study was done using a questionnaire, which was con-
structed as follows: In the first question, the participants were given the list of retail
data types along with a set of category names (app data, personal profile, location
data, sales receipt data, interests). The participants then were asked to either assign
the data types to a group, or to create a new group. As our list might not be exhaus-
tive, we asked whether there were other types of data that might be recorded that
came to a participant’s mind, and which data types would be hard to assign to a spe-
cific group. The next question asked about the sensitivity of the different data types
on a five-point scale from “I would never disclose this data” to “I would disclose
this data without any concerns”.
All proposed clusters were used, except for the “app data” cluster, which was
perceived as too vague by most of the participants. They agreed to assign the “app
data” to the data group according to the type of data, e.g. whether it is location data
or related to the sales receipt. Apart from that, they had no problems assigning the
items to the proposed group, and did not feel the need to create new groups. The
clusters and sensitivity ratings for the different data types are shown in Table 6.4.
Except for personal data, we were able to bring the data types inside a cluster into
an ascending order regarding the reported sensitivity. The sensitivity for personal
data was too varied to find a meaningful order that works for all participants. In
the user interface presented in Section 8, we showed the data items with descending
sensitivity, so that the users’ focus lies on the most sensitive data items and so that
they are checked and adapted first.
6.3 Online study
Based on the results of the expert interview, we were able to design an online study
to check for correlations between privacy attitude and data disclosement behav-
ior. The study was conducted as an online survey using the software LimeSurvey3.
100 participants were recruited using Prolific Academic4. each participant received
3https://www.limesurvey.org, last accessed 09-05-2016
4https://www.prolific.ac/, last accessed 09-05-2016
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Rank
Personal
Data
Address 3 4 3 4 4
Birthday 3 1 2 3 2
Name 3 2 2 4 4
Income 5 3 3 4 3
Gender 3 1 2 3 2




- Province 1 1 2 3 3 1
- City 2 2 2 3 3 2
- Address 3 2 3 4 3 3
Movement 4 1 2 3 3 4
Shopping
Receipt
Loyalty points 1 2 3 3 2 1
Items bought
- Amount 4 3 3 2 3 2
- Category 3 3 3 3 2 3
- Price 3 2 3 3 2 4
Interests
Wishlist 1 3 3 3 2 1
Recently viewed 2 3 3 3 2 2
TABLE 6.4: Sensitivity rankings for the different data items from 1
(very sensitive) to 5 (very unsensitive) and sensitivity ranking inside
each data groups. Data items are listed with descending sensitivity in
the user interface to put the focus of the user on sensitive data items.
2£upon completing the questionnaire succesfully. The recruiting system from Pro-
lific Academic allowed us to check the results for plausibility before the participant
was paid. If we rejected the results, for example because one of the control questions
was not answered correctly, the system automatically recruited a new participant.
Therefore we have exactly 100 viable results. The age of the participants ranged from
18 to 73 years (average 33, SD 11.7). The audience had a wide variety of occupations:
we recruited students, self-employed workers, employees, and also homemakers.
The survey contains two parts: In the first part, we asked the subjects to fill out
the privacy and personality questionnaires. In the second phase, we asked, for each
item of the Retail privacy settings, how likely he or she would refuse to disclose the
item on a six-point scale (1 = very unlikely, 6=very likely). The survey ended with a
short feedback question in free-text style.
6.4 Results
The 100 participants filled out 100 retail privacy settings, whose mean and standard
deviation can be found in Table 6.5 together with the frequency of denied permis-
sions (sharing likelihood < 3).
As our study data consists of ordinal variables and was not normally distributed
according to F-tests, we decided to perform a Spearman correlation (“Spearman’s
Rho”) on the individual measures and the privacy settings. The results are shown in
Figure 6.1.
The measures of the privacy and personality questionnaires are in the rows,
whereas the retail privacy settings are plotted as the columns of the table. Significant
and highly significant correlations are marked with one or two asterisks, and colored
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Item mean stdev % denied
Name 3.96 1.48 29.7
Birthday 3.79 1.66 36.6
Address 3.00 1.71 60.4
Income 2.97 1.59 60.4
Nutrition 4.37 1.47 23.8
Allergies 3.74 1.70 40.6
Recent visits 3.68 1.49 39.6
Wishlist 3.78 1.62 41.6
Recently viewed 3.96 1.48 54.5
Receipt 3.79 1.66 31.7
Category 3.00 1.71 21.8
Price 2.97 1.59 24.8
Amount 4.35 1.33 22.8
Loyalty 4.37 1.47 15.8
Location 3.74 1.70 66.3
TABLE 6.5: Mean and standard deviation for the sharing likelihood
and percentages of denials for each retail privacy setting.
in gray or dark gray, respectively. Regarding the IUIPC measures (collection, control,
awareness), the collection measure yields highly significant correlations for most of
the permissions (10 out of 16). Control and awareness both also correlate with sev-
eral permissions. The general personality seems not to correlate with the choice of
retail privacy settings and is therefore unsuitable for a machine-learning-based pre-
diction. However, the amount of falsified information given to online companies
seems to correlate significantly or highly significantly with seven out of 14 items of
the privacy settings. We therefore dropped the TIPI questionnaire and continued to
work with the IUIPC and our additional questionnaire for the prediction in the next
sections.
6.5 Retail privacy setting prediction
As the results in the last section have shown, there is a correlation between indi-
vidual measures and privacy settings, whose suitability for predicting the privacy
settings using machine learnings will be checked within this section. Similar pub-
lications predicting privacy settings in other domains [208] used support vector al-
gorithms for the prediction. As we have fine-grained ordinal data for the privacy
settings, we are also able to use a regression to predict privacy settings. The predic-
tion result is then mapped to allow (result > 3.5) or deny (result < 3.5). We tried
several regression methods and achieved the best results with a ridge regression.
We followed the same procedure described in earlier section, i.e. training the
algorithm, adjusting parameters and finally validating the trained regressor. To pre-
vent biasing of the results, we used a cross-validation method called repeated random
sub-sampling validation, also known as Monte Carlo cross-validation: The data set is
split into two parts, the training set containing 75% of the data set, and the test set,
that is used solely for the evaluation, containing 25% of the data. The data in the test
set is never used while setting up the algorithm, neither for training/fitting, nor for
selecting optimal algorithm parameters, nor for finding the optimal feature set. We
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FIGURE 6.1: Correlations between privacy awareness/personality
measures and retail privacy settings. Entries in light and dark gray
are statistically significant and strongly significant, respectively.
performed 100 distinct runs, and used the average precision of all runs for select-
ing the best set of features. After each run, the data set was shuffled randomly, and
reassigned to one of the two parts.
6.6 Validation
We validated the results of the prediction using the trained estimators as described
in the last subsection. For this purpose, we used the trained regressor to predict the
privacy settings based solely on the individual factors in the test set, and compared
the results with the actual privacy settings. Neither the estimators nor the input
features were changed throughout the validation. As a baseline, we used the same
random probabilistic approach that has already been used for the mobile app domain,
this time trained with the intelligent retail data from the same training set that was
also used for the machine-learning based prediction.
The results of the analysis can be found in Table 6.6. The columns denote the
condition and used input features (either the random probabilistic method, or the
machine-learning approach using either the IUIPC privacy measures or our addi-
tional questions), the rows contain the different data types for which we predicted
the permissions. Similar to the mobile phone approach, the row “all” denotes the
average precision over all data types.
Similar to the mobile phone validation, the random probabilistic method can
also outperform a pure random method (whose precision would be about 50%) with
a precision of 57.7% in this domain. Nevertheless, it is outperformed by the machine
learning-based prediction (MIUIPC = 69.1, MAdditional = 67.6). The prediction based
on the IUIPC questionnaire (12 questions) performs best, although good results can
also be achieved using our additional questionnaire (two questions) if the amount of
questions to be answered by the user and thus the user burden has to be decreased
further. Best results can be achieved for the Amount permission (MIUIPC = 87.3,
MAdditional = 87.3). The disclosement setting for the recently viewed permission was
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Item Probabilistic IUIPC Additional
All 57.7 69.1 67.6
Name 60.0 73.6 71.8
Birthday 55.4 60.0 56.4
Address 48.1 61.8 59.1
Income 50.9 59.1 54.5
Nutrition 53.6 63.6 53.6
Allergies 67.2 81.8 81.8
Recent visits 61.8 78.2 78.2
Wishlist 52.7 64.6 65.5
Recently viewed 51.8 52.7 53.6
Receipt 49.0 60.9 60
Category 54.5 68.2 68.2
Price 50.9 59.1 59.1
Amount 80.0 87.3 87.3
Loyalty 60.9 78.2 77.3
Location 62.7 75.5 74.5
TABLE 6.6: Percentage of correct predictions for the random proba-
bilistic method, and the machine-learning approach using either the
IUIPC privacy measures or our custom (additional) privacy ques-
tions.
hardest to predict (MIUIPC = 52.7, MAdditional = 53.6). Overall, the machine learning
approach outperformed the probabilistic method by about 11%.
As the results seemed promising, we created a user interface called “Retailio” that
uses our approach. The next section will give details about the UI as well as a final
evaluation study.
6.7 “Retailio” privacy settings UI
The precision of the machine learning prediction has shown that such a personalized
recommendation system can offer the users a set of privacy settings that is signifi-
cantly more precise than a naive approach based on the data types or a generic set
of privacy settings. In other domains, like the mobile app domain or the social web
domain, related work has already tested whether such prediction approaches can
be integrated into user interfaces, and whether this is accepted by users. However,
we still have not tested whether such an approach is accepted by users, and whether
they also perceive the predicted settings to be significantly better than random in the
domain of intelligent retail data. For this purpose, we implemented and evaluated
a privacy user interface empowered by our personalized privacy setting prediction.
Based on the findings of the online study, we decided to create a user interface which:
1. allows the customer to set and monitor his retail privacy settings in one central
place, and
2. supports the user during his decision, by utilizing the machine learning tech-
niques described in the former sections
We therefore implemented a mobile website that gives a clear overview on the
settings, and that offers a privacy assistant to set the privacy settings automatically.
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The detailed workflow of the UI is denoted in Figure 6.2. When the customer opens
the website for the first time after registration, he is offered a privacy assistant (see
Figure 6.3, upper left) which asks the 12 questions of the IUIPC questionnaire.
FIGURE 6.2: Typical workflow of Retailio during first use.
FIGURE 6.3: Retailio’s privacy assistant: IUIPC questions (upper left)
and results page (lower right).
After the survey is finished (typically 2-3 minutes), the customer is presented
the results (mean scores) of the questionnaire along with the typical mean scores
of other customers (Figure 6.3, lower right). When clicking on “calculate settings
now”, the privacy assistant uses the ridge regression estimators (see Section 6.5) to
predict the privacy settings tailored to the customer. From that point on, Retailio is
initially set up and ready to use. The customer can still manually enable or disable
single permissions on the main screen (See Figure 6.4), or re-run the assistant at a
later point in time.
6.7.1 Evaluation
In order to evaluate the final design of Retailio, we performed a lab study with 24
participants from the university context. As stated in the introduction, there is cur-
rently no system that offers the customer a user interface to set his retail privacy
settings. Therefore we could only evaluate the attractiveness of the Retailio UI as it
is; there is no baseline interface that we could use as a comparison. Nevertheless, we
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FIGURE 6.4: Main screen of Retailio.
were able to evaluate the prediction of the privacy assistant as a comparative study
against the probabilistic approach as the baseline.
The goal of the evaluation was to check in a realistic scenario:
• whether the idea of using a privacy assistant is accepted by the users
• if the predicted settings of the privacy assistant are useful
• how well Retailio is rated in terms of user experience and performance
• if there are still some points for improvement
All studies were conducted remotely using a Teamviewer session. The partici-
pants accessed the Retailio website remotely over their web browser. Although the
UI was the same, we tested two different conditions for the prediction: The first con-
dition used the ridge regression estimator in the privacy assistant; the second one used
the probabilistic estimator. Just as in Section 6.5, the second condition therefore forms
the baseline condition. The order in which conditions were used was shuffled using
a Latin square. The procedure was the same for both conditions: After filling out
a questionnaire containing general information (gender/age etc.), the subjects were
given a link and the account data for the Retailio website. After logging in, they fol-
lowed the typical workflow as depicted in Figure 6.2: First, the privacy assistant was
used to do an initial setup of the retail privacy settings. After that, the user reviewed
the predicted settings on the main page, and changed incorrectly predicted settings.
When the user finished the editing process, the procedure ended with a subjective
rating of the prediction on a 10-point scale (1 = not at all accurate, 10 = very accu-
rate). The participants were invited to a second meeting seven days after the main
experiment. We chose this timespan as it was short enough so that people’s privacy
preferences would not change in the meantime, but long enough so that they would
not remember the settings from the previous appointment. The procedure was the
same as in the first meeting, this time with the other condition. The second and last
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Variable Question
General_privacy
I like the idea of privacy management in general
(being able to individually set your own settings)
Privacy_assistant
I like the idea of a privacy assistant that helps me
to set my permissions
Prefer_to_manual I would prefer a privacy assistant over a manual setting
Prefer_predefined I prefer to use predefined privacy profiles
Trust
In general, I trust the conditions and privacy
statements of companies
TABLE 6.7: Additional questions asking for general attitude toward
privacy assistants, privacy settings and general trust in companies’
privacy policies.
meeting ended with an attrakdiff questionnaire [150] as well as additional questions
about the general attitude toward privacy assistants, privacy settings and general
trust in companies’ privacy policies as described in Table 6.7 on a five-point ordinal
scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
In addition to the questionnaire results, we recorded the number of changes
made by the user after finishing the privacy assistant in each of the two conditions.
6.7.2 Results
We first analyzed the data on the number of changes made by the user. As a test on
normal distribution failed, we used a Wilcoxon signed ranks test, which is a non-
parametric test to analyze interval or ordinal data of two populations. As the re-
sults show, the settings predicted by the machine-learning-based privacy assistant
(Mchanges = 4.35, SD = 2.76) were changed significantly less often (Z = 2.891, p =
0.004) compared to the control condition using the random probabilistic approach
(Mchanges = 5.6, SD = 2.8).
The subjective rating for each condition (10-point scale, 1=worst, 10=best) gave
us two sets of ordinal data for the two conditions. Tests on normality failed; there-
fore, we compared the results again using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test, as it is the
preferred statistic for this kind of ordinal data. Also here, the users significantly (Z =
2.331, p = 0.02) preferred the machine-learning-based settings (M = 7.05, SD = 1.5)
to those of the probabilistic privacy assistant (M = 6.1, SD = 1.48).
The additional questions (see Table 6.7) were proven to be normal-distributed
this time using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test. Therefore we were
able to use a one-sample t-test with a test value of 3 (mean of the five-point scale)
for the analysis. The results can be found in Table 6.8. According to the results,
with high significance, people like the idea of managing their privacy settings them-
selves (t = 17.61, p < 0.005) in general and also by using a privacy assistant for
this task (t = 10.672, p < 0.005). Privacy assistants are preferred to manual settings
(t = 4.27, p < 0.005). In general people do not trust the privacy statements and
regulations offered by companies (t = −3.58, p = 0.002), highlighting the need for
a custom privacy management tool like Retailio. We were not able to prove any
trend in whether the subjects prefer to use pre-defined privacy templates instead of
setting every single permission themselves, although there is a slight lean towards
individual settings rather than privacy templates (t = −0.195, p = 0.84).
The results of the attrakdiff questionnaire at the end of the experiment are posted
in Figure 6.5. An average user interface would have a neutral pragmatic and hedonic
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Variable mean T p
General_privacy 4.75 17.62 <0.005
Privacy_assistant 4.45 10.72 <0.005
Prefer_to_manual 3.70 4.27 <0.005
Prefer_predefined 2.95 0.195 0.85
Trust 2.35 -3.58 .002
TABLE 6.8: Statistical results for the additional questions.
FIGURE 6.5: User experience results of Retailio: Portfolio presenta-
tion for the pragmatic and hedonic quality (left), and detailed aver-
age values of the four attrakdiff measures pragmatic quality (PQ), he-
donic quality regarding stimulation (HQ-S) and identity (HQ-I) and
attractiveness (ATT) (right).
score (about zero) and would therefore be located in the center of the central square
(neutral) of the portfolio presentation. Scores > 1 or < −1 are perceived as above
average or below average respectively [150].
Retailio received a high pragmatic score (PQ = 1.37) which clearly attests to a
usability that is above average. Although we did not put much effort into the user
experience or design aspect of the UI design, we still received a hedonic quality
at the border of above average (HQ − I = 1.04, HQ − S = 0.8). Nonetheless, the
attractiveness of the UI was found to be clearly above average (ATT = 1.49).
6.8 Discussion
6.8.1 Precision of the prediction vs. size of the data set
As we have seen throughout the development process of Retailio, including the cor-
relations found (Figure 6.1) and the precision of the machine learning algorithm
(Table 6.6), there is a strong correlation between the IUIPC and the retail privacy
settings. Although the setting prediction led to good results (about 70% correct-
ness), we think that it is still possible to improve the prediction. Although not fully
comparable to our work, researchers from other areas, like mobile app settings pre-
diction, achieved up to 80% correct predictions [208, 206] with a large online settings
database containing several million data sets. In contrast to the mentioned work,
there is no large online database of retail privacy settings that we could utilize as
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training data. We would like to see whether the performance improves with a larger
training set.
6.8.2 User acceptance
According to the questionnaire results in the main study (Table 6.8), customers desire
to have control over the data that is collected, shared and used by intelligent retail
stores. The users stated in our study that they generally distrust the companies and
their privacy regulations, emphasizing the urgent need for a privacy management
system like Retailio. Privacy assistants are perceived as a reasonable approach to
support them while making their settings. Shoppers dislike selecting all the settings
manually, and prefer a privacy assistant to do all the work for them. The predictions
performed by Retailio were significantly more precise than those from a simple prob-
abilistic method. Still, we cannot state for sure whether fine-grained individual set-
tings are the best solution for all customers. As the question Prefer_predefined shows,
opinions are diverse: some of the subjects stated they preferred pre-defined privacy
setting templates, while some liked to be able to adapt every single setting, as offered
by Retailio. A different approach to Retailio could use a finite set of privacy profile
templates, and use (maybe shorter) questionnaires to select one of the templates, as
is done in related work on Facebook privacy settings [272]. To sum up, we can say
that a concept like Retailio is accepted.
6.8.3 User interface design
We took an iterative approach when designing Retailio, starting from background
research, to a user study, checking for correlations that could be utilized as a basis
for machine learning, and ending up with a proof-of-concept UI that implements
our approach. Although a lot of effort was put into the implementation of the UI to
make it as convenient as possible, we did not conduct an in-depth design process,
including design thinking and the design and evaluation of several layouts. As the
attrakdiff results show, the UI is indeed perceived as convenient on one hand; on the
other hand, there is some space for improvement in the hedonic quality, i.e. the user
experience as such when using the interface. Especially the stimulation measure
(HQ− S) could be improved, meaning the interface could be designed to be more
eye-catching and interesting. We would like to go through this process of designing
an advanced UI, involving all the steps that are needed for a design process, in future
work.
In a second step, we want to bring Retailio to customers, connecting it with an
intelligent retail store like Amazon Go. We would like to explore in an in-the-wild
study whether Retailio will be used in practice, how well the prediction performs
with a large user base, and how useful such an approach is perceived to be by the
customers.
6.9 Conclusion
New intelligent retail stores like Amazon Go make it clear that we are on the verge of
brick-and-mortar stores becoming more comfortable, intelligent, customer-sensitive
and individual. On the other hand, the increasing comfort and individualization
comes with a need for a higher amount of individual customer data. Although some
accept giving away their data for advanced customer services, not all customers
want to share all their data with retail companies; sometimes they want to share
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only part of it. We implemented a system called Retailio, which gives shoppers
control over, and an overview of their personal shopping data, and offers a privacy
assistant to automatically set up an individual initial privacy profile. We did some
background research on which data is recorded in intelligent retail stores, and did
an online user study to capture how far the personality and privacy awareness of a
customer correlates with the desired data disclosure settings (retail privacy settings).
Machine learning has been used to build a privacy assistant for Retailio, which cre-
ates the initial privacy settings profile after the user answers some simple questions.
The study results show that customers have a strong mistrust of retail companies’
privacy settings and a need for control over their personal data. The privacy assis-
tant concept used in Retailio was accepted and the results of the prediction were
perceived as useful. Nevertheless, our research brought some different promising
approaches as well as chances for further improvements to light, which could make






As we have seen in the last chapters, one way to recommend privacy settings is to
use context factors or earlier privacy decisions in the same domain (for example the
same social network website) as an input to recommend privacy settings. Some-
times, there is no information available about previous privacy decisions which can
be used for the prediction, also known as the cold start problem [222]. In Chapters 4
to 6, we discussed alternative ways of using individual measures as an input for the
prediction, solving the cold start problem, if no previous privacy decisions are avail-
able. The privacy measures can be captured using a questionnaire or inferred from
blog/social network entries of the user. However, sometimes these two data sources
are also not available. Still, in some cases, the user has already used other systems
where privacy settings had to be selected. These could be suitable as an input for
the prediction, also known as cross-domain user modeling. Although single-domain
recommender systems should be preferred due to their higher prediction precision,
if available [282], cross-domain recommender systems have the advantage that they
are able to predict settings for more than one domain, leading to increased engage-
ment and satisfaction of the user [5].
Cross-domain recommenders have been very succesful in transferring product
recommendations between multiple domains, for example for recommending books
based on the preferred movies of the user [345], or for recommending music based
on places of interest [111]. Another approach by Dominikus Heckmann called Ubiq-
uitous User Modeling [152] uses ontologies to build a generalizable user model that
is applicable for multiple domains and scenarios, allowing use of the user model in
different situations. For example, when the user books a flight at home, her personal
preferences and personal data (such as flight time, airport etc.) are stored within
the ubiquitous user model, so that it can later be used at the airport to customize
the navigation to the gate according to the time left until the flight, taking either a
relaxed and interesting route through some stores, or taking the most direct route if
the user is about to miss the flight. Although such a ubiquitous user model is very
powerful and also offers rudimentary options for defining the privacy settings of the
collected data, such as an informal privacy level, ownership, purpose, and a reten-
tion date, it cannot propose privacy settings that can be directly applied for example
on a social network website, as they are too abstract and not domain-specific for that
purpose. Cross-domain recommender systems that do not rely on an ontology and
that are tailored especially towards privacy settings have so far, to the best of our
knowledge, not been a subject of research. In this chapter, we took four domains as
an example, to find out whether and how well the privacy settings of one domain
can be predicted using the privacy settings from one or several other domains.
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As we have shown in earlier chapters, privacy decisions are not ultimately bi-
nary. In social network posts, a user might not just hide or show the complete post,
but he might want to take a middle road and hide only the post image or comments,
while still sharing the post text with a certain friend group. Furthermore, different
domains have different privacy options to set, which makes it hard to directly com-
pare the privacy settings per se. We therefore use privacy levels in our prediction.
A privacy level describes how important data privacy is for the user on a continu-
ous scale, allowing a comparison of the privacy levels between different domains.
The privacy levels can be resolved to concrete privacy settings after a prediction,
depending on the domain (see Section 2). In our work, we discuss two different
granularities of privacy levels: first, mean domain privacy levels describe an average
privacy level over all privacy levels for a user in a specific domain, independent of
context factors. There is exactly one mean domain privacy level per domain. In con-
trast to that, there are multiple context-based privacy levels for a domain, one for each
combination of each context factor instance (for example, there is one context-based
privacy level for the post topic “family affairs” (context factor 1) in combination with
the recipient group “school friends” (context factor 2). Currently, social media or lo-
cation sharing services offer users a “one size fits all” solution for their users, where
everything is set to a specific default value at the beginning. Using the user’s mean
domain privacy level, the service could already tailor all privacy settings to be more
restrictive if the user has a high mean domain privacy level for that domain, or use a
looser set of default privacy settings if the mean domain privacy level is low. Using
the context-based privacy levels, one could tailor the privacy settings even better to the
user, by providing different privacy settings for different contexts, for example when
a new post about “family affairs” has to be shared with “school friends”.
In this chapter, we will build upon our previous work on deriving privacy set-
tings using context factors and individual factors (such as user personality or pri-
vacy attitude) described in Chapters 4 to 6. Based on the user studies presented in
this chapter, we want to compare the four different domains of privacy levels for
social networks, location sharing, intelligent retail data, and mobile apps permissions re-
garding how privacy levels for each of those domains can be predicted using the
privacy levels from the other domains, and find to what extent the usage of context-
based privacy levels, using different values for each context factor, plays a role in
this context. In contrast to previous work, we will not use context or individual fac-
tors as a source for the prediction. Instead, we will predict the privacy settings of
a domain using the privacy settings from another of the aforementioned domains.
In our work, we will investigate which of the two mentioned granularities, mean
domain privacy levels or context-based privacy levels, work best for predicting the
mean domain privacy levels and the context-based privacy levels, which domains
and, inside a domain, which of the privacy levels should be used for the prediction
and how precise a prediction can be.
7.1 Cross-domain user modeling for privacy settings
As earlier chapters have shown, privacy decisions are influenced by several context
factors and individual factors based on the user’s desires and behavior. Whereas
the individual factors mostly depend on the personality and privacy attitudes of the
user that can be captured by the respective questionnaires like the big five personal
[78] inventory or the IUIPC information privacy scale [221], the context factors differ
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between the domains. For location data and social network data, those context fac-
tors are the group of recipients for the SN post or location, and the topic of the post
(e.g. “family affairs”) or occasion when sharing the location (for example “sports
events”). For intelligent shopping data, context factors are the receiving group (e.g.
the retailer, family and friends, or third parties like a marketing organization). Lastly,
for mobile apps, the category of the app (like “navigation app” or “messenger”) as
well as the type of permission (e.g. “access contacts” or “access microphone”) play
the most important role for the privacy decision apart from individual factors.
However, although context and individual factors, and their use for predicting
privacy levels, have already been well researched, inferring privacy levels between
domains raises several new challenges for a prediction. We still don’t know whether
the context factors of one domain also have an impact on the privacy levels of an-
other domain; for example, whether the choice of privacy levels for the different
occasions in a location sharing scenario allow one to infer the privacy levels for the
different stakeholders in an intelligent shopping data scenario, or whether it is suf-
ficient to take the average location sharing privacy level for that user to do so. Fur-
thermore, the actual privacy options differ between domains: For example, for a
social network post, the user can decide to hide parts of the post like image content
or comments, or hide it from the news wall, to increase his privacy, whereas location
privacy can be tuned by reducing the precision of the shared location (for example
by sharing only the city instead of the exact location). To conclude, at present, we do
not know which context factors of one domain are important predictors for another
domain; furthermore, the value set of privacy levels differs (in terms of answer op-
tions as well as number of possible answers) between domains, making it hard to
create a direct mapping of privacy levels between them.
We performed two iterative studies using a bottom-up approach: In the first
study (“exploratory study”), we performed regression analyses on the generic pri-
vacy levels for each domain and analyzed the regression coefficients,
1. to find out the domains containing privacy settings that are suitable regres-
sion coefficients (“input variables”) for the regression of each of the four target
domains, and
2. to identify which context-based privacy levels are potential candidates for im-
proving the precision of the prediction of
(a) the generic privacy level of the target domain and
(b) the context-based privacy levels of the target domain
In the second study (“validation study”), we validate the choice of the context-
based privacy levels using a fresh data set and compare the regression precision
using either
1. the generic privacy levels of the suitable domains as identified in 1 or
2. the context-based privacy levels that have been identified as suitable in 2,
for predicting the generic privacy levels for each domain, as well as the context-
based privacy levels.
In more detail, we pursue four different kinds of predictions, as depicted in Fig-
ure 7.1. For the mean-based regression analysis (MGR), we work only on the top level,
including the mean domain privacy levels, neglecting any context information, i.e. we
are trying to predict mean domain privacy levels using the mean domain privacy
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FIGURE 7.1: Planned regression analyses.
levels of the other domains. For the context-factor-based regression analysis (CGR),
we use context-based privacy levels on the input side, to predict the mean domain
privacy levels on the output side. Conversely, the mean domain privacy levels could
also be used as coefficeints for a regression of the context-factor-based privacy levels
(Mean-based context-aware regression analysis (MCR)). Finally, the context-factor-based
context-aware regression analysis (CCR) uses context-factor-based input to predict
context-factor-based privacy levels. Our ultimate goal is to find out which of the ap-
proaches works best for predicting the mean domain privacy and the context-factor-
based privacy levels, which domains and, inside the domains, which context-factor
based privacy levels should be used; and what standard error can be achieved.
7.2 Exploratory study
The exploratory study and the validation study were conducted as an online study
using a local LimeSurvey1 installation at our institution. The participants were re-
curited using an online recruiting platform called Prolific Academic2. According to
study results, the audience recruited through such a platform can be compared to an
audience recruited through conventional methods like notice boards at a university
or social network posts[53]. The participants were paid £2.10 for a succesful partici-
pation, which took 20 to 25 minutes, so that the minimum wage of £5 per hour that
is required for studies on Prolific Academic is guaranteed. At the beginning of the
questionnaire, the participants had to confirm that they would carefully read and
answer all the questions, as not following the instructions or giving contradictory
answers might lead to their participation being rejected. The actual questionnaire
then asked demographic questions and whether the subject actively uses social net-
works and smartphones. To ensure domain knowledge of the participants, we re-
quired them to be active users of at least one social network and to own and use a
smartphone. When the participant entered responses not fulfilling these criteria, we
ended the survey at that point. All other participants were then asked about their
1https://www.limesurvey.org (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
2https://prolific.ac/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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privacy preferences in the four aforementioned domains. The order of the domains
was shuffled for each participant to avoid bias in the results.
At the beginning of each block of questions, we gave the participants an intro-
duction to the situation that we were targeting, for example “imagine you are creat-
ing a new social network post about your hobbies” for the social network domain.
We then asked, for each group of recipients (like “friends”, “family”, etc.), which
privacy option they would choose, according to the privacy options as presented in
Chapters 4 to 6. This procedure was conducted for all combinations of
• post topic and group of recipients (social network domain)
• occasion and group of recipients (location sharing domain)
• stakeholder and data type (intelligent shopping domain)
• application category and permission type (mobile phone domain)
As privacy options, we gave the users the same options that we gave the partic-
ipants in earlier studies in the respective domains (see Chapters 4 to 6 for details),
namely:
• social network domain: five different privacy levels (show on timeline, show
on page, hide images and comments, hide post, hide even if reshared)
• location sharing domain: the seven different location abstraction levels offered
by the Google Maps API (exact location, street only, city only, province only,
country only, continent only, no location)
• intelligent shopping domain: allow/deny for each binarized granularity (see
Chapter 6) option for all combinations of data type and stakeholder
• mobile phone domain: allow/deny for each combination of app category and
permission type
To assure the quality of the answers, we added four control questions in the sec-
tion “location sharing” that the users had to answer exactly as stated in the task
description. At the end of the questionnaire, the participants were offered a text box
to enter any comments or ideas for improvements about the questionnaire. This pro-
cedure was reviewed and approved by the ethical review board of our institution.
7.2.1 Results
In total, we had 109 paticipants that completed the questionnaire; they needed on
average about 23 minutes for the task. Eight result sets had to be discarded as a
control question was answered incorrectly, leading to 101 viable results. The age of
the participants ranged from 18 to 64 years (mean 32.39, stdev. 9.55). 58 participants
were female, 43 male. 26 had already heard of intelligent retail stores, and 75 had
not.
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After importing the data for the analysis, we first computed several average val-
ues that will be used in the analysis later:
• For each context factor (see Chapters 4 to 6), we computed the mean privacy
level for each instance of the context factor. For example, to compute the mean
privacy level for the “events” occasion in the location sharing domain, we av-
eraged the privacy levels for the “events” occasion for the different recipient
groups (e.g. we calculated the average over one column or one row in the
context-based privacy levels table described in Chapters 4 to 6). The averaged
values will later be called (mean) context factor privacy levels.
• For each domain, we computed the average over all privacy levels, regardless
of the context factors. These values are denoted as mean domain (privacy)
levels.
We used the following procedure for the analysis:
1. Context factor difference analysis: We performed a variance analysis on the
mean context factor privacy levels for each domain and context factor, to find out
which context factors lead to a significant difference in privacy levels.
2. Mean-based generic regression analysis: We performed a regression analysis
on the mean domain privacy levels for each domain, using the mean domain privacy
levels of the other domains as regression coefficients, to determine which other
domains are of influence for a prediction of the privacy levels.
3. Mean-based context-aware regression analysis: We performed the same kind
of analysis on the mean domain privacy levels for each domain, using the context-
based privacy levels of the other domains as regression coefficients, to determine
how precise a prediction on the context-based privacy levels can be when
using only mean domain privacy levels.
4. Context-factor-based generic regression analysis: Conversely, we performed
a regression analysis on the mean domain privacy levels using the mean context
factor privacy levels as regression coefficients, to determine which context factor
instances could be of influence for the prediction. At this point, we were only
interested in filtering out potential candidates, and building up hypotheses
on which context factor instances could be of influence. As we were reusing
the same data for multiple analyses, the reported significance values cannot
be used to determine which context factor instances are significant procedures
without applying alpha correction. We therefore validate the results of the
exploratory study later in the validation study using a fresh data set.
5. Context-based context-aware regression analysis: Finally, we performed a re-
gression analysis on the context-based privacy levels for each domain, using the
context-based privacy levels of the other domains as regression coefficients, to
determine how precise a prediction on the context-based privacy levels can
be when using context-based privacy levels.
The results of the above analyses will be described in the next subchapters.
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TABLE 7.1: Average privacy levels and tests for variance on the con-
text factors using a Friedman test.
Domain avg. privacy level context factor χ2 asymp. sig.
Social 2.05 (41%) topic 263.24 < 0.001
friend group 254.64 < 0.001
Location 3.91 (56%) occasion 154.22 < 0.001
requestor 328.80 < 0.001
Mobile 0.57 (57%) category 37.50 < 0.001
permission 4.70 0.45
Shopping 0.46 (46%) data type 44.28 < 0.001
stakeholder 25.825 < 0.001
Context factor difference analysis
Prior to the analysis, we tested each data set for normal distribution and sphericity,
in order to decide on the correct statistical test for the variance analysis (e.g. ANOVA
or its non-parametric equivalent, the Friedman test). For each domain and context
factor, we had at least one context factor instance for which the mean context factor
privacy levels were not normally distributed. Therefore, we performed Friedman
tests for all variance analyses. In addition to the variance analysis, we computed the
mean privacy levels for each domain. As the scales have a different size, we added
a normalized percentual average privacy level for each entry. The results for the
analysis are shown in Table 7.1.
For the social network domain, both context factors (post topic and receiving
friend group) lead to significantly different settings (χ2topic = 263.24, p < 0.001;
χ2f riendgroup = 254.64, p < 0.001), assuring that both context factors have a signifi-
cant impact on the choice of the privacy levels and supporting the results of earlier
chapters. The same holds for the location sharing domain, whereas the difference
in privacy levels for the requestors is higher (χ2topic = 328.80, p < 0.001) than for the
occasion(χ2occasion = 154.22, p < 0.001) when the location is shared. In Chapter 4, we
also found those context factors to be significant, although we found the occasion to
be more important than the requestor, whereas others state the requestor to be more
important [246]. In the intelligent shopping domain, the data type has a higher influ-
ence on the privacy level (χ2topic = 44.28, p < 0.001) than the stakeholder requesting
the data (χ2topic = 25.82, p < 0.001). However, for the mobile app permissions, only
the app category seems to lead to a significant difference in the permission settings
(χ2topic = 37.50, p < 0.01). The privacy levels for the different permission types do
not differ significantly (χ2topic = 4.70, p = 0.45). The average privacy levels for loca-
tion sharing (M=2.05) and mobile apps (M=0.57) are very similar when normalized
to a percentual scale (56% and 57%, respectively) and higher than the mean privacy
levels for social media (M=2.05, normalized 41%) and shopping (M=0.46, normal-
ized 46%).
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TABLE 7.2: regression analyses for the mean domain privacy levels.
Target domain coefficients R2 adj.R2 stderr F sig.
Location all 0.21 0.19 1.43 12.73 < 0.001
social 0.19 0.18 1.43 22.63 < 0.001
mobile 0 -0.1 1.59 0.02 0.88
shopping 0.06 0.05 1.55 6.02 0.016
Social all 0.22 0.19 0.61 9.02 < 0.001
location 0.19 0.18 0.61 22.63 < 0.001
mobile 0.03 0.02 0.67 3.00 0.086
shopping 0.06 0.05 0.66 5.79 0.016
Mobile all 0.19 0.17 0.33 11.49 < 0.001
social 0.03 0.02 0.36 3.00 0.086
location 0 -0.1 0.37 0.02 0.877
shopping 0.19 0.18 0.31 22.43 < 0.001
Shopping all 0.24 0.22 0.30 10.42 < 0.001
social 0.06 0.05 0.33 5.79 0.018
location 0.06 0.05 0.33 6.02 0.016
mobile 0.19 0.18 0.31 22.43 < 0.001
Mean-based generic regression analysis (MGR)
To find out which domains are reasonable regression coefficients for a certain do-
main X, we first performed a separate regression analysis for each domain different
from X, followed by a regression analysis including all domains that have a ten-
dency to become significant coefficients (meaning p < 0.10). For each regression, we
report the goodness of fit (R2) and adjusted goodness of fit (adj.R2) describing how
well the regression curve fits the data, as well as the results (F and significance) of the
ANOVA analysis, describing whether a prediction using a regression produces vi-
able results with the given coefficients. The results are shown in Table 7.2. Note that
it is typical for a regression that measures like R2 and results of the variance analysis
are the same for a regression on X using Y as a coefficent as they are for Y using X
as a regression coefficient. However, to maintain readabilty and an easy compari-
son of the coefficients, we included both combinations in the table. All significant
coefficients are printed in bold face.
The best regression coefficients for the location domain are the mean domain pri-
vacy levels from the social and shopping domains, which result in a highly significant
(F=22.63, p < 0.001) and a significant prediction (F=6.021, p = 0.016), respectively.
However, the mean privacy level of the mobile domain has a negative adjusted
goodness of fit (R2); the ANOVA further implies that the prediction does not gen-
erate viable results, leading to the assumption that this domain is not of use for the
prediction of a mean location sharing privacy level. A similar picture can be seen for
the social network domain, where the best coefficient is the mean domain privacy
level of the location domain (F=22.63, p < 0.001). However, the shopping domain as
a coefficient still produces viable results (F=5.79, p = 0.018), and the regression us-
ing the mobile permission privacy level has a tendency to become a viable regression
coefficient (F=3.00, p = 0.086).
The generic mobile app permission privacy level can be predicted best using
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the mean domain privacy level from the shopping domain (F=22.43, p < 0.001).
The mean domain privacy level from the social network domain has a tendency to
become a viable coefficient (F=3.00, p = 0.086), whereas the mean domain privacy
level from the location sharing domain is of no use for this kind of prediction (F=0.02,
p = 0.877). Lastly, the mean domain privacy level from the shopping domain is
predicted best using the mean privacy level of the mobile app domain (F=22.43,
p < 0.001), followed by the mean domain privacy level from the social (F=5.788,
p = 0.018) and location (F=6.02, p = 0.016) domains which both provide a viable
prediction.
Context-factor-based generic regression analysis (CGR)
For the context-factor-based generic regression analysis, we used the mean context
factor privacy levels as regression coefficients to find out whether an increased de-
tail level (e.g. one privacy level for each combination of context factors instead of
one generic domain privacy level) can lead to an increased prediction precision in
the regression. For this purpose, we first had to find out which instances of each
context factor are suitable coefficients. However, as stated earlier, the significance
values here cannot be seen as final (without using alpha correction or validation in
a follow-up study), as the same data set is used multiple times. Later, we will vali-
date the choice of context factor instances in the validation study using a fresh data
set. Similar to the analyses described above, we select all context factor instances
that have the tendency to become significant (p < 0.1), so that we do not omit any
instance that might be significant within another data set, while eliminating other
instances that will most likely not become significant and that would disturb the re-
gression algorithm. Note that we excluded the “permission type” context factor, as
it was found to be insignificant in the context factor difference analysis. The results
can be found in Table 7.3.
Similar to the results of the generic regression analysis, the domains with the
lowest standard error and the highest precision in the generic regression analysis
have the highest number of significant context factor instances here. The location
domain can be predicted best by the context factor instances from the social me-
dia domain, namely the privacy level for posts about events (t=2.49, p=0.015) and
movies (t=1.753, p=0.083) as well as the privacy level for the friend group “school
friends” (t=2.49, p=0.015). However, the privacy level for the amount of products
bought in the shopping domain can also be used as a regression coefficient (t=1.672,
p=0.098).
A similar picture can be seen for the location sharing domain, which can be pre-
dicted best using the context factor privacy levels from the location sharing domain,
where the privacy levels of the occasions about having “food” (t=1.79, p=0.077),
“traveling” (t=2.071, p=0.041) and “tech events” (t=2.203, p=0.03) are found to be
suitable, together with the privacy level of the requestor groups “immediate family”
(t=1.804, p=0.075) and “extended family” (t=1.803, p=0.075). From the other coeffi-
cients, only the “games” category of the mobile app domain had a tendency to be a
useful regression coefficient (t=1.696, p=0.093).
For the mobile app domain, we found coefficients from different domains to be
useful. Most are found in the intelligent shopping domain, namely the privacy lev-
els of the “income” of the customer (t=1.88, p=0.064) and his “birthdate” (t=1.78,
p=0.077), as well as, with high significance, the stakeholder “third parties” (t=3.818,
p < 0.001). Using the regression coefficients from the location sharing domain, only
the context factor privacy levels of two requestors, namely “close friends” (t=1.668,
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TABLE 7.3: Tendentially significant regression coefficients (context
factor instances) for the prediction of the domain privacy levels.
Target domain coefficients instance t sig.
Location social - topic events 2.49 0.015
movies 1.753 0.083
social - recipients school friends 1.661 0.099
mobile - category - - -
shopping - data type amount 1.672 0.098
shopping - stakeholder - - -
Social mobile - category games 1.696 0.093
shopping - data type - - -
shopping - stakeholder - - -
location - occasion food 1.79 0.077
travel 2.071 0.041
tech events 2.203 0.03
location - requestor immediate family 1.804 0.075
extended family 1.803 0.075
Mobile social - topic sports 2.215 0.029
social - recipients close friends 2.008 0.048
location - occasion - - -
location - requestor extended family 1.855 0.067
close friends 1.668 0.099
shopping - data type birthdate 1.78 0.077
income 1.88 0.064
shopping - stakeholder third parties 3.818 < 0.001
Shopping social - topic - - -
social - recipients immediate family 1.959 0.053
location - occasion - - -
location - requestor immediate family 2.067 0.042
mobile - category social media 1.964 0.052
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p=0.099) and “extended family” (t=1.855, p=0.067) seem to be suitable. From the
social media domain, the “sports” topic (t=2.215, p=0.029) and the recipient group
“close friends” (t=2.008, p=0.048) are both statistically significant regression coeffi-
cients.
Lastly, the shopping domain can only be predicted by a few coefficients from
different domains. From the social media domain, the recipient group “immediate
family” is found to be suitable (t=1.959, p=0.053). The same coefficient “immedi-
ate family” is a significant coefficient from the context factor “requestor” from the
location sharing domain (t=2.067, p=0.042). From the mobile app coefficients, the
privacy level for “social media” apps seem to be suitable (t=1.668, p=0.099).
Mean-based context-aware regression analysis (MCR) and context-based context-
aware regression analysis (CCR)
Both analyses try to predict the fine-grained context-based privacy levels. The mean-
based context-aware regression analysis uses coarse-grained mean domain privacy
levels as a source for the prediction, whereas the context-based context-aware re-
gression analysis uses fine-grained context-based privacy levels as an input. The pro-
cedure used here was the same that we employed for the CGR method, i.e. we
performed a regression analysis on all input variables, and selected those with a p-
value < 0.1 for the validation study. Taking all four domains into account, we have
a total of about 100 context-based privacy levels, with up to four viable coefficients
each for the MCR, and again up to about 100 coefficients for the CCR. For each of
those combinations, we would have to report t and significance values. For the sake
of brevity, we will not report and discuss all viable coefficients here, but report the
results of the final regression analysis in the validation study in Table 7.6.
7.2.2 Discussion
Context factor difference analysis and choice of context factors
For most of the context factors that we chose according to related literature, we con-
firmed their significant impact on the choice of privacy settings in the context factor
difference analysis. Especially for the social network domain, both the recipient group
(or friend group) as well as the topic of the post are very important context factors.
For the location sharing domain, the requestor seems to have a larger impact on the
privacy setting than the actual occasion, which supports earlier work [31, 74] that
came to a similar conclusion, that the requestor and occasion are the most impor-
tant factors when the location is shared. Whether the requestor or occasion is more
important, differs between earlier publications: Some found the requestor to be the
most important factor [31, 74] whereas the work presented in Section 4.1 found the
occasion to have a higher influence. According to our results in the intelligent shop-
ping domain, the stakeholder requesting the data is also a significant context factor,
but is less important than the data type (for example viewed products or in-store
movements) that is requested. We assume that the high diversity of data in the intel-
ligent shopping domain might cause this effect, as the need for privacy differs more
for data types like household income or in-store movements, which might be con-
sidered more private than one’s birthday or loyalty points earned throughout the
shopping processes. However, as other studies on the importance of context factors
also led to different results in other domains, the results have to be validated in fur-
ther studies. In the location sharing domain, the data type is always the same, and
therefore yields a similar perceived criticality when shared unintentionally. This
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leads to the assumption that the importance of the “data type” as a context factor
might rely on the diversity or number of data types (for example whether data in
the domain consists only of GPS locations, or whether there is demographic data,
financial data and location data within the domain), or both, which should be fur-
ther investigated in future research. Interestingly, although the current privacy user
interfaces in smartphone operating systems (Android or iOS) are tailored towards
setting the permission individually for each permission type, our results indicate
that the difference in privacy levels between permissions is not significant. In con-
trast to that, the category to which the app belongs has a strong influence on the
privacy level (p < 0.001). It seems that either the users trust apps from a certain
category and grant the permissions, or they do not trust that kind of app and deny
all of them. If the results can be supported by future studies, smartphone suppli-
ers might want to redesign their permission UI, and include the app category as an
option to let the user decide whether an app from that category should receive all
permissions, or whether only some of them should be granted. The average pri-
vacy levels for location sharing and mobile apps are higher than for the other two
domains, signaling that both location sharing and mobile app permission settings
are perceived as more critical, or the recipient groups less trustworthy than for the
two other domains. Apart from the permission type in the mobile app domain, all
context factors have been proven to have a highly significant impact (p < 0.001)
on the permission settings, supporting earlier work that relies on context factors for
recommending privacy settings [246].
Generic regression analysis
According to the results, we have two clusters of domains that can profit from each
other for a prediction using a regression: the location sharing domain and social me-
dia domain privacy levels seem to be good regression coefficients for each other and
form the “location-social cluster” on the one hand, whereas mobile app settings and
intelligent shopping privacy levels form another cluster, later called the “shopping-
mobile cluster”, that allow a good prediction of each other’s privacy levels. For loca-
tion sharing and social media, if the data of the other domain is not available, the
privacy levels from the shopping domain, and to some extent also from the mobile
app domain (for social media), can be used. But if the data of the other domain
within the cluster is available, adding the coefficients from the other domains does
not reduce the standard error for the location-social cluster. So if the mean domain
privacy level of the other domain inside the cluster is available, the privacy levels
from the other domains can be omitted, according to our results.
For the shopping-mobile cluster, the situation is not that clear. Although using
the mean domain privacy level of the cluster partner as a coefficient leads to the low-
est standard error compared to the other domains, the social and location privacy
levels are very good alternatives, especially for the intelligent shopping domain,
where both coefficients are found to be significant. Therefore, combining all three
domains leads to the lowest standard error for the intelligent shopping domain, al-
though the two additional domains outside the cluster reduce the standard error
only from 0.31 to 0.30. For the mobile app domain, adding coefficients other than the
mean privacy level of the cluster partner cannot improve the prediction precision;
therefore, if the privacy level from the intelligent shopping domain is available, all
other data should be omitted for best results. If this is not the case, the privacy level
from the social media domain also allows a prediction slightly better than random.
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On the other hand, data from the location sharing domain is useless and should not
be used for this domain.
Interestingly, the two clusters always contain the two domains that have a simi-
lar granularity, meaning they have a similar number of privacy levels (see Chapters
4 to 6). Whereas it seems clear that it is hard to use a binary scale from the shopping-
mobile cluster to predict a more fine-grained scale from either the social media or
the location sharing domain, this should not be the case for the other way around.
However, the context-based location and social privacy levels were also of no use to
enhance the regression for the mobile app domain. Also for the intelligent shopping
domain, the decrease in standard error is small. We therefore suppose that the exis-
tence of those two clusters is not a main product of the difference in their scales, but
is caused by some other factor, like the type of occasion when the decision is made
(for example whether it is made incidentally on the go for mobile apps or during
shopping inside an intelligent retail store, vs. as a main task during a leisure activity
for the two others) or the type of privacy (privacy from companies like app manufac-
turers or retailers on one hand, and friends or family members on the other). Which
factors finally led to the clustering of domains, and which other clusters exist, should
be further investigated in future work.
Context-factor-based generic regression analysis
In general, we can see that, similar to the generic regression analysis, the domains
within the corresponding cluster in general produce the most, and most significant,
context-factor-based coefficients (CFB-coefficients), supporting the correctness of the
analysis. Taking a look at the most significant CFB-coefficents, we can see that the
coefficient “third parties” in the “mobile apps” target domain has the highest signif-
icance of all of them. However, other stakeholders, like the retailer, do not even have
tendency to become significant (p > 0.1). This fact leads to the assumption that the
trust that consumers put in app manufacturers is comparable to the trust they put in
third parties like marketing companies, and not like the trust they put in a retailer.
This is interesting, as app manufacturers and retailers are both the direct providers
of the service the costumer requests, unlike marketing companies, which usually do
not offer a direct advantage for the customer. A possible explanation for this circum-
stance might be that the mere size, brand awareness or privacy image of a company
is a key indicator for trust in terms of privacy, rather than the service quality or the
benefit from the service. This assumption is supported by other significant CFB-
coefficients of the shopping domain, like one’s birth date and household income.
Both data types are on average perceived as very sensitive by most customers, and
therefore are shared rarely, indicating that the trust in mobile app developers and
the will to offer them access to app permissions is relatively low. Interestingly, the
other CFB-coefficients (outside the location-social cluster) that have been found use-
ful for the mobile app domain indicate a less privacy-sensitive behavior. Posts about
sports, and for close friends or the extended family, are usually not very restricted.
However, taking a look at the results of the generic regression analysis, including
these other coefficients in the prediction actually reduces the precision and increases
the standard error; we therefore assume that they are just statistical artifacts.
For predicting the social media privacy level, both the location sharing settings
from the immediate and extended family are found to be useful, meaning that the
privacy levels used when sharing the location with members of the family are similar
to those used in social networks. Considering the mean domain privacy levels, we
can see that location sharing privacy settings are typically stricter than settings for
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social media posts. Furthermore, users usually have relatively loose privacy settings
for their family members (see Chapter 4). However, as the location sharing domain
is stricter in general, we assume that the loose settings in this stricter domain can
be compared to an average privacy level in the social media domain, making it a
good regression coefficent. Similar to this, more private occasions like traveling or
preparing meals together (“food”) have been found to be good CFB-coefficients.
For the location sharing domain, most viable coefficients have their origin in the
social media domain. The best coefficient is the privacy level of the posts with topic
“events”, most likely because events are the occasion where users typically share a
location. Also “movies”, e.g. social network posts about watching movies together
or going to the cinema, are common occasions when a location is shared, making
it the second most important CFB coefficient. We also found the recipient group
(friend group) “school friends” to be viable, although the p-value is relatively high.
In our opinion, locations are usually shared when a user does something interesting
in her life, like attending events or having a meal at an expensive restaurant. The
things in your life that you want to tell your school friends in order to improve your
image are typically the same things. The same might hold for the amount of items
that you bought at a shop. Therefore we think both privacy levels correlate to the
location sharing domain privacy level, and hence are good CFB-coefficients for the
regression.
Lastly, in the shopping domain, we have one CFB-coefficient from each of the
other domains. The results indicate that the recipient or friend group “immediate
family” both from the social media and location sharing domains, as well as per-
mission settings for social media apps, are good coefficients. As stated before, most
users use relatively loose privacy settings for their immediate family. Furthermore,
social media apps require a lot of different permissions in order to be fully func-
tional, like access to stored images or the location, which may lead users to grant
them these permissions. So overall, the shopping domain seems to be a domain
where customers feel confident when sharing their data, because they either do not
see much harm in oversharing, or because their trust in retailers is relatively high.
The lower average domain privacy level supports this assumption. In the next step,
we will validate the choice of the aforementioned regression coefficients (Tables 7.3
and 7.2 and the candidates from the MCR and CCR method) using a fresh data set,
which will be done in the validation study in the next section.
7.3 Validation study
In the exploratory study, we had the goal to get a first impression of how accurate
the prediction of the mean domain privacy levels can be when the mean privacy
levels of the other domains are used, which domains are useful for a prediction, and
which context factors (like the recipient of the data or the occasion, see Chapters 4 to
6) and mean domain privacy levels (i.e. the average over all privacy levels of a do-
main, see section 7.1) are potential candidates for the prediction of the domain and
context-based privacy levels. In the validation study, we will validate the results
from the exploratory study, especially how well the regression performs with the
selected coefficients, and which of the outlined approaches (MGR or CGR for pre-
dicting mean domain privacy levels, and MCR or CCR for the context-based privacy
levels) performs best.
As we found out in the context factor difference analysis, the permission type
does not have a significant influence on the permission level. We have therefore
7.3. Validation study 177
excluded this context factor in the validation study. Apart from this change, the
procedure for collecting data was similar to that of the exploratory study.
We had 117 participants in the validation study, out of which 11 were discarded,
as they answered a control question incorrectly, resulting in 106 valid records. The
participants were aged between 18 and 71 years (average 32.67) and needed on aver-
age about 27 minutes for the task. 52 participants were female, 54 male. All of them
use a smartphone.
7.3.1 Results
In the validation, we again performed the regression analyses from the validation
study with the newly collected data set. Instead of using all coefficents for the re-
gression, we used exactly the regression coefficients that were found viable in the
exploratory study. To be more precise, we again performed:
• Mean-based generic regression analysis (MGR) trying to predict mean do-
main privacy levels from a domain using mean domain privacy levels from
other domains
• Context-factor-based generic regression analysis (CGR) trying to predict mean
domain privacy levels from a domain using context-based privacy levels from
other domains
• Mean-based context-aware regression analysis (MCR) trying to predict context-
based privacy levels from a domain using mean domain privacy levels from
other domains
• Context-factor-based context-aware regression analysis (CCR) trying to pre-
dict context-based privacy levels from a domain using context-based privacy
levels from other domains
In the following section, we will first present the results from the statistical anal-
yses. The interpretation of the results follows in the discussion section later.
Mean-based generic regression analysis (MGR)
As stated before, we use the mean domain privacy levels from the exploratory study
that have been found to be viable (e.g. p < 0.1). The results can be found in Table 7.4.
Remember that the MGR is based solely on mean domain privacy levels, meaning
it uses mean domain privacy levels from other domains as an input to predict the
mean domain privacy level of the target domain. Context factors or context-based
privacy levels are not used.
For the location sharing domain, the social media mean privacy level allows the
most precise prediction (stderr=1.27). Both the shopping (stderr=1.37) and the mo-
bile (stderr=1.35) mean privacy level result in a higher standard error in the analysis.
Compared to the experimental analysis, the precision and R2 values of the value pair
“location sharing” – “mobile apps” have significantly improved. In the social media
domain, including all other mean domain privacy levels led to a standard error of
0.498 on the seven-point privacy level scale for this domain. Using only single mean
domain privacy levels as an input, the location domain performs best (stderr=0.51),
followed by the shopping (stderr=0.54) and mobile (stderr=0.57) privacy levels. The
mean privacy level of the mobile app domain can be predicted best by using either
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TABLE 7.4: Validation study results for the MGR analysis.
Target domain coefficients R2 adj.R2 stderr F sig.
Location all 0.27 0.25 1.26 14.43 < 0.001
social 0.24 0.23 1.27 36.61 < 0.001
mobile 0.14 0.14 1.35 17.53 < 0.001
shopping 0.12 0.12 1.37 14.73 < 0.001
Social all 0.30 0.27 0.50 14.42 < 0.001
location 0.24 0.23 0.51 23.61 < 0.001
mobile 0.06 0.05 0.57 7.11 0.009
shopping 0.16 0.15 0.54 19.83 < 0.001
Mobile all 0.15 0.14 0.27 9.27 < 0.001
social 0.06 0.06 0.28 7.11 0.009
location 0.14 0.14 0.27 17.53 < 0.001
shopping 0.14 0.13 0.27 16.91 < 0.001
Shopping all 0.25 0.23 0.27 11.30 < 0.001
social 0.16 0.15 0.28 19.83 < 0.001
location 0.13 0.12 0.29 19.83 < 0.001
mobile 0.16 0.15 0.28 19.60 < 0.001
the mean privacy level of the intelligent shopping (stderr=0.27) or location shar-
ing domain (stderr=0.27). Using both viable domains from the experimental study
(social and shopping) results in the same standard error of 0.27. The social media
domain performs slighty worse, resulting in a stderr of 0.28. Lastly, in the intelli-
gent shopping domain, all single domains produce similar results. Both the social
media and mobile domain privacy levels allow a prediction with a standard error of
0.28; the location sharing domain is only slightly worse (stderr=0.29). Using all three
domains together allows us to reduce the standard error to 0.27.
Context-factor-based generic regression analysis (CGR)
Also for the CGR, we used only the context factor instances that were found to be
useful in the exploratory study, together with the mean domain privacy levels of
the respective domain(s). The results can be found in Table 7.5. Note that for some
domains (for example the mobile domain for predicting location sharing), none of
the context factor instances was found to be suitable in the exporatory study. Those
domains are marked using “-” in the table.
In the location sharing domain, using all viable context factor coefficients leads
to the smallest standard error (stderr=1.20) for this domain, followed by the “topic”
context factors of the social media domain (stderr=1.22). However, using the “recipi-
ent” context factors leads to a higher standard error (stderr=1.43); therefore, combin-
ing them with the “topic” coefficeints leads to a higher standard error (stderr=1.23)
than using the “topic” coefficients alone. For the social media domain, equally good
results can be achieved using only the location sharing coefficients (stderr=0.51) or
a combination of all viable coefficients. If only data from the mobile app domain is
available, a prediction with a standard error of 0.57 can be achieved. Data from an
intelligent retail store did not provide any significant coefficient in the exploratory
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TABLE 7.5: Validation study results for the CGR analysis.
Target domain coefficients R2 adj.R2 stderr F sig.
Location all 0.36 0.32 1.20 7.95 < 0.001
social - all 0.31 0.27 1.23 8.9 < 0.001
social - topic 0.33 0.30 1.22 15.12 < 0.001
social - recipients 0.19 0.18 1.43 22.63 < 0.001
mobile - category - - - - -
shopping - data type 0.18 0.15 1.34 5.44 0.001
shopping - stakeholder - - - - -
Social all 0.30 0.24 0.51 5.22 < 0.001
mobile - category 0.06 0.06 0.57 7.11 0.009
shopping - data type - - - - -
shopping - stakeholder - - - - -
location - all 0.26 0.22 0.51 5.78 < 0.001
location - occasion 0.24 0.22 0.51 10.57 < 0.001
location - requestor 0.25 0.22 0.51 8.38 < 0.001
Mobile all 0.20 0.15 0.27 4.018 0.001
social - all 0.11 0.08 0.28 4.09 0.009
social - topic 0.11 0.09 0.27 6.11 0.003
social - recipients 0.06 0.05 0.28 3.53 0.033
location - occasion - - - - -
location - requestor 0.14 0.14 0.27 17.53 < 0.001
shopping - all 0.15 0.10 0.27 3.42 0.007
shopping - data type 0.15 0.11 0.27 4.31 0.003
shopping - stakeholder 0.14 0.13 0.27 16.91 < 0.001
Shopping all 0.23 0.20 0.27 6.07 < 0.001
social - topic - - - - -
social - recipients 0.16 0.15 0.28 19.83 < 0.001
location - occasion - - - - -
location - requestor 0.12 0.12 0.28 19.83 < 0.001
mobile - category 0.16 0.15 0.28 19.60 < 0.001
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study and therefore cannot be more precise than a prediction using the MGR ap-
proach. For the mobile app domain, using the coefficients from the location, the
shopping domain or the “topic” coefficients from the social media domain results
in a stderr of 0.27, equal to that of the MGR method. Using the “recipient” coef-
ficients, or using them together with the other social media coefficients, leads to a
standard error of 0.28. Lastly, using all coefficients and mean domain privacy levels
as an input leads to a standard error of 0.27, which is again equal to that of the MGR
method; using only the context-factor coefficients of the social, location, or mobile
app domain leads to a standard error of 0.28.
Mean-based context-aware regression analysis (MCR)
In contrast to the MGR and CGR methods, which have the goal to predict mean do-
main privacy levels, the MCR and CCR methods do a regression on the fine-grained
context-factor-based privacy levels. We followed the same approach as in the exploratory
study, but this time using only the mean domain privacy levels that were found vi-
able in the exploratory study. As the number of context-based privacy levels is
very high, we report only the mean standard error, as well as the minimum and
maximum standard error for every domain and context factor for the MCR and
CCR method. The results can be seen in Table 7.6.
For the location sharing domain, the standard error is similar for both the occa-
sion and requestor context factor instances, whereas the “requestor” privacy levels
can be predicted slightly better using all other mean domain privacy levels (stderravg =
1.57) compared to the “occasion” context factor (stderravg = 1.53). When using only
single mean domain privacy levels, the ones from the cluster partner (social media
domain; see Section 7.2.2) lead to the smallest standard errors (stderravg = 1.58 for
“occasion”; stderravg = 1.54 for “requestor”). The same holds for the social me-
dia domain, where the best domain for predicting the context-based privacy levels
is the location sharing domain (stderravg = 0.80 for “topic”; stderravg = 0.72 for
“recipients”). Adding the other mean domain privacy levels does not increase the
precision. However, in contrast to the prediction for the location sharing domain,
the standard errors using the shopping mean domain privacy level are only slightly
higher (stderravg = 0.81 for “topic”; stderravg = 0.73 for “recipients”). For the privacy
levels for the different app categories in the mobile app domain, all domains lead to
the same precision (stderravg = 0.43). Using all of them together again slightly re-
duces the standard error (stderravg = 0.72). Finally, the shopping domain can be
predicted best by both the social media and mobile phone mean domain privacy
levels (stderravg = 0.41 for “data type”; stderravg = 0.94 for “stakeholder”). Using all
mean domain privacy levels does not decrease the standard error – neither for the
“data type”, nor for the “stakeholder” context factor.
Context-factor-based context-aware regression analysis (CCR)
As described in the results section of the exploratory study, we use the context-based
privacy levels with p < 0.1 for the validation study of the CCR analysis. The stan-
dard errors for the different domains are shown in Table 7.6 together with the results
of the MCR analysis. For each target domain, we calculated the average, minimum,
and maximum standard error for the different context-factor-based privacy levels,
using either the coefficients from all other domains, or only from one of the three
other domains.
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TABLE 7.6: Validation study results for the MCR and CCR analysis.
Target domain coefficients MCR CCR
stderr stderr
avg min max avg min max
Location - occasion all 1.57 1.27 1.73 1.50 1.22 1.70
mobile 1.65 1.31 1.86 1.67 1.32 1.87
social 1.58 1.28 1.74 1.52 1.25 1.74
shopping 1.65 1.33 1.85 1.64 1.33 1.86
Location - requestor all 1.53 1.43 1.59 1.49 1.39 1.57
mobile 1.62 1.51 1.74 1.61 1.50 1.73
social 1.54 1.43 1.59 1.48 1.39 1.58
shopping 1.61 1.50 1.70 1.61 1.50 1.70
Social - topic all 0.80 0.66 1.09 0.76 0.63 1.09
mobile 0.83 0.69 1.11 0.82 0.69 1.11
location 0.80 0.66 1.09 0.77 0.65 1.07
shopping 0.81 0.67 1.08 0.81 0.66 1.08
Social - recipients all 0.72 0.58 0.90 0.67 0.57 0.81
mobile 0.75 0.62 0.96 0.75 0.61 0.96
location 0.72 0.58 0.90 0.70 0.57 0.84
shopping 0.73 0.60 0.88 0.72 0.60 0.88
Mobile - category all 0.45 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.50
social 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.50
location 0.46 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.42 0.50
shopping 0.46 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.49
Shopping - data type all 0.46 0.41 0.50 0.44 0.38 0.50
social 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.45 0.41 0.49
location 0.46 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.50
mobile 0.46 0.41 0.50 0.45 0.39 0.49
Shopping - stakeholder all 0.94 0.85 1.10 0.91 0.82 1.09
social 0.94 0.85 1.09 0.94 0.85 1.08
location 0.96 0.89 1.09 0.96 0.86 1.09
mobile 0.94 0.85 1.10 0.95 0.84 1.10
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For the “occasion” privacy levels in the location sharing domain, the CCR method
produces better results for all input domains, except for the mobile app domain. In
the following, we will compare the standard errors of the MCR method with the
standard errors of the CCR method. The difference in the standard error will be de-
noted by ∆ and is calculated as ∆ = stderrMCR − stderrCCR. Especially when using
all viable coefficients, the standard error can be reduced to 1.50, which is a difference
of ∆ = −0.07 compared to the MCR method. Using only social media coefficients
allows us to reduce the stderr by 0.06 to a final value of 1.52 for the CCR. Using
the context-based privacy levels from the intelligent shopping domain can only im-
prove the stderr by 0.01 compared to the MCR analysis. Finally, the stderr using the
coefficients from the mobile app domain increases by 0.02 to 1.67, which is the high-
est standard error of all input combinations for the location sharing domain. The
CCR produces better results for the “requestor” context factor of the location shar-
ing domain as well: when using only social media input, the stderr decreases to 1.48
(∆ = −0.06); it stays almost the same for the mobile app (stderr = 1.61, ∆ = −0.01)
and intelligent shopping coefficients (stderr=1.61, ∆ = 0.00). Again using all coef-
ficients from all three domains leads to a prediction which is ∆ = −0.04 (stderr =
1.49) more precise compared to the MCR method. The social media domain can also
profit from the more fine-grained input of the CCR domain: Using all coefficients,
we can reduce the stderr by ∆ = −0.04 for the “topic”, and by ∆ = −0.05 for the
“recipients” context factor. Also, using only the coefficients from the location shar-
ing domain reduces the standard errors for both “topic” (stderr=0.77, ∆ = −0.03)
and “recipients” (stderr = 0.70, ∆ = −0.02). However, the prediction using only
mobile app (stderr = 0.82, ∆ = −0.01 for “topic”, stderr=0.75, ∆ = 0.00 for “re-
cipients”) or intelligent shopping (stderr = 0.81, ∆ = 0.00 for “topic”, stderr=0.72,
∆ = −0.01 for “recipients”) coefficients improves the precision only slightly. In the
intelligent shopping domain, only the precision using all context-based privacy lev-
els improved the regression precision (stderr = 0.91, ∆ = −0.03 for “stakeholder”,
stderr = 0.44, ∆ = −0.02 for “data type”). The precision using only coefficients
from either the social media (stderr = 0.94, ∆ = 0.00 for “stakeholder”, stderr =
0.45, ∆ = −0.01 for “data type”), location sharing (stderr = 0.96, ∆ = 0.00 for
“stakeholder”, stderr = 0.46, ∆ = 0.00 for “data type”) or mobile app (stderr = 0.95,
∆ = +0.01 for “stakeholder”, stderr = 0.45, ∆ = −0.01 for “data type”) domain
did not change much. Finally, the mobile app domain also could not profit signif-
icantly from the increased granularity of the CCR method. Using coefficients only
from the social media (stderr = 0.46, ∆ = −0.01) or location sharing (stderr = 0.45,
∆ = −0.01) domain only slightly decreases the standard error, whereas it stays the
same for the intelligent shopping domain (stderr = 0.46, ∆ = 0.00) and also when
using all domains together as an input (stderr = 0.45, ∆ = 0.00).
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7.4 Discussion
7.4.1 Predicting mean domain privacy levels using MGR vs. CGR
We presented two different approaches for predicting the mean domain privacy
level (the mean privacy level computed over all privacy levels of a domain) of a
domain: first the MGR approach that uses the other mean domain privacy levels as
an input, and second the CGR method that uses the privacy levels for the different
context factor instances (like the privacy level given for social network posts about
food, or a location sharing privacy level that has to be applied when a family mem-
ber requests the location) in addition to the mean-based privacy level. Usually, one
would think that more data leads to a higher precision (e.g. a lower standard er-
ror). However, this is only the case for the location sharing domain, where the CGR
method leads to lower standard errors when using the social media or shopping pri-
vacy levels, and especially when all domain data can be used. Still, the size of the
effect is relatively small, with a standard error improvement ranging between 0.03
for the intelligent shopping domain to 0.06 (or 5%) when using all context-based do-
main privacy levels as an input, resulting in a final standard error of 1.20. For all
other domains, except for the shopping domain, where the CGR method produces a
slightly better result (standard error improvement of 0.01) when using location shar-
ing privacy levels, the CGR method offers exactly the same precision as the simpler
MGR approach.
Taking a look at the coefficients used for the location sharing prediction (Table
7.3), we can see that there are two context factor instances which are of major impor-
tance from the social media domain: the “topic” context factor instances “movies”
and especially “events”. Those two post topics are occasions in which users typically
also share their location (especially for events), which might lead to their suitability
for a prediction, which then leads to a decreased standard error when added to the
set of coefficients. The same seems to hold for the amount of items bought, which
is used for predicting the location sharing level when only shopping privacy levels
are available. People like to share their location during shopping either when they
have bought expensive products, or when they have bought an extraordinarily high
amount of items, for example at a sale or at a factory outlet store. To conclude, we
can state that the simple MGR approach works very well for most of the domains.
There are only some domains where the increased data set of the CGR method can
improve the precision, like the location sharing domain. Which other domains are
also suitable for CGR should be a research topic of future work. As a rule of thumb,
it seems like CGR can profit from its context-based privacy levels from the other do-
mains, if some of them are very similar or are often used together with the privacy
levels of the target domain.
7.4.2 Predicting context-based privacy levels using MCR vs. CCR
When it comes to predicting the context-based privacy levels, i.e. the different pri-
vacy levels depending on the context factors mentioned in Chapters 4 to 6, the sim-
plistic mean domain privacy level-based approach (MCR) still performs well. How-
ever, in this case, the context-based method (CCR) can outperform the MCR in most
cases. In the location sharing domain, where the CGR already outperformed the
MGR, the CCR leads to a standard error that is on average 2.6%–4.4% more precise
than the MCR approach when using all other domains as an input. The improve-
ment is even larger for the social media domain, where the standard error is reduced
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by 5%–7% when using all input data. For the shopping domain, the improvement
amounts to 3.2%–4.3%. The mobile app category remains the only one where the
CCR approach led to only meaningless improvements. In the domain of mobile app
permissions, the context-based privacy levels were based on the app category as a
context factor. However, none of the other domains have a similar context factor,
so the other context-based privacy levels, which were based on the requestor or the
occasion, for example, were not of any help, so that the CGR approach could not
lead to an improvement of the prediction precision. We therefore speculate that the
performance of the CCR depends on the semantic distance between the context fac-
tors of the target domain and the input domains. Whether this assumption can be
generalized should be investigated in future work. In general, we conclude that, for
predicting context-based privacy settings, the context-based CCR method should be
preferred for most cases, if the data is available. But if the context factors do not
match well, e.g. the semantic distance between them is high, the CCR seems not
to lead to any advantage. However, the simplistic MCR approach that uses only
the mean domain privacy levels from the other domains performs surprisingly well,
even for predicting fine-grained privacy levels.
7.4.3 Which data set is to be used for a prediction?
After deciding on a suitable prediction method (either mean-based or context-based),
the next question is which data should be used for the prediction, or whether the
available data is sufficient for a prediction. In general, if data from all other do-
mains is available, this data should also be used. In our experiments, we did not
identify any case where the precision decreased when using all domain data instead
of only a specific domain. If privacy levels of only some of the domains are avail-
able, or if the data has to be acquired/processed first, it is best to think in clusters.
In the experiments, we identified two domain clusters, within which each domain
is particularly suitable for predicting the other domain. The first is the location-
sharing/social media cluster; the second is the mobile app permission/intelligent
shopping cluster. Whenever the privacy levels from the cluster partner are available
or can be acquired, they should be preferred before those of all other domains. If
data from other domains is already available, it should be added as well, although
it will not increase the precision very much. We recommend not to add further do-
main data if the additional data must be acquired first, and the acquisition would
lead to an increased user burden or an excessive computing overhead.
7.4.4 The privacy paradox in privacy recommender systems
The goal of our research is to help users to tune their privacy settings so that they
disclose as little private information as needed while still keeping the services (for
example the social network or smartphone) usable. However, in order to allow an
automatic prediction of privacy settings, we in fact need additional information from
the user as an input for a meaningful prediction. This fact, known as the “recom-
mender systems privacy paradox”, has been a subject of research for several years
[322]. There are several approaches that allow the user to increase her privacy in
such a recommender system, for example by using k-anonymity (aggregating the
personal information together with 2, 3, 4 or n other data sets) at the cost of predic-
tion precision [322]. Data expiration and data morphing are further methods that can
enhance privacy at the cost of the recommendation quality [322]. Other approaches
try to adapt the recommender system itself to be more privacy-aware, for example
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by employing a differential privacy mechanism in matrix factorization approaches
[121]. Another PLA-based framework selects a personalisation method at runtime
that fits the user’s privacy requirements, to enhance privacy while keeping the pre-
diction quality at a similar level [332]. In our studies, we were focused on finding out
whether and how well privacy recommendations work in an optimal case, where the
user’s personal information is fully available. However, in future work, we would
like to inspect how well our approaches work when privacy-enhancing techniques
are included.
7.5 Conclusion
User often neglect their privacy settings, as they often do not see the potential risks
that come with oversharing the data. There exist many solutions that try to aid the
user in choosing the privacy settings using machine learning, either by using other
privacy settings from the same domain as an input, or by utilizing the user’s per-
sonality and privacy attitudes for a personalized recommendation. However, as this
information is not always available, we examined whether privacy settings from
other domains can also be used as an input for the prediction. We observed the
prediction of a mean domain privacy level that gives only one general user-specific
privacy level for a domain as an orientation, as well as the prediction of fine-grained
context-based privacy levels that give a distinct personalized privacy level for each
combination of context factors. The results show that both types of privacy levels
can be predicted already using only the mean domain privacy levels from the other
domains. However, the fine-grained context-based privacy levels and the mean do-
main privacy levels from the location sharing domain can be predicted better using
the context-based privacy levels as an input. Although we verified the selected re-
gression coefficients within a validation study, and although we achieved a small
increase in the prediction precision using the CGR and CCR method compared to
the MGR and MCR method in some cases, we would like to test the suitability of
our prediction in future work in an in-the-wild study, where the privacy levels are
predicted from actual privacy settings of the users, and check how well the imple-
mentation of the predicted privacy levels in the different domains fits the actual
desired privacy settings of the user.
In the last chapters, we have seen that individual factors can improve the predic-
tion accuracy in several domains; we examined four different domains as an exam-
ple. Using machine learning, the individual measures can even be derived automat-
ically without any user burden. However, those algorithms are not always correct;
there is always a small chance of an incorrect prediction, no matter how good the
algorithm is. Therefore, in our opinion, such a recommender system must always
be accompagnied with a privacy UI that helps the user to get an overview of their
privacy settings and possible errors, and that also gives the user the possibility to
correct these errors easily. The next chapter will describe in more detail which tasks
have to be conducted typically when a user has to select her privacy settings, and





Motivating and assisting users to
reflect their privacy
As mentioned earlier, the concept of our privacy framework is based on two pil-
lars (see Chapter 1): first, offering the user a set of privacy settings that is tailored
towards her personality and privacy attitude, and second, a user interface that en-
ables the user to review and adapt these proposed settings. In the previous chap-
ters, we proposed different mechanisms that allow us to propose privacy settings,
either based on context and individual factors, or based on other privacy settings
of the user. In this chapter, we will discuss the user interfaces needed to complete
the concept of the privacy framework. First, we will discuss options for helping
users to do friend grouping, which is an indispensable requirement for many pri-
vacy recommenders [246]. Afterwards, we will show two user interfaces that cover
two different aspects of privacy. The first user interface is targeted towards defining
the audience (i.e. the recipients) for a sensitive data item. The system, called Omni-
Wedges, allows the user to select the correct audience for a social network post based
on the user’s friend groups and the tie strength between the user and his friends us-
ing a radar metaphor. In contrast, the second of the two user interfaces has the goal
to allow the user to define the granularity of the private information that should be
shared, considering the example of the intelligent retail domain. URetail is tailored
especially towards detecting unusual and possibly incorrect privacy settings at one
glance, so the user knows where to focus when reviewing the privacy settings. Al-
though both user interfaces are demonstrated with the example of one domain, the
approaches can also be transferred to other domains where private data has to be
shared (such as, for example, the four domains discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6), as
we will discuss in this chapter. The chapter ends with a discussion of how in-situ
feedback on mobile devices can be employed to allow the user to notify the system
about privacy invasions as soon as they are noticed, which consequences users ex-
pect from the system when giving feedback, and how this kind of feedback can be
used to refine the privacy settings.
8.1 Motivating users in friend grouping
As we have highlighted in earlier chapters, users often share data online with a
larger audience than intended. Social networks such as Facebook or Google+ al-
low their users to create custom friend lists and share content exclusively with these
lists. In the last two chapters, we presented approaches that recommend privacy set-
tings for a user based on the user’s individual measures for each group of recipients.
However, users rarely create friend lists [230]. Known causes for this behavior are
the mental effort to group people [336] and usability problems, e.g. regarding the
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mechanics, general workflow problems or simply the user interface design [179, 346,
184].
Compared to other sorting tasks, the task of social network friend grouping in-
cludes several special challenges to be solved: First, we have seen in the last chapters
that privacy preferences are highly individual in several domains like social network
posts and location sharing, mobile app permissions or shopping scenarios. Every
user has her own different criteria to build groups and to categorize her friends into
them, depending on her personal preferences, her personality and privacy attitudes,
and also her posting preferences, regarding post topics and intimacy of the shared
information. Second, there is no definite answer to the correct assignment of a friend.
Some of the friends might fit into multiple groups; some might not fit in any group
and will remain unassigned. This leads to the fact that for some friends, it is im-
mediately clear to which groups they should be assigned, whereas the user needs a
longer time to think about a correct assignment for other cases, as our study results
will show.
Research has tried to tackle this problem by creating new design concepts with
an increased usability in order to reduce the mental effort to perform the friend sort-
ing task. Some of the approaches use graph-based interfaces [85, 224], where groups
are represented by vertices with the corresponding friends attached as their leaves;
others rely on a conventional list-based design [210] improved by an auto-grouping
algorithm based on community detection [40]. Nevertheless, the usage of virtual
reality to enhance the usability of social network friend sorting on the one hand,
and to make the task more interesting and enjoyable by enhancing the user experi-
ence on the other hand, has not been discussed in research so far to the best of our
knowledge. To be more precise, we try to solve the following research questions:
1. Can we enhance the usability and user experience of the social network friend
sorting task using a VR environment and metaphors?
2. Do users prefer a playful approach or an approach that is optimized towards
usability (“pragmatic design”) for VR sorting?
3. How do the VR designs affect the errors made during friend sorting?
For this purpose, we created two different UI designs. The first one, later called
“pragmatic design”, is focused on further increasing the usability (in a virtual reality
environment) by adapting traditional concepts such as card sorting. The second is
geared towards making the sorting task as fun and enjoyable as possible by packag-
ing the task as an interactive VR game (“playful condition”). In a study comparing
these to a conventional sorting interface from the Facebook social network website,
we found that we could further increase the usability with the pragmatic design.
The playful condition was perceived as highly motivating and achieved a signifi-
cantly higher user experience score, at the cost of an increased error rate. The work
presented here is based on already published research [266].
8.1.1 FriendGroupVR Designs
We implemented two different VR design approaches to sort and organize social
network friend lists, targeting different objectives: the first “pragmatic” approach
is optimized towards usability in terms of efficiency and performance, whereas the
second “playful” approach is focused on maing the sorting task as enjoyable and
interesting as possible. Each world was implemented in Unity using an HTC Vive
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FIGURE 8.1: VR setup in our lab using the HTC Vive. “L” denotes the
positions of the lighthouse position trackers, “V” the initial position
of the user wearing the HTC Vive
VR Kit. The setup contained a 4m x 4m floor equipped with an HTC Vive Lighthouse
setup that allows tracking the user’s movements inside the area (see Figure 8.1).
Each user movement was reflected in the VR world as well. In order to track hand
movements, each user was given two Vive controllers, one for each hand. Grabbing
gestures were realized by usage of the trigger buttons of the controllers. For our
lab study, we recorded the created friend lists and the contained friend lists locally
instead of applying the changes to the user’s social network account.
A special problem of the friend sorting task is that the time needed for the as-
signment of a friend to one or multiple groups can be highly variable. For some of
the friends, it is instantly clear to which social circle(s) or which friend list(s) they
belong, but for others it is less clear, so that the user might need a few seconds to
think before he can conduct the actual assignment task. Therefore, we put a special
emphasis on the possibility to interrupt the sorting task between two friends, so that
the user has the possibility to think about the best assignment options in advance.
Pragmatic design
According to related work, the metaphor of card sorting is one of the most efficient
methodologies [61]; we therefore decided to transfer the open card sorting metaphor
into a VR world, leading us to an office metaphor as shown in Figure 8.2. The
“cards”, i.e. the social network friends, are represented as picture frames (“friend
frames”) standing inside a bookshelf. Each friend frame consists of the friend’s pro-
file picture and first name on the front, and the first and last name on the back, form-
ing a combination of a card sorting and picture sorting metaphor (“card sorting+”),
as described in the related work section. Friends can be displayed with ascending
tie strength (equivalent to the Facebook friend list order) or sorted by first or last
name. As space is limited, the shelf always contains only nine friend frames at a
time. To access the other frames, we placed two buttons at the left and right edges of
the shelf, allowing the user to access friends that appear earlier or later in the sorted
list, respectively (see Figure 8.2).
According to the stacked cards metaphor, friend lists are represented as labeled
boxes (“list box”) in which the user can drag & drop friend frames using a VR con-
troller. As a starting point, the VR world contains the five most frequently used
friend lists according to Chapter 4.1, namely “family”, “acquaintances”, “close friends”,
“work” and “sport”, as a box. Boxes have no physical weight in our VR world, and
can therefore be placed in mid-air at any desired location. As the task of arranging
friend lists is highly individual, we opted for an “open card sorting” design allowing
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FIGURE 8.2: Bookshelf in the pragmatic design, including friends rep-
resented by “friend frames” (left) and spawner to create new friend
list boxes (right).
users to create arbritrary additional friend lists. To create a new list box, we added
the “box spawner” into the environment (Figure 8.2): To create a list box, the user
has to touch the red button with the VR controller, which opens a VR keyboard to
enter the list name. Pressing the enter button hides the keyboard and spawns the
newly created list box, as seen in the figure.
To manage the friend lists, a user typically starts with creating and arranging
the list boxes around the shelf. After that, the friend frames are traversed one after
another and placed inside one or multiple list boxes that should contain the friend.
As soon as a friend frame is placed inside a box, the frame is shrunk to half of its
size to save space. If a friend is placed inside the wrong box or if the user decides to
assign them to a different list box, he can always empty the box on the floor or grab
a picture inside the box and put it into another.
Playful design
In contrast to the former design, here we concentrated on making the sorting task as
enjoyable and interesting as possible. We therefore decided to design the approach
as an interactive VR game that challenges the user, including gamification elements
like high score tables, upgrades and bonus items that should motivate the user in
carrying out the task and competing with others. As stated in the beginning of the
section, the time needed for finding an optimal assignment is very different from
friend to friend. We therefore need a game design which can be interrupted or de-
layed at certain points in time to allow the user to take her time for the assignment
decision. As related work has shown, most of the friends (about 90%) are assigned
only to one friend group; we therefore decided on a game with a linear action line,
where only one friend is part of the game at a time, with the possibility to manu-
ally go back to a friend again if he or she has to be added to multiple friend groups.
We came up with the idea of a “can knockdown” game, where the user can assign
her friend to friend lists by shooting dispatched “friend balls” to different can stacks
representing the available friend lists. Using this design, the user can always wait
and think about the correct assignment, before she starts the dispatch of the friend
ball.
In a typical workflow, the user first creates the needed friend lists using a tool
similar to the box spawner in the pragmatic design. After this task is finished, the
friend lists are represented by can stacks (“list stacks”) at a distance of about five
meters in front of the user. The user then starts the assignment phase, where a ball
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FIGURE 8.3: Can knockdown game in the playful design.
representing each social network friend is dispatched in the direction of the user
one after another. The player uses a bat to redirect the friend ball to a can stack
corresponding to the friend list the user should be assigned to. As mentioned before,
each friend ball is dispatched only once. If the user wants to add a friend to multiple
groups, he has to press the “back” button on the control panel (see below) to display
the last friend ball again and add her to another group. Depending on how many
cans the user is able to hit with the friend ball, the user gains points to be added to
his personal high score.
A screenshot of the playful VR world from the user’s initial position can be found
in Figure 8.3: the shelf on the left side of the user (Figure 8.4 left) is used to create and
arrange the friend lists, similar to the pragmatic design. In the shelf, friend lists are
represented by a small board with the list name written on the front. Similar to the
other design, the five most frequently used friend lists are already created in advance
and placed at the bottom of the shelf. If the user wants to create a new friend list,
he touches the button, which opens a keyboard to enter the friend list name, exactly
like in the pragmatic design. To use a friend list in the can knockdown game, the
user has to place a friend list board in one of the containers in the shelf, which will
display a can stack in the game at the respective location (e.g. if the board is placed
in the container to the left of center, the corresponding can stack will also be shown
to the left of center in the game). At the right hand side of the user is a control
panel (Figure 8.4 top right) which allows the user to switch forward or backward
between the social network friends, and a button to start and pause the game at any
given time, for example if more time is needed to contemplate the correct friend list
assignment. Using the control panel, the user can also go back to an earlier friend
and dispatch her friend ball another time to assign her to another friend list.
At the front, the user is facing a panel (Figure 8.4 bottom right) which displays
the name and profile picture of the next friend to be sorted, together with the current
score and the remaining time for the currently collected bonus item (see below).
When the game is started by pressing the “start” button, the user has five seconds
to think about the correct list stack that he wants to aim at. The five dots at the top
of the panel represent the time in seconds that is remaining. When the last dot turns
from gray to red, the friend ball is dispatched towards the user. If no can stack is
hit, the same friend ball is again dispatched for another try. When the user does
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FIGURE 8.4: Friend list management shelf (left), score and dispatch
panel opposite the user, dispatching a friend ball (bottom right) and
control panel to switch the current friend and start/pause the game
(top right) in the playful design.
FIGURE 8.5: Different bats available to the user with ascending diffi-
culty from left to right: Round bat with magnifier functionality, round
bat without magnifier functionality, cricket bat, baseball bat.
not want to assign the friend to any group, he can aim for the monster at the upper
left of the VR world, which will then eat the friend ball, so that it is not dispatched
again. If the user hits the wrong can stack, he can always undo the last assignment
by hitting the “undo” buzzer directly in front of him. To further motivate the user,
we integrated “bonus balls” into the game, which are dispatched in the direction of
the user at randomized times. Collecting each bonus ball activates a special upgrade
for a limited time, for example a score multiplier, or an increase of the friend ball
size.
The user has a choice of different bats (Figure 8.5) with different difficulties: The
easiest bat is largest and catches the ball so that the user has the possibility to aim
and shoot at the desired location by pressing a button. The second easiest bat has
the same size, but directly deflects the ball without catching it first. The remaining
two bats have the same behavior with a smaller size, making it more difficult to hit
the ball. The more difficult a bat is, the more points are rewarded for each can hit.
When all friend balls have been processed, the game stops and the user’s high score
is displayed on the high score table in the upper right of the VR world, along with
the high scores of other users, and the friend lists are stored.
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We had the goal to find interaction designs using VR for the creation and mainte-
nance of social network friend lists that would be both more efficient and also more
enjoyable than the current standard. As a reference interface, we used the Facebook
interface for creating friend groups as shown in Figure 8.6. In the Facebook interface,
the user is shown all friends in a grid view, and has to select the friends to be added
to the list by clicking on them.
In order to measure the differences from the Facebook UI, we conducted a lab
study at our department, where the participants had to use both VR designs as well
as a standard interface from the Facebook social network site using a desktop PC as
a baseline. With each interface, the participants had to assign their 40 closest friends
(according to the Facebook friend ordering) to friend groups. For each condition, we
recorded usability and user experience scores using the AttrakDiff [150] question-
naire as well as an error rate (for example friends missing from a group, or friends
assigned to the wrong group), as desribed below in more detail. To reduce training
effects and to get users used to the VR environment, we implemented another VR
“training” world which shows the user an overview of the 40 friends that have to be
assigned in the experiment (Figure 8.7). To further reduce training effects, the order
of conditions was permuted for each participant so that each sequence of conditions
appears equally often during the study, leading to 3! = 6 different orders.
The procedure was the same for each participant but with a different order of
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FIGURE 8.7: Training world with 40 friends that the user is shown
before the experiment starts.
conditions, as stated before. After signing a consent form and agreeing to the pri-
vacy policy, the participant had to fill in a questionnaire about demographic data
and previous experience using the Facebook friend grouping tool and virtual real-
ity setups. She was then given a desktop screen to enter her Facebook login data.
With the aid of the Selenium web browser automation toolkit1, a Python script then
traversed the participant’s friend list and extracted the friend names and profile pic-
tures for later use during the study. After the process was finished, the participant
was given instruction in the VR hardware, and had to put on the headset for the first
time. We started the training level and gave her the time to get familiar with the VR
world and the controllers, and to have a first look at the friends to be sorted and to
contemplate the friend lists and the assignments to be made. When the participant
stated she was ready, the training world was closed, and the main experiment phase
started.
In the main phase, the three interface conditions were tested one after another in
a different order, as stated above. For each condition, the participant was given an in-
troduction to the interface with all of its interaction possibilities and some time to get
familiar with it and to test each functionality once. When she stated she was ready,
the world was reset, and the participant had to do the friend grouping with her 40
friends until she stated she was finished. Participants were told that they should
do the task seriously, as wrong assignments would be recorded. In the following,
the participant had to fill in several questionnaires about the current condition: the
AttrakDiff questionnaire [150] measuring usability (PQ) and user experience (HQ-I,
HQ-S), the NASA TLX capturing the mental and physical workload, and an MSAQ
questionnaire asking about motion sickness in the VR conditions, as well as a cus-
tom questionnaire asking whether the interface was motivating or fun to use, and
whether the participant thought it could be integrated into her daily life, on a five-
point Likert scale. After a five-minute break to rest and recover, this procedure was
repeated for the two other conditions. For each condition, we recorded the overall
time spent on soritng. At the end of the study, the participant was asked which was
their favorite interface, and had to traverse the friend lists created to check for errors
made during the assignment. We recorded the following error measures:
1https://docs.seleniumhq.org/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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measure MFB Mplay f ul Mpragmatic
PQ -0.15 0.61 1.99
HQ-S -1.81 2.02 1.13
HQ-I -0.54 0.96 1.21
FUN 1.57 4.77 4.57
MOTIV 1.65 4.23 4.33
DAILY 2.10 2.87 3.77
Workload 30.61 39.42 22.86
Errors 8.50 11.93 7.60
Time(s) 418 587 512
TABLE 8.1: Results for the usability and user experience scores in-
cluding pragmatic quality (PQ), hedonic quality regarding stimula-
tion (HQ-S) and identification (HQ-I) and the custom questions ask-
ing about fun (FUN) and motivation (MOTIV) to do the task and suit-
ability for everyday usage (DAILY), as well as the Nasa TLX work-
load, time spent on sorting and the error rate.
• Person missing from a group (MISS)
• Person added despite not belonging to the group (TOOMUCH)
• Wrong group label (LABEL)
• Group should be split into multiple groups (SPLIT)
• Multiple groups should be merged into one group (MERGE)
8.1.3 Results
In total, we had 30 participants in the study, 18 female and 12 male. Participants were
recruited at our university using postings and the university’s social network group.
As a compensation, a 25e Amazon voucher was raffled off among all participants.
Ages ranged from 19 to 50 (mean=26.67, SD=5.474), representing a good portion
of typical social network users 2. When asked about their experiences with virtual
reality, 12 people had no experience (40%) and 5 almost no experience (16.7%). 25
people answered that they had never used Facebook’s grouping interface (83.3%),
while 5 people had used it (16.7%). On average, the main experiment was completed
within 64 minutes.
The experiment results can be found in Table 8.1. Depending on whether an F-
test showed a normal distribution of the data, we performed pairwise paired T-tests
or Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to compare the pragmatic quality (PQ), also known as
usability; the measures from the custom questionnaire asking about experienced fun
(FUN) and motivation (MOTIV) and suitability for daily use (DAILY), the NASA-
TLX workload values; times needed for sorting; the error rates and the hedonic
scores HQ-I and HQ-S measuring the user experience between the three conditions.
The usability (PQ) was highest for the pragmatic interface (M = 1.99) and signif-
icantly better than for the playful interface (M = 0.61, T = 4.6, p < 0.001) which
is itself significantly more usable than the Facebook standard (M = −0.15, T =
3.1, p = 0.004). Regarding the user experience, the user could identify significantly
better with the pragmatic interface (M = 1.20) than with the playful interface (M =
2https://www.statista.com/statistics/274829/age-distribution-of-active-social-
media-users-worldwide-by-platform/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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FIGURE 8.8: Distribution of the time needed to assign a friend for
three representative subjects.
0.0.96, T = 2.13, p = 0.042) which was again better than Facebook (M = −0.53, T =
8.38, p < 0.001), but felt most stimulated by the playful interface (M = 2.04), fol-
lowed by the pragmatic VR design (M = 1.13, Z = −4.50, p < 0.001) and distantly
followed by the Facebook UI with a significantly lower score (M = −1.81, T =
14.471, p < 0.001). The FUN was on average also highest using the playful de-
sign (M = 4.77) although we could not prove the difference from the pragmatic
interface to be significant (M = 4.57, Z = 0.965, p = 0.334). The Facebook interface
was again rated significantly worse than the pragmatic interface (M = 1.57, T =
4.79, p < 0.001). The most motivating interface is the pragmatic interface (M = 4.33)
according to the mean values, but is again not significanlty better than the play-
ful interface (M = 4.23, Z = 1.62, p = 0.09). The Facebook UI is again signifi-
cantly worse than the playful UI (M = 1.65, Z = 4.75, p < 0.001). The same order
holds for the suitability of integrating the UI into everyday social network usage:
the pragmatic interface (M = 3.77) significantly outperforms the playful interface
(M = 2.87, Z = 3.24, p = 0.001), which is again significantly better than the current
standard on Facebook (M = 2.10, Z = 2.39, p = 0.017). The time in seconds needed
to perform the grouping task was lowest with the Facebook interface (M = 418)
and significantly higher with the pragmatic (M = 587, T = 2.722, p = 0.011) and
playful VR designs (M = 588, T = 2.50, p = 0.018). A visual analysis on the time
distributions for the times needed to assign a single friend showed that the times
are very different for some of the users, supporting our assumption that an inter-
face is needed that allows users to pause the sorting task, as the time needed for an
assignment can differ substantially. Figure 8.8 shows the time distribution for three
representative subjects of the study.
The motion sickness (MSAQ) scores, ranging from 11.1 (best) to 100 (worst),
were very low for both VR interfaces and did not differ significantly (Mpragmatic =
16.02, Mplay f ul = 16.37, Z = 0.991, P = 0.322), attesting that motion sickness was not
a noticeable problem in our UI designs. The pragmatic interface received on aver-
age the smallest error rate (M = 7.60). Nevertheless, the error rate using the baseline
interface is not significantly higher (M8.50, Z = 0.419, p = 0.675). The playful inter-
face led to the highest error rates, which are significantly higher than for the stan-
dard Facebook interface (M = 11.933, Z = 2.204, p = 0.027). The same holds for the
workload, which is highest for the playful interface (M = 39.42), significantly lower
for the Facebook UI (M = 30.61, T = 2.79, p = 0.0009), and lowest for the prag-
matic UI (M = 22.85, T = 2.90, p = 0.007). A detailed overview on the error rates
and the different workload items can be found in Tables 8.2 and 8.3. We can clearly
see that the main cause for the higher workload in the playful design is that the VR
game was perceived as challenging, as the mental demand (Z = 4.19, p < 0.001),
temporal demand (T = 4.37, p < 0.001) and effort (Z = 4.22, p < 0.001) are sig-
nificantly higher compared to the pragmatic interface. The frustration was highest
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measure MFB Mplay f ul Mpragmatic
MISS 2.5 4.6 1.43
TOOMUCH 0.57 4.6 0.57
LABEL 0.03 0.03 0.1
SPLIT 0.23 0.27 0.17
MERGE 0.07 0.03 0.03
TABLE 8.2: Detailed results for the average number of errors per par-
ticipant for the different error types.
measure MFB Mplay f ul Mpragmatic
Mental demand 29 41.17 22.67
Physical demand 10.50 44.17 35.67
Temporal demand 39.50 47.83 25.67
Performance 30.33 34.83 20.17
Effort 26.33 42 21.50
Frustration 47.67 26.50 11.33
TABLE 8.3: Detailed results of the NASA TLX questionnaire for the
three different conditions.
using the Facebook interface, supporting our claim that friend grouping is perceived
as a very frustrating and uninteresting task. Using VR, the frustration is significantly
lower for both the pragmatic (T = 6.79, p < 0.001) as well as the playful design
(T = 3.65, p = 0.001). The most favored interface was the pragmatic design (73.3%)
followed by the playful design (23.33%). Only one participant claimed to like the
standard Facebook interface best. We observed different behaviors regarding the
choice of bat used throughout the game: 17 participants used the “sticky” bat and
9 used the “deflective” bat most of the time (> 80% of the time); three switched be-
tween the types. One used the baseball bat exclusively. However, we did not find
any significant difference between these usage groups for any of our measures.
8.1.4 Discussion
Increased usability using VR
We presented two VR friend grouping interfaces, one geared towards maximizing
the usability, and one towards maximizing the fun and motivation when sorting
friends. Comparing the usability scores of the interfaces, we can see that both VR in-
terfaces were perceived as significantly more useful than the Facebook interface. The
pragmatic design achieved the highest usability score, 1.99, which is very close to the
theoretical maximum of 2.50 on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, indicating that we achieved
the goal of increasing the usability compared to the current standard. Interestingly,
the interaction time was lowest for the Facebook interface, although it was rated as
having a significantly lower usability. On the other hand, the error rate was higher
for the Facebook interface, leading to the assumption that the Facebook interface is
fast to use on one hand, but is complicated and leads to an increased error rate on
the other hand, which leads to a smaller perceived usability of this interface.
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Challenging game design leads to increased error rates
The error rate is on average lowest for the pragmatic interface, although the differ-
ence to the standard interface is not significant. As stated earlier, we designed the
playful design to be challenging for the user, including bonuses, high scores, and dif-
ferent levels of difficulty using different bats. This is also reflected in the perceived
workload according to the NASA-TLX, where the mental and physical effort in par-
ticular are higher compared to the other interfaces. Nevertheless, the frustration is
low compared to the Facebook interface, indicating that the stress was perceived to
be positive. However, the challenges may also lead to the increased error rate, which
is also highest for the playful interface. The game may have been too challenging,
or the design as a game may have led the participants to take the task less seriously
and pay less attention to a correct sorting; which of these factors led to the increased
error rate should be further investigated in a follow-up study.
Significantly improved user experience, not only for the playful condition
The differences for the user experience scores are again larger than for the usability
scores when comparing the VR designs with the standard interface. The playful de-
sign received a very high stimulus and FUN score, again indicating that the game
was perceived as challenging, stimulating and fun to use. But the pragmatic design,
which was not optimized towards user experience, also achieved a high user ex-
perience score, which was significantly higher than for the Facebook baseline. The
pragmatic design was voted to be most motivating, although not significantly more
so than the playful interface. One reason why it was rated as being more motivat-
ing on average might be the succesful combination of an appealing and interesting
user interface, which still provides a high usability without trying to challenge the
user. Which factors led to the higher motivation should therefore be investigated in
a follow-up study.
Conclusion on the favored interface
Taking all the aspects into account, the results indicate that VR designs are per-
ceived as more useful on the one hand, and as more fun and motivating on the other,
which gives them a clear advantage over the current mouse & keyboard interface.
However, such conventional interfaces have the advantage that every computer is
equipped with a mouse and keyboard; the audience that can use the Facebook in-
terface is therefore currently significantly larger than those who own a VR setup at
home to do the friend sorting with one of the two VR designs. Nevertheless, VR
interfaces will gain importance in the next few years, as the number of VR users is
increasing exponentially 3.
As stated in the introduction, one of the major problems of friend sorting is that
the task imposes a high mental demand, making it a task that is often avoided. A
first approach is therefore to present the task as an interesting and challenging game,
as in our playful design. However, a playful design has the drawback that it can
lead to an increased error rate according to our results. We speculate that this might
be caused by the task being taken less seriously, or users being lost in the game
without paying attention to the actual task, leading to a decreased quality of the
desired results. Therefore, according to our results, the method that is preferred by
3https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/426237/umfrage/prognose-zur-
anzahl-der-aktiven-virtual-reality-nutzer-weltweit/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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users is a VR design which is targeted towards usability and that could be enhanced
with some small game elements, but without losing the focus on the actual task too
much. These results confirm the study findings about card sorting, which was al-
ready shown to be very efficient using a desktop interface [61], and which seems to
be efficient for sorting within a VR world as well. Regarding the differences in time
needed for assigning a friend to a list, our results indicate that this time requirement
indeed is very diverse, making it important to design a user interface or a VR sorting
game so that it can be paused at any time, especially between the items to be sorted.
Whether these assumptions can be proven to be true remains for a follow-up exper-
iment, where we will take a closer look at the effects that led to the increased error
rates in the playful condition.
8.1.5 Conclusion
Neglecting privacy settings in online social networks can lead to serious harms, but
privacy functionalities like friend lists are rarely used in social networks, often due
to the fact that the mental effort for creating friend lists prior to their usage is too
high, leading users to either censor their posts or to publish more information than
they originally intended to. Related work focused on improving the usability of con-
ventional desktop interfaces for friend sorting. In this section, we took a first look at
how friend sorting interfaces could look in virtual reality. We proposed one interface
focused on usability by taking the idea of card sorting into VR, and a second inter-
face having the goal to maximize the user experience by wrapping the sorting task
in a challenging game. A comparative study with the Facebook sorting interface as
a baseline has shown that both interfaces achieved their goal of improving the us-
ability and user experience, although the error rate significantly increased within the
playful design. However, which distinct factors led to the increased error rate, and
which factors led to the increased user experience scores, should be further studied
in future research.
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8.2 OmniWedges: area-based audience selection for social
network posts
Having created the friend groups as described in the last section, the user still has to
remember which friends are inside the created friend groups. Currently, the privacy
dialogues of social network sites typically offer to share the post with all friends or
friends of friends at first sight. There is also an option to go for custom privacy set-
tings for a post, opening a new window where the user can enter names of friends
and friend groups that should be either included in or excluded from the post. Al-
though this option in theory gives the user the ability to define the visibility for a post
differently for every user, she still has to remember which friends are in the friend
lists that should be included in or excluded from the post. There is no possibility to
see a list of all friends or their profile pictures, or take a look at the members of the
friend lists. Additionally, it can be very burdensome to type in all names of users
that the user wants to exclude, keeping in mind that a typical Facebook user often
has more than 1000 friends. Therefore, users often stick to the default option and
share the post with all friends, although the intended audience is actually smaller
[139]. Radar interfaces have been used succesfully in research for giving a better
overview on privacy settings [69], also further motivating users in adapting them
on a regular basis [69].
Nevertheless, the available space inside a radar interface is limited compared to
an interface based on a list where the users are listed one by one, which can be ex-
tended endlessly using scrollbars. The research community on visualization focuses
mainly on mapping-based and clustering-based techniques to reduce the complex-
ity and space needed in a user interface [254]. Nevertheless, those algorithms are
usually applied on unstructured data sets like image databases.
In contrast to those approaches, the domain of social network audience selection
faces two additional challenges: first, the social network friends cannot be seen as an
unstructured database. Each friend has a different role and a different importance
to the user, based on factors like the tie strength between the user and the friend
in question, or special social ties like family members, neighbors, or friends from a
sports club. Earlier work on user interfaces for selecting the social network audience
has already shown that aligning the users based on their tie strength to the orig-
inal poster allows a faster and more intuitive selection of the right post audience,
especially for posts with potentially awkward content [180]. Therefore, a visual-
ization that is able to efficiently display and select social network friends needs to
take care of each of those individual factors in order to support the user. Second,
using clustering-based algorithms like multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) to form a
hierarchical structure and to show only one representative of similar images in the
user interface is not a solution, as every friend can be seen differently when it comes
to privacy decisions, even if the friends are members of a similar social circle, like
family members.
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In this section, we therefore concentrate on this use-case as an example to inves-
tigate:
1. how an interface based on a radar metaphor can be enhanced to be able to dis-
play a user’s social network audience, while considering the individual roles
and social ties of the audience members;
2. whether the error rate (like sharing a post with an unintended audience) can
be reduced using such an enhanced radar interface for selecting the post audi-
ence; and
3. whether the mental model changes using a radar interface for this task, and
which possible effects in usage stratgies arise from this change.
OmniWedges is based on a radar metaphor and aligns the friends of the users
based on the tie strength to the user and friend groups they belong to. The audi-
ence for a post can be chosen by selecting single or multiple areas inside the radar
or subsequently adding single persons. OmniWedges includes functionalities that
make it scalable, so it can display all of a user’s social network friends, even if their
number is in the range of several hundreds or thousands, while still giving the user
an overview on the most important friends and especially who is selected and who
is not. We conducted a study comparing OmniWedges with the standard Facebook
interface for custom privacy settings, and were able to show that our approach sig-
nificantly reduces the amount of errors made during audience selection.
To conclude, our work builds upon a radar design, and introduces several new
design innovations and functionalities that make the interface suitable for practical
use on Facebook with all Facebook friends. The work presented here is based on
already published research [262].
8.2.1 Design of the OmniWedges user interface
OmniWedges allows the user to select the post audience based on the tie strength
and the user’s friend groups. An example of how the audience can be selected in
OmniWedges can be seen in Figure 8.9. Each of the user’s social network friends
is represented by her profile picture in the user interface, later called the “friend
picture”. For each friend group that the user created on the social network site, the
interface contains a wedge including the friends inside the friend group, represented
by their friend pictures.
Inside the whole circle of the UI and also inside each wedge, the friend images
are aligned according to their tie strength with the user: The closer the friend image
is placed to the center, the stronger the tie strength to the user. Currently, Omni-
Wedges is using the tie strength calculation provided by Facebook, i.e. the friend
order as displayed on Facebook’s friend page, which uses a tie strength calculation
for organizing the friends4. However, in order to reduce side effects, we let partici-
pants review and adapt the friend ordering and the friend lists before the start of the
experiment.
In the beginning, no friends are selected. To select a subset of friends, the user
drags from the center of a wedge to the outer rim. The area selected by the user is
highlighted in a grayish color (see Figure 8.9). The friends inside the selected area
of the wedge (“wedge area”) are then selected as the recipients of the post. This
4https://www.techniquehow.com/2018/07/facebook-order-friend-list.html
(last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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FIGURE 8.9: Radar UI of OmniWedges. The profile pictures shown
here and in the remainder of this section are fake profile pictures cre-
ated by the https://randomuser.me/ API.
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FIGURE 8.10: Detailed view of a wedge during selection process.
procedure can be repeated an infinite number of times. It is also possible to select
multiple areas inside the same wedge. The selected friend images are highlighted
with a yellow border. Apart from selecting only parts of the wedges, the user can
also grab and extend the inner ring in the UI, making it possible to select all friends
up to a certain tie strength, independent from the friend group. This procedure can
also be repeated as often as desired. Also, single friends can be selected by clicking
on the respective friend image.
OmniWedges always adapts the size of the friend images, so that the friend im-
ages that are currently of the highest importance also receive the largest amount
of space in the UI. In general, the size of the friend image corresponds to the tie
strength: whereas closest friends have the highest importance for the user and there-
fore have the largest image, the size decreases with decreasing tie strength. When
the user starts to hover over a friend image or is about to select them, the friend
image is magnified and the name of the friend is shown below the enlarged friend
image (see Figure 8.10), allowing the user to identify the friends that are currently
on the cusp of being selected. The UI again incrementally shrinks the friend image
to its initial size and hides the name as the mouse leaves the area.
Below the radar, the UI shows how many friends are currently selected together
with a list of the ten closest selected friends. Two buttons in the bottom left corner
allow the user to select or deselect all friends.
In order to design and refine the user interface concept, we started with a focus
group to discuss the idea. The group was composed of six participants (age: 21-
25; mean: 23): five students from different faculties and a process engineer. Four
participants were male, two female. All of them used at least Facebook as a social
network and one of them was also active on Xing and Instagram. The interview
started with general questions about their social network usage behavior, especially
use of Facebook friend lists. We continued to discuss possible alternatives for audi-
ence selection, introducing a social graph and a sketch of the OmniWedges interfaces
in later stages.
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FIGURE 8.11: Functionalities of OmniWedges.
All participants stated that their usage behavior had changed over the last few
years. They had posted more content to a broader audience in the past, but more
recently, they focused on direct chats and shared less content. Only two out of six
participants knew about Facebook friend lists, but they never created or used them
for publishing a post. When introducing the sketch of a social graph for Facebook
friends, participants stated that such a graph could be used in order to visually se-
lect the post recipients by marking areas of the social graph. The proposed concept
was perceived as a useful and efficient solution for audience selection. Participants
claimed to be willing to use such an interface if it was available on Facebook, and
suggested some additional functionalities:
• Exclude a set of friends using the social graph.
• Include/exclude specific friends or a subset of friends inside a friend group.
• Store the selection for reuse in future posts.
• Switch between classic view (the current Facebook standard) and OmniWedges.
We used the input of the focus group to extend our concept and to add additional
features (see Figure 8.11), which cover most of the desired functionality mentioned
by the participants. In the following, we will describe the functionalities of Om-
niWedges using typical use-cases in a social network website. The use-cases are
depicted in Figure 8.11.
Select all friends up to a given tie strength (A):
Click and drag the central circle to expand its radius to the desired size. All
friends inside the circle are selected as post recipients.
Typical use case: only the friends up to a specific tie strength should receive
the post, independent of the friend group. Example: a family visit to an amuse-
ment park. Although the information is suitable for all groups of friends, it is
private information that might not be of interest for very distant friends.
Select friends of one or more friend groups up to a given tie strength (B):
Click and drag the inner rim of a wedge to create a wedge area and expand
its size. As with (A), friends that are covered by the dragged wedge area are
selected to receive the post. This process can be repeated with all available
wedges. (A) and (B) can be combined.
Typical use case: only the friends in one or several friend groups, up to a
specific tie strength, should receive the post. Example: pictures of a party
at the university. The post is only suitable for a subset of the friends (most
likely the friend group of fellow students). Additionally, the user might feel
uncomfortable including distant fellow students in the recipients, and selects
only friends up to a certain tie strength.
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Exclude friends up to a given tie strength (C) and (D):
After a wedge area has been created in step (B), the user can click and drag
the inner rim of the wedge area created in (B) to shrink it, excluding the inner
friends of the wedge. As the shape of the wedge area becomes sickle-like by
this process, this mode is later called “sickle mode”; the selected areas are de-
noted as “sickles”.
Typical use case: only friends with intermediate tie strength of a friend group
should receive the post. This is useful, for example, if you need feedback about
something which is potentially embarrassing. Example: a rock band member
asks for suggestions of some nice techno events. He might not want his best
friends to know of his “special” hobby, but still needs some friends who know
him well in order to receive good recommendations.
Select multiple areas inside a friend group (E):
Following (C)/(D), the processes (B) and (C)/(D) can be repeated in order to
create a second sickle/wedge area. This process can be repeated up to four
times per wedge.
Typical use case: A clique of friends inside a friend group should not receive
the post. Example: you post a picture of fireworks that you bought in a foreign
country. A sub-group of your friends would oppose such actions, and you
want to exclude them.
Select/deselect single friends (F):
Independent of the selections in (A)–(E), a click on a profile picture selects or
deselects the user as a recipient of the post.
Typical use case: a single friend has to be added to or removed from the audi-
ence due to special reasons. Example: a user posts a picture of her new partner
on Facebook. To avoid conflicts, she wants to exclude her ex-partner from the
audience.
Select all, select none
Two buttons to select all or no friends can be found in the lower left corner of
the UI.
Typical use case: a post should be sent to all friends, or the user wants to reset
the selection.
As stated in the introduction, the space in a radar interface is limited. For the use-
case of selecting social network friends, we therefore had to implement techniques
that allow us to display a larger number of friends inside the radar, which we will
refer to as space enhancement features from this point:
A Incremental picture size Only a small subset of the Facebook friends are real
friends that are of importance for recipient selection [66]. We therefore de-
crease the size of the friend images with decreasing tie strength, so that the
closest friends gain the most importance.
B Zooming Using a double click, it is possible to zoom into and out of a certain area
of the wedge to have a better overview, especially in crowded areas.
C Lighthouse design Based on the number of friends inside a wedge, OmniWedges
selects some of the friend images (every second, third, fourth...) as lighthouse
images that can be used as orientation points for the selection. All other friend
images are shrunk to a small dot to avoid crowding.
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D Overview bar When the user drags a wedge to select an area of friends, the
overview bar is displayed to the right (see Figure 8.13): the line in the mid-
dle depicts the border of the current selection. Already-selected friends are
listed below, including their name and friend images; not-yet-selected friends
are displayed above. This functionality should help the user to spot exactly
up to which tie strength he has currently selected, and whether more or fewer
friends should be selected.
Technically, OmniWedges was implemented as a website with a frontend based
on JavaScript, a Django backend and mySQL as a database engine.
8.2.2 User study
In order to validate the design of OmniWedges and to check whether the user inter-
face improves the usability and the error rate of the friend selection process, we con-
ducted a small-scale usability study at our university. The study was performed with
20 participants in a within-subject design, meaning half of the participants started
with the Facebook interface and continued with OmniWedges, and vice versa for the
other half of the participants. The participants were recruited by postings around the
campus, and received a payment of 12 EUR for their participation.
At the beginning of the study, users had to first organize their friends into friend
groups using the Facebook website. After the user claimed to be finished, we used
automated scripts using the Selenium web toolkit5 to traverse the user’s Facebook
website and to extract the created friend lists as well as the user names and links
to their profile pictures. To maintain the data privacy rights of participants’ social
network friends, the procedure did not extract or store any profile pictures, but only
hyperlinks to the friend’s profile images that are later referred to by the OmniWedges
UI.
As a last step before the main experiment, the user was presented with the
friends sorted by ascending tie strength as calculated by Facebook, and had the task
of adjusting the order if necessary. After a five-minute recovery break, the user was
given 12 different tasks to solve for each interface. The first six tasks were of an
explicit nature, meaning we explicitly stated “select all university and family friends”
or “select your 20 closest friends”. For the remaining six tasks, we gave the subjects
explicit posts with a sensitive nature like “Please imagine you want to share pictures of
a party that caused you to miss your family’s Thanksgiving event”. In order to achieve
comparability of the results, each subject was given the same set of tasks and hypo-
thetical posts instead of actual posts from the user’s Facebook profile.
After each condition, the user was given a list of all friends for each task together
with a “+” if the friend was selected as a recipient or a “-” if not. The user then
had to go through the list and identify friends that were included by mistake (false
positive) or mistakenly not included as a recipient (false negative).
The users had to fill out an AttrakDiff [150] usability questionnaire after each
condition, resulting in four measures from -3 (worst) to +3 (best) describing the per-
ceived attractiveness (ATT) of the interface, hedonic quality measures describing
how stimulating the interface was (HQ-S) and how much they could identify with
the UI (HQ-I), and a pragmatic score (PQ) similar to a system usability scale [150].
For the OmniWedges condition, the participants had to fill out an additional a ques-
tionnaire asking about the perceived usefulness of the space enhancement features on a
seven-point scale (1=not useful at all, 7=very useful).
5https://www.seleniumhq.org/ (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
8.2. OmniWedges: area-based audience selection for social network posts 207
FIGURE 8.12: Comparison between number of friends and errors
made using OmniWedges.
Before the experiment continued, the participants were given a five-minute break
to rest and recover. The experiment closed with a semi-structured interview, where
we tried to find out which interface they preferred, which selection strategy they
used with OmniWedges, whether their posting behavior might change and which
additional functionalities or combinations of interfaces between Facebook and Om-
niWedges were perceived as useful. The procedure was reviewed and approved by
the ethical review board of our institution.
8.2.3 Results
The age of the participants ranged from 21 to 38 years (mean 24.38). 66% of the 20
participants were female, 44% male. The number of Facebook friends of the partici-
pants was between 53 and 1260 (mean 437), representing a good portion of average
user profiles6. As the number of friends was very variable, we had to normalize the
number of false positives and negatives by dividing them by the number of friend
list entries before starting the analysis. We performed a 2 (condition) x 2 (explicit
or implicit task) x 2 (false positive or false negative) ANOVA to compare the errors
made throughout the study. If only the interface is taken as an effect, the results show
that using OmniWedges significantly decreased the amount of errors (F = 5.57,
p = 0.031, MWedges = 0.0076, MFacebook = 0.020). Whether the task was an explicit
or implicit task did not have any significant effect on the error rate between the two
interfaces (F = 0.677, p = 0.423 using interface and task type as effects). The type of
error that was made (false positive or false negative) did not depend on the interface
(F = 0.001, p = 0.98, MFP−Wedges = 0.0099, MFN−Wedges = 0.0052, MFP−FB = 0.0221,
MFN−FB = 0.0176 using interface and error as effects). Taking a look at the compari-
son between the number of friends and the amount of errors made in OmniWedges
in total (Figure 8.12) does not show any disproportionate increase in errors with an
increasing number of friends. A correlation analysis between number of friends and
errors made (normalized) was not significant (r = −0.370, p = 0.144), indicating
that the number of friends, and hence the degree of population of the UI, does not
have any significant effect on the errors made.
The space enhancement features were perceived as very useful by the users, as
shown in Table 8.4. The Overview bar was voted as the most useful feature with
a score of 6.38 on average on a scale from 1 (worst) to 7 (best). The lighthouse design
and zooming achieved similar scores of 5.81 and 5.9, identifying them as the second
6http://blog.stephenwolfram.com/2013/04/data-science-of-the-facebook-world/ (last ac-
cessed: 2020-03-09)
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feature mean stdev
Overview bar 6.38 1.284
Incremental picture size 5.43 1.248
Lighthouse design 5.81 0.981
Zooming 5.9 1.179
TABLE 8.4: Perceived usefulness of the space enhancement features of
OmniWedges.
FIGURE 8.13: Overview bar during selection process.
most useful features. Finally, the incremental picture size recevied an average score
of 5.43, which was the lowest of all scores, although it was still perceived as very
useful.
We calculated the attractiveness (ATT), pragmatic score (PQ) and the two he-
donic scores (HQ-S and HQ-I) by calculating the average over the responses for
the corresponding questions in the AttrakDiff questionnaire [150] and performed
four paired T-tests to spot significant differences between the two interfaces. Om-
niWedges outperforms its Facebook counterpart in terms of attractiveness (T =
6.115, p < 0.001, MWedges = 5.37, MFacebook = 3.35) as well as the hedonic qual-
ity (THQ−I = 4.93, pHQ−I < 0.001, MHQ−I−Wedges = 5.09, MHQ−I−Facebook = 3.66;
THQ−S = 7.83, pHQ−S < 0.001, MHQ−S−Wedges = 5.26, MHQ−S−Facebook = 3.17) with
high significance, assuring a better user experience. There is also a tendency for
a higher pragmatic quality using OmniWedges (T = 1.83, p = 0.082, MWedges =
4.75, MFacebook = 4.06 ), although we could not prove a significance here.
In the semi-structured interview, 85.7% stated they would use OmniWedges if it
was integrated into Facebook. 61.1% would use it only if they had a post that would
be of interest only for some friends (“narrowcasting”) instead of the “custom privacy
settings” view on Facebook, or if it contained sensitive information (just like the ex-
ample tasks in our study). 85.7% stated they would change their posting behavior
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when using OmniWedges. Of those who would, 88.9% would do more narrowcast-
ing, and the remaining 11.1% would post more sensitive posts. When asked explic-
itly, 42.9% of the participants stated they would post more on Facebook when using
OmniWedges, 38% would not do so, and 19% remained unsure. When asked which
interface they preferred and which functionality they would add, 50% stated they
preferred OmniWedges with an additional search field for finding specific friends,
33% preferred a combination of OmniWedges and the Facebook interface, and 8.3%
wished to keep only OmniWedges or the Facebook interface, respectively. When
asked about what selection strategy they used within OmniWedges, all participants
used one of two different strategies, or a combination thereof: In the first strategy,
users only searched for single persons they wanted to select (3 participants). In
the second strategy, the participants thought more of areas inside the wedges they
wanted to include, rather than single persons (10 participants). Finally, 7 remaining
participants used a combination of both strategies, where they first made a raw se-
lection using the wedges, which was then refined by selecting or deselecting single
persons in a second step.
8.2.4 Discussion
Scalability
As stated in the introduction, the space in a radar interface is very limited. Without
modifications, this approach is not suitable for a social network, where users can
have up to thousands of friends that are potential receivers of newly created posts.
We therefore introduced several UI mechanisms (see Section 8.2.1) that allow the
display of all of a user’s friends inside our radar interface. The results of the study
show that, using these improvements, the concept of a radar metaphor can also be
used to display a large number of friends while still reducing the amount of errors
made during the selection process. The correlation analysis showed that there is no
significant effect on the number of errors made using OmniWedges depending on
the amount of friends displayed, indicating that the techniques achieved their goal.
However, although the techniques seem to work in this application context, we are
interested in whether these ideas could be transferred to other domains or use cases,
which we are eager to research in future work.
User acceptance & UI improvements
According to the interview results, a large majority of users would replace the cur-
rent audience selection method on Facebook with a version of OmniWedges. Never-
theless, there are still some improvements that were suggested by the users and that
are perceived as must-haves if OmniWedges is to be used on a daily basis. About
half of the participants would use the UI only if a search functionality was intro-
duced, which would help them find single, critical friends that they want to include
in or exclude from their selection. One third of the subjects preferred a combination
of OmniWedges and the Facebook interface, so they could select larger portions of
friends using OmniWedges and easily find and select single friends using the Face-
book interface. Although they declared this combination to be their favorite, we
cannot clearly state why they voted for the additional integration of the Facebook
UI: whether they only need it as a kind of search functionality for OmniWedges or
whether they are also interested in other functionalities that cannot be included in
OmniWedges. Whether we can also satisfy these users’ desires with an improved
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OmniWedges interface, including a search functionality, should be researched in fu-
ture work.
Change in mental model
Although the procedure and tasks were the same for both interfaces, the interview
answers indicate that only the OmniWedges interface changes users’ mental model,
compared to the standard Facebook interface: Most users tend to do more narrow-
casting, i.e. disclosing posts only to people who might be interested in them. A
smaller number of the subjects also stated they would publish more sensitive posts
with our interface. The answers lead to the assumption that the different kind of
visualization that we use leads to a different awareness of the post audience: Rather
than always displaying only a small portion of all friends at once in a scrollable list,
the radar interface displays all of a user’s friends at once, allowing them to have an
overview of the large number of friends that would see the post when the sharing
option is set to “all friends”. Therefore, users begin to think about whether this large
audience is really the desired audience for their post, resulting in a more rigorous
limitation of the post audience with OmniWedges, and therefore a smaller amount
of false positives and false negatives, as the study results show. On the other hand,
users seem to have a higher trust in their audience selection when they can see all of
their friends at a glance, leading them to post sensitive posts more frequently with
OmniWedges. However, the aforementioned motivations for different behavior are
only guesswork. Proving their correctness remains as future work.
Observed selection strategies
The change in the mental model is also reflected in the different usage strategy when
using OmniWedges compared to Facebook. Where Facebook only supports the sin-
gle selection strategy, where the audience can be refined by adding a single person or
a group of friends, OmniWedges also allows users to select areas containing mul-
tiple friends with a similar tie strength. In fact, most of the users (70%) used the
area selection strategy either as their sole selection strategy, or in combination with the
single selection strategy for refinement. But still, a small amount of users (15%) did
not take advantage of the area selection strategy at all. In future research, we would
like to elaborate on the efficiency of the different strategies, e.g. which one leads to
the most false positives/negatives, which is the least time-consuming strategy, and
whether there is an optimal strategy that optimizes both factors at the same time.
Application to historical posts
OmniWedges was designed to select the audience for a new social network post.
Nevertheless, the same design can also be used to visualize and review the audi-
ence for historical user posts that have been published in the past, even if a differ-
ent user interface was used for the selection: selected users are initially selected as
single friend selections (action F in Figure 8.11). If the UI detects two or more se-
lected friends next to each other inside the same wedge, a selected area is created
around them (actions B to E). By that means, OmniWedges is able to construct a se-
lection that corresponds to the historical sharing setting using the wedge-based UI.
We would like to examine the usefulness and correctness of such a functionality in
future research.
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8.2.5 Conclusion
Most social network posts are still shared with “all friends” although this mostly
does not correspond to users’ actual sharing desires and often leads to unwanted
disclosures. Radar interfaces have been proven to increase privacy awareness and
thereby to motivate users in adapting their privacy settings, leading to a reduced
amount of unwanted disclosure and an increased trust in the privacy settings. We
adapted the radar approach to offer a radar-based audience selection tool for social
networks, called OmniWedges. We integrated several techniques to be able to show
huge numbers of social network friends in our UI, while still maintaining usability.
The study results show that OmniWedges significantly decreases the error rate and
offers a higher usability. In a semi-structured interview after the study, the results
indicate that the different UI design also leads to a different mental model on the
part of the users, which leads to an increased awareness of the amount of recipients
selected, and in turn leads to a more frequent use of recipient limitation techniques
like narrowcasting. The UI also seems to increase trust in the privacy settings, which
leads users to post more sensitive posts. Whether the UI can be succesful when it is
integrated into daily use of a social network remains to be proven in an in-the-wild
study in the future. Whereas OmniWedges was meant to define the audience for a
data item like a social network post, the next section will discuss an approach that
is targeted towards defining the granularity of information that should be shared,
considering the example of the intelligent shopping domain.
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8.3 Assisting users in detecting flaws in their privacy settings
using a privacy overview
Especially after the introduction of the General Data Protection Law (GDPR) in the
European union, data privacy has received increased attention also in (online) re-
tail business7. Whereas data was collected in an aggregated way or at least anony-
mously, intelligent retail stores like Amazon Go8 have to collect a lot of personal
data to be able to offer their assistence systems, like the invisible checkout system
that already knows the items inside the customer’s basket before she arrives at the
checkout. Upon entering the shop, the shopper uses the NFC functionality of her
smartphone to identify himself at the entrance gate. She can then browse the store,
grab products, put them back again, and leave the store with the selected products,
without a checkout or scanning process. Amazon achieves this using “sensor fu-
sion and deep learning”9 without naming further details. The technology behind
the service is most likely based on camera systems and a combination of different
sensors, and tracks the customer throughout the complete shopping process, from
entering the store and identifying herself through the smartphone, through viewed
products and items placed in the shopping basket, to the invisible checkout, that
allows the customer to leave the store without any payment procedure, by with-
drawing the price of the items registered in the shopping basket from the user’s
credit card. On one hand, the instrumentalization of this intelligent retail store al-
lows the customer to save a lot of time. On the other hand, customers also mention
privacy concerns: in order to make the service work, Amazon has to record and store
a large amount of private data throughout the shopping process, and it is not even
anonymized. Which sensors are used, which data they generate, and in which form
they are stored, anonymized or deanonymized, is not clear to the user.
Apart from operative intelligent retail stores like Amazon Go, there exist sev-
eral research laboratories like the Innovative Retail Laboratory (IRL) [308], which
investigate the capabilities of new technologies in the context of brick-and-mortar
retail stores. The Innovative Retail Laboratory (IRL) is an application-oriented re-
search laboratory of the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI)
run in collaboration with the German retailer GLOBUS SB-Warenhaus Holding in
St. Wendel. In this living lab, research is conducted in a wide range of different do-
mains, mostly related to intelligent shopping assistance. The demonstrators range
from an instrumented shopping cart employing indoor navigation to several intelli-
gent shopping consultants, ambient information services and an automated check-
out system.
Until fairly recently, such features have only been concepts and never imple-
mented in a real store. Maybe this is one reason why the research field of retail
data privacy has been mostly neglected in the past: related work has done research
in many other fields where sensitive data plays a role, like social networks [180],
location sharing [169] or mobile app permission setting [206]. However, the appli-
cation of those approaches to data from the intelligent retail shopping domain has
not been a subject of research so far. The current standard in the aforementioned
domains is list-based interfaces, where the permission settings are listed in sequence
together with an option to adapt each setting. Although such an interface give the
7https://www.bdo.com/insights/industries/retail-consumer-products/gdpr-what-
retailers-need-to-know-about-the-new-e (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
8https://www.amazon.com/b?ie=UTF8&node=16008589011 (last accessed: 2020-03-09)
9http://www.self.com/story/amazon-go-grocery-store-of-the-future
(last accessed: 2020-03-09)
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user the freedom to adapt any of the given settings, those interfaces neither offer a
good overview, nor are they perceived as attractive and motivating [67], which leads
to the fact that the task of choosing privacy settings is perceived only as burdensome
and “not worth it” by most users [128, 220]. Therefore, users typically stick to the
standard privacy settings. Christin et al. provided a more sophisticated interface
based on the radar metaphor, called privacy radar [67], that visualized the privacy
settings for participatory sensing applications. The authors conducted a study on
the effects of their privacy radar, and found out that their design led to a significantly
better overview on the privacy status, and thereby motivated users in adapting their
privacy settings [67].
In this section we want to examine how a conventional list-based interface as
well as such a radar interface could look like in the context of retail data. Our pri-
mary goal is to create an interface that is enjoyable and more fun to use than a con-
ventional list-based interface, in order to motivate users to use the interface more
frequently. Although list-based interfaces are already very efficient to use, we tried
to develop an alternative UI that is at least as efficient and fast to use as a conven-
tional list-based interface. In order to develop the interface, we reuse the results
from the background research in Chapter 6, Section 6.2, where we already inves-
tigated which data is and could be used inside an intelligent retail store, and how
the data types can be clustered and sorted into groups, in order to structure the user
interface accordingly.
In detail, we try to solve the following research questions:
1. How do the interaction times of the radar interface compare to those of a list-
based interface?
2. Can we make it easier to detect unusual privacy settings using an interface
based on a radar metaphor?
3. How convenient is the radar interface compared to the list interface?
4. Does a radar interface for retail data provide a better user experience than a
standard UI?
The next sections will first describe similar approaches in other domains, and
afterwards present the implementation of the list and the radar interface based on
prior background research discussed in Chapter 6. Afterwards, we will describe the
evaluation study, and a discussion of the results. The work presented here is based
on previously published research [267].
8.3.1 Retail privacy user interfaces
We propose two interfaces to control the disclosement of shopping data, the first
based on a conventional list-based interface, and the second inspired by a radar
metaphor [67], which was also used as an inspiration for the audience selection UI
discussed in Section 8.2. Each interface has two major tasks: On the one hand it
should give a clear overview on the settings, and allow the user to set his privacy
settings with a minimum of effort. On the other hand, it should be easily possible
to compare one’s own settings with the settings of an average user, and to quickly
detect unusual decisions. In Chapter 6, we already described a background study
to find out the data types recorded inside an intelligent retail store, as well as the
services and the personal data needed by the service in order to operate. For details
on the identified data types, data groups and orderings, please refer to Chapter 6,
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Section 6.2. To quickly summarize the results, we worked out that there are four
major different parties that might be interested in retail data and that we wanted
to include in the UIs, later called stakeholders: friends and family of the shopper, the
intelligent retail store that records the data, and third parties that might be interested
in creating a shopping profile to offer personalized ads to the shopper. There are
several types of data that could be recorded in an intelligent retail store (see Table
6.1), like personal information, along with location data, in-store movement profiles,
or items viewed, that can be grouped into four distinct data groups. Except for one
of the data groups, there is a sensitivity order for the data in each data group that
is shared among most users. The next two subsections will describe the two created
privacy UIs.
List-based interface
Privacy interfaces have been widely used in other domains like social networks,
location sharing and mobile app permissions. In most cases, the privacy settings
can be manipulated using a list-based interface, i.e. the different data types (photos,
posts, comments, locations, app permissions, etc.) are listed along with a button
or slider to select whether and from whom the data should be kept private. Figure
8.14 shows the list-based interface of URetail. The list interface contains one webpage
for each of the four stakeholders. The navigation bar on the left side (1) of each page
allows the user to switch to the pages of the other stakeholders.
Except for the background color (and the headline) that distinguishes the four
different pages, all of them are designed in the same style. The different data types
are listed one after the other, grouped according to the groups of data types acquired
in Chapter 6. To the right of each data type entry, a draggable slider can be found,
which allows the user to change the disclosure policy to disclose/not disclose (2).
In addition to the list of data, we want the user to have an overview on which
data types he has shared compared to an average user. For this reason, a summary
of his disclosure choices along with an average disclosure setting is displayed at the
bottom of each group (3), later called the status message. The numbers on the left side
of the fraction represent the user’s amount of disclosed data in this group, and on
the right, the average amount of data disclosures.
Radar interface
Although the list-based interface is widely used, the immense number of switches is
often seen as very confusing by the average user; furthermore, it is hard to see which
settings are unusual, or possibly misconfigured [277]. Christin et al. succesfully used
a radar metaphor to visualize privacy threats in participatory sensing applications.
Inspired by this interface, we created a privacy interface based on a radar metaphor
as depicted in Figure 8.15: the different data types are grouped together in six dif-
ferent wedges. The data items of the six data groups can be ordered by ascending
sensitivity of the data. Each of the wedges contains several layers, corresponding to
the data types inside the corresponding group in ascending order from the inside to
the outer rim. Similar to OmniWedges, the user has to click and drag from the center
of the wedge to the outer rim, to select the data types to be shared up to this point
(1). To share no data from the given group, the user has to choose the innermost
layer. Each wedge has a corresponding list view next to it, which displays the data
items in the same order as the wedge’s layer (2), together with a checkmark if the
data type is shared or a red cross if it is not. It is also possible to adapt the order
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FIGURE 8.14: List-based interface of URetail: All data types are listed
one after the other along with a slider to change the disclosure setting.
of layers using drag and drop in the list, or to enable or disable the sharing of sin-
gle data types by clicking on the respective item. The radar interface supports the
display of several stakeholders, realized by several radars that can be selected using
the navigation bar on the left, similar to the list interface.
In addition to displaying the three radars seperately, the radar interface also of-
fers a 3D overview (“privacy pyramid”) at the bottom of the UI (3) that shows all
four radars at once. This privacy pyramid consists of four layers stacked on top of
each other, each of the representing one of the four stakeholders. Within each layer,
the data groups are represented by the four edges. The larger the distance from the
edge to the center, the more data types are disclosed. Usually, the least information is
shared with third parties, more with retail companies, and the most with family and
friends, resulting in the pyramid-like shape of the privacy pyramid. To get an im-
pression of how an average profile looks, the user can display the privacy pyramid
of an average user as a transparent overlay (see Figure 8.16).
8.3.2 Evaluation
Although both UIs were designed in a user-centric way involving user feedback cy-
cles, we checked the usability in a final evaluation study. The interfaces had two
main goals: first, to allow management of the disclosure settings, and second, to
give a clear overview on the settings, and to be able to compare them to those of
an average user. The management part was realized with a list or a radar interface,
whereas the second goal was achieved with a simple status message in the list in-
terface, and a three-dimensional privacy pyramid in the radar interface. The goal
of the study was therefore to validate the results of the background research and
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FIGURE 8.15: Radar interface of URetail: data types are arranged in
groups in a circular form, sorted by the sensitivity of the data types.
FIGURE 8.16: Privacy pyramid: comparison to the average user.




It was easy for me to spot:
whether - whether there are unusual settings
how_much - how many are unusual
which - which settings are unusual
average - what an average value is
diff - how much the difference from an average value is
I found the visualization to be:
clear - clear
appealing - visually appealing
fun - fun to use
TABLE 8.5: Practicality questionnaire used in the evaluation.
the radar interface concept and to compare for both interfaces the interaction times,
practicality and usability in terms of hedonic and pragmatic quality.
The study was conducted as a lab study with 21 participants from the univer-
sity context (students of different subjects). Their ages ranged from 17 to 52 with an
average of 31.19 years. The study was designed within-subject, which means that
each subject used both interfaces, one after the other. To prevent biasing of the re-
sults, the order in which the participants used the two interfaces was decided using
a Latin square, i.e. half of them started with the list-based, the other half with the
radar-based interface. The procedure was the same for all participants, and started
with a questionnaire capturing demographic data. Afterwards, they were given an
introduction in the first interface condition (either the list-based or the radar-based
one), explaining all functionalities and displayed UI elements, and had some time
to try out the UI themselves. After they claimed to be sufficiently familiar with the
interface, they were given the task to set all the privacy settings according to their
needs. The time measurement started directly after the task instruction, and ended
with the last interaction. For the radar interface, we also recorded when single items
were (de-)selected using the lists ((2) in Figure 8.15), and how often the items were
rearranged. After succesful completion of this first task, we started over with the
second one: we loaded a privacy profile that had some unusual settings, which had
to be spotted using either the privacy pyramid or the status messages. The subjects
had to find out and state where the unusual settings were, and to adapt them so they
matched the settings of an average user. We again recorded the interaction time from
the first to the last click, and whether all unusual settings were correctly found and
changed. Each condition ended with two questionnaires: first the AttrakDiff ques-
tionnaire, which captures the hedonic and pragmatic quality of the interface, and
second, a custom questionnaire to capture which interface allows an easier comple-
tion of the comparison task, using either the privacy pyramid or the status messages.
The statements on the custom questionnaire (see Table 8.5) were recorded on a five-
point scale from fully agree (=1) to fully disagree (=5). The procedure was imme-
diately repeated for the second interface. The experiment ended with an informal
discussion of the perceived problems and advantages of both interfaces, possible
improvements and other thoughts about the experiment.
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To conclude, we recorded the following measures:
1. Interaction time with the radar or the list interface for the first task (adjust
disclosure settings)
2. Frequency of list selections in the radar interface
3. Rearranging frequency in the radar interface
4. Interaction time for the second task (find deviations from average settings and
change them) with the privacy pyramid or status messages
5. Number of deviations that were not spotted
6. Practicality of the privacy pyramid and status messages using our custom
questionnaire
7. User experience and usability using the AttrakDiff questionnaire
8. Qualitative feedback from the interview at the end of the experiment
Results
Only 11 out of 20 participants selected single items in the radar interface. Those who
did clicked on average on two items throughout the whole experiment, over the four
pages of the stakeholders. Rearranging was used by three participants; on average
two item switches were done. Two out of three participants dragged the loyalty
points to the outer rim of the radar, so it became the item with the least sensitivity.
The low frequency of single selections and rearrangements supports the results of
the study in Chapter 6, except for the loyalty points item, which seems to have a
different sensitivity level for a small portion of the participants.
All participants spotted all deviations from the average settings profile with both
interfaces in the second task. In contrast, the results of the custom practicality ques-
tionnaire were quite diverse, as listed in Table 8.6. For the analysis of the ques-
tionnaire data, we first performed Shapiro-Wilk and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to
ensure normality, and used a paired T-test later, as these tests were positive. Re-
member that the scale ranges from 1 (=best) to 5 (=worst). Users found it signifi-
cantly easier to spot whether there are unusual deviations from an average settings
profile (Mradar = 1.62, Mlists = 2.14, p = 0.012). In contrast, the list interface is bet-
ter for seeing how an average profile looks, and what the differences are (Mradar =
2.19, Mlists = 1.67, p = 0.012). Although the radar interface on average performs
better in spotting how many differences exist (Mradar = 2.48, Mlists = 2.57, p =
0.733) and which things are different (Mradar = 2.29, Mlists = 2.62, p = 0.217), we
were not able to prove a significance within our test set. The visualization of the
radar interface is on average seen as more clear, but not with a significant difference
(Mradar = 2.10, Mlists = 2.29, p = 0.296). Furthermore, it is perceived as significantly
more visually appealing (Mradar = 2.15, Mlists = 3.10, p = 0.001) and fun to use
(Mradar = 2.14, Mlists = 3.19, p < 0.001), which is an important factor in a boring,
burdensome task like choosing privacy settings. These results are also reflected in
the AttrakDiff scores (Table 8.7), which clearly favor the radar over the list-based
interface. The scores for each measure range from -3 (worst) to +3 (best). An aver-
age user interface would have a neutral pragmatic and hedonic score (about zero)
and would therefore be located in the center of the central square (neutral) of the
portfolio presentation (Figure 8.17).
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FIGURE 8.17: Portfolio presentation of the AttrakDiff results, includ-
ing the average hedonic (HQ) and pragmatic quality (PQ) as well as
the confidence rectangle. Pragmatic quality increases to the right, he-
donic quality to the top of the graph.
Measure List Radar T p
Whether 2.14 1.62 - 2.75 .012
How_much 2.57 2.48 - .346 .733
Which 2.62 2.29 - 1.276 .217
Average 1.81 2.62 3.068 .006
Diff 1.67 2.19 2.95 .008
Clear 2.29 2.10 -1.073 .296
Appealing 3.10 2.14 -3.76 .001
Fun 3.19 2.14 -5.966 <0.001
TABLE 8.6: Results of the custom practicality questionnaire.
Scores > 1 or < −1 are perceived as above average or below average respectively
[150]. As the tests on normality failed this time, we used a Wilcoxon signed ranks
test, which is the non-parametric equivalent of a paired t-test. All four measures at-
tractiveness (ATT), hedonic quality regarding stimulation (HQ-S) and self-identification
with the interface (HQ-I), and pragmatic quality (PQ) are better for the radar inter-
face, with high significance. All mean scores for the radar interface are above one
and, except for PQ, also above two, attesting to an excellent user experience (HQ)
and a pragmatic quality (PQ) clearly above average. The list-based interface, on
the other hand, has a pragmatic quality which is somewhat above average, but a
user experience notably less than average. The stimulation (HQ-S) in particular is
clearly below average, classifying it as a significantly less interesting interface than
the radar.
Although the radar offers a significantly better user experience and is also per-
ceived as more practical, we could not prove that there was a significant difference
for the interaction times between the two interfaces. We conducted Shapiro-Wilk
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to succesfully prove the normal distribution of the
interaction times (1. and 2.). Therefore, we were able to use a paired T-test on these
measures, whose results can be found in Table 8.8.
The radar interface, as well as the privacy pyramid, had on average a similar in-
teraction time as the list interface with its status messages. The qualitative feedback
from the closing interview, as well as the implications of the results above stated,
will be discussed in the next section.
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List Radar Z p
PQ 0.69 1.99 -3.785 <0.001
HQ-I -0.16 2.18 -4.015 <0.001
HQ-S -1.33 2.38 -4.017 <0.001
ATT -0.31 2.21 -4.026 <0.001
TABLE 8.7: Results of the AttrakDiff questionnaire.
List Radar T p
Adjustment task 156.76 151.10 -1.005 0.327
Find task 75.57 70.81 0.891 0.383
TABLE 8.8: Statistical values for the interaction times in milliseconds.
8.3.3 Discussion
Feedback and improvement suggestions from the interviews
Besides some minor design suggestions like coloring of the pyramid, or the order of
the loyalty points in the radar interface, the interview at the end of the experiment
brought some interesting thoughts to light: some participants disclosed more data
to retailers and third parties than to friends and family. When asked for the reason
for that decision, they stated that it is easier for them to disclose the data to an im-
personal entity like a retailer or a third party company, than to a person they know
personally. One person stated that this is caused by the fact that he has a specific
image that he wants to keep for the people he knows. For example, if a shopper has
a masculine image in his circle of friends, he might not want them to see that he just
bought some knitting accessories. Disclosing the wrong information might disturb
that social role, and therefore he is more cautious with disclosing that data to well-
known persons. He also suggested to include a functionality in the radar interface
that allows users to disclose data types according to the role of that product. The
receipt data, for example, could be filtered before disclosure to friends and family, to
maintain a personal image towards that group of persons. In the example above, the
user would give the UI the information that he wants to be seen as masculine by his
friends. The interface then matches from the role to products that most likely violate
that role, e.g. knitting products or ballet accessoires, and hides them. Furthermore,
most people stated that the radar interface is at a first glance harder to understand
and use, but becomes more convenient than the list interface after the first training
session and throughout the evaluation tasks. They stated that they were more used
to the list interface, and could therefore use it directly without any problems. Never-
theless if they used the radar interface more frequently, especially in everyday use,
they would most likely prefer that interface, and also be able to work with it faster
than the list.
Validation of earlier results
The studies on data types in the intelligent retail domain, groupings and severity or-
ders in Chapter 6 were only meant as an explorative study to get a first impression
on how the data could be clustered, and which clusters could be ordered accord-
ing to the sensitivity of the data. Therefore we recorded in the evaluation study, for
all participants, whether they checked single data items in the list or whether they
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changed the order of items in the clusters. As the evaluation study results show, sin-
gle items rarely got selected or had their order switched. Mostly, the loyalty points
were moved from the position of the least sensitive item (innermost layer) to the
most sensitive item (outermost layer). This effect has to be further observed; per-
haps the loyalty points are perceived very differently for a larger group of users,
and might be realized as a slider inside the list in a future interface. Aside from this
outlier, the clusters and order of the data types inside them could be approved by
the evaluation study, supporting the reasonableness of our radar interface concept.
User experience differences
Both interfaces had an acceptable pragmatic quality, while the radar interface was
still significantly better than the list. Although both interfaces are therefore handy
to use, the list is anything but an appealing and engaging interface. The stimulation
(HQ-S) in particular is very low, which also means that the fun factor is very low. As
earlier research has already shown, the fact that setting privacy settings in social net-
works is a very tedious task leads users to almost never touch their privacy settings
page [128, 220]. The radar, on the other hand, has an outstanding user experience,
especially regarding stimulation. Combined with the increased practicality (PQ), it
may lead the users to open and adapt their privacy settings more often, or at least
reduce the resistance to doing so.
Similar interaction times for the privacy setup
Although the main focus of our work was to design an interface which enhances
the user experience and enjoyability while maintaining one’s settings, we were also
interested in the interaction times of the two interfaces. The radar interface in fact
needs fewer clicks to complete all the settings (only one per group vs. many per
group for the list), and is also perceived as more practical, easier and faster to use.
Interestingly, the interaction times are not significantly different. There are two pos-
sible reasons for that mismatch: First, the list interface splits the disclosure decisions
into smaller, easier tasks, as there is one slider for each data type that has to be set.
The time needed for the disclosure decision is therefore the same, whether they go
through the list and check the items to disclose, or whether they go though the data
types in the radar interface, and decide where to make the cutoff. Furthermore, peo-
ple are more used to conventional list-based interfaces, as they are widely used. This
also leads to the second possible reason, namely that radar-based interfaces are quite
new and have to be learned first to be used efficiently. Although we gave the users
some time to get familiar with both interfaces, a definite answer can only be given
after several consecutive training sessions, which would be a good starting point for
future work.
Privacy pyramid vs. status messages
The results for the second task, namely spotting unusual settings, brought quite di-
verse results to light: a graphical 3D interface like the privacy pyramid allows users
to spot very quickly whether there are unusual settings, but it is easier to identify the
differences and the normal values with a text-based interface like the status mes-
sages. The quantity of differences and which things are different seem to be seen
more easily with the pyramid, although we could not prove a significance within
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our small sample set. This implies that neither a 3D interface, nor a textual inter-
face is best for this kind of task. Only a combination of both interfaces can perform
optimally. Whether this assumption holds should be verified in future work.
8.3.4 Conclusion
The rise of intelligent retail stores like Amazon Go makes it necessary to offer shop-
pers a control interface where they can determine which of their personal data should
be recorded and disclosed to the retailer, third parties, or other stakeholders. Cur-
rent list-based privacy interfaces, best known from social networks or mobile app
permission settings, are on one hand very efficient, but on the other hand neither vi-
sually appealing, nor fun to use, leading to the fact that they are almost never used.
We presented two user interfaces, a traditional list-based interface and a more mod-
ern radar-based interface that should enhance the user experience compared to the
former approach. The succeeding evaluation study showed that the radar interface
provides a user experience which is clearly superior to a conventional interface, and
that is perceived as more practical, although the interaction times are similar on the
first try. Nevertheless we found some interesting points on how the combination of
both interfaces could lead to an even stronger UI, and spotted interesting directions
for future work in the experiment interviews and the discussion of the results.
After having described the user interface design for defining the audience and
also for defining the detail level of the data to be shared, the last chapter will now
discuss how in-situ feedback can be collected and used for refining already existing
privacy settings.
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8.4 Leveraging in-situ user feedback for privacy settings
As already stated in earlier chapters, the perceived audience of a social network
post comprises only a small amount of the actual audience, on average 27% of its
true size. Research has already begun to tackle this problem by giving users an
overview of their audience and the possibility to withdraw their post before the
final publication [333]. Another problem that arose recently with the redesign of
the Facebook newsfeed is a mechanism called algorithmic curation, which organizes
and selects the posts that should appear on the user’s news wall. The majority of
users (62.5%) are not aware that the posts on their news wall have been filtered
and selected previously, and typically feel anger when being informed about their
existence [270, 100]. A study has shown that if users have the possiblity to control
which posts are filtered and how, they are significantly more engaged in using the
social network and have a higher feeling of control on the website [100].
Selecting the correct post audience is a task that is often neglected by users due
to its high complexity and the additional effort that is needed for every post [128,
218]. Therefore, most posts are shared with “all friends” instead of a targeted audi-
ence [218]. One approach that can assist the user in selecting her privacy settings,
namely by proposing privacy settings based on the user’s individual measures, has
already been discussed in earlier chapters. Nonetheless, those systems require the
user to be intrinsically motivated in using the system, and still need the user to in-
vest some time in choosing the settings, although this time could already be reduced
using machine learning support. Related work has already explored an approach
called “Twitch Crowdsourcing” that motivates users in doing crowdsourcing tasks
by fostering the common habit of turning to one’s mobile phone in spare moments,
by providing short micro-tasks with a duration of one or two seconds whenever the
screen is unlocked [328]. Within this section, we discuss whether a similar feedback
method, namely in-situ feedback on social network update notifications, can work
as a possible solution for both of the aforementioned problems.
For the study, we implemented a mockup smartphone app, which adds a feed-
back functionality to social network posts, as shown in Figure 8.18. Below the noti-
fication, we added two buttons allowing the user to give either positive or negative
feedback. Negative feedback means that the user disliked that the user was able to see
and like the post, meaning he experienced some kind of privacy invasion; whereas
positive feedback means that the user liked that the friend could see and like the post.
If the user does not want to give any rating, she can also decide to swipe away or to
delete the notification as usual. As stated earlier, our goal is to catch in-situ feedback
on the go, wherever the user is; therefore we designed the interface to be as simple
and quick to use as possible [328], offering only a binary feedback choice to the user.
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FIGURE 8.18: Smartphone showing a Facebook update notification
using our application, providing buttons for in-situ feedback.
Within the described approach, we faced several interesting questions that we
try to answer within this section:
1. How do users currently react to unwanted comments or likes?
2. Which possible solutions can users imagine for this problem?
3. When using in-situ feedback for the given problem, how could the possible
feedback options look? Should these look like a “positive” or “negative” deci-
sion, as shown in the UI example? Do users prefer other answers, or is it better
to use 3, 4 or more different options?
4. Which effect on the post audience or the news feed is expected by users, if
one of the two buttons is pressed? Do they expect a direct impact on the post
audience or the news feed?
5. What other uses of the feedback can users imagine?
In order to solve these questions, we conducted a small-scale qualitative study
with four focus groups. Throughout this section, we will first take a look at how
in-situ feedback is used in other scenarios, then give a detailed description of the
conducted focus groups and the findings that we gathered throughout these ses-
sions. We will discuss the findings and assemble them into a new approach later on
that is capable of managing privacy settings and that allows content elicitation using
in-situ feedback, as described in the “Outlook” section. The work presented here is
based on already published research [263].
8.4.1 Study methodology
As stated in the introduction, the goal of our work is to find out whether in-situ
feedback is useful for social network notifications, and what effects users expect after
giving feedback. For this purpose, we created a mockup of a part of the Facebook
mobile phone application that allows users to give in-situ feedback for each update
notification. The app is not fully functional, as social networks do not offer an API
endpoint for receiving and modifying social network notifications. Nevertheless,
we used the mockup for explaining the application to the participants of the focus
group. A screenshot of an update notification generated by our application can be
seen in Figure 8.18. At the top of the notification, the user can see which post has
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been liked or commented on, and by which friend, together with the abbreviated
content of the post. Below that, the user can find two buttons, allowing them to
give either positive (“I liked that the person commented on the post/I liked that he
saw the post”) or negative feedback (“I did not like that the person commented on
the post/I did not want him to see the post”). If the user decides not to give any
situational feedback on the update or does not feel either positive or negative, she
can just ignore or swipe away the notification.
To find out which consequences (for example for privacy settings) users expect,
we conducted a set of focus groups at our institution. Among the four focus groups
that we conducted, two had two participants, and the others three participants. The
participants were recurited through postings at our university, and had to be active
social network users to take part in the study. The participants were students of
different discliplines, with aged between 19 and 31 (mean 25.6). The experimenter
noted the most important contributions from the discussion directly, and recorded
the interview for a detailed analysis later. As usual for a focus group, the interview
was structured more like a discussion that is moderated by the experimenter, rather
than a Q&A session.
The topics discussed in the interview followed the same structure for all groups:
1. “Has somebody in the group, or one of your friends, ever experienced that you
were notified about a new comment or like on one of your posts, and you had
a very positive or negative feeling about it, such as being really happy he read
and commented on your post, or wishing he had not seen the post at all?”
2. “What did you do in this case? What do you think would be a good reaction?”
3. “If you could tell the social network provider to change something on their
webpage, to add a certain functionality or something like that to support you
in this case, could you imagine how that could look?’
4. The idea of in-situ feedback on social network update notifications was ex-
plained to users without showing the mockup prototype.
5. “How could such a system look? Which feedback options would you like to
have?”
6. The smartphone with the update notification (see Figure 8.18) was shown and
explained to the participants. Participants were told that pressing the “positive”
button means “I like that the post was seen and commented on” and “nega-
tive” means “I dislike that the post was seen and commented on”.
7. “Should the privacy settings be adapted when either positive or negative feed-
back was clicked? If yes, how?”
8. “Should the privacy settings for the best friends of the affected person also be
changed? If yes, how?"
9. The participants were each given an empty sheet of paper and had five minutes
to write down further possible applications of the feedback data.
10. After the time was up, participants were requested to discuss the noted ideas
with each other.
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The experiment ended with a short feedback round about the experiment itself,
and whether there were any open questions or things they wished to mention, and
then the participants received their payment afterwards. The aforementioned pro-
cedure was reviewed and approved by the ethical review board of our instituiton.
8.4.2 Results
All participants were active social network users, using the social network sites on
a daily or near daily basis. All of them owned a smartphone that was used on a
daily basis; three of them had an additional smartwatch that they used rarely (2
participants) or not at all (1 participant). Six out of eight participants stated they had
already experienced a situation where they felt negative about a comment or like
and where they would have preferred that the person had not seen the post. All of
them stated they experienced at least one situation where they felt positive about a
comment. In order to cluster the given answers into several topics, we used an axial
coding approach [315].
In the following subsections, we will present the results according to the design
questions posed in the introduction.
Current reaction to unwanted comments/likes
The reactions to the discovery of an undesired audience via negative comments and
likes were very diverse. We characterized the different types of reactions as follows,
denoting the the source of the unwanted comment or like as the commentator, and the
original poster that gave in-situ feedback on the commentator’s post as the user:
Deletion and reposting to a different audience All ten participants stated they would
either delete the post without reposting it (four participants) or publish the
same post again to a smaller audience, by using friend lists or changing the
disclosement from public to friends only.
Adaptation of friend’s privacy settings Three of the participants stated that such a
behavior would also directly affect the disclosement settings for the commen-
tator. Depending on whether she was a close friend or not, she would either
be blocked on Facebook, or put on the restricted friends list, so that she would
not see future posts.
Adaptation of general privacy settings Another three participants stated that such
a case would make them question their trust in their general privacy settings,
so they would take their time to review all of their settings, rearrange friend
groups and adapt the privacy settings accordingly so that such a case would
not happen again in the future.
When questioned about the effort needed for the measures mentioned, all par-
ticipants stated that they are very effortful. One of the groups mentioned that the
measures they are currently taking are too slow to prevent further damage, so a new
functionality should be included in social networks to assist in such situations.
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Possible new functionalities to overcome the problem of negative updates
Before presenting our new interface, we asked the participants whether they could
think of possible solutions for how social network sites could prevent such a situa-
tion or assist them when it occurred. The results can be clustered as follows:
Core group One of the groups came up with the idea of publishing the post to a core
group of the closest friends first, so they could check and review the post. If
one of the friends gives a positive review (for example by pressing a “positive”
button on the facebook app) or if there was no negative review after a certain
amount of time, the post is published to the remaining friends.
Direct discussion with the commentator One of the participants mentioned that for
her, just removing the post or blocking the person is not a complete solution,
as the problem with the commentator is not solved. She therefore proposed
that a functionality should be implemented which allows the user to directly
contact the commentator to discuss why he posted that comment or like, so
that the problem is solved directly, and future conflicts can be avoided.
Delayed posting Another group mentioned that removing a person immediately
from the post audience could be seen as rude by the commentator. They
therefore suggested to add a functionality where the commentator could be
removed from the audience after a certain delay, like a week, so the commen-
tator is removed from current and future posts without noticing, and he will
not feel offended.
Automatic audience selection by tie strength Using an automatic or semi-automatic
selection of the post audience based on tie strength was proposed by some of
the participants. The tie strength denotes the social interconnectedness between
the user and her friends, based on social network data like frequency of chat
messages, profile visits, number of likes or comments, etc. The participants
proposed two different approaches. One would use the topic of the post and
the friend group to automatically determine whether the person should see
the post or not (as described in Chapter 4); the other suggests a user interface
to manually do the task. The participants described a user interface where
the friend images are shown with ascending tie strength, so that the user can
draw a line at a certain level of tie strength, above which the post should be
published.
Direct or daily feedback on update notifications
Direct feedback was also suggested by two of the groups. In the first discussed
option, the participants proposed to add some buttons to the update notifica-
tion, which allow them to directly block and notify the commentator, to change
the privacy settings for the post, and/or hide future posts from the commen-
tator. The second discussed option saw this process more as a daily review
process, for example at the end of the day. For this purpose, the social network
provider offers a “notification dashboard” where the user can see all update
notifications together. She can then scroll through the updates and mark the
updates as positive/helpful or negative. For the case of negative updates, the
privacy settings are directly applied so that the commentator cannot see the
post.
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Presentation of the interface and discussion of desired consequences for privacy
settings
After discussing possible solutions, the participants were shown the notification
message with the feedback opportunity, as shown in Figure 8.18. As stated in the
methodology section, we first asked which direct consequences are expected when
one of the feedback buttons is pressed, e.g. how privacy settings of the commentator
and his closest friends should be adapted. We received the following answers:
Direct impact on the commentator When asked for the direct impact on the disclo-
sure settings for the commentator, we received answers with a widely differing
impact on the commentator’s disclosement setting:
• In the weakest form, one participant proposed a discussion approach,
where the comment is deleted and a chat system is opened to discuss the
comment with the commentator. Only if the discussion is not succesful,
the commentator is then put on a “restricted” list.
• Two more participants would block access to the commented-on post
only.
• Hiding future posts from the commentator’s timeline only is the desired
solution for two other participants.
• Four participants would record the amount of negative feedback and put
the commentator on the “restricted” list at some point. One would do it
after the first, one after the second, and two others only after additional
cases of negative feedback, depending on whether it is a close friend or
not.
• Finally, one person wished to block a person completely from Facebook
after the first negative feedback.
Impact on the direct friends of the commentator The negative feedback had no in-
fluence on the closest friends or the friend group of the commentator for most
of the participants (6 out of 10). However, two subjects would also adapt the
privacy settings so that the close friends could not see the post either, based on
the tie strength between user and commentator (one subject) or the topic of the
post (one subject). An additional two subjects would like to be asked by the
software whether the group should be removed from the post, so they could
choose on their own.
Further applications of the user feedback
We then collected further ideas by first letting participants write down ideas on a
sheet of paper and then discuss the collected ideas with each other. Two groups came
up with a similar idea: The feedback could be continously collected to create some
kind of “positivity ranking” for all social network friends: each instance of positive
feedback adds one point for the commentator, while each negative one removes two
or more points from the commentator’s positivity score. Using this score, the friends
can be sorted by descending “positivity”. The applications of such a score would be
versatile:
Privacy settings The score can be used to decide whether a post should be dis-
played to a friend’s newsfeed, whether it should be accessible only if the friend
visits the user’s personal profile, or whether it should be not visible at all.
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There should be two different threshold levels that split the user’s friends into
the three above-mentioned groups and that can be adjusted by the user, in the
best case by using a user interface with profile pictures and names of the users
and a line which can be moved using drag & drop. Friends that are above the
first line will see the user’s posts on their wall, friends between the first and
second line only if they visit the user’s personal page, and friends below the
second line not at all. One participant stated that the user should be notified if
one of his friends is falling below or rising above one of the thresholds, so the
user can review and decide whether the privacy settings should be adapted as
proposed.
Ranking newsfeed Another useful option for the positivity ranking is the ranking
of the social network newsfeed according to the positivity score in addition to
the time the post was published. Posts of friends with a higher score are placed
earlier, whereas those of friends with lower scores are placed further down the
page or not displayed at all. Also here, a user interface to define the cut-off
threshold was favored by the participants.
Content filtering and emphasis Some social networks like Facebook tend to auto-
matically generate “friendship movies”, for example when two persons have
been friends for one year, or one year after they posted an event together. The
positivity score could also be used to decide which friends should receive such
a friend video, either to reward friends for their friendship when they have a
high positivity score, or on the other hand, to cheer up friends with a negative
score so the friendship can again be stronger in the future. The user should
also be notified more about life events of friends with a high positivity score,
for example their birthdays. On the other hand, persons with a very negative
score should receive fewer status updates and posts about the user.
Friendship dashboard Some subjects stated they would like to have a positivity
dashboard, where they can see all their friends together with their positivity
score, details about their positive and negative actions, and the option to re-
view their privacy settings and friendships. That way, users can review and
adapt their privacy settings manually and unfriend or block friends or put
them on a restricted list, so that they will not see any future posts. That way,
situations like those discussed at the beginning of the experiment would be-
come more unlikely.
Problem discussion Another functionality that could also be integrated into the
dashboard is a discussion functionality with friends with a low positivity score.
That way, the user could discuss the possible problems that may have led to
the negative comments and clarify them, so that they will not happen again in
the future. Nevertheless, if the discussion fails, there should also be a button
to block the person or put her onto a “restricted” list.
Lastly, the functionality could also be used to give feedback on friends’ original
posts. That way friends can easily notify the original poster when he is about to do
something without due consideration, so he can delete the post quickly in order to
avert further damage.
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8.4.3 Discussion
Direct adaptation of privacy settings not possible
Unfortunately, as our results have shown, there is no general rule on how the feed-
back should affect the user’s privacy settings, neither for the person that wrote the
feedback, nor for the friends or the friend groups she is part of. According to the
results, there is also no lowest common denominator that can be used as a min-
imal solution: whereas some of the users expected the social network to open a
direct communication with the friend to discuss what information he saw and that
he wasn’t supposed to see that post, so he does not further spread the information,
others would put the person on a list of restricted users directly or after a certain
amount of negative feedback, whereas others would block the user instantly. This
also holds for the direct friends of the user or the friend groups containing the friend.
The majority do not expect any influence on the closest friends of the user, whereas
four out of ten users want them to be put on a restricted list after approval of the
user. Therefore, we see little value for using in-situ feedback on privacy violations
for adapting privacy settings, neither based on a rule set derived within a large-scale
user study, nor based on machine learning techniques using a large data set.
Privacy settings through positivity ranking
Nevertheless, the feedback can be used for creating a positivity rating by summing
up positive and negative ratings for a user, that can used for an indirect adaptation
of privacy settings through a user feedback cycle, as described in the last section.
Based on the friendship score, the friends are separated into three friend groups:
The topmost group (“green list”) receives the user’s posts and updates directly on
their news wall. The next group of friends (“yellow list”) also has full access to the
user’s updates, but will see them only on the user’s personal page and not in their
news feed. Finally, the last group of friends (“red list”) does not receive any of the
user’s posts. The user should have an interface to define the boundaries between the
red, yellow and green lists and should be notified when a person is about to move
to another list based on the user’s feedback.
There have been several approaches that use tie strength between the user and
his social network friends instead of the positivity ranking to limit the audience for
social network posts [180]. Whereas the approach by Kauer et al. [180] relies on a
slider approach to define the cut-off between friends that should receive and friends
that should not receive a post, OmniWedges (see last section) uses a radar metaphor
to do so. Studies have shown that PrivacyWedges significantly reduces the amount
of false positives, i.e. the amount of friends that received the post even though the
user did not intend them to. In contrast to the positivity ranking, both approaches
rely on the tie strength measure reported by Facebook, which is calculated indirectly
using measures like the frequency of private messages, comments, profile visits, etc.
Whether the same or better results can also be achieved with the positivity rating
should be elaborated upon in future research.
Granularity of the feedback mechanism
As space is very limited on smartphone devices, we concentrated on a minimalistic
design for the update notification messages on our smartphone application, offering
only a binary feedback choice (positive and negative). However, it might be possi-
ble that a more fine-grained feedback option is needed, involving three, four or more
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buttons. Users often receive feedback that is on one hand negative, but that is useful
for further improvement or that leads to a different, new point of view. Such helpful
feedback might have a different impact on the positivity rating than destructive neg-
ative feedback. The same applies also for positive feedback, which can be helpful or
not. We would like to investigate the optimal number of feedback options and the
desired effects on the positivity score in future work.
Ethical issues involved in a positivity ranking
Allowing content filtering based on a ranking score is a mechanism that can be seen
as censorship, similar to a “social credit score” that is used to rank a country’s cit-
izens according to their loyalty to the government. Such a mechanism can distort
reality (create a “filter bubble”) when negative (but possibly appropriate) comments
are hidden from the posts, or when commentators are removed from the audience
for future posts. It is therefore highly important that the decision as to whether or
not to include a friend in the post audience is one that should not be made automat-
ically by the system, but must be made by the user herself. The social network site
can assist the user in offering him a positivity score and a ranking of friends, but it
should not be allowed to set the privacy settings automatically. The user still has
to think about how he groups his friends together, based on the thresholds that he
can adapt, in order to define which users should receive his posts and which should
not. In this way, the user can decide whether he wants to use filtering by assigning
friends to the different privacy groups and have an “optimized” social network ex-
perience without negative emotions, or whether he wants to see the plain hard truth
of all positive and negative comments or posts from all users.
Other applications of the positivity ranking
In addition to privacy settings, there have been discussed several other ideas that
can be applied to the positivity ranking, which can be divided into two different
categories: friendship monitoring and content elicitation.
The former could be perfectly combined with the privacy setting approach dis-
cussed in the earlier subsection: a new friendship dashboard could be implemented
where users can see all of their friends divided into three blocks with an accord-
ing color, depending on the privacy group they are currently in, together with their
positivity score, recent actions and the user’s feedback on their actions. In addition
to the displayed information, adapting the privacy settings should also be possible
within the dashboard: for each user, there should be a functionality to block him
or put him on a restricted list. Also, setting the threshold levels could be realized
by a draggable slider between the three groups, or by using drag & drop to switch
groups for specific friends.
The latter is already partially being done by social network providers. Facebook,
for example, displays or hides content based on calculated tie strength. It is also
possible for the user to give explicit feedback on some posts, so that “fewer posts
like this” are displayed in the future. Nevertheless, studies have shown that the tie
strength and friend lists do not completely fit the tie strength order that a user would
expect [311]. Using the positivity ranking could therefore lead to better content elic-
itation than the current standard. Whether this is the case should be investigated in
a future study.
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8.4.4 Conclusion
In-situ feedback has been proven to be very effective due to its realistic nature and
rich context information. It is therefore used in a wide variety of application sce-
narios. Using in-situ privacy feedback on social network notifications has not yet
been one of these scenarios. In contrast to traditional scenarios like remote software
evaluation, the desired changes in the privacy settings for in-situ privacy feedback
are not immediately clear. We held focus groups with a design prototype to capture
the desired effects of the user feedback. Although we found that there is no general
rule on how the feedback should affect the privacy settings, we have outlined an
approach involving a friendship dashboard, which can be used to review the feed-
back ratings, and for grouping the user’s friends into different categories that reflect
the privacy settings for future posts for the respective group of users. In addition to
managing privacy settings, the dashboard could also be used for content filtering in




In this final chapter, we will sum up the research topics discussed within this the-
sis. We will highlight major contributions in the three examined categories, namely
privacy recommender systems, privacy user modeling and privacy user interfaces,
that support the user in various touchpoints in the privacy journey (see Chapter 1).
Nevertheless, the scope of this thesis is limited. Therefore, we will also discuss pos-
sibilities for future work that can be conducted based on the insights of the thesis.
9.1 Summary
Privacy is a term that has grown and changed over the years from ancient Roman
times to the age of the internet and social media. Whereas the rise of mass media can
be seen as the first major threat for data privacy, the media creators in that era were
solely professional users, like reporters. In contrast to that, the rise of the internet as
a second big wave of privacy threats allows also lay users, for the first time, to create
and share media with a large audience on websites and social media, making it sig-
nificantly harder to control the flow and spreading of information. It is especially a
problem that users unintentionally share data with a significantly broader audience
than intended. The consequences that can arise from this oversharing are manifold.
The data can be used for social engineering attacks, deriving social security numbers
needed for legal acts, profiling and stalking. Even governmental organizations and
employers use social media for screening potential immigrants and employees. As
we have discussed throughout the thesis, the process of choosing privacy settings
consists of more steps than merely adjusting the privacy settings. There are prepara-
tory actions needed, like the grouping of recipients or the creation of a user model
for a personalized recommendation. Some actions cover the continuous assessment
of the settings and capture of privacy violations, that allow the user to refine the cho-
sen settings in the aftermath. We identified several of those actions that we called
touchpoints in the privacy journey. Figure 9.1 shows the approaches that we discussed
for the different touchpoints on the privacy journey throughout the thesis.
At the beginning of the journey, we support the user in grouping the recipients,
which can later be used for defining the audience of a data item, for example a social
network post. Earlier work concentrated on automatically deriving recipient groups
based on factors like the recipient’s home address, workplace, etc. However, none
of the algorithms was able to group the recipients in a meaningful way that was per-
ceived as useful by the users. This led us to research question (RQ) 2, asking how we
can motivate a user to do recipient grouping. We followed a new approach trying to
make the task of friend grouping more enjoyable by involving new interaction tech-
niques and gamification concepts in the task. Studies on our approach have shown
that our design led to a significantly improved user experience, which was stated to
be more likely used in everyday social network usage compared to a conventional
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FIGURE 9.1: Approaches supporting several touchpoints on the pri-
vacy journey proposed in this thesis.
interface. However, we also found that the error rate is a critical factor that increases
with an increased degree of gamification, leading to the conclusion that the gamifi-
cation of serious tasks is only possible to a certain degree while keeping the quality
of the results at the same level.
Similar to the recipient grouping, the privacy user modeling also has to be done
before the individualized privacy recommendation. Whereas earlier approaches re-
lied on questionnaires to capture privacy and personality measures, we had the goal
to find a way to infer the user model without introducing an additional user burden
(RQ 1). We used text analysis software that extracts the frequency of words related
to a finite set of word categories, ranging from words about hobbies and religion,
over several other categories, to sports topics, and used these measures as an input
to predict the privacy and personality measures using machine learning. The results
show that, using social network posts of a user, it is possible to infer not only per-
sonality, but also the IUIPC privacy measures of a user, whereas the Westin privacy
categories cannot be predicted.
Based on these two inputs, we investigated whether the individual factors have a
significant impact on the privacy levels, a more general form of privacy settings (RQ
3). Research in the past has concentrated mainly on context factors for the prediction,
or used the personality to cluster users and assign them a set of privacy settings that
fit their general privacy stereotype. We proved that in the four domains observed
within this thesis, using solely individual measures for deriving the privacy levels
allows a prediction significantly better than random. This leads to the conclusion
that individual measures should be included for a prediction of privacy settings, and
are very likely to increase the recommendation quality of recommenders based on
context factors. To be more precise, we examined the recommendation of the privacy
levels for the recipients of a social network post, the recipients of a shared location,
and the permissions for mobile smartphone apps, as well as for data collected inside
an intelligent retail store, where sensors record customers’ movements, products of
interest, products in the shopping basket, etc. We found that the individual measures
that should be used as an input for the prediction depend strongly on the domain.
If neither a user model nor access to previous privacy decisions is available, the
last possible data source for recommending privacy settings is privacy settings that
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the user chose in another domain (for example recommending privacy settings for a
shared location based on the user’s permission settings on her smartphone). In the
scope of this thesis, we conducted a user study examining which other domain pri-
vacy levels can be used for a prediction and which granularity is needed for best re-
sults (e.g. using one general privacy level for the whole domain vs. using a number
of privacy levels for a domain depending on context factors). Our studies identified
two clusters that allow the prediction of each other’s privacy levels. The privacy
levels of the mobile app domain allow a prediction of the privacy levels from the in-
telligent retail domains and vice versa, while the same holds for the social network
and location sharing domains. Interestingly, a general privacy level for the whole
domain is sufficient as an input in most cases.
Finally, we posed several research questions to be addressed by user interfaces
and interaction principles. First, RQ 5 asked how radar interfaces, which have been
shown to motivate users in engaging with their privacy settings, can be enhanced
to support a large amount of data items, for example recipients of a data item, and
how they can be altered to support the display of multiple privacy settings at once
(for example for multiple groups of recipients). We designed a radar interface that
uses several design elements to be able to display hundreds and even thousands
of recipients, the social network friends of a user in our case. In a study involv-
ing the users’ real social network profile and friends, we were able to show that
our new design significantly reduces the amount of errors, namely unwanted dis-
closures and missing recipients. Furthermore, we proposed a design that renders a
three-dimensional privacy pyramid out of multiple privacy settings for multiple re-
cipients. Our study has shown that the privacy pyramid is superior for detecting
unusual and potentially erroneous settings, allowing the user to review and adapt
the critical settings in a conventional list-based interface. Second, we examined how
we can capture privacy violations as they occur using a mobile phone app; we were
interested especially in consequences for the privacy settings that users expect when
giving in-situ feedback (RQ6). Although we found no general rule on how privacy
settings should be adapted in our focus group studies, we were able to develop an
idea for how the feedback can be accumulated to create a friendship score, which
can be used within a user interface (“friendship dashboard”) to support the user in
assigning disclosement settings and adjusting content filtering settings based on the
friendship quality.
The next section will highlight the contributions that the thesis achieves within
each of the mentioned research questions.
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9.2 Contributions
To summarize, our work provides the following contributions to the reseach field:
1. Usage of personality and privacy measures for individualized privacy rec-
ommendations using multiple privacy levels (RQ 3, Chapters 4-6): Our ap-
proaches use a user model based on personality and privacy measures to pre-
dict individual privacy settings tailored to the user’s individual measures rather
than using the same privacy settings for each user assigned to the same stereo-
type. Furthermore, we are the first to predict privacy levels that can be trans-
formed into more detailed privacy settings, allowing users for example, to
share only the current city with specific users, instead of the detailed GPS lo-
cation. The results show that in the four examined domains, individual factors
play a significant role in the privacy decision and thus should be included as
an additional factor for the prediction together with other factors, like context
factors. We have shown that using only individual factors, it is possible to
predict privacy settings with a precision significantly better than random. Fur-
thermore, we have shown that the individual measures that have the highest
impact on the privacy levels are dependent on the domain. For one of the ob-
served domains, personality measures did not have an effect on the privacy
decision, according to our results.
2. Derivation of privacy measures from written text (RQ 1, Chapter 3): We repli-
cate existing research on deriving personality measures from written text and
are the first to examine the correlation between the frequency of words per
word category and the privacy measures of a user. The study results show
that it is possible to derive personality and also the IUIPC privacy measures
with our regression-based approach.
3. Usage of privacy levels from other domains for a recommendation (RQ 4,
Chapter 7): Within this thesis, we investigated whether privacy recommen-
dations can also be derived using the privacy levels from other domains. We
identified two clusters within the four observed domains, which allow us to
predict the privacy levels of one domain using the privacy levels of the other
domain. The study results show that a prediction is already possible with a
single average privacy level of the other domain in the cluster (MGR and MCR
method). Having multiple context-dependent privacy levels of the other do-
main as an input (CGR and CCR method) can increase the prediction precision
only in some rare cases.
4. Radar interfaces able to display a large amount of data items and multiple
privacy policies at once (RQ 5, Chapters 8.2 and 8.3): The thesis discusses a
design that increases the amount of items displayable in the radar. Accord-
ing to our study results, this design allows an audience selection with a large
number of recipients with a significantly decreased error rate compared to con-
ventional list-based UIs. Furthermore, we propose a design allowing us to dis-
play multiple privacy policies in a three-dimensional privacy pyramid, which
allows users to detect potential misconfigurations more easily than with a con-
ventional interface, according to the study results.
5. Approach to engage users in sorting tasks by optimizing both usability and
enjoyability (RQ 2, Chapter 8.1): Our results have shown that increasing the
user experience motivates the user in doing the task and makes it more likely
9.3. Future work and limitations 237
that users perform the task as a part of their daily routine. The interaction time
does not have a significant influence on the motivation. However, our results
also indicate that increasing the degree of gamification also increases the error
rate. Therefore, one should always consider the a trade-off between motivation
through gamification and quality of the results affected by the increased error
rate through gamification.
6. Approach for capturing privacy violations as they occur and using them to
improve privacy policies (RQ6, 8.4): The studies described within this thesis
have shown that it is not possible to infer a direct rule for how the reporting
of privacy violations should affect the privacy settings. Still, we were able to
develop design ideas with the participants of the study, leading to the concept
of a privacy dashboard displaying potential recipients according to reported
feedback, allowing the user to manage her privacy settings based on the given
in-situ feedback.
Although the thesis offers a number of contributions, there are still open ques-
tions and starting points for future research, which will be discussed in the next
section.
9.3 Future work and limitations
Throughout the thesis, we discussed approaches that cover several touchpoints in
the privacy journey. In order to reduce random effects, the approaches were tested
independently from each other. However, it would be interesting to understand how
the recommendation of the complete privacy framework are perceived by users. In
particular, using the results of an automatically derived user model for recommend-
ing privacy settings in productive environments of the examined domains, for exam-
ple in cooperation with an established social network provider, would be of interest.
As we have seen, both components infer a certain prediction error; therefore, future
studies should determine the error arising when both components are combined,
and especially whether the result of such a system is still perceived as useful by the
users. Apart from this, also the acceptance of the privacy framework as a whole,
including the user modeling tool, privacy recommendations, UIs for reviewing and
adapting the settings and usage of in-situ feedback in a productive environment,
would be one of the major long-term goals for future work in cooperation with a
social network provider.
The studies included in this thesis gathered data from (online) questionnaires
and are sufficient for a machine learning analysis, and to find out whether the indi-
vidual factors and a personalized privacy setting recommendation is a fruitful ap-
proach, which leads to an increased prediction precision if used for deriving the
permission settings. However, the study cannot show how precise the approach can
be if a large permission database is used, as has been done for other approaches
based on context factors without personalization. However, machine learning algo-
rithms typically gain in prediction precision with an increased amount of training
data. The results shown here can therefore be seen as a lower bound for the preci-
sion that can be achieved with a large data set, such as what social network providers
like Facebook could use for training such a system. Further research on how much
the precision can be increased with large data sets is therefore one further step that
could be taken within a research collaboration with a social network provider. In this
thesis, we used a generic user model, including personality and privacy measures
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for predicting the privacy settings or privacy levels in three of the four examined
domains. Only for the social network domain, we added additional domain-specific
questions to our set of generic privacy and personality questions to increase the pre-
diction precision. Although generic questionnaires have the advantage that they
can be used in several domains, the precision can be further increased if additional
domain-specific questions are introduced (see Chapter 4). We would therefore like
to examine in future work whether and how much the recommendation can be im-
proved by using domain-specific questionnaires and thereby specialized user mod-
els. Within this case, it is especially interesting whether domain-specific measures
of one domain can be used to infer domain-specific measures of another domain,
similar to the cross-domain privacy setting prediction described in Chapter 7.
Also the privacy levels and their implementation are only described on a theo-
retical level at the moment. As all social network providers shut down almost all
functionalities of their API for public use, it was not possible to implement the de-
scribed privacy levels as a social network app or plugin. Although we evaluated
the acceptance and usefulness of the given implementations of the privacy levels in
the user studies presented in this thesis, we would like to conduct a bottom-up de-
sign process in future work, also involving end-users in generating ideas on which
implementation of privacy levels are reasonable, and then to validate the choice of
these design thinking sessions in validation studies later. The design of the privacy
dashboard for the in-situ feedback was only discussed in theory, without having any
prototype of the final UI at hand. In future work, we would like to design such a
privacy dashboard, and evaluate especially its utility for managing privacy settings
based on the user feedback.
For the social network and location sharing privacy setting recommenders, we
concentrated on a fixed number of topics and occasions as a context factor used as an
input for the ML prediction. Although we conducted a pre-study in order to provide
post topics which are very common and frequently used, we are aware that the set
of topics and occasions does not form an exhaustive list. Therefore, we had to find
a compromise between practicability and degree of realism in our validation study.
It is not possible to implement a trained system that covers all possible individual
topics or occasions and friend groups for each participant. A fully individualized
system would operate better, but the results of the validation section have shown
that precision and user acceptance is already high with a non-individualized system.
A manual annotation of the topics of a user’s posts or the occasions of the shared
locations, as described for the social network and location sharing recommenders,
would not scale to handle a real social network user profile, where each user has
up to hundreds of posts and shared locations on his personal profile. To maintain
scalability of the approach, a final version would use machine learning to cluster and
label a user’s posts. In a first step, text cluserting libraries like carrot2 [241] cluster
the existing posts of a user into groups of topics. Each of the topic groups is assigned
a topic label by the clustering engine. In the second and final step, the user checks
the topic labeling of the groups, and edits incorrectly labeled clusters. Whenever a
new post is created, the post is assigned a topic label, based on its assignment to
one of the earlier created topic clusters. In this way, besides the initial questionnaire
which is filled out, only a little user input is needed to setup and use the system: post
topics and privacy settings are assigned automatically by the two machine learning
components. Only if either the topic classification or the privacy setting derivation
is incorrect, additional user input is needed. Similarly, the occasions could also be
derived by clustering shared locations together based on their distance and labeling
them.
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Apart from that, it is also possible that a post or shared location belongs to more
than one topic or occasion, or is at the boundary between them. Although a cluster-
ing approach like the former will assign the post to exactly one cluster, the prediction
mechanism can also handle a post that is tagged as belonging to more than one topic
or occasion. In this case, the prediction will give us several privacy policies, one for
each topic. A merging algorithm would go through all of the user groups in each of
the policies, and according to Ravichandran et al. [272], use for each observed group
the according privacy level depending on the conservativeness ratio of the user in
the merged policy. The same merging technique can be used for friends which ap-
pear in multiple friend groups. Although this merging is not yet implemented and
evaluated, it will allow us to predict posts with an arbitrary number of topics in a
future version.
For the derivation of individual measures, we focused on the two currently most
popular social networks, namely Facebook and Twitter, to record written text for the
study and to perform the prediction. Nevertheless, there are several other social me-
dia websites that are getting more and more important recently, and that are often
not used in research. To name only one example, we did not examine Youtube com-
ments and posts as a source for the prediction. As related work has shown, a rough
prediction of personality features is also possible using image features like bright-
ness, hue, or different color values [112]. Maybe the content of YouTube videos can
also be used for such a prediction. We would also like to explore other data sources
apart from written text on different websites, including image or video content, to
predict our set of privacy and personality measures.
In the cross-domain privacy setting prediction, we were able to identify several
coefficients for the context-based regression methods (MCR and CCR) that can be
of use in future work. We found that the four domains treated in this chapter can
be clustered into two clusters, inside which a regression of the partner’s privacy
levels is possible. However, there are plenty of other domains that have not been
part of our research so far. In future work, we therefore want to investigate whether
other domains also form clusters together, or whether they are part of one of the
two aforementioned clusters. The ultimate goal is to find out whether there is a
finite number of clusters that allow a prediction of each other’s privacy levels, what
domains they include, and which common properties they share that make them
belong to the same cluster. Apart from that, we investigated only a finite amount of
context factors in this chapter that have been found to be significant in related work.
There might be still other context factors that have not been discovered yet, which
we would propose as topics for future work.
We found differences in the prediction precision between the methods using the
mean domain privacy level as an input (MGR and MCR) and the methods using
context-based privacy levels (CGR and CCR). In some domains, the CGR and the
CCR outperform the MGR and MCR. However, the difference is below 10% and
therefore relatively small. In future work, we would therefore like to perform a
field study, where users have to use a social media account, for example, including
privacy settings based on one of the aforementioned approaches, and the task to use
the account for some weeks and to adapt the privacy settings, if needed. At the end
of the study, we will compare the changes to the privacy settings and thereby the
number of errors made with each method. Using a questionnaire, we will evaluate
the subjective differences on the perceived prediction precision.
We created two different designs for the social network friend grouping task, one
trying to improve the usability of the sorting using VR metaphors, and one geared
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towards making it a more fun and entertaining experience. Based on different crite-
ria like the possibility to interrupt the sorting task at any given time, or using gam-
ification elements to enhance the user experience, we came up with two different
designs for our user study. Notwithstanding, plenty of other possible design ideas
exist and might be suitable for this kind of task. Still, we were able to show that,
with our design ideas, the user experience as well as the perceived usability could
be improved. However, we would like to elaborate on other designs in the future, es-
pecially game designs that might be more prone to errors than our can knockdown
game, although the increased error rate might be an effect of the gamified design,
which would hold for other game types as well.
In the validation of the friend grouping interfaces, we used the current standard
interface as a baseline in order to minimize side effects and to get a comparison
of our designs to the current working standard. Although we were able to prove
that both usability and user experience were higher using the VR design, we would
like to elaborate more on the parts of the design that lead to this effect. We would
especially like to discover which of the developed metaphors used in the pragmatic
and the playful design led to an increased rating, whether it was the representation
of the friends as friend frames inside a shelf, the friend boxes, or the interaction by
inserting the frames inside the box. Also, the usage of virtual reality alone might
already lead to some effect, at least in terms of user experience. In several follow-up
studies we would like to find out more about which design elements have a positive
effect in VR using A/B testing, and give concrete guidelines on which metaphors
should be used and which should be avoided.
Also for the radar-based UI for selecting the post audience, we had to make com-
promises at some points in our experiment to increase realism as much as possible
while reducing the amount of side effects. The largest compromise we had to make
was the grouping of friends and the friend order according to tie strength. Friend
groups are already offered automatically by Facebook, but they often contain incor-
rect information, i.e. friends that should not be in the list, or friends that are missing.
The same holds for the tie strength calculated by Facebook based on the frequency of
interactions like chat messages, likes or profile visits. For the sake of this lab study,
the goal was to judge the user interface and its functionalities without the influence
of other side effects like the correctness of these ranking and grouping mechanisms.
We therefore let the users manually create their friend groups and correct the tie
strength ordering in the experiment. However, we are aware that a typical user will
not perform these tasks in her daily social network use, especially as tie strength
changes often and has to be adapted accordingly. As a first step in future work,
we would therefore like to integrate our approach into a social network website
and evaluate the usage frequency of our tool against the standard audience selec-
tion functionality, especially when using the already existing friend groups (created
either automatically or by the user) and the tie strength calculation offered by the
social network provider. The same holds for the hypothetical posts for which users
had to select their audience during the study. In order to allow a fair comparison
and to reduce side effects, we had to show the same set of posts to each user. There-
fore, we could not use the user’s actual social network posts, as these might lead to
different results because of different sensitivity levels of the posts. Supported by the
results from the current study, we would like to conduct an in-the-wild study with
a UI integrated into a social network site as a next step, with a focus on evaluating
the usage ratio and user acceptance of our UI rather than comparing it to the current
standard in a controlled lab study
In the in-situ feedback approach, we conducted only four focus groups to get a
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first impression on whether the update notification feedback can be used to adapt the
privacy settings based on a rule set, and which alternatives may arise. The discus-
sions clearly show that the former is not the case. Nevertheless, the discussions led
to an outline for how an alternative could look: first, feedback data is collected in or-
der to form a positivity score for all friends. Using a friendship dashboard, the user
can easily get an overview on the current state of the positivity scores, and define
his privacy settings based on three different groups depending on the recent scores.
He can adapt the threshold levels that define the boundaries between the different
groups, and adapt the privacy settings by that means. In this way, we would like to
explore whether the outlined idea is accepted by users using an interface prototype.
If the dashboard is accepted, we will extend the functionalities to allow content and
notification elicitation based on the positivity scores. Although the discussions have
already led to a promising idea for a possible approach, further discussion groups
could reveal more insightful ideas and alternative directions that could be taken into
consideration, if the outlined approach is not as succesful as expected.
Finally, in cooperation with a large social network provider, a retailer like Ama-
zon and a smartphone operating system developer like Google, we would like to
evaluate the framework with all its components in a large-scale in-the-wild study,
that includes all discussed domains and approaches presented in this thesis. Users
should use the components of the framework on a daily basis with their own data
and as part of their daily routine, so we can get an insight into whether the frame-
work is accepted as a whole, which components are perceived to be most useful, and
which need further improvement to be accepted by users. Qualitative feedback in
particular can be of great value for identifying possible problems with the compo-
nents of the framework.
9.4 Concluding remarks
We presented a framework here that targets the privacy threat of oversharing data by
the user. There are many other threats that can harm users’ privacy in the domains
which are not addressed in this thesis (see Chapter 2); therefore, the framework dis-
cussed here can only protect a user’s privacy if it is combined with other approaches
targeting the remaining privacy threats that are out of scope of the thesis. However,
developers and researchers can only minimize the privacy and security risks to a
certain degree, by assisting the user in privacy tasks or by designing products (ei-
ther hardware or software) to be privacy preserving by nature (“privacy by design”).
But in the end, the users themselves are often the weakest link in the chain, as they
are often not aware enough of privacy issues so far. Furthermore, new privacy and
security threats and hacking attacks are discovered every day; some are kept private
for a long time until they become public (“zero day exploits”). For those two reasons,
this thesis, even in combination with the best approaches for other privacy threats,
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question topic number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 all
1. My social network is part of my everyday activ-
ity.
X X X X
2. I feel out of touch when I haven t logged onto
my social network for a while.
X X X X X X X X X X
3. On my social network, I feel close to the people
in my friend list.
X X
4. On my social network, I am updated about my
friends.
X
5. There are several people on my social network I
trust to solve my problems.
X X X X X X
6. I do not want to post very intimate things about
myself on my social network.
X X X
7. I post very intimate things about myself on my
social network.
X X X X X X X X
8. I want to share only minimal information about
myself on my social network.
X
9. I want to be able to choose what to share and
what to hold back on my social network.
X X X X X X
10. My friends keep personal information they
know about me between us.
X X X X X X X
11. I want to limit what personal information my
friends share about me on my social network.
X
12. I want my social network friends to keep per-
sonal information they know about me between
us.
X X X
13. I only have people in my social network who I
associate with on a regular basis in real life.
X X X X X X
14. I do not have social network friends who are
no longer real friends.
X
15. I make a distinction between my friends based
on the type of relationship I have with them. For
example, family, friends, co-workers, etc.
X X X X X
16. I manage everything that shows up on my
timeline/wall for others to see.
X X X X
17. I want to approve all content before it is posted
to my my social network timeline/wall.
X X
18. I want to control who sees the status updates I
post.
X X
19. I know whether friends of friends can see my
posts.
X X X X
20. I am concerned about who sees the status up-
dates I post.
X X X X X
TABLE A.1: Questions selected for the social network privacy setting
prediction prediction of each topic.
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question topic number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 all
21. I want to restrict others in my network from
being able to see who I am and am not friends with
on my social network.
X X
22. It is not important for me that I am aware of
and that I know who can see my personal infor-
mation.
X
23. I want to avoid letting specific groups of
friends interact with each other on my social net-
work.
X X
24. I want to keep my different social circles sepa-
rate from each other on my social network.
X X X X X X X X X
25. I want to moderate how my different groups of
friends interact with one another on my my social
network page.
X X
26. Users’ control over their personal information
in a social network lies at the heart of user privacy.
X
27. I think that the privacy in my social network is
violated if control over private information is lost
or reduced against my will.
X X
28. I check my my social network privacy settings
regularly.
X X X X
29. I am satisfied with the privacy settings that my
social network offers to the users.
X X
30. It is very important for me that I am aware of,
and that I know who can see my personal informa-
tion.
X X X
31. It bothers me if other network users ask me for
personal information.
X X X
32. If someone asks me for personal information I
usually think twice before I give it away.
X X X
33. It bothers me that so many members of the so-
cial network are able to look into my personal in-
formation.
X X
34. I am concerned that other users collect too
much information about me.
X X X
35. Consumers have lost all control over how per-
sonal information is collected and used by compa-
nies.
X
36. Existing laws and organizaitional practices
provide a reasonable level of protection for con-
sumer privacy today.
X X X
TABLE A.2: Questions selected for the social network privacy setting
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